HARRIS (KIMBERLY) ON BEHALF OF C.C., A MINOR CHILD VS. COFFEY (STEVEN)
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RENDERED: MAY 13, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001553-ME
KIMBERLY HARRIS, ON BEHALF OF
C.C., A MINOR CHILD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CATHERINE RICE HOLDERFIELD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-D-00060
STEVEN COFFEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Kimberly Harris appeals the Warren Circuit Court’s denial of
her motion to extend a domestic violence order (DVO) entered on June 21, 2010.
After a careful review of the record, we affirm.
This matter arose from an incident of alleged abuse of the parties’
then fifteen-year-old son, C.C., after he was spanked by his father with a belt. On
May 26, 2010, nearly three days after the alleged abuse occurred, Kimberly filed
for a motion for an emergency protective order on behalf of C.C. An emergency
protective order was entered that day. A hearing was then held on June 21, 2010.
The trial court entered a short-term DVO, effective for thirty days. The court
observed that this case would be more appropriately addressed by the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services (Cabinet) and required both parties to comply with the
case plan set forth by the Cabinet.1
On June 28, 2010, Kimberly filed a motion to amend the prior DVO.
Kimberly indicated that she wished to have the DVO extended to allow time for
her to file for custody of C.C. At the hearing, the trial court found that seeking a
modification of custody was an insufficient basis for extending the DVO. The
court also indicated that there had not been any change in circumstances to warrant
an extension. Accordingly, the trial court denied the extension and again found
that any issues arising from this matter would be more appropriately addressed by
the Cabinet. Kimberly now appeals.
We review a trial court’s decision regarding the duration of a DVO for
an abuse of discretion. Buddenberg v. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky.
App. 2010). Furthermore, “the length of the DVO is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.” Id. The trial court has the authority to determine the duration of
the DVO so long as it does not exceed three years, and there are no specific factors
1
Both parties mention in their respective briefs that C.C. is currently in foster care. The record
before us does not include any documentation of this.
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which the court must follow when making this determination. Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 403.750 (2); Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d at 721-22.
Kimberly argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied her motion to extend the DVO. In support, she contends that 1) the trial
court applied an incorrect standard, i.e. changed circumstances, for denying the
extension of time, and 2) the DVO was still necessary for the protection of the
child.
As to her first contention, no specific standard is imposed upon a trial
court’s determination as to the duration of a DVO. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d at
721-22. Instead, a court is afforded broad discretion. See id. Additionally, while
the court did indicate that there had not been a change in circumstances, we
interpret the court’s statement to mean that the court did not find Kimberly’s
reasons for requesting an extension to be sufficient to warrant a modification of the
court’s initial determination, rather than a statement of the standard governing its
decision.
As to her second contention, the trial court is in the best position to
determine if continued protection is necessary for the child. Buddenberg, 304
S.W.3d at 720 (noting that a trial court is in the better position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and make a finding of domestic violence). Furthermore,
the trial court, in its wisdom, allowed a thirty-day period after which it believed
that it would be appropriate for C.C. to continue residing with his father with the
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Cabinet’s involvement. We can find nothing in the record that would indicate that
the trial court’s refusal to modify its initial determination is clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul Neil Kerr II
Russellville, Kentucky
Casey A. Hixon
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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