BURDEN (JENNY MARIE) VS. MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., D/B/A J.C. MALONE & ASSOCIATES
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 26, 2014; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2013-CA-001907-MR JENNY MARIE BURDEN v. APPELLANT APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE OLU A. STEVENS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 12-CI-005639 MANAGEMENT REGISTRY, INC., D/B/A J.C. MALONE & ASSOCIATES APPELLEE OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CLAYTON, COMBS, AND STUMBO JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Jenny Marie Burden appeals the summary judgment granted by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of her former employer. After our review, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. In March 2010, Burden was hired by Management Registry, Inc., d/b/a J.C. Malone & Associates (“MRI”), a staffing and recruiting agency in Louisville. She was assigned by MRI to work as a temporary employee for Toyotetsu Mid-America LLC, an automotive component parts manufacturer in Owensboro. On August 26, 2010, Burden allegedly suffered an injury to her right shoulder and neck when she lifted a component part at Toyotetsu. On August 30, 2010, Burden filed a claim with the Department of Workers’ Claims seeking disability benefits. She was terminated by MRI on September 17, 2010. On October 22, 2012, Burden filed a civil action alleging that she had been discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim -- a violation of the provisions of KRS 342.197(1). Soon after the filing, the parties negotiated a settlement of the workers’ compensation claim. On November 1, 2012, Burden signed a Department of Workers’ Claims Form 110-1, an “Agreement as to Compensation and Order Approving Settlement” (settlement agreement). The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Burden would be paid $5,000 in a lump sum. The settlement agreement further provided, in part, as follows: Claimant agrees that $5000.00 is sufficient consideration for a buyout and dismissal of all claims pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. The $5000.00 shall be apportioned to a buyout/waiver of claimant’s claims to indemnity benefits (permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, or permanent total disability benefits), past and future medical expenses, right to vocational rehabilitation, right to reopen, and any other benefits that claimant may be entitled to pursuant to the Act. -2- The proceeds of the settlement shall be allocated as follows: $2000.00 for a buyout and waiver of any claim for indemnity benefits (permanent partial disability, temporary total disability, permanent total disability benefits) under KRS 342; $1500.00 for a buyout and waiver of right to past medicals; $1000.00 for a buyout and waiver of right to future medicals; $250.00 for a buyout and waiver of right to vocational rehabilitation; $250.00 for a buyout and waiver of right to reopen. Claimant agrees that she has received adequate consideration for her waivers. The total settlement of this claim equals $5000.00 Claimant affirmatively acknowledges that any and all future medical expenses are her own exclusive liability, to be paid from her own resources or any other health coverage that might legitimately be available to her. Claimant enters into this agreement freely, knowingly, intelligently and with the advice of competent counsel. Claimant’s claim is herein dismissed. The Department’s administrative law judge signed an order approving the terms of the settlement agreement on November 9, 2012. On July 23, 2013, MRI filed a motion to dismiss the civil action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. By the attachment of a copy of the parties’ settlement agreement, the motion was converted to one for summary judgment. Persuaded that the parties’ settlement agreement barred Burden from pursuing her claim under the provisions of KRS 342.197, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion. Summary judgment was entered in favor of MRI on October 18, 2013. This appeal followed. On appeal, Burden contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Citing to our decision in Hall v. Hammond Transportation, Inc., 2009 -3- WL 3231392 (Ky.App. Oct. 9, 2009), unpublished, Burden argues that the settlement of her claim for benefits under the workers’ compensation act had no effect upon her right to recover against MRI in the civil action. We agree. The parties’ use of Form 110-1specifically limited the scope of their settlement to matters within the jurisdiction of the Department’s ALJ. Forms promulgated by the Department were created to facilitate the settlement of claims in accordance with KRS 342.265, which provides, in part, that an agreement with respect to “compensation” signed by the parties or their representatives “shall be filed with the executive director, and, if approved by an administrative law judge, shall be enforceable[.] KR 342.265(1). “Compensation” is defined under the provisions of our Workers’ Compensation Act as “all payments made under the provisions of this chapter representing the sum of income benefits and medical and related benefits[.]” KRS 342.0011(14). While the statute protecting workers from retaliatory discharge is located in Chpater 342, “compensation” does not include an employee’s claim for or recovery of damages for his employer’s violation of that provision. We noted in Hall that jurisdiction over that claim lies with the judiciary. We are not persuaded that a different analysis of this issue is required because the civil action was pending in the circuit court at the time that Burden settled her workers’ compensation claim. The jurisdiction of an administrative agency does not extend beyond those matters that are delegated to it by the legislature. Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Aldridge, 57 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2001). -4- KRS 342.197(3) provides that an individual injured by an employer’s retaliation against him for having filed a workers’ compensation claim “shall have a civil cause of action in Circuit Court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages sustained by him, together with the costs of the law suit, including a reasonable fee for his attorney of record.” If an agreement with respect to claims outside the jurisdiction of the ALJ had been included in the Form 110-1, the ALJ would have lacked the authority to approve it and render it enforceable. Settlement of the civil action filed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 342.197(1) would have required a separate agreement – an agreement supported by separate consideration. The lump sum payment to Burden under the terms of Form 110-1 allocates all of the settlement proceeds to various forms of “compensation” under Chapter 342, leaving nothing attributable to the settlement of any other claim -- specifically the civil action that she had filed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 342.197(1). Thus, we agree with Burden that the terms of the settlement agreement do not preclude her from pursuing her claim for retaliatory discharge. Consequently, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court must be vacated. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. ALL CONCUR. -5- BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Charles W. Miller Rheanne D. Falkner Louisville, Kentucky James M. Morris Lexington, Kentucky -6-
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