COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. WAYNE INGRAM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
AS MODIFIED: JUNE 14, 2001
RENDERED: MARCH 22,200l
TO BE PUBLISHED
1998-SC-1
COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY
ON CERTIFICATION FROM
JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT
98-M-2988
V.
WAYNE INGRAM
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
CERTIFYING THE LAW
Pursuant to CR 76.37(10), this Court granted the motion for certification of
the law requested by the Commonwealth to consider the following questions: (1)
whether video arraignment violates the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, (2)
whether video arraignment violates the local Jefferson District Court Rules, and (3)
whether the video arraignment procedure as practiced in Jefferson County violates a
defendant’s constitutional due process rights.
In July 1996, the Jefferson District Court began using interactive
audiovisual technology to arraign defendants without having to transport them from the
jail to the courthouse. This ‘video arraignment system’ permitted the accused to see
and converse with the judge, who likewise could see and converse with the accused.
The arraignment proceedings occurred live over a closed circuit television. The video
images and the accompanying audio feed were transmitted instantaneously. All
participants were able to see and hear each other simultaneously.
Another part of the video arraignment system consisted of television
monitors in the court room. From the monitors, any person who was present in the
courtroom could view the arraignment proceeding. Additionally, if the accused was
represented by counsel, communication between the two could be achieved through
the use of conference room telephones.
Appellee, Wayne Ingram, was charged with loitering and arraigned in
Jefferson District Court by use of the video arraignment system. Subsequently, he filed
a motion seeking to discontinue the use of video arraignment in Jefferson County. On
November 17, 1998, the Jefferson District Court issued an order holding that the video
arraignment system violated RCr 8.02 and RCr 8.28, and Rule 6.05 of the Jefferson
District Rules of Court. The order also held that video arraignment, as currently
practiced in Jefferson County, violated a defendant’s due process rights. Accordingly,
the district court ordered the termination of the video arraignment system. The
Commonwealth sought certification of the law on the issues decided by the trial court,
and this Court granted its certification request.
The first issue is whether video arraignment violates the Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure. RCr 8.02 states, in relevant part,
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall
consist of reading or stating to the defendant the substance
of the charge and calling upon the defendant to plead in
response to it.
-2-
RCr 8.28 provides that
(1) The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at
every critical stage of the trial including the empaneling of
the jury and the return of the verdict, and the imposition of
the sentence.
In its ruling, the Jefferson District Court relied upon Valenzuela-Gonzales v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the Dist. of Arizona,’ in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit construed the applicable federal rules to require a defendant’s actual physical
presence at arraignment. Other courts, however, have construed the same or similar
rules otherwise.2
The language of RCr 8.02 and RCr 8.28, particularly when construed in
light of RCr 1 .043, is broad enough to accommodate the use of video proceedings at
arraignment. The closed circuit video technology operates as the functional equivalent
of an in-court arraignment, as both the defendant and the judge can see and hear each
other. Moreover, the requirement that the arraignment be held in open court is satisfied
because a television monitor allows any member of the general public present in the
courtroom to observe the proceedings.
The second issue is whether video arraignment violates local Jefferson
District Court Rule 6.05, which requires that at all arraignments the defendant be given
in-hand notice of the next scheduled court date. To comply with this rule, under the
‘915 F.2d 1276 (gth Cir. 1990).
2State v. Phillios, 656 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio 1995)(the Ohio Supreme Court was
persuaded by its rule of construction, which is the same in substance as RCr 1.04);
United States v. Washinaton, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3Rcr 1.04 provides, “The Rules of Criminal Procedure are intended to provide for
a just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay.”
-3-
video arraignment system the defendant’s new court date was entered into a computer
in the courtroom, and then that date was sent to a printer located near the defendant.
The trial court held that JDR 6.05 was violated in practice because the printer often
malfunctioned and because there were no court personnel at the delivery area to
assure that defendants actually received the document from the printer. Although the
technical problems noted by the trial court are a cause of concern to this Court, the fact
that the accused is being arraigned over closed circuit television does not violate the
tenets of JDR 6.05. Whether an arraignment is conducted in the courtroom or by
closed circuit television, it is the responsibility of the trial court to see that all aspects of
the rule are observed.
The third and final issue is whether video arraignment violates
constitutional due process guarantees. In its order, the trial
court stated that a
defendant’s basic due process rights were not protected because of the poor conditions
of the holding area, a frequent inability to hear and communicate with defendants over
the closed circuit system, the judge’s inability to see the defendant’s full body on the
television monitor and thus to assess the defendant’s demeanor, and because of the
aforementioned system of printing the next court dates. Despite these stated concerns
about the technical difficulties in implementing the video arraignment effectively, the
trial court’s order fails to identify constitutional due process violations associated
therewith. Rather, the court engrafted upon “due process of law” a host of
requirements not heretofore recognized as being components of due process. While
the conditions may not have been ideal, there was nothing about the proceeding that
violated due process as that concept is generally understood. The Commonwealth
appropriately observed,
-4-
The Jefferson District Court . . . never explained which rights
were violated by the process. The Court simply cited
concerns with the system, such as overcrowding and heat in
the arraignment area, a malfunctioning printer, time
constraints on the completion of documents, the fact that
video arraignments “foster and encourage” distractions, and
the inability of the judge to see more than the head[s] and
shoulders of defendants.4
A properly functioning video arraignment system is the equivalent of incourt arraignment. The Ohio Supreme Court so held in Phillips5 as did the Florida
Supreme Court in In Re Rule 3.160(a). Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,’ and the
Missouri Supreme Court in Guinan v. State.’ We are persuaded that these authorities
amount to a proper analysis of the law. United States v. Revnolds,’ relied upon by the
trial court is inapplicable here as that arraignment was by telephone and lacked a video
component. The trend among state and federal courts is to allow the properly
4As this case comes to the Court upon certification of law and in recognition of
extensive inquiry at oral argument, we take the liberty of a slight departure from the
record. The circumstances that prevailed when the trial court rendered its decision
have changed dramatically. The “new” Jefferson County Jail is equipped with video
arraignment equipment in a location that eliminates the deficiencies observed by the
trial court. During oral argument, we were informed that the Jefferson County Courts
now conduct in-custody arraignments in a full-staff courtroom within the secure part of
the jail facility. The judge, clerks, prosecutor, defense counsel, sheriff deputies,
corrections officers, and inmate-arraignees are all physically present in the courtroom.
5656 N.E.2d at 665. “The defendant’s actual, physical presence in the courtroom
at the time of his arraignment ‘was not required to ensure fundamental fairness or a
“reasonably substantial opportunity . . . to defend against the charge . . ..‘I’ Therefore, we
hold that arraignment of an accused via closed circuit television is constitutionally
adequate when the procedure is functionally equivalent to live, in-person arraignment.”
%28 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 1988). “We are satisfied that due process does not
require the presence of a defendant in a courtroom before a judge when, through
mechanical means, he can see the judge and the judge can see him.”
‘769 S.W.2d 427, 431 (1989). “We find no diminution of our traditional
standards of fair trial resulting from injecting the video cameras into the proceeding.”
844 M.J. 726 (Army Ct.Crim.App. 1996).
-5
safeguarded use of video proceedings9 provided there is no violation of some specific
constitutional right. Video arraignment is entirely consistent with Kentucky law and our
view of federal law, and we so hold.
For the foregoing reasons, the law is so certified to the Jefferson District
court.
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
concur.
‘See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 1 IO S.Ct. 3157, 11 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990);
United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4”’ Cir. 1995).
-6-
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Albert 6. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
William L. Daniel
Carlton S. Shier, IV
Assistant Attorneys General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel T. Goyette
Jefferson District Public Defender
Bruce P. Hackett
Deputy Appellate Defender
Ann Bailey Smith
Assistant Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
-7-
1998-SC-1090-CL
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
ON CERTIFICATION FROM
JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT
98-M-29844
V.
APPELLEE
WAYNE INGRAM
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND MODIFYING OPINION
The petition for rehearing filed by Appellee, Wayne Ingram, is hereby denied.
On the Court’s own motion, the Opinion of the Court rendered on March 22,
2001, is modified by the substitution of new pages 1, 5 and 7, hereto attached, in lieu of
pages 1, 5 and 7 of the opinion as originally rendered. Said modification does not
affect the holding.
All concur.
Entered: June 14, 2001.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.