L. (J.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 11, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001090-ME
J. L., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA ADDINGTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-J-00116
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2010-CA-001091-ME
K. L., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA ADDINGTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-J-00118
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, NICKELL, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
APPELLEE
NICKELL, JUDGE: J.L., a male child, and K.L., his minor sister, have appealed
from separate orders entered on the same date by the Hardin Circuit Court, Family
Division, finding them each to be habitual truants and imposing restrictions on
their movements and school absences until graduation or until they reach the age of
21, whichever occurs first. After a careful review of the record and the law, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On March 31, 2010, juvenile petitions were filed alleging J.L. and K.L
each had an excessive number of unexcused absences from school as well as
several unexcused tardies. The children continued to be absent from school
subsequent to the filings. On April 23, 2010, the juveniles and their mother
appeared in court for arraignment on the charged offenses. The family court
discussed at length their absence from a previously scheduled court date from
which they believed they had been “excused.” The court informed the juveniles
and their mother of their right to be represented by counsel, made several inquiries
regarding the family’s financial situation, and appointed the Department of Public
Advocacy (DPA) to represent J.L. and K.L.
On May 7, 2010, the parties appeared again before the family court
accompanied by their appointed attorney. The attorney indicated the children
would be entering admissions to the charged offenses. J.L. and K.L. were placed
under oath. The following brief exchange occurred:
Judge: Alright you can lower your hands. Now I’ll need
for you to speak a little bit louder. Let me start with
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[J.L.]. [J.L.] it is my understanding that you’re prepared
today to admit to being habitually truant, is that true?
J.L.: Yes ma’am.
Judge: Alright, let me note for the record then that the
juvenile admits to habitual truancy. [K.L] it is also my
understanding that you’re prepared today to admit to
habitual truancy, is that true?
K.L.: Yes ma’am.
Judge: Alright, I’ll note for the record then that the
juvenile admits to habitual truancy.
The court then indicated that a juvenile status offense order would be entered. This
order would include provisions that the children attend school and comply with
other orders of the court until their graduation from high school or until they
reached the age of 21, whichever were to come first. The court inquired as to
whether the children’s attorney would be making an objection about the court’s
jurisdiction after the children reached 18 years of age, which inquiry was answered
in the affirmative.1 Noting the objection, the court explored the substance of the
disposition order with the juveniles. This appeal followed.
Before this Court, J.L. and K.L. present two contentions in urging
reversal. First, they contend their admissions to the charged offenses must be set
aside based on the trial court’s failure to ensure the entry of the admissions was
1
Although not part of the record before this Court, the briefs for the children indicate that
substantive arguments on this issue were presented to the trial court in a different status offender
case around the same time as the instant cases were before the court. That unrelated case is
presently on appeal to this Court. Because the trial court and the attorneys were aware of the
substance of the objection, no further discussion appears in our record.
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knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made and that the juveniles knew the
constitutional rights they were giving up by entering such admissions. Second,
they contend the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction when it entered the
disposition order imposing conditions relating to their education until their twentyfirst birthdays.
The entry of an admission of guilt2 necessarily involves the waiver of
numerous constitutional rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.
1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Before accepting a plea, a court must determine
whether the accused fully understands the charges levied against him and the
consequences of entering the plea. D.R. v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 292, 294
(Ky. 2001). A waiver of rights cannot be assumed from a silent record. Id. In the
recent case of A.C. v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Ky. App. 2010), a
panel of this Court reiterated that the requirements of a plea colloquy as set forth in
Boykin apply with equal force in juvenile status offender cases as they do in adult
criminal matters.
Here, the trial court made no apparent attempt on the record to discuss
any of these important matters before accepting pleas from the juveniles. Although
it appears there may have been an agreement between the parties as to disposition,
the trial court made no inquiry as to whether the children understood the terms of
any such agreement, the consequences of admitting the underlying charges, or that
the admissions were being “knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently” entered.
2
In typical criminal matters, guilty pleas are entered by those charged. In juvenile matters, there
is a change in terminology such that charges are “admitted.” The ultimate outcome is the same.
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The record in the present case shows that under any test,
the bare minimum for compliance with Boykin was not
met. We recognize that juvenile proceedings are by
nature less formal than adult proceedings; and we are
aware of the great number of cases most district judges
handle. However, juvenile adjudication proceedings
must meet constitutional muster, and this one does not.
Id. at 323 (quoting J.D. v. Commonwealth, 211 S.W.3d 60, 62-63 (Ky. App. 2006)
(emphasis and alterations in original)). While we understand the heavy loads
placed on family courts and the need to streamline their dockets, we cannot
condone the violation of any party’s constitutional rights. Thus, we must reverse
and remand this matter for a new dispositional hearing which passes constitutional
muster.
Because we are reversing and remanding based on the constitutional
infirmity, J.L. and K.L.’s other allegation of error is moot and warrants no formal
discussion. However, we feel it important to note that the record before this Court
is severely lacking in support of the jurisdictional argument. The parties and the
trial court were obviously aware of the substantive arguments on the matter, but
this Court is not privy to discussions had in other unrelated cases. Suffice it to say
that a party risks the loss of an otherwise valid argument on appeal if the record
before us is incomplete. Merely asking a trial court to note an objection raised in
another case is likely insufficient to garner full review by this Court because we
are limited to examination of the certified record in each individual appeal.
Citation to another case presently under review by this Court which contains
similar arguments on similar issues does not satisfy a party’s burden of providing
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us with a complete record, the absence of which can be fatal to appellate
arguments. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Hardin Circuit Court,
Family Division, are reversed and remanded for additional proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Hobbs
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
No brief filed.
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