SARGENT & GREEN LEAF VS. COMP QUILLEN (DONALD G.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001612-WC
SARGENT & GREEN LEAF
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-07-75170
DONALD G. QUILLEN;
HON. OTTO DANIEL WOLFF, IV,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND VANMETER, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Sargent & Green Leaf (“Sargent”) petitions for review of
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) which affirmed an
1
Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
opinion of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarding benefits to Donald G.
Quillen for contraction of an occupational disease. Finding no error, we affirm.
Beginning in 1994, Quillen worked as a tool and die maker at Sargent. As
part of his work, he routinely cleaned tools and machine parts in a washer with a
cleaning solvent containing the chemical benzene. He used the washer daily, from
two to twelve times a day, for five to thirty minutes at a time, regularly inhaling
fumes from, and having extensive dermal exposure to, the cleaning solvent.
On March 31, 2007,
Dr. Monty Metcalfe, a hematologist, diagnosed
Quillen with myelodysplastic syndrome (“MDS”) and advised him to immediately
cease working at Sargent, which he did. Thereafter, Quillen filed a workers’
compensation claim alleging that he contracted MDS as a result of his exposure to
benzene while employed with Sargent.
The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter and determined that Quillen had
sustained a permanent total disability from an occupational disease. Sargent filed a
petition for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. Sargent then appealed the
ALJ’s decision to the Board, which affirmed both the ALJ’s award and its denial of
Sargent’s petition for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
The standard for appellate review of a Board decision “is limited to
correction of the ALJ when the ALJ has overlooked or misconstrued controlling
statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as
to cause gross injustice.” Bowerman v. Black Equip. Co., 297 S.W.3d 858, 866
(Ky.App. 2009) (citing W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
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1992)). We review an award by the ALJ to determine whether its findings were
reasonable under the evidence. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643
(Ky. 1986). We note that the “ALJ, as the finder of fact, and not the reviewing
court, has the sole authority to determine the quality, character, and substance of
the evidence.” Square D Co. v. Tipton, 862 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1993) (citation
omitted).
First, Sargent claims the evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that
Quillen’s contraction of MDS was causally attributable to his work activities. We
disagree.
Per KRS 342.0011(3),
An occupational disease . . . shall be deemed to arise out
of the employment if there is apparent to the rational
mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a
causal connection between the conditions under which
the work is performed and the occupational disease, and
which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
to the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the
nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced
to the employment as the proximate cause.
Furthermore, “[m]edical causation must be proved to a reasonable medical
probability.” Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 106 (Ky.
2008) (citations omitted).
In this case, the record reflects that voluminous medical and lay evidence
was taken on the issue of causation. The ALJ relied on the medical opinions of
Drs. Rogers, Prince and Metcalfe, as well as the testimony of Quillen, to find the
existence of a causal relationship. Quillen’s testimony confirmed that the cleaning
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solvent he used at Sargent contained the chemical benzene and that he used the
washer more frequently than any other Sargent employee. Despite the fact that he
wore gloves while cleaning, the solvent splashed onto his hands and forearms.
And although he was required to wear safety glasses with shields in order to
prevent the solvent from splashing into his eyes, he was not required to wear a
respirator or mask. Other than use of his automobile and power tools, Quillen
could not identify any other source that may have exposed him to benzene.
Dr. George C. Rogers, a pediatrician and toxicologist, prepared a report in
which he opined within reasonable medical probability that Quillen’s MDS was
causally related to his work environment, due to his extensive exposure to the
solvent containing benzene. Dr. Rogers was of the opinion that Quillen had no
other identified risk factors for MDS and no other known exposure to benzene
other than his workplace exposure.
Dr. Scott Prince, a designated university evaluator whose opinion must be
given presumptive weight pursuant to KRS 342.315,2 reviewed Quillen’s history,
including his employment history, and the course of treatment with Dr. Metcalfe.
He also conducted a physical examination of Quillen. In his report, Dr. Prince
opined within reasonable medical probability that Quillen’s condition was related
to his work environment, noting that Quillen’s significant ongoing exposure to the
solvent containing benzene would substantially raise the risk of developing MDS.
2
Under KRS 342.315(2), “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in KRS 342.316, the clinical findings
and opinions of the designated evaluator shall be afforded presumptive weight by administrative
law judges and the burden to overcome such findings and opinions shall fall on the opponent of
that evidence.”
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Dr. Metcalfe, who initially diagnosed Quillen with MDS, indicated in
his report that exposure to benzene is one of two major causes of MDS. Although
the record reflects that a large number of MDS cases are idiopathic in origin, Dr.
Metcalfe opined that Quillen’s MDS was not clearly idiopathic; Quillen regularly
inhaled fumes from, and had dermal contact with, the solvent containing benzene.
While the record discloses that Sargent presented evidence that could have
supported a conclusion contrary to the ALJ’s decision, such evidence is not an
adequate basis for reversal on appeal. McCloud v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 514
S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1974). Rather, reversal is appropriate only if no substantial
evidence exists to support the ALJ’s findings. Special Fund, 708 S.W.2d at 643.
Upon review of the entire record, we are unable to say that the evidence did not
support a finding that Quillen’s MDS was causally attributable to his work
activities.
Next, Sargent claims that contrary to the ALJ’s findings, it did not waive its
Daubert objection concerning the admissibility of Dr. Rodgers’ medical report.
Sargent further claims that Dr. Rogers’ opinion on causation failed to rise to a level
sufficient to be admissible under the Daubert standard. We disagree.
KRE3 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
3
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
Id.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that under Fed.R.Evid.4
702, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. The factfinder is, thus, required to make an initial assessment “of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 59293, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the Daubert standard with
respect to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony is applicable in workers’
compensation proceedings. City of Owensboro v. Adams, 136 S.W.3d 446, 449-50
(Ky. 2004). Further, the fact-finder is afforded great latitude in making a
reliability determination and need not recite any of the Daubert factors so long as
the record is clear that a Daubert inquiry was made. Id. at 451.
In this case, the ALJ held that Sargent was precluded from challenging the
admissibility of Dr. Rogers’ report after the final hearing since it failed to raise a
Daubert objection prior to submission of this case for decision; Sargent challenged
4
Federal Rules of Evidence.
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the admissibility of Dr. Rogers’ report for the first time in its post-hearing brief,
and neither raised the issue at the benefit review conference conducted by the ALJ
prior to the final hearing during which the ALJ identified all contested issues, nor
during the final hearing itself. As a result, Quillen was not afforded an opportunity
to present evidence on the reliability of Dr. Rogers’ report under the Daubert
standard. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Sargent waived its Daubert
objection.
We agree that because the Daubert challenge was not raised at the benefit
review conference and Quillen did not have a chance to present evidence in
support of his position, Sargent’s post-hearing challenge was untimely. See 803
KAR5 25:010, Section 13(14) (“Only contested issues shall be the subject of
further proceedings.”). In addition, assuming, arguendo, that Sargent’s Daubert
challenge was timely, the ALJ made a reliability determination sufficient to satisfy
Daubert, based on Dr. Rogers’ credentials and its finding that Dr. Rogers was the
expert most qualified to opine on the issue of causation. Moreover, we note that
the Board concluded that Dr. Rogers’ use of a differential diagnosis methodology6
to ascertain causation satisfies the standard for admissibility under Daubert. For
these reasons, we cannot say that the ALJ improperly admitted and relied upon Dr.
Rogers’ testimony.
5
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
6
Differential diagnosis “is a well-recognized and widely-used technique in the medical
community to identify and isolate causes of disease and death.” Hyman & Armstrong, 279
S.W.3d at 107 (citation omitted).
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The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas M. Edelen
Louisville, Kentucky
Paul J. Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
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