JAMES P. BRASHARS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND GARY LYNN JOHNSTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 24,200O
TO BE PUBLISHED
1999-SC-0852-MR
JAMES P. BRASHARS
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. STEVE MERSHON, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-2489-001
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
1999-SC-0853-MR
AND
APPELLANT
GARY LYNN JOHNSTON
V.
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HON. STEVE MERSHON, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 98-CR-2489-002
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The trial court entered judgment upon appellants’ conditional guilty pleas to the
felony offenses of First Degree Sodomy of a child under twelve (12) years of age and
First Degree Sexual Abuse and to the misdemeanor offense of Distribution of Obscene
Matter to a Minor. The trial court sentenced each defendant to the minimum sentence
of twenty (20) years for First Degree Sodomy, the maximum sentence of five (5) years
for First Degree Sexual Abuse, and twelve (12) months for Distribution of Obscene
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Matter to a Minor and ordered that the sentences on the three convictions run
concurrently for a total sentence of twenty (20) years. Brashars and Johnston appeal to
this Court as a matter of right. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment with respect to both appellants.
BACKGROUND
The Jefferson County Grand Jury returned indictments for the three crimes with
which the appellants stand convicted against Brashars, Johnston, and a third man,
David J. Southard,’
The Commonwealth alleged that the men had subjected an eight
(8) year old child, J.J., to sexual contact, including deviate sexual conduct, and had
shown the child homosexual pornographic movies.
Pursuant to RCr 7.24(l), the Commonwealth disclosed to the appellants during
pre-trial discovery that it intended to introduce at trial incriminating statements made by
the appellants to Detective William Stanley during Detective Stanley’s investigation.
Brashars and Johnston filed motions to suppress these statements on the grounds that
they had not given the statements voluntarily.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Detective Stanley
testified that he had worked as a police officer for nineteen (19) years and spent the last
ten (10) years assigned to the Crimes Against Children Unit (CACU).
Detective
Stanley explained that he investigated allegations that the three men had sexual
‘Southard entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford to the
amended charge of complicity to Class B felony First Degree Sodomy and First Degree
Sexual Abuse by complicity. The trial court sentenced Southard to the minimum
penalty of ten (10) years on the sodomy conviction and the maximum penalty of five (5)
years for the sexual abuse conviction, but ordered that the two sentences run
concurrently for a total of ten (10) years. Southard did not seek appellate review of his
convictions.
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contact with a male child, and testified that he interviewed the men both at the trailer
park where they resided and at the CACU office downtown. Detective Stanley testified
that he had given the appropriate Miranda warnings to the men prior to his questioning
and that each of the men had signed a form stating that he understood his rights and
did not wish to have an attorney present during questioning. Detective Stanley
questioned each of the men individually at the CACU office and each of the men
admitted to the accusations.
Detective Stanley admitted that he did not record any of the interviews on video
or audio tape and indicated he had not done so because the men exhibited reluctance
to speak with him initially and he was concerned that the men would not have allowed
him to continue questioning them if he tried to record their statements. Although the
CACU does not have a policy regarding the electronic recording of interrogations,
Detective Stanley explained that he had used tape recorders in the past and knew that
the Captain’s office contained a video camera and that audio equipment was available
to him.
Brashars and Johnston then abandoned the original grounds for their
suppression motions and argued that the trial court should suppress the confessions
because Detective Stanley elected not to record the confessions on video or audiotape
and that due process requires law enforcement officers, where feasible, to tape
interrogations. After asking the parties to brief the issue, the trial court overruled the
appellants’ motions to suppress their incriminating statements and set the matter for
trial.
Subsequently, the appellants reached a plea agreement with the Commonwealth
and petitioned the court, pursuant to RCr 8.09, to allow them to enter a conditional
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guilty plea and preserve for appellate review the trial court’s ruling with respect to their
motions to suppress their confessions. The trial court accepted the conditional guilty
pleas and sentenced Brashars and Johnston in accordance with the Commonwealth’s
recommendations.
ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF QUESTIONING
Brashars and Johnston acknowledge that the issue of whether due process and
the Commonwealth’s responsibility to preserve evidence require law enforcement
officials to electronically record custodial interrogations is an issue of first impression in
the Commonwealth. The appellants argue that this Court should hold that trial courts
should suppress alleged confessions in cases where the Commonwealth seeks to
admit incriminating statements stemming from unrecorded custodial interrogations*
because defendants otherwise must engage in a “swearing contest” with law
enforcement officers in order to litigate issues relating to the voluntariness or substance
of confessions. According to Brashars and Johnston, trial courts invariably resolve
these “swearing contests” in favor of the law enforcement officers, and a recording
requirement is necessary to adequately protect defendants and to ensure fair process.
Brashars and Johnston cite to case law from a minority of jurisdictions which have
either interpreted their state constitutional due process guarantees to require law
enforcement officers to electronically record oral statements of the accused during
‘We address the appellants’ “moderate” position despite the fact that it is unclear
whether a holding limited to custodial interrogations would result in the reversal of the
appellants’ convictions. Although the trial court did not enter written findings of fact with
respect to the appellants’ original suppression grounds, he expressed his doubts at the
end of the suppression hearing whether Detective Stanley was even required to give
the appellants Miranda warnings because he believed the questioning was not a
custodial interrogation.
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custodial interrogations or which have adopted such a requirement pursuant to their
supervisory powers.4
They ask this Court to adopt a similar rule for prosecutions in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Brashars and Johnston concede that the due process protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not mandate a recording
requirement, and, although the United States Supreme Court has not yet directly
addressed this issue, we agree with other jurisdictions5 which have addressed this
question that it is unlikely such claims could satisfy the standard of constitutional
materiality adopted by the Court in California v. Trombetta.6
Consequently, the appellants seek a basis for a recording requirement in the
Kentucky Constitution, and ask this Court to interpret the due process protections of our
state constitution as exceeding those in the United States Constitution. In
Commonwealth v. Coooer,’ this Court found the right against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution did not exceed the protections of the United
States Constitution and cautioned that only in a handful of instances did Kentucky
Constitutional protections exceed those in the United States Constitution:
3Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (“[AIn unexcused failure to
electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates
a suspects right to due process under the Alaska Constitution and . . . any statement
thus obtained is generally inadmissible.” Id.).
4State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
‘See, m.. vv. supra note 3 at 1160; Commonwealth v. Craft, 669
A.2d 394, 396-397 (Pa.Super. 1995); State v. Kilmer, 439 S.E.2d 881, 892 n. 15 (W.Va.
1993); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988).
6467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).
‘KY,, 899 S.W.2d 75 (1995)
From time to time in recent years this Court has
interpreted the Constitution of Kentucky in a manner which
differs from the interpretation of parallel constitutional rights
by the Supreme Court of the United States. However, when
we have differed from the Supreme Court, it has been
because of Kentucky constitutional text, the Debates of the
Constitutional Convention, history, tradition, and relevant
precedent. We have admonished against “novel theories to
revise well-established legal practice and principle” and
stated the prevailing rule as follows:
While we have decided several recent cases
protecting individual rights on state
constitutional law grounds, our stated purpose
is to do so only where the dictates of our
Kentucky Constitution, tradition, and other
relevant precedents call for such action.’
While we may use, in our analysis, the jurisprudence from our sister states which have
addressed this issue in the context of their own constitutional provisions9
our decision eventually must turn on an interpretation of the due process protections
afforded criminal defendants in Kentucky Constitution Section Eleven:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. He cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the
law of the land; and in prosecutions by indictment or
information, he shall have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the vicinage; but the General Assembly may
provide by a general law for a change of venue in such
prosecutions for both the defendant and the
‘1d. at 77-78.
9See, e.g, Steohan v. State, supra note 3; Commonwealth v. Craft, supra note 5;
State v. Kilmer, supra note 5; Williams v. State, supra note 5; State v. Got-ton, 548 A.2d
419 (Vt. 1988); Baynor v. State, 736 A.2d 325 (Md. 1999); State v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d
1016 (Me. 1992); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326 (Mass. 1996); State v.
Kekona, 886 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1994); State v. James, 678 A.2d 1338 (Conn. 1996).
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Commonwealth; the change to be made to the most
convenient county in which a fair trial can be obtained.”
After reviewing the text, history, and previous precedent interpreting Section Eleven’s
due process protections, we hold that the Constitution of Kentucky does not mandate
the electronic recording requirement advocated by the appellants.
This Court has never held that the procedural due process protections of Section
Eleven extend beyond the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, and the appellate courts of this state have interpreted other
clauses of Section Eleven as co-extensive with federal protections.” Additionally, in
Commonwealth v. Raines,12 we implicitly found Section Eleven’s protections coextensive with federal protections when we jointly addressed, under standards adopted
from federal case law, federal and state due process challenges to a statute authorizing
pretrial suspension of operator’s license privileges.13
Although we could end our inquiry
here, we believe that the appellants’ argument fails on a more fundamental level.
From the perspective of this Court, the issue before us is not exclusively a
question of cost benefit analysis, or, as phrased by the appellants, whether an
electronic recording requirement would enable courts to easily resolve disputes
regarding what transpired during a custodial interrogation without unduly burdening law
“Constitution of Kentucky §I 1.
“See, e.u., Newman v. Stinson, Ky., 489 S.W.2d 826, 829 (1972) and
Commonwealth v. Cooper, Ky., 899 S.W.2d 75 (1995) (right against self-incrimination);
Ross v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 577 S.W.2d 6, 9 (1978) (right to compulsory
process); Cane v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 556 S.W.2d 902 (1977) (right to counsel);
Commonwealth v. Wrllis, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 224 (1986) (right to confront accusers).
12Ky., 847 S.W.2d 724 (1993).
131d. at 728.
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enforcement. We agree with the view that widespread electronic recording has its
benefits,14
although we stop short of finding electronic recording a panacea which could
end disputes over confessions to law enforcement officers.” As we are asked to
determine whether due process requires such a requirement, our inquiry, therefore,
must focus on whether determinations of reliability traditionally made by trial courts on
the basis of opposing testimony deprive defendants of fundamental fairness. Due
process inquiries require us to assess “[t]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of [liberty]
as a consequence of the . . . procedures used.“” Accordingly, we disagree with the
appellants’ contention that fundamental fairness cannot be ensured by a trial court’s
resolution of factual disputes regarding custodial interrogations on the basis of
14See, e.g., State v. Kekona, supra note 9 at 746:
Undeniably, recording a custodial interrogation is important
in many contexts. A recording would be helpful to both the
suspect and the police by obviating the “swearing contest”
which too often arises when an accused maintains that she
asserted her constitutional right to remain silent or requested
an attorney and the police testify to the contrary. A
recording would also “help to demonstrate the voluntariness
of the confession, the context in which a particular statement
was made and of course, the actual content of the
statement.” Id.
“See. e.g., State v. James, supra note 9 at 1360:
[Rlecording would not in all circumstances be a foolproof
mechanism for accurately resolving disputes between an
accused and the police as to the circumstances surrounding
a confession. For example, there might, despite a
recording, be disputes concerning what transpired before the
recording began or during breaks in the interview when the
suspect is not being recorded, such as when the suspect
uses the bathroom . . . or on occasions when the tape
recording may be inaudible or partially so. Id.
‘Commonwealth v. Raines, supra note 12 at 727.
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testimony from the persons involved. As was the case with the Supreme Court of
Connecticut in State v. James:17
We are not persuaded that determinations of admissibility
traditionally made by trial courts are inherently untrustworthy
or that independent corroboration of otherwise competent
testimonial or documentary evidence regarding the
existence and voluntariness of a confession is necessary to
comport with constitutional due process requirements.”
We depend on trial courts to resolve factual disputes, and trial judges commonly
decide, without independent corroboration, disputed issues regarding whether a
defendant gave consent to a search of his home or vehicle or whether a defendant’s
conduct gave rise to reasonable suspicion for a detention or probable cause for a
search. We need not concern ourselves with the appellants’ claims regarding the ability
of an electronic recording requirement to solve all of the problems relating to custodial
interrogations unless Brashars and Johnston first make a threshold showing that such
problems exist because of inadequacies with the current procedures. The inability of
the appellants to make such a showing merely reaffirms our faith in the ability of trial
judges to fairly evaluate factual disputes, and, for that reason, we conclude that the due
process protections in Section Eleven of the Constitution of Kentucky do not mandate
the recording requirement advocated by the appellants.lg
“Supra note 9.
181d. at 1360.
19We likewise decline the appellants’ request to adopt such a requirement
independent of constitutional requirement in our supervisory capacity. We agree with
the Supreme Court of Vermont that “[i]n the absence of legislation, we do not believe it
appropriate to require, by judicial fiat, that all statements taken of a person in custody
be tape recorded,” State v. Got-ton, supra note 9.
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’
Although we find that the Kentucky Constitution does not require electronic
recording of custodial interrogations, we believe the circumstances surrounding such
questioning remain appropriate grounds for defendants to explore at trial as the
“defendant [still] retains the right to put before the jury, as the trier of fact, all evidence,
including the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of his confession,
‘relevant to weight or credibility.“‘*’ In other words, although we disagree with the
appellants’ contention in as much as it relates to the admissibility of statements
admitted without corroboration by means of electronic recording, we believe defendants
may ask the “trier of fact to consider the circumstances of the confession, including any
lack of corroboration, in determining the weight, if any, to be afforded that particular
piece of evidence.“*’ Indeed, in Crane v. Kentucky,** the United States Supreme Court
held that the United States Constitution protects a defendant’s right to introduce at trial
evidence relating to the reliability of a confession:
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.” We break no
new ground in observing that an essential component of
procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. That
opportunity would be an empty one if the State were
permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing
on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is
central to the defendant’s claim of innocence. In the
absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind
*‘State v. Kekona, supra note 9 at 746 (quoting State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58,
75 (1993)).
“State v. James, supra note 9 at 1360.
**476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). See also Crane v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 726 S.W.2d 302 (1987) (affirming conviction on harmless error
analysis upon remand).
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of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic
right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and “survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.“23
“STATEMENTS” IN THE CONTEXT OF KRE ARTICLE EIGHT
Brashars and Johnston argue that Detective Stanley’s investigative report
containing a synopsis of the appellants’ incriminating statements did not contain
“statements” within the contemplation of Article Eight of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence
because Detective Stanley’s summary of the interview is not an “oral or written
assertion” by a declarant as defined in KRE 801 (a). The appellants argue, therefore,
that the trial court should have suppressed their confessions because the
Commonwealth could not have introduced Detective Stanley’s summary under KRE
801A(b)(l)‘s
exception to the hearsay rule for statements of a party.
Brashars and Johnston allege that they presented this argument to the trial court
and preserved it for appellate review within the text of a memorandum in support of
their motions to suppress. Under a heading titled “Argument: Due process requires the
statements made by the defendants to be suppressed since the custodial interrogations
were not electronically recorded, or, in the alternative, the Court should exercise its
supervisory power and exclude the statements based on the same grounds,” counsel
for Brashars wrote:
This Court has the responsibility to ensure that evidence
admitted at trial is sufficiently reliable so that it may be of
use to the finder of fact who will draw the ultimate
conclusions of guilty or innocence. “[R]eliability is the
linchpin in determining admissibility” of evidence under a
standard of fairness that is required by the Due Process
23Crane v. Kentucky, supra note 2 2 at 476 U.S. 683, 690-91, 90 L.Ed.2d. 636,
645, 106 S.Ct. 2142, -.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53
L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977) (analyzing admissibility of
identification testimony). The Kentuckv Rules of Evidence
soecificallv arant this Court the power and duty to exclude
relevant evidence if necessarv to facilitate the ascertainment
of truth. See KRE 403. KRE 611 (a).
Brashars and Johnston argue before this Court that the last sentence in the paragraph
quoted above presented to the trial court an issue of whether the Commonwealth could
introduce the incriminating “statements” through an exception to the hearsay rule, and
contend that both the trial court below and the Commonwealth overlooked the
argument. We are not surprised that others have overlooked this argument, and
believe the rash of myopia may stem from the fact that nothing resembling the
argument the appellants make on appeal was even whispered in the trial court.
Before the trial court, the appellants argued that, if the trial court concluded that
due process did not require electronic recording of confessions made during custodial
interrogations, the trial court “should exercise its supervisory power and exclude the
statements” because of the failure of Detective Stanley to electronically record them.
The memorandum filed in support of the motion to suppress the statements contains
zero references to KRE 801 (a)‘s definition of “statement,” and, in fact, zero references
to Article Eight of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence: Appellate courts review only claims
of error which the parties presented before the trial co~rt.~~ We find the argument
raised by Brashars and Johnston before this Court wholly unpreserved for our review.
We would note, however, that the appellants’ argument would fail on its merits,
as well, because the Kentucky Rules of Evidence contain no requirement that, in order
24& Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (1998); Caslin v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 491 S.W.2d 832 (1973).
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to be admissible, testimony relating to a declarant’s oral statement must be a verbatim
recitation of that statement. Seldom will a witness be able to recall each and every
word spoken by a declarant, but, by paraphrasing, witnesses may communicate
relevant evidence regarding the substance of a declarant’s statement. Any dispute as
to what a declarant actually said goes to the weight of such testimony and not its
admissibility.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF KENTUCKY’S MEGAN’S LAW
At final sentencing, the appellants’ counsel made oral motions requesting that
the trial court declare Kentucky’s Sex Offender Registration Act, more commonly
referred to as Megan’s Law,25 unconstitutional. The appellants alleged in the trial court
that the statutory notification scheme violated the separation of powers doctrine,
constitutional protections against double jeopardy, arbitrariness, bills of attainder and
involuntary servitude, the right to privacy under the Kentucky Constitution, and
substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution. The appellants
filed no written motion with the trial court, and neither appellant gave notice of the
constitutional challenge to the Office of the Attorney General as required by CR 24.03:
[Wjhen the constitutionality of an act of the General
Assembly affecting the public interest is drawn into question
in any action, the movant shall serve a copy of the pleading,
motion or other paper first raising the challenge upon the
Attorney-GeneraL2’j
Brashars and Johnston urge this Court to overlook their failure to notify the Attorney
General by arguing that this notification requirement is found only within a civil rule
*‘KRS 17.570 et seq.
‘CR 24.03.
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relating to intervention and emphasizing that the Commonwealth was a party to this
action and could easily itself have notified the Attorney General.
In Manev v. Mat-v Chiles Hosoital,*’ this Court stated that a sound basis exists for
the notification rule notwithstanding the fact that the rule appears in an awkward place
in the civil rules and in a statute concerning declaratory judgments:
During oral argument and in colloquy between the Court
and counsel, an issue emerged as to whether a valid
judgment determining constitutionality could be entered by a
trial court in the absence of prior notification to the Attorney
General. From our examination of KRS 418.075 and CR
24.03, we are convinced that there is a compelling public
purpose to be served by the notification rule. The language
of the statute and rule evinces a strong public policy in favor
of notification to the Attorney General whenever the
constitutionality of a statute is placed in issue despite the
location of KRS 418.075 in the Kentucky Declaratory
Judgments Act and the appearance of CR 24.03 in our rule
relating to intervention.
’ ‘Among the purposes underlying [KRS 418.0751 is the right
of the people, by the chief law officer, to be heard on
matters affecting the validity of duly enacted statutes. KRS
15.020. . . . It is in the interest of the people to afford the
Attorney General an opportunity to participate on their
behalf, whether it is to argue for or against the validity of a
statute.28
In this case, however, the appellants cannot claim ignorance of CR 24.03 because the
trial court advised counsel they must notify the Attorney General of such a challenge
and indicated his intention to summarily overrule any constitutional objection to the
statutory sexual offender notification scheme if counsel had not notified the Attorney
General.
Counsel did not request a continuance to file a written motion and serve the
“KY., 785 S.W.2d 480 (1990).
*‘ld. at 481.
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Attorney General, but rather assented to the trial court’s intention to summarily overrule
the motions.
Although the appellants suggest that CR 24.03 is unclear regarding the actor
responsible for notifying the Attorney General and attempt to slough the burden off
upon the Commonwealth, this Court changed the language of CR 24.03 to require a
party seeking to have a statute declared unconstitutional to notify the Attorney General
even when the Commonwealth is a party to the action.”
As a result of the manner in
which Brashars and Johnston chose to present their constitutional objections, the
“record” as to these motions before this Court consists of a number of claims of
constitutional violations without any warrants, and we, as well as the trial court, have
been deprived of an adversarial hearing regarding the constitutionality of sexual
offender notification. Accordingly, we hold that the appellants’ failure to notify the
Attorney General of their constitutional challenges alone provided the trial court with a
sufficient basis to overrule the motions and affirm the trial court’s ruling.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the appellants’ convictions.
All concur.
29Prior to January 1, 1999, the effective date of the amended CR 24.03 quoted in
the text above, the relevant portion of CR 24.03 read:
When the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly
affecting the public interest is drawn in question in anv action
to which the State or an officer, aaencv. or emplovefe]
thereof is not a partv, the movant shall serve notice of the
motion upon the Attorney General.
Former CR 24.03 (emphasis added).
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, JAMES P. BRASHARS:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public Defender
Of Counsel
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, GARY L. JOHNSTON:
J. David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public Defender
Of Counsel
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1025 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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