ROBERTS (WANDA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 26, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001336-MR
WANDA ROBERTS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CR-00024
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Wanda Roberts brings this appeal from a June 18, 2010,
judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court upon a conditional plea of guilty and a
sentence of one-year imprisonment. We affirm.
Officer Nicholas Love, an officer of the Highland Heights Southgate
Police Authority, observed a motor vehicle traveling east on Moock Road in
Wilder, Kentucky. After passing an access road to Canterbury Apartments, the
motor vehicle stopped on Moock Road and traveled backward from about five to
thirty feet. At such point, the vehicle turned into the access road to Canterbury
Apartments.
Officer Love then effectuated a traffic stop for careless driving
pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189.290. Upon approaching the
vehicle, Officer Love discovered that the driver was Roberts. Roberts produced a
valid driver’s license and vehicle registration. Officer Love testified that he asked
Roberts for permission to search the vehicle, and she consented. Roberts denied
consenting to the search.
Upon Roberts exiting the vehicle, Officer Love testified that he
requested permission to search Roberts’ person, and she agreed. Roberts again
denied agreeing to such search. Upon searching Roberts, Office Love found no
contraband. Thereafter, Officer Love opened the driver door to the vehicle and
spotted marijuana seeds in the side pocket of the door. Officer Love then testified
that Roberts withdrew her consent to search the motor vehicle. Officer Love
located Robert’s purse. Inside the purse, Officer Love seized pills, which were
later determined to be Aderol and Hydrocodone. Roberts was then transported to
the Campbell County Jail, and a search of her person produced a clear plastic
baggy containing marijuana. Roberts admitted to not possessing prescriptions for
the prescription drugs.
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Roberts was indicted upon the offenses of first-degree promoting
contraband (KRS 520.050), second-degree possession of a controlled substance
(KRS 218A.1416) and with being a second-degree persistent felony offender (KRS
532.080). Roberts filed a motion to suppress and argued that Officer Love lacked
probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a stop of her motor
vehicle. Following a suppression hearing, the circuit court denied the motion.
Subsequently, the Commonwealth and Roberts entered into a plea
agreement. Pursuant thereto, Roberts entered a conditional guilty plea to firstdegree promoting contraband and second-degree possession of a controlled
substance. Roberts was eventually sentenced to a total of one-year imprisonment
but reserved for appellate review the circuit court’s denial of her motion to
suppress. This appeal follows.
Roberts argues that the stop of her motor vehicle was without
probable cause and constituted an unconstitutional seizure violative of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. She also asserts that the search of
her person and vehicle was undertaken without her consent and also violated the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Upon the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the circuit court’s
findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and issues of law de novo.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78. The circuit court’s findings of
fact are upheld if supported by substantial evidence of a probative value. Talbott
v. Com., 968 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1998).
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The circuit court concluded that the initial stop of Roberts’ vehicle
was constitutionally justified as Officer Love possessed probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation had occurred citing to KRS 189.290(1).1 Also, the circuit
court held that the searches of Roberts’ person and vehicle were constitutionally
justified as Roberts gave consent for both searches. In so concluding, the circuit
court found the testimony of Officer Love credible.
Upon review of the evidence adduced at the hearing and applicable
law, we conclude that the circuit court’s findings of fact were supported by
substantial evidence of a probative value and that the circuit court properly applied
the law herein. We view the circuit court’s opinion as accurately setting forth the
law as applied in this case and adopt it herein:
Under the Fourth Amendment, all warrantless
searches and seizures are presumed to be unreasonable
and unlawful unless the Commonwealth can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the search and seizure
falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329,
331-32 (Ky. 1992). However, the temporary detention
of a motorist upon probable cause to believe she has
committed a traffic violation does not violate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
seizures. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Such a temporary detention during a traffic stop, even
if only for a brief period and for an intended purpose,
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
1
KRS 189.290(1) provides:
The operator of any vehicle upon a highway shall operate
the vehicle in a careful manner, with regard for the safety
and convenience of pedestrians and other vehicles upon
the highway.
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at 809-10. Consequently, an automobile stop is subject
to the constitutional imperative that it not be
unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 810.
Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable where the police officer has probable cause
to believe a traffic violation has occurred. Id.
Therefore, an officer who has probable cause to
believe a traffic violation has occurred may stop a
vehicle regardless of his subjective motivation in
doing so. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745,
749 (Ky. 2001).
In this case, Officer Love testified that he stopped
the Defendant's vehicle without a warrant on the
grounds that she committed the traffic violation
referred to as careless driving. He eventually cited the
Defendant for the traffic violation. Pursuant to KRS §
189.290(1), the operator of any vehicle upon a highway
shall operate the vehicle in a careful manner, with
regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians and
other vehicles upon the highway.
The Defendant admits that she was driving her
vehicle around 11:00 p.m., and that the entrance to the
road onto which she wanted to turn was dark. The
Defendant admits that she missed the road and then
stopped her vehicle, put the vehicle into reverse, passed
the entrance of the road going in the wrong direction
and turned onto the road. A dispute exists as to
whether the Defendant backed up thirty (30) feet or five
(5) feet on the road. This Court finds Officer Love's
testimony to be more credible.
The Defendant argues that her actions did not
constitute careless driving, because the road was free of
traffic and she looked before putting her car in reverse.
The Court disagrees. According to Officer Love,
Moock Road is heavily traveled. Driving one's
vehicle the wrong way for approximately thirty (30)
feet on a heavily-traveled road, late at night, in a
poorly-lighted area, is not driving in a careful manner,
with regard for the safety and convenience of
pedestrians and other vehicles. Although there
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apparently was no traffic at the time of the Defendant's
actions, the Defendant could not have anticipated when
another vehicle or a pedestrian may have crossed her
path. Further, other drivers and pedestrians would not
anticipate a vehicle traveling backwards in the wrong
direction on the road.
This Court does not believe the Commonwealth is
required to prove the careless driving violation. Rather,
an officer must only have probable cause to believe
that a traffic violation has occurred in order to stop a
suspected vehicle. Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749.
Wherefore, this Court finds that Officer Love had
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had
occurred and was justified in initiating the traffic stop.
Next, the Defendant argues that Officer Love had
no right to search her person or her vehicle without a
warrant. Consent is an exception to the warrant
requirement. Cook, 826 S.W.2d at 331. The
Commonwealth must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that consent was freely and voluntarily
obtained without any threat, or express or implied
coercion. Id. The question of voluntariness turns on
a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances
in a specific case. Id. The question is to be
determined by an objective evaluation of police
conduct, not by the defendant's subjective view of
reality. Id. at 331-32.
Asking a detained motorist whether she would
consent to a search of her vehicle does not necessarily
make the stop unreasonable in scope or duration.
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (U.S. 199) [sic].
In Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2004), the Court of Appeals discussed and
relied on Robinette and United States v. Burton, 334
F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court recognized that a
prolonged detention and request to search a defendant's
vehicle following a traffic stop may be reasonable
despite the absence of a reasonable suspicion of
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separate criminal activity or the subjective intentions of
the officer. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d at 887.
Questions that hold potential for detecting
crime, but create little or no inconvenience, do not turn
reasonable detention into unreasonable detention, they do
not signal oppressive police tactics and they do not
forcibly invade any privacy interest. Id. at 888. All
suspects may fully protect themselves by declining to
answer. Id. Moreover, where a motorist is initially
stopped for a valid purpose and subsequently gives
consent to a search of her vehicle, the voluntariness of
her consent is the only issue to consider for Fourth
Amendment purposes, not whether the continued
detention was justified by reasonable suspicion. Id.
Having conducted a legitimate traffic stop of
the Defendant's vehicle, Officer Love was warranted in
requesting permission to search the Defendant's person or
vehicle. The Defendant disputes that she gave the
officer consent. Again, this Court finds her
testimony to be less credible than that of Officer Love.
Officer Love testified that he asked the Defendant for
consent to search her vehicle and she agreed, and then
he asked her for consent to search her person and she
agreed. He returned the money he found in the
Defendant's pocket, which was the only item he
found on her person. Officer Love testified that
approximately five minutes elapsed from the time of
the stop to obtaining consent. This Court finds that the
prolonged detention and request to search were
reasonable.
Under Erickson and the case law to which it refers,
the voluntariness of Defendant's consent is the only
issue to consider for Fourth Amendment purposes.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that Officer
Love obtained the Defendant's consent to search through
any threat, or coercion. Considering all of the
surrounding circumstances of the stop and objectively
evaluating Officer Love's conduct, it appears that the
Defendant voluntarily gave consent to search her vehicle
and her person.
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Officer Love freely admits that the Defendant
later revoked her consent. Before that revocation
occurred, Officer Love began the search and observed
marijuana seeds in the pocket on the driver's side door.
As a result of his personal observation of the
marijuana seeds, Officer Love had probable cause to
continue searching the vehicle.
In sum, we hold that the circuit court properly denied Roberts’ motion
to suppress.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Deanna L. Dennison
Covington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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