DAVID McCOOL V. MARTIN NURSERY & LANDSCAPING, INC.; SPECIAL FUND; SHEILA C. LOWTHER, Administrative Law Judge; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: APRIL 26,200l
TO BE PUBLISHED
d
2000-SC-0604-WC
DAVID McCOOL
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 1999-CA-001622-WC
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 96-85603
MARTIN NURSERY & LANDSCAPING, INC.;
SPECIAL FUND; SHEILA C. LOWTHER,
Administrative Law Judge; and
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This workers’ compensation appeal concerns a May, 1996, injury, the claim for
which was settled in July, 1997. In September, 1998, the claimant alleged a change of
condition and moved to reopen, but the motion was denied based upon the December
12, 1996, version of KRS 342.125(3) which prohibits reopening an original award within
two years of its entry. The Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of
Appeals have affirmed the denial. In appealing, the claimant maintains that applying the
amended statute to a right of action which arose before its effective date impairs a
vested property right and is unconstitutional.
The claimant asserts that he was entitled to rely upon the law as it existed on the
date of his injury, including the provisions for reopening an award. He explains that at
the time of his injury, KRS 342.125 permitted reopening at any time upon an allegation
of a change of occupational disability. In contrast, the amended version of
KRS 342.125 precludes a reopening within two years of an award and, therefore,
deprives him of compensation to which he would have otherwise been entitled.
In support of his position, the claimant relies upon Article I, § 10 of the United
States Constitution and §§ 13, 19, and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution for the
principles that the legislature cannot impair the obligations of contract or take property
without just compensation. He explains that applying the amended provision to a claim
that arose before its effective date impairs a vested property right and deprives him of a
right which existed by virtue of his contract of employment and the Workers’
Compensation Act.
The Board and the Court of Appeals relied upon Meade v. Reedy Coal Co., Ky.,
13 S.W.3d 619, 622 (2000), wherein we determined that the time limitations contained
in KRS 342.125(3) were intended to govern the reopening of all awards which were
entered on or after December 12, 1996. Because Meade’s award had been entered
before December 12, 1996, we concluded that the legislature did not intend for the
amended provision to apply.
Subsequently, in Brooks v. University of Louisville Hospital, Ky., 33 S.W.3d 526
(2000) we were faced with a challenge to KRS 342.125(3) by a worker who was injured
before December 12, 1996; received a post-December 12, 1996, award; and sought to
reopen her award within two years of its entry by alleging a change of condition. As in
the instant case, the motion to reopen was denied, and the worker challenged the
-2-
constitutionality of the amendment, asserting that it impaired a vested right. We
rejected the argument, pointing out that the time limitations within KRS 342.125(3) were
statutes of limitation which could be enlarged or restricted without impairing vested
rights. Id. at 530. We also pointed out that because the award was entered after
December 12, 1996, and the change for which reopening was sought had occurred after
that date, the worker’s right to be compensated for the change did not vest until after the
effective date of the amendment. We concluded, therefore, that applying the
amendment on those facts did not violate § 4, 54, or 241 of the Kentucky Constitution.
We also determined that because the amendment prevented both workers and
employers from reopening within two years of an award in instances where the basis for
reopening was a change of condition, it also did not violate 5 59(24) when applied to
such a reopening.
In the instant case, the claimant raises different constitutional provisions, but his
argument is based upon the same erroneous premise. Like the worker in Brooks, he
asserts that applying the amendment to the reopening of his post-December 12, 1996,
award would impair a vested right because the underlying injury occurred before that
date. Although it is true that when the claimant was injured reopening was permitted at
any time upon evidence of increased occupational disability, the fact remains that
reopening is a remedy for an increase in disability that occurs after an award is entered.
Any right that a worker has to be compensated for a post-award increase in disability is
inchoate until such time as he sustains a post-award change of occupational disability,
at which point the right becomes vested. The claimant’s award was entered after
December 12, 1996, and what he sought to redress was an increase in occupational
disability that occurred after December 12, 1996. Because the alleged increase in
-3-
disability occurred after the effective date of the amendment, applying the amendment
and dismissing the motion to reopen did not affect a right that vested before the
amendments effective date.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Hon. David R. Marshall
271 West Short Street
111 Security Trust Building
Lexington, KY 40507
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
MARTIN NURSERY & LANDSCAPING, INC.:
Hon. James R. Carpenter
GALLION, BAKER, & BRAY, P.S.C.
PNC Bank Plaza
200 West Vine Street, Suite 710
Lexington, KY 40507-I 620
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
SPECIAL FUND:
Hon. Joel D. Zakem
Hon. David W. Barr
Labor Cabinet - Special Fund
1040 U.S. Highway 127 South, STE 4
Frankfort, KY 40601-9979
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.