RALPH S. BAZE. JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RALPH S. BAZE. JR.
V.
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APPELLANT
APPEALED FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
CIRCUIT COURT NO. 93-CR-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Ralph S. Baze, Jr., appeals to this Court as a matter of right from the
Rowan Circuit Court’s denial of his RCr 11.42 motion seeking the vacation of his
murder convictions and death sentences. The facts of this case are set forth in our
opinion affirming Appellant’s two death sentences on direct appeal. Baze v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817 (1997), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 118 S.Ct. 1536
(1998).
The trial court denied Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion, as well as a motion to
reconsider, without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, our review at this time is
confined to “whether the [RCr II.421 motion on its face states grounds that are not
conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.”
L..
Lewis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1967).
Appellant argues that the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion without a
hearing denied him meaningful post-conviction review. Further, Appellant sets forth
seven allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel which he claims precluded him
from receiving a fair trial: (1) counsel’s failure to exercise all nine peremptory strikes in
jury selection; (2) inadequate pre-trial investigation to locate available mitigation
witnesses; (3) failure to object to change of venue; (4) failure to provide pre-trial
counseling; (5) failure to move for a mistrial or continuance; (6) inappropriate comments
in closing arguments; and (7) failure to object to police officers’ presence during trial.
I. TIME FOR PREPARATION OF RCr 11.42 MOTION
Appellant correctly states that although the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution does not require states to provide a mechanism for post-conviction
relief, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987),
when a state chooses to do so the courts must construe and interpret available
remedies in a manner which accords with the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Appellant argues,
however, that the post-conviction scheme in Kentucky does not provide a uniform
process for death row inmates to meaningfully develop and present their RCr 11.42
issues. Citing his case as an example of the disparate treatment of death row inmates,
Appellant notes that his conviction became final on April 20, 1998, when the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. An execution warrant was thereafter signed by
the Governor on May 5, 1998, and Appellant’s execution was scheduled for June 5,
1998. Appellant contends that upon the signing of the execution warrant, the three-2-
year statute of limitations contained in RCr 11.42 and the one-year time period imposed
under the AEDPA’ became irrelevant, and the filing of an RCr 11.42 motion, however
incomplete, was necessary to stay his execution.
Appellant’s argument with respect to the need for additional time to prepare and
file an RCr 11.42 motion is virtually identical to the argument raised and rejected in
Bowlina v. Commonwealth, Ky., 926 S.W.2d 667, 670 (1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1223 (1996), in which we stated:
We are aware of the complexities involved in preparing an RCr 11.42
motion that will adequately address any and all legal challenges a
defendant may have. The rule states that the motion “shall state
specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and
the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds.” RCr
11.42. Moreover, any possible grounds that could have been raised will
be lost if not presented in the same proceeding. Id. These requirements
must be met or the motion may be summarily dismissed.
It is very clear that any defendant is entitled to a review of the
conviction and death sentence by the Kentucky Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court. KY CONST. § 110; KRS 532.075; U.S.
CONST. art. III. Further, a defendant is entitled to pursue post-conviction
remedies, and appeal, subject to the rules of this Court. Coupling the
availability of these procedures with the gravity of the punishment
involved, it is mandatory that a defendant raise all issues without delay. In
recognition of the need for both speed and specificity, we hold that an RCr
11.42 motion must be filed in an expeditious manner and is subject to
amendment, if appropriate, with leave of court. Due to the unquestioned
right of defendants to have their contentions decided by a court, “leave [to
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” CR 15.01.
The Department of Public Advocacy provided Appellant continuous competent
counsel since the commencement of charges against him. Appellant had over fourteen
months from the issuance of this Court’s opinion affirming his conviction to prepare an
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, signed into law in 1996,
imposes a general one-year statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions, running
from the date of finality of the state court conviction. The limitations period is tolled
while a properly filed state post-conviction action is proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)( 1).
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RCr 11.42 motion. Although he argues that new witnesses were identified and “a
comprehensive review of [his] medical history was undertaken for the first time,”
Appellant fails to identify a single issue he would have raised but for the time
constraints.
Reviewing federal appellate courts clearly expect work on a condemned
prisoner’s habeas petition to commence upon this Court’s announcement of its opinion
affirming the denial of RCr 11.42 relief. See In re Parker 49 F.2d 204, 212 (6th Cir.
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1995). We have expressed a similar expectation where the next step in the attack on
the judgment is from direct appeal to RCr 11.42. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975
S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 119 S.Ct. 1266 (1999). Therefore,
we “decline Appellant’s invitation to revisit this issue.” Bowlina v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
964 S.W.2d 803, 804 (1998).
II. COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Appellant argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in negligently
failing to exercise a ninth peremptory challenge available to the defense. As a result, a
correctional officer the defense had intended to strike was allowed to serve on the jury,
and a juror “who might have been disinclined to impose the death penalty” was
removed by the trial court as if he was the ninth juror struck.
On direct appeal, we held that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s request
to use his ninth peremptory strike, as this request was made after Appellant’s counsel
had been furnished a list of the Commonwealth’s intended peremptory challenges.
“Peremptory challenges shall be exercised simultaneously . . ,‘I
RCr 9.36(2), and “[n]o prospective juror may be challenged after being
accepted unless the court for good cause permits it.” RCr 9.36(3). Thus,
when Baze returned his list containing only eight peremptory challenges,
his right to a ninth peremptory challenge was extinguished. Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 492 S.W.2d 878 (1973). One obvious reason for
this rule is to preclude a party from saving his last peremptory challenge
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until after he has examined the opposing party’s list to insure that he does
not waste a peremptory challenge on a juror who also has been
challenged by the other party.
A s i m i l a r c l a825. w a s r e j e c t e d b y t h e S i x t h C i r c u i t i n M c Q u e e n v .
Baze, supra, at i m
Scrogay, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996), where the ninth peremptory was lost not through
omission, but through counsel’s use of the challenge to remove a juror who, according
to McQueen, should have been stricken for cause in the first place.
There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, see Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), and
there is no showing that had there been one more peremptory available, it
would have had any effect on the trial at all, let alone that the lack of a
peremptory (because it was used on Leo Johnson) resulted in an
unconstitutionally biased jury. It is insufficient simply to claim that, had
there been another peremptory available, a different juror would have
been excluded, and the result might have been a more favorable jury for
McQueen. In other words, it is not enough for a defendant to say “I would
have been better off if. . .‘I He must demonstrate that judicial or
prosecutorial action (or inaction) resulted in a constitutional violation, not a
tactical or strategic disadvantage. The constitution is not designed to
afford either party a right to the most advantageous tactical or strategic
situation possible. It is designed to insure that a person receives a fair
trial by an impartial jury.
McQueen, suora, at 1320-I 321.
Appellant argues that in this case, trial counsel’s failure to exercise the ninth
peremptory challenge was an oversight and cannot be excused under the guise of “trial
strategy.” Moreover, he contends that he was clearly prejudiced by trial counsel’s error,
as the correctional officer voted to convict him as well as sentence him to death.
Even assuming , however, Appellant’s theory, this Court has repeatedly held that
“[a]n issue raised and rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated . . by claiming
that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Sanborn, supra. Notwithstanding
this fatal procedural deficiency, Appellant’s claim also fails on its substantive merits.
The entirely speculative and self-serving assertion that, but for counsel’s
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negligence, Appellant would have used the ninth challenge to strike the correctional
officer, thereby altering the outcome of the trial is convenient revisionism.
We simply
cannot say that trial counsel was deficient, and Appellant was prejudiced as a result of
the failure to exercise the ninth challenge, because it is virtually impossible to know
what a differently impaneled jury would have done. For this Court to hold otherwise
would essentially create a practice in which error could be built into any trial record
simply through counsel’s decision not to exercise alj peremptory challenges, resulting in
this type of argument being raised in every post-trial proceeding. It is not the function of
this Court to usurp or second guess counsel’s trial strategy.
ill. COUNSEL’S PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION
Appellant next claims that his trial counsel failed to conduct adequate pretrial
investigation and secure the attendance of mitigation witnesses, and that these failures
amounted to representation below that which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. In support, Appellant relies upon affidavits submitted by
counsel two months prior to trial in which they concede investigative shortcomings due
to heavy workloads, as well as a lack of cooperation from the Commonwealth in
providing discovery. The trial court did, in fact, grant a continuance, however Appellant
asserts that such was granted to have him psychologically evaluated, and was not in
response to counsel’s admission that they were unprepared for trial.
We are of the opinion that trial counsel’s affidavits are, at best, self-serving and,
more likely, a disingenuous attempt to inject error into the record. Either way, the test
for effectiveness is not whether counsel could have done more, Waters v. Thomas, 46
F.3d 1506, 1514 (1 Ith Cir. 1995) (en bane), but rather whether counsel’s errors
undermined the reliability of the trial. McQueen. supra, at 1311-1312. Counsel’s
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deficient investigation, if in fact it was so, does not appear to have violated this wellrecognized standard.
Trial counsel has a clear “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”
Strickland v.
Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
A
reasonable investigation is not, however, the investigation that the best defense lawyer,
blessed not only with unlimited time and resources but also with the inestimable benefit
of hindsight, would conduct. Kokoraleis v. Gilmore,
131 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1997);
Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1996); Waters, supra, at 1514.
With regard to the alleged failure to secure the attendance of mitigation
witnesses, Appellant concedes that his counsel and the trial court went through an
elaborate and lengthy process to determine which out-of-state witnesses could offer
testimony. Defense counsel even retained an Ohio attorney to facilitate the process of
interviewing Appellant’s family members located there. In fact, on direct appeal
Appellant argued that he was entitled to a directed verdict in light of the substantial
mitigation evidence presented at trial. Nonetheless, Appellant now contends that
counsel failed to secure several mitigation witnesses who could have shed light on his
troubled childhood.
Depending on the circumstances, there are many ways a case may be tried.
Waters, supra, at 1512. The test for effective assistance of counsel is not what the best
attorney would have done, but whether a reasonable attorney would have acted, under
the circumstances, as defense counsel did at trial. Id. Appellant offers this Court
nothing to demonstrate that trial counsel did not act reasonably by failing to secure the
witnesses about whose absence he now complains. Nor is there any evidence as to
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how these witnesses would have helped, or even which witnesses counsel did or did
not interview.
It is reasonable and necessary for counsel to place a certain reliance on its
client. If the client, his family and friends impede counsel by concealing psychological
problems that might have provided an alternative theory of mitigation, counsel cannot
be faulted for not exploring the unknown. Strickland, supra, at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 20662067; Kokoraleis, supra, at 697; Stewart, supra, at 135; LaRette v. Delo, 44 F.3d 681,
685 (8th Cir. 1995). The conduct of a trial is a necessarily constrained operation and
attorneys and defendants alike must make, and stand by, difficult decisions concerning
the allocation of resources, trial tactics, and countless other issues. Effective
assistance of counsel entails the reasonable anticipation and making of these
decisions, not the elimination of them altogether.
IV. CHANGE OF VENUE
Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion belatedly complained that the trial judge
erroneously transferred venue from Franklin County to Rowan County’. This matter
was raised at trial but abandoned on direct appeal.
As previously stated, RCr 11.42 cannot be used to relitigate issues decided on
direct appeal, or to raise issues that could have been presented on direct appeal.
It is not the purpose of RCr 11.42 to permit a convicted defendant to retry
issues which could and should have been raised in the original
proceedings, nor those that were raised in the trial court and upon an
appeal considered by this court.
The offenses were committed in Powell County, however, it was agreed that
Appellant would not receive a fair trial in Powell County and venue was originally
transferred to Franklin County. Subsequently, when Powell Circuit Judge James L.
King disqualified himself due to a prior relationship with one of the victims, Rowan
Circuit Judge William Mains was assigned as special judge. Judge Mains thereafter
moved the trial to Rowan County.
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Thacker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (1972).
Appellant argues that it is not the actual transfer of venue, but rather trial
counsel’s failure to object to the transfer that is at issue. He contends that Evans v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 645 S.W.2d 346, 347 (1982), and Wolfenbaraer v.
Commonwealth, Ky.App., 936 S.W.2d 770, 773 (1996), prohibited the trial court’s action
and counsel failed to raise the proper objection. We disagree.
First, the record is clear that a discussion was held between both parties and the
trial judge concerning moving the trial to Rowan County. Although the Commonwealth
and defense counsel raised initial objections, all subsequently agreed to the transfer.
Notwithstanding, Appellant’s reliance on Evans supra, and Wolfenbaraer, supra, is
misplaced. In Evans, we stated:
The theory of forum non conveniens has one shortcoming which prevents
its serving as an apt model for a change of venue. That is, it provides a
basis on which one court may decline to entertain a case, but does not
enable that court to force another court to take it. Theoretically we have in
this state only one circuit court, but because there is no inherent authority
for a judge in one circuit to move a case to the judge of another, the
situation is the same as if the courts within the different circuits were
separate.
Id. at 347. Reiteratinq Evans, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held in Wolfenbaraer that
a Boone County Judge had no authority to conduct a trial in another county.
H o w e at , i n
Wolfenbaraer, supra, v e r772. t h i s c a s e J u d g e M a i n s d i d n o t t r a n s f e r t h e
case to another judge or to a county outside of his circuit, but merely moved the trial to
his own county. As such, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an invalid
objection.
V. FAILURE TO OBTAIN PSYCHIATRIC COUNSELING
Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to obtain pre-trial psychiatric
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counseling for him resulted in him giving an interview with a reporter because he
“needed to talk with someone.” Appellant contends that this omission by counsel in
failing to anticipate the events as they occurred compromised his defense.
It is undisputed that Appellant wanted to talk about the shootings. In fact,
Appellant, without being questioned by the police, told one of the arresting officers,
“You tell them that you got the right man. I’m the one that killed them son of a bitches.”
Baze, supra, at 820.
Appellant later gave two interviews to a news reporter, providing
a detailed account of the killing of the two police officers.
On direct appeal, this Court rejected Appellant’s claim that the statements he
made to the reporter should have been suppressed. Id. Appellant now seeks to
relitigate the admissibility of statements by arguing that a multi-disciplinary team of
trained professionals might have dissuaded him from talking to the reporters. Again, we
disagree. Assuming arguendo that Appellant’s talkativeness would have been sated by
psychiatric intervention, “the fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an
indigent defendant does not mean that the service is constitutionally required.” Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2447, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). An attorney is
not legally ineffective simply because his client disregards his advice.
Appellant’s conscious decision to ignore counsel’s advice and to speak with law
enforcement authorities and news people following arrest and without the presence of
counsel is not a reflection on the adequacy of his legal representation, but rather,
perhaps, an indication that even the most effective representation may be of little use to
such an individual. The Sixth Amendment protection requires that counsel be effective,
not that counsel be heeded. Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1244 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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VI. FAILURE TO MOVE FOR CONTINUANCE OR MISTRIAL
Appellant contended from the start that there was another shooter involved on
the day on question. Accordingly, he filed a fourteen (14) page motion for discovery
seeking, in part, any evidence of other individuals in the vicinity armed with a small
caliber weapon at the time of the incident. The trial court’s order included the following:
List and describe any weapons, or live or spent firearm projectiles, or
footprints viewed or inspected within one thousand (1,000) yard radius of
the scene of the shootings in this case by any person listed in paragraph 1
which was not seized. This is not meant to include the weapons or live
projectiles in the possession of the official investigating personnel at the
crime scene after the shooting, list and describe each item viewed or
inspected. Name the person who decided not to seize each item, and if
known, the present whereabouts of each such item.
The Commonwealth responded by providing the entire investigative case file to the
defense.
However, the Commonwealth did not disclose until trial the fact that
Detective Ashley used his .22 caliber rifle with a scope for the sole purpose of
observing the scene through the scope.
Appellant raised a “blatant discovery violation” claim on direct appeal, which was
rejected by this Court as being without merit and unworthy of discussion.
Baze. supra, at 820. At this juncture, Appellant now complains that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to request a continuance or mistrial at the introduction of the
evidence regarding Detective Ashley. Appellant argues that trial counsel was surprised
by information that, with proper investigation, he believes might have added an element
to, or significantly altered the defense theory of the case. Moreover, he maintains that
counsel’s failure to act cannot be considered trial strategy. We find this contention to
be completely without merit.
The testimony at trial indicated only that Detective Ashley used his rifle scope to
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observe the scene of the shooting from more than 500 feet. His rifle was not part of
any shootout and there was no evidence presented that a shot was fired from the area
where he was standing. Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that a police
officer must disclose what type of weapon he or she was carrying during an incident in
which that weapon was not fired. Moreover, Appellant fails to specify what further
investigation could have been conducted in response to the new information.
Speculation that a continuance or mistrial would have been granted is not sufficient
evidence that counsel acted deficiently and prejudiced Appellant’s right to a fair trial.
VII. CLOSING ARGUMENT STATEMENTS
Appellant alleges that trial counsel was deficient in making statements during
closing argument that called into question Appellant’s credibility and undercut defense
theories of the case. We disagree. Both statements Appellant takes issue with were
merely comments on evidence introduced during the trial. Furthermore, Appellant has
taken the statements out of context, as review of such reveals that trial counsel did, in
fact, articulate the point Appellant now alleges he failed to make. Counsel was not
ineffective during closing argument.
VIII. POLICE PRESENCE IN THE COURTROOM
Appellant complains that trial counsel failed to object to the significant number of
police officers present in the courtroom during the trial. Appellant does not state the
actual number of officers, but nevertheless alleges that their presence possibly
influenced the jury, and thus counsel was deficient in not raising an objection.
This case involved the murder of two police officers. As such, it was not unusual
for fellow officers to be present, some in official capacity and others as spectators. We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s citation to Woods v. Duaaer, 923 F.2d 1454 (1 I’” Cir.
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1990), as that case involved the presence of over forty-five uniformed correctional
officers. More importantly, as Appellant failed to raise on direct appeal any issue
regarding prejudicial effect resulting from the officers’ presence, he cannot now couch
the claim as ineffective assistance of counsel in an RCr 11.42 proceeding.
The record clearly reflects that Appellant received constitutionally sufficient
representation by trial counsel. Counsel did the best job it could with the facts
presented. The jury deliberated at length in both the penalty and guilt phases of trial,
which is an indication that Appellant received competent and credible representation.
Furthermore, the trial court properly determined that Appellant was not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion. Clearly, there is no right to an
evidentiary hearing even in a death penalty case. Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 854
S.W.2d 742 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); Skaaas v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
803 S.W.2d 573 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 844 (1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 975 S.W.2d 901 (1998), cert. denied, -U.S. _, 119 U.S. 1263 (1999).
Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to simply fish for claims,
and such is not warranted if the record resolves all issues raised in the RCr 11.42
motion. Glass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d
400 (1972); Ford v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 453 S.W.2d 551 (1970).
The Rowan Circuit Court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for post conviction relief
is affirmed.
Lambert, C.J., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, and Wintersheimer, J.J.,
concur. Stumbo, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Timothy T. Riddell
Milton C. Toby
3070 Harrodsburg Road
Lexington, KY 40503
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Paul D. Gilbert
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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RENDERED: APRIL 20,200O
TO BE PUBLISHED
1999-SC-0028-MR
RALPH S. BAZE, JR.
V.
APPELLANT
APPEALED FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
93-CR-1
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Respectfully, I must dissent from affirmation of this RCr 11.42 case. The trial
court denied the motion without first ordering an evidentiary hearing be held. In
particular, I believe a hearing was necessary in regard to whether defense counsel’s
performance was deficient in failing to exercise all of the peremptory strikes permitted
during the trial in chief. Failure to properly utilize this strike resulted in leaving on the
jury a juror who served as a correctional officer at Eastern Kentucky Correctional
Complex. Once the trial court denied the defense motion to strike her for cause, a
peremptory challenge was the only way to remove her from the jury.
Because the
defense did not exercise all of its peremptory challenges at the appropriate time, the
error of leaving this juror in the panel could not be reviewed during the direct appeal.
Baze V. Commonwealth, KY., 965 S.W.2d 817, 825 (1997). The majority opinion now
renders the merits of this issue impossible to ever address by holding that issues raised
and disposed of on direct appeal are not the proper subject of review in an RCr 11.42
motion.
While the majority opinion purports to confront the merits of this issue, it does so
without having heard from trial counsel. The lack of testimony from that counsel makes
the majority opinion’s discussion of the issue purely speculative, the very flaw it uses to
dispose of Appellant’s argument. I would reverse and remand to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing to explore the basis of trial counsel’s failure to exercise the last
peremptory strike to remove the juror from the jury panel.
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