CLAYTON (HENRY F.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001365-MR
HENRY F. CLAYTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-CR-00115 AND
98-CR-00016
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Henry F. Clayton, was convicted of
stalking in the first degree, two counts of kidnapping, and assault in the second
degree, and was sentenced to forty-two years of imprisonment in 1998. This
appeal concerns the denial of Clayton’s Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
60.02 motion. Having reviewed the record, the arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law, we affirm.
Clayton was convicted of the aforementioned charges on September
23, 1998, and sentenced to forty-two years of imprisonment. His conviction was
affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on August 26, 1999.1 Thereafter, on
September 21, 2001, Clayton filed a Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42 motion, and the Commonwealth filed an extensive reply. On June 4, 2002,
the trial court entered an order denying Clayton’s RCr 11.42 motion, a decision
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on January 9, 2004. On June 9, 2004,
the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
Approximately five years later, on August 27, 2009, Clayton filed a
CR 60.02 motion, which he amended several times. The Commonwealth replied,
and on July 2, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. It is from
that order that Clayton now appeals to this Court.
In reviewing the arguments of the parties, we note that our standard of
review concerning a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion is whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky.
1996). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). CR 60.02 is an
extraordinary remedy that is available only when a substantial miscarriage of
1
Case No. 1998-SC-000854.
-2-
justice will result from the effect of the final judgment. Wilson v. Commonwealth,
403 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966). We review the arguments of the parties with
these standards in mind.
As his first basis for appeal concerning his CR 60.02 motion, Clayton
asserts that the trial court’s refusal to grant him a continuance so that he could
prepare his case with the attorney of his choice2 was an abuse of discretion and
reversible error. Clayton asserts that his newly chosen counsel needed a
reasonable opportunity to prepare for the case because he had just been hired at the
time of the trial. In response, the Commonwealth argues that this issue has already
been raised before and decided by our Kentucky Supreme Court, both on direct
appeal and again in response to Clayton’s RCr 11.42 motion. Thus, the
Commonwealth asserts that Clayton cannot raise the same issue again on appeal of
the denial of his CR 60.02 motion. We agree.
As noted, Clayton’s conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court on August 26, 1999. In this Court’s opinion affirming the denial of
Clayton’s subsequent RCr 11.42 motion, we stated, “The sole issue raised in his
direct appeal concerned the refusal of the trial court to allow his court-appointed
counsel to withdraw on the morning of trial (a situation which would have
necessitated a continuance) in order that he might be represented by counsel
employed by him. In its opinion affirming Clayton’s conviction, the Supreme
2
According to Clayton, he was previously advised that he could not have the attorney he desired
and, accordingly, he had to choose another attorney.
-3-
Court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Clayton to
proceed to trial with his appointed counsel.”
Having reviewed the record, we are in agreement with the
Commonwealth that Clayton cannot raise the same issue in this appeal as he has
already raised in his direct appeal. The decision of our Kentucky Supreme Court
on this exact issue is the law of the case, and we are without authority to find
otherwise. Further, CR 60.02 relief is not available for issues that could have been,
or were, raised on direct appeal or in RCr 11.42 proceedings. See Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983); McQueen v. Commonwealth,
948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997).
As his second basis for appeal, Clayton argues that “due to the budget
crunch in the Commonwealth” and Clayton’s “peaceful nature,” his sentence
should be reduced to time served. Clayton describes himself as a model inmate,
and states that he has changed entirely as a person since the time of his conviction.
Accordingly, he asserts that the remainder of his sentence should be vacated.
Clayton also argues that public policy now favors more humane, just sentencing,
and the conservation of state resources and that, as a result, the remainder of his
sentence should be commuted. In response, the Commonwealth argues that this is
merely Clayton’s attempt to avoid the Parole Board which has twice denied him
parole. Again, we agree.
Clayton’s arguments concerning his character and the nature of our
justice system are directly contrary to the holding of our Kentucky Supreme Court
-4-
in McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Ky. 1997). In that case,
McQueen argued that his death sentence “should be commuted to life
imprisonment because his attitude and character have changed during his sixteen
years of confinement.” Addressing that argument, our Supreme Court found that
even if McQueen could prove a change in character, it would afford no basis for
relieving him from his legally imposed punishment. Indeed, the Court found that
McQueen’s arguments would be properly addressed through a plea to the executive
branch pursuant to Section 76 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Such is the case with Clayton, sub judice. It is not within the purview
of this Court to review Clayton’s arguments regarding his allegedly changed
character, nor his status as a “model inmate.” Likewise, it is not within the
authority of this Court to commute or vacate a sentence otherwise legally imposed
upon Clayton as a result of the crimes for which he was convicted. Accordingly,
we decline to either reverse or vacate Clayton’s sentence on this basis.
Finally, Clayton argues that his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated as a result of the court’s refusal to grant him a
continuance. Essentially, Clayton equates the denial of a continuance with the
denial of his due process rights during the prosecution and adjudication of his case.
For the aforementioned reasons, including the fact that the continuance issue has
already been raised and ruled upon both on direct appeal and through Clayton’s
RCr 11.42 motion, we decline to address this issue further herein based upon our
reasoning infra in addressing the first alleged error.
-5-
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the July 2,
2010, order of the Grant Circuit Court denying Clayton’s motion pursuant to CR
60.02.
KELLER, JUDGE CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
LAMBERT, JUDGE CONCURS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack S. Gatlin
Covington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.