COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. EUGENE FRANK TAMME
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AMENDED:
MAY 24, 2002
RENDERED: MARCH 21,2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
2000-SC-0784-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
84-C R-002 1
EUGENE FRANK TAMME
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
This appeal is from a decision of the Fayette Circuit Court vacating Tamme’s
convictions for two capital murders and sentence of death and ordering a new trial
The history of this proceeding is lengthy. In 1985, a jury found Tamme guilty of
two counts of intenrional murder, and he was sentenced to death for each of the
murders. His convictions were reversed by a majority of this Court in Tamme v
Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.Zd 51 (1988). Tamme was tried again in 1994. and
again found guilty of two intentional murders and sentenced to death. This Court
affirmed the second conviction in Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13
(1998).
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court declined review of Tamme II.
Tamme v. Kentuckv, 525 U.S. 1153, 119 S.Ct. 1056. 143 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999).
After having been twice convicted of capital murder and twice been sentenced
to death, Tamme sought a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02 and 10.06 and also moved
separately to vacate his conviction under RCr 11.42. He was granted a stay of
execution pending resolution of his post-conviction motions. The circuit judge
determined that the misrepresentation by counsel of the holding in Tamme I and
subsequent failure to make a record in regard to the interwoven relationships of Tamme
and his principal accusers in the drug business was ineffective representation that
cannot be excused as strategy. The circuit judge also stated that although the
testimony of Armstrong corroborates Woodward and might not be sufficient grounds for
a new trial alone, when coupled with RCr 11.42 issues, this testimony emphasizes the
need for a new trial. Accordingly, she vacated the conviction and ordered a third trial.
This appeal by the Commonwealth followed.
The Commonwealth argues that the circuit judge erred by overruling the decision
of this Court in Tamme I, by holding that the evidence of Tamme’s marijuana farming
operation should have been admitted at a second trial. The Commonwealth maintains
that this is a law of the case situation. It contends that the circuit judge abused her
L discretion by applying an incorrect, more lenient legal standard when granting Tamme
his third trial; that the circuit judge erred by commingling the standards under RCr
11.42 with the new trial standards under RCr 10.02 and 10.06 for newly discovered
evidence; that the circuit judge erred by granting a new trial based solely upon the
cumulative impeachment testimony of a single newly discovered witness; and that the
circuit judge erred in failing to dismiss the new trial motion as untimely because good
cause was not shown. Finally, the Commonwealth claims that the circuit judge erred by
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granting the RCr 11.42 motion because of a failure to satisfy either the deficient
performance or prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
Counsel for Tamme responds that this Court should affirm the opinion of the
circuit judge granting the RCr 11.42 motion because his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in prejudice. Tamme also argues that
this Court should affirm the opinion of the circuit judge granting him a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence pursuant to RCr 10.02 and 10.06; that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the Commonwealth; that the circuit
judge applied the correct legal standard in granting him a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence; that the opinion of the circuit judge granting him a new trial on that
basis was within her discretion and that the testimony of Armstrong would probably
change the result if a new trial was granted; and that his testimony was not cumulative,
and is newly discovered.
The crux of the facts of this case is that Buchanan, a business partner of
Tamme’s in September of 1984, came forward and told police that he witnessed
Tamme shoot both victims and dispose of their bodies in 1983. Tamme testified in his
own defense and denied the killings. The case has occupied the dockets of the Court
of Justice since 1984.
I. Law of the Case
Tamme was successful in his first appeal by claiming that the evidence of his
marijuana farming operation was irrelevant and prejudicial and that his due process
rights were violated by its introduction. This Court ruled that his case should be retried
with no mention of the marijuana farming. Now, Tamme argues that the marijuana
farming evidence should have come in at his second trial and that it was a due process
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violation when the evidence was not admitted. The only reasonable and legally correct
interpretation of Tamme I is that evidence regarding the marijuana farming was not to
be allowed.
Williamson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d
323 (1989) states:
It is fundamental that when an issue is finally determined by
an appellate court, the trial court must comply with such
determination. The court to which the case is remanded is
without power to entertain objections or make modifications
in the appellate court decision.
This admonition, which prevents a RCr 11.42 movant from relitigating issues
which were raised and decided in the direct appeal or which could have been raised,
was not followed. See Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d
500 (1990); Sanborn
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905 (1998); Thacker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476
S.W.2d 838 (1972).
In addition, the doctrine of law of the case applies here so as to defeat the
arguments of Tamme.
It has long been recognized that the final decisions of the court
are binding on the parties, the trial court and this Court. See Haight v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243 (1996), citing Martin v. Frasure, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 817 (1961);
Taylor v. Mills, Ky., 320 S.W.2d 111 (1958). Obviously, the law of the case doctrine is
intended to prevent defendants from endlessly litigating the same issue in appeal after
appeal. It also prevents a dissatisfied party from presenting piecemeal issues to the
appellate courts so that no decision is ever final. See Marshall v. Merrifield, Ky., 474
S.W.2d 99 (1971), citing Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 4 S.W.2d 731 (1928)
It was reversible error for the circuit judge to grant a new trial in this matter, The
trial court should have adjudicated all claims raised by Tamme rather than piecemeal
the case by ruling on only two of the many issues raised in the RCr 11.42 procedure.
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II. Incorrect legal standard
The correct legal standard for adjudicating a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may be found in Collins v . Commonwealth, Ky., 951
S.W.2d 569 (1997):
Newly discovered evidence must be of such decisive value
or force that it would, with reasonable certainty, change the
verdict or that it would probably change the result if a new
trial should be granted.
Similar pronouncements may be found in Coots v. Commonwealth, Ky., 418
S.W.2d 752 (1967) and Wheeler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 569 (1965). The
trial judge did not use this rigorous standard and therefore is in error for granting the
new trial. The trial judge indicated that the applicable standard is whether the testimony
could reasonably result in a different verdict and whether this testimony could be
reasonably persuasive as a part of the entire defense theory. Such is a more liberal
standard at variance with the requirements of this Court as previously noted. No
precedent was cited supporting the standard used.
The trial judge also mixed the standards for adjudicating RCr 11.42 motions with
those for adjudicating RCr 10.02 and 10.06 new trial motions. The combination of
these standards produced reversible error. We find no precedent for allowing a
defendant to combine an insufficient new trial motion with an insufficient RCr 11.42
motion so as to grant a new trial. In this case, the trial judge admitted that the newly
discovered evidence, which was the testimony by Armstrong, did not meet the new trial
standard, thus it was error to grant such a new trial.
Moreover, the trial judge erred by granting a new trial based solely on the
cumulative impeachment testimony of a single newly discovered witness, Armstrong,
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See Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d
479 (1988). This Court has held in
Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 55 S.W.3d 809 (2000), that the granting of a new trial is
disfavored when the grounds are newly discovered evidence which is merely
cumulative or impeaching in nature. The reference to Folev v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17
S.W.3d 878 (2000), was inappropriate.
Contrary to the claim by Tamme, this Court has jurisdiction to reinstate the jury
verdict in this case. See Commonwealth v. Brindlev, Ky., 724 S.W.2d 214 (1986).
Reliance on Commonwealth v. Littrell, Ky., 677 S.W.2d 881 (1984), is misplaced.
Here, the Commonwealth is not appealing from a verdict of acquittal.
III. Deficient Performance/Prejudice
The trial judge misapplied the legal standards set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984). Strickland, supra,
holds that the appropriate question to be considered by a trial court is whether the
defendant received representation that fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. It was error for the trial judge
to conclude that Tamme had received ineffective assistance of counsel based solely on
the interpretation of Tamme I by defense counsel.
Tamme has the burden of demonstrating that defense counsel denied him his
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and that this prejudiced his
trial. Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 878 (2000); Strickland. He must also
demonstrate that counsel made errors that were so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense and deprived him of a fair trial and produced an
unreliable result. See Harper v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 31 l(l998).
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In our view, trial counsel for Tamme used a reasonable trial strategy and
rendered effective assistance of counsel. The argument that the original decision of
this Court was intended to limit any reference to drug activities only to the prosecution,
but permit the defense to impeach the credibility of the prosecution’s witness with
evidence of involvement in the drug operation is absurd. Clearly, the door would be
opened and could not stand ajar for the benefit of one of the parties. The trial judge
failed to consider the proper standard and Tamme failed to demonstrate how he
received an inadequate defense.
The trial counsel defending Tamme presented a reasonable performance under
all the circumstances. The comment by the trial judge that “Counsel’s misinterpretation
of the holding in Tamme I and the subsequent failure to make a record in regard to the
interwoven relationships of Tamme and his principal accusers in the drug business was
ineffective representation that cannot be excused on mere strategy grounds” is
unconvincing. The real issue was whether the defense performance was reasonably
effective assistance of counsel as required by Strickland. As stated by this Court, “The
critical issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was so thoroughly
ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.” Foley v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d
878 (2000).
There is always a strong presumption that the conduct of counsel is within the
acceptable range of reasonable and effective assistance. Humphrev v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d
870 (1998). Keeping the evidence out was consistent
with the strategy to present an alibi defense and to portray Tamme as a solid citizen in
the community.
As testified by defense counsel, he believed that the introduction of
the drug activity among the witnesses might actually cause Tamme more harm than
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good.
Clearly, this was a tactical or strategic decision made by defense counsel,
perfectly acceptable under Strickland.
The argument accepted by the circuit judge is based on the type of hindsight
decried by Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (1 Ith Cir. 2000). A careful review
of the testimony from Tamme I supports the defense theory at the time it was
presented. Here, both counsel were experienced and knowledgeable in criminal
defense work and exhibited all the skill necessary to ensure that Tamme received a fair
trial.
Tamme also failed to show the required prejudice as set out in Strickland. He
did not demonstrate that the errors alleged against defense counsel were so serious as
to deprive him of a fair trial which would produce an unreliable result. Here, Tamme
presented only a conclusory claim that but for the misinterpretation of Tamme I by
defense counsel he would not have been convicted the second time. We find no
support for such a conclusion. There was no proof offered as to how the conduct of
defense counsel failed to produce a reasonable defense and thus deprived him of a fair
trial at the second trial. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146
L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). It was error for the trial judge to grant the RCr 11.42 motion.
The decision of the circuit court which granted Tamme post-conviction relief and
a new trial is reversed. This case is remanded for consideration of the other issues
raised in the RCr 11.42 motion, but not originally addressed by the trial court.
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, JJ., concur. Stumbo, J., concurs in result only.
Keller, J., concurs by separate opinion joined by Lambert, C.J.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Connie V. Malone
Assistant Attorney General
Michael G. Wilson
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Stutsman
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
John E. Selent
R. Kenyon Meyer
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
2000 Meidinger Tower
Louisville, KY 40202
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AMENDED: May 24,2002
RENDERED: MARCH 21,2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
2000-SC-0784-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
84-CR-002 1
EUGENE FRANK TAMME
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it vacated Appellee’s
convictions and sentences of death and granted Appellee a new trial. As to Appellee’s
contention that he was entitled to a new trial because of a newly-discovered
impeachment witness, I agree with the analysis in Part II of the majority opinion.
With
respect to Appellee’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
his trial counsel misinterpreted this Court’s opinion’ on appeal from his first trial,
however, I cannot agree with the majority’s Part I conclusion that Appellee’s trial
counsel correctly interpreted Tamme I as prohibiting the defense from introducing any
evidence concerning Appellee’s drug cultivation and trafficking operations. I
‘Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 51 (1988) (hereinafter “Tamme I”).
nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because Appellee has failed
to demonstrate that his trial counsel rendered him ineffective assistance of counsel
under the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washinaton.*
3
Accordingly, I again write separately from a majority that improperly
applies the law of the case doctrine.
In Tamme I, this Court considered Appellee’s allegations of error concerning his
1985 trial by jury, and the Court reversed Appellee’s convictions and sentences of
death because of errors committed during the prosecution’s capital sentencing voir dire
and because the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce irrelevant,
prejudicial evidence concerning Appellee’s criminal conduct.4
With regard to the
evidentiary errors, the Court stated:
Appellant also argues that the repeated references to
other unconvicted bad acts violated his right to a fair trial.
Appellant claims that the prosecutor erroneously dwelt upon
his marijuana farming operation and the allegation that he
was a heavy user and supplier of cocaine. The prosecutor
also presented evidence of appellant’s alleged insurance
fraud to the jury. The Commonwealth maintains that such
evidence is relevant and necessary to expiain the motive
and circumstances surrounding the murders. We disagree.
Although appellant has a right only to a fair trial, not a
perfect one, he is entitled to be tried for the crimes charged
in the indictment and no others. Holland v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 703 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1985). Evidence that appellant is
a drug user and cultivator is highly prejudicial, and only
marginally probative in determining who killed Maddox and
Sutherland. The evidence of motive, what little there was,
tended to prove some sort of jealous-lover scenario, not a
drug deal gone sour. The farming of marijuana had virtually
‘486 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
‘See Taylor v. Commonwealth, - S.W. 3d -, - (2002) (Keller, J.,
dissenting).
‘Tamme I, supra note 1 at 52-54.
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nothing to do with the crime other than to produce the
scene. On retrial, the jury only needs to be told that the
victims were occasional employees of appellant, shot in a
field where they worked.5
The language in this paragraph -which, although apparently dispositive to the
majority, is not quoted in the majority opinion - leads today’s majority to its conclusion
that the Tamme I Court prohibited the defense from introducing evidence that
Sutherland and Maddox were murdered as a direct result of their involvement in the
drug trade with the primary prosecution witnesses. I have previously expressed my
belief that this Court should exercise greater discretion in its invocation of the law of the
case doctrine.‘j I see no reason to repeat those views here, however, because I believe
the doctrine is inapplicable to this case for an even more fundamental reason Tamme I addressed an allegation of error regarding the introduction of this evidence at
the first trial, but did not finally adjudicate whether Appellee could introduce the
evidence for some other relevant purpose. I simply cannot agree with the majority’s
interpretation of the Tamme I holding,’ and I thus write separately as to Part I of the
Majority Opinion.
The majority’s application of the law of the case doctrine rests on its conclusion
that Tamme I’s observation that “[o]n retrial, the jury only needs to be told that the
victims were occasional employees of appellant, shot in a field where they worked”
constitutes a prohibition against the introduction of any evidence relating to Appellee’s
51d. at 54-54.
6TavIor v. Commonwealth, supra note __ at - (Keller, J., dissenting)
(Dissenting Slip Op. at 4).
‘Majority Opinion at -S.W.3d
, (200-) (Slip Op. at 4) (“The only
reasonable and legally correct interpretation of Tamme I is that evidence regarding the
marijuana farming was not to be allowed.“).
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marijuana cultivation activities by any party for any purpose. While the majority is
correct that a trial court must follow an appellate court order that remands a matter with
specific instructions,’ ” a trial court taking a case on remand may generally consider or
decide any matter left open by the remanding appellate co~rt”~ and “parties are entitled
to introduce additional evidence, supplement pleadings and expand issues in the trial
on remand from a reversed judgment, unless there are specific limitations imposed [in
the opinion remanding.]“” Tamme I’s statement regarding what evidence the jury
“needs to be told” upon retrial does not even contain traditional prohibitory language,”
and is not a “specific limitation” prohibiting the introduction of the evidence for the
purpose Appellee identified in his RCr 11.42 petition.
Certainly, application of the law of the case doctrine, much like cases where
issue or claim preclusion is alleged, “must rest upon a more solid basis than mere
speculation as to what was actually adjudicated in the prior action.“‘* In order to
properly interpret whether an appellate court’s opinion imposes a specific limitation,
therefore, we must consider both the context of the proceedings and the rationale
‘5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review 3 787 (1995).
91d. at 5 792.
‘Old. at § 788 (emphasis added).
“Cf. Osborne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 234, 241 (2001) (“The improper
admission of the grand jury testimony. . . requires reversal for a new trial at which none
of Reid’s statements inculpating Appellant shall be admitted.” (emphasis added)).
“47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 727 (1995).
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supporting the opinion.13
Finally, “[a]n appellate court’s decision should be read with
the understanding that it is an error-correcting co~rt.“‘~
In accordance with this inquiry, I would observe that the error addressed In
Tamme I was Appellee’s allegation that the trial court erred when it denied Appellee’s
motion in limine to exclude evidence of other-possible crimes committed by Appellee.
Appellee argued that evidence of his participation in a marijuana cultivation operation
was not relevant to the Commonwealth’s case because the Commonwealth’s proposed
motive had nothing to do with drug cultivation. The Commonwealth argued both that
the evidence supplied a secondary motive for the murders and that it was “inextricably
intertwined”‘5 with the other evidence in the case because the victims’ bodies were
found in a marijuana field. This Court rejected the Commonwealth’s arguments as to
the alleged probativeness of the evidence and explained how the Commonwealth could
present its case without making reference to Appellee’s marijuana cultivation
operations. Tamme I thus found that the evidence was neither relevant to, nor
inseparable from, the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
This finding, however, would not
preclude introduction of the evidence for some other relevant purpose.
The entire concept of evidentiary relevance is defined by, and is contingent
upon, the purpose for which the evidence is offered.” Accordingly, “[i]t is not
I35 Am. Jur.2d Appellate Review 5 782 (1995).
‘“ld.
“See KRE 404(b)(2).
16Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law
(Michie 1993) (hereinafter “Lawson”) (“Relevancy is
must exist between a proposition to be established
evidencing the proposition (evidentiary facts) before
prove the former.“).
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Handbook (3rd Ed.) § 2.05 at 51
the status (or the relationship) tha t
(ultimate fact) and material
the latter may be admissible to
I
.
uncommon for an item of evidence to be admissible for one purpose but not another,“17
and the fact that evidence may not be admissible to prove one proposition does not
preclude its introduction to prove another proposition.” In accordance with KRE 403,
trial courts must assess “multiple admissibility” or “limited admissibility” evidence to
determine whether its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.” If a
trial court does not exclude the evidence under KRE 403, however, it “upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.“*’
In my opinion, the majority’s conclusion divorces itself from the inherent contextdriven relevancy inquiry when it holds that Tamme I - which considered the relevance
of the marijuana cultivation evidence in only one context - held that the evidence was
inadmissible for any purpose.
While Appellee still maintains that evidence relating to
his participation in marijuana cultivation is irrelevant to the Commonwealth’s case
against him, he argues that the evidence directly relates to his defense - that his
“I 992 Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Committee’s Commentary to KRE 105.
“Lawson, supra note 1 5 at 5 1.05 at 16-17. See also 1 Wigmore, Evidence §I3
at 694 (Tiller rev. 1983):
In other words, when an evidentiary fact is offered for one
purpose, and becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules
applicable to it in that capacity, it is not inadmissible
because it does not satisfy the rules applicable to it in some
other capacity and because the jury might improperly
consider it in the latter capacity. This doctrine . . . is
indispensable as a practical rule.
Id.
19See Id. at § 1.05(111) at 18-I 9.
‘OKRE 105(a).
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accusers, themselves participants in the drug operations, killed the victims for reasons
relating to those drug operations.
None of the cases cited by the majority in support of its application of the law of
the case doctrine involve a question of evidentiary relevance, and only one of those
cases even involves an evidence issue.*’ Simply put, the law of the case doctrine is not
applicable when a subsequent trial presents different facts, issues, or evidence.** As
Appellee argues that he wished to introduce evidence of the drug operation for a
purpose different from the one considered by this Court in Tamme I, I believe this Court
errs in holding that the Tamme I decision resolved the question of the admissibility of
the evidence for that purpose.
I nevertheless concur in the result reached by the majority because I agree with
the majority’s Part III holding that “it was error for the trial judge to conclude that Tamme
had received ineffective assistance of counsel based solely on the interpretation of
Tamme I by defense counsel.“23
While I happen to disagree with the interpretation of
Tamme I reached by both Appellee’s trial counsel and today’s majority, I recognize that
the issue is debatable.24
Given the fact that members of this Court disagree as to the
“Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 4 S.W.2d 731 (1928). And, in that case, our
predecessor Court affirmed, in face of a law of the case doctrine challenge, the trial
court’s decision to admit non-hearsay evidence on a topic, see Id. at 732, because, on
a prior appeal, see Coleman v. Sowders, 206 Ky. 841, 268 S.W. 579 (1925), it had
only prohibited the introduction of hearsay evidence on the topic at retrial. Id. at 581.
These cases illustrate the importance of correctly interpreting the instructions given to a
trial court upon remand.
“5 Am. Jur.2d Appellate Review $j 611 (1995).
13Maiority Opinion, supra note 7 at ( S l i p O p . a t 6 ) .
‘“While I find the issue as one which is subject to alternative interpretations, I
note that the majority characterizes the interpretation of Tamme I reached by Appellee’s
appellate counsel, the trial court, and this concurring Justice as “absurd,” Majority
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correct interpretation of Tamme I, I do not believe the fact that Appellee’s trial counsel
interpreted Tamme I one way rather than the other demonstrates deficient
performance.25
Accordingly, I would reverse the Fayette Circuit Court’s order granting Appellee
post-conviction relief and a new trial and I would remand the case for consideration of
the other issues raised in Appellee’s RCr 11.42 petition.
Lambert, C.J., joins this concurring opinion.
Opinion, supra note 7 at __ (Slip Op. at 7).
“a Haiaht v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 448 (2000) (“We are at a
loss to see how failure to move to admit evidence -the admissibility of which is still an
open question - can ever sink below sufficient performance into deficiency.“).
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2000-SC-0784-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
84-CR-0021
APPELLEE
EUGENE FRANK TAMME
ORDER
The Concurring Opinion by Justice Keller rendered March 21, 2002 shall be
amended on page 7, footnote 23, by adding supra note “7”, and on page 8, continuation
of footnote 24, by adding supra note “7”, as attached hereto. Said modification does
not affect the holding.
ENTERED: May 24, 2002.
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