THOMPSON (BETH A.) VS. ASHLAND HOSPITAL CORPORATION
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RENDERED: JULY 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000801-MR
BETH A. THOMPSON,
As Executrix of the Estate of
SAMMY EUGENE THOMPSON, SR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEORGE DAVIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01601
ASHLAND HOSPITAL CORPORATION
d/b/a KING’S DAUGHTERS MEDICAL CENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 CHIEF SENIOR
JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Beth A. Thompson (“Ms. Thompson”) appeals from an order
of the Boyd Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Ashland
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Chief Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
Hospital Corporation d/b/a/ King’s Daughters Medical Center (“KDMC”). Ms.
Thompson sued KDMC after her father fell off a table and was injured as he was
about to receive an x-ray. Thompson contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that her failure to provide expert testimony on the issues of standard of
care and causation was fatal to her claim. We conclude that because Ms.
Thompson is prosecuting a claim of ordinary negligence rather than complex
medical negligence, the trial court erred in determining that expert testimony was
required to instruct the jury on KDMC’s standard of care and its alleged breach of
that standard. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment on appeal and
remand the matter for further proceedings.
On August 11, 2008, Sammy Thompson (“Mr. Thompson”) was
admitted as a patient at KDMC in Ashland, Kentucky. One week later, and while
still a patient, Mr. Thompson was taken to an area of the KDMC facility to receive
an x-ray. According to the record, Mr. Thompson – who allegedly was designated
by KDMC as being at a high risk of falling due to his medical condition, and who
was semi-comatose – was placed without restraints or side rails on a 29” wide table
to undergo the scan. One technician was present in the room with Mr. Thompson.
When the technician allegedly stepped away from the table,2 Mr. Thompson fell
off the table and onto the floor. Mr. Thompson’s head and face struck the floor,
allegedly resulting in serious bodily injury and additional medical costs.
2
KDMC states that the record contains no evidence that the technician stepped away from the
table.
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Sometime thereafter, Mr. Thompson died for reasons apparently not
associated with the fall. His daughter, Ms. Thompson, in her capacity of executrix,
then filed the instant action in Boyd Circuit Court on December 8, 2008, alleging
that KDMC’s ordinary negligence resulted in Mr. Thompson’s fall and resultant
injuries. Ms. Thompson alleged that KDMC breached its duty of care by placing
her semi-conscious, heavily sedated father on the x-ray table without any restraints
or side rails, which proximately resulted in his fall and resultant injuries and costs.
The matter proceeded in Boyd Circuit Court, where KDMC was
served with interrogatories and various motions were made and ruled upon. One
ruling required Ms. Thompson to identify any expert witnesses by January 30,
2010. After Ms. Thompson failed to comply with the order, she filed a written
motion on February 1, 2010, seeking 30 additional days to identify her experts.
The motion was sustained, which gave Ms. Thompson until March 5, 2010, to
disclose the witnesses. Ms. Thompson failed to disclose the names of any expert
witnesses by the March 5, 2010 deadline.
After waiting an additional three weeks, KDMC filed a motion for
summary judgment. As a basis for the motion, KDMC argued that Ms.
Thompson’s failure to produce an expert witness prevented her from establishing
either the correct standard of care and/or that KDMC’s alleged breach of that
standard of care proximately resulted in Mr. Thompson’s injuries. Ms. Thompson
did not file a responsive pleading.
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On April 5, 2010, the trial court rendered an Order and Summary
Judgment, which sustained KDMC’s motion upon finding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and that KDMC was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. As a basis for the judgment, the court opined that Ms. Thompson’s
failure to present expert testimony on the issues of a breach of a standard of care,
and of causation, resulted in her inability to meet her burden of proof if the matter
proceeded to trial. This appeal followed.
Ms. Thompson now argues that the trial court erred in sustaining
KDMC’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Ms. Thompson contends
that the court erred in concluding that she could not prosecute her action without
providing expert testimony on the issues of whether KDMC had a duty to prevent
Mr. Thompson from falling off the table, and whether it breached that duty which
proximately resulted in Mr. Thompson’s injuries. While acknowledging that a
complicated medical negligence action may require expert testimony to establish
duty, breach and causation, Ms. Thompson notes that she is prosecuting an
ordinary negligence action in which no medical procedure – much less a
sophisticated medical procedure – was performed. She contends that genuine
issues of material fact remain for adjudication, and that the trial court erred in
failing to so rule.
In order to prevail in a negligence action in Kentucky, a plaintiff must
offer proof that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, which the
defendant breached that duty, and that injury proximately resulted from the breach.
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Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W. 3d 85 (Ky. 2003). In a medical negligence
action, the plaintiff must prove that the treatment given was below the degree of
care and skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner, and that the
negligence proximately caused injury or death. Reams v. Stutler, 642 S.W. 2d 586
(Ky. 1982). As a rule, the complexity of medical procedures requires a medical
negligence plaintiff to rely on expert testimony rather than lay testimony to
establish duty, breach, causation and injury. Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d
665 (Ky. 2010). Conversely, ordinary or simple negligence actions do not require
expert testimony. Id. The test for distinguishing between medical negligence and
ordinary or simple negligence is “. . . whether the case involves a matter of science
or art requiring special knowledge or skill not ordinarily possessed by the average
person or is one where the common everyday experiences of the trier of the
facts . . . are sufficient in order to reach the proper conclusion. In the former,
expert opinion testimony is ordinarily required to aid the trier of the facts; in the
latter it is unnecessary.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165 (Ky. App. 2006),
quoting Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 A.D.2d 125, 127-128 (N.Y.A.D.1980).
The question for our consideration, then, is whether the facts
surrounding Mr. Thompson’s fall involve a matter of science or art requiring
special knowledge or skill not ordinarily possessed by the average person, or
conversely whether the common everyday experiences of a jury are sufficient in
order to reach the proper conclusion. Andrew, supra. Having closely considered
the entire record, we cannot conclude that an average person would be unable to
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discern without the benefit of expert testimony why Mr. Thompson fell off the
table, nor why the fall allegedly resulted in injury. The facts of this action are
more akin to a routine “slip and fall” negligence action than a medical malpractice
action involving complex and sophisticated medical procedures which are outside
the knowledge or skill ordinarily possessed by the average person. That is to say,
whereas an average person will not possess the knowledge or skill required to
consider the complexities of sophisticated medical procedures, such a person’s
“common everyday experiences” will allow him or her to determine why an
allegedly sick, semi-comatose individual fell off a table. Additionally, Ms.
Thompson, through counsel, repeatedly alleged in her complaint that KDMC
engaged in ordinary negligence rather than medical negligence. While her usage
of this language is by no means controlling, it does bolster her assertion that the
instant action has from the outset been about KDMC’s alleged ordinary negligence
rather than medical negligence. Finally, we cannot conclude that every alleged act
of negligence occurring in a hospital setting must be characterized as medical
negligence. The determination of whether the alleged negligence is ordinary
negligence or medical negligence is fact-based, and the facts now before us do not
compel us to conclude that the trier of fact would be unable to reach a proper
conclusion absent hearing expert testimony.
KDMC directs our attention to Blankenship, supra, in support of its
contention that summary judgment was properly rendered after Ms. Thompson
failed to produce an expert who would testify as to the elements necessary to prove
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medical negligence. Specifically, it maintains that such testimony was necessary
as to the standard of care, how that standard allegedly was breached by KDMC,
and how that alleged breach actually caused Mr. Thompson’s injuries.
Blankenship held in relevant part that summary judgment was properly rendered
after the plaintiff failed either to produce an expert witness or to claim that no such
witness was necessary in his medical malpractice action. Blankenship is
distinguishable from the facts before us, however, in that the Blankenship action
centered on a physician’s alleged negligence in failing to properly diagnose and
treat appendicitis. That is to say, Blankenship addressed a medical malpractice
claim, which involved sophisticated diagnostic and medical treatment requiring
special knowledge or skill not ordinarily possessed by the average person.
Andrew, supra. Whereas an average person could not manage the emergent
diagnosis and treatment of acute appendicitis as found in Blankenship, such a
person could – with the application of “common everyday experiences” –
understand why and how a sick person fell off a table. Id. Since we cannot
characterize Ms. Thompson’s action as a medical malpractice claim requiring her
usage of expert witnesses, we must conclude that KDMC’s reliance on
Blankenship is misplaced.
Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
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law.” CR 56.03. “The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky.1991). Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible
that the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a
judgment in his favor. Id. “Even though a trial court may believe the party
opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary
judgment if there is any issue of material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of
review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found
that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779,
781 (Ky. App. 1996).
When viewing the record in a light most favorable to Ms. Thompson
and resolving all doubts in her favor, we cannot conclude that it appears impossible
for Ms. Thompson to prevail at trial. The fact that Ms. Thompson’s counsel
inexplicably failed to meet two discovery deadlines or file a responsive pleading to
KDMC’s motion for summary judgment does not alter this conclusion. Ultimately,
the dispositive questions are whether the trier of fact would be unable to consider
the issues presented without the benefit of expert testimony, and whether it appears
impossible that Ms. Thompson could prevail at trial absent such testimony. We
must answer these questions in the negative, and accordingly conclude that
summary judgment was not warranted.
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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary judgment of the
Boyd Circuit Court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
LAMBERT, CHIEF SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the majority
opinion, but write separately to point out that, to reverse the circuit court’s
summary judgment, we are taking the extraordinary approach of engaging, sua
sponte, in a palpable error review under CR 61.02. See Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d
218, 222 (Ky. 1997) (“Court of Appeals sua sponte . . . reasoned that the trial
court’s [ruling] constituted palpable error under CR 61.02.”); but see Shepherd v.
Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (“Absent extreme circumstances
amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage
in palpable error review pursuant to [Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure] RCr
10.26 [worded identically to CR 61.02] unless such a request is made and briefed
by the appellant.” Emphasis supplied.).
Because Ms. Thompson never disputed the need for an expert witness
while the case was before the circuit court – and, in fact, asked the circuit court for
additional time to identify her own expert – the issue was never preserved for our
review. She even failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. Ms.
Thompson acknowledged her failure to preserve the issue before the circuit court
by her subsequent failure to tell this Court “whether the issue was properly
preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). It has long
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been our Supreme Court’s view that specific grounds not raised before the trial
court, but raised for the first time on appeal, will not support a favorable ruling on
appeal. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989) (“The
Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by
the trial court.”). As our high court recently said,
when an appellate court determines to reverse a trial
court, it cannot do so on an unpreserved legal ground
unless it finds palpable error, because the trial court has
not had a fair opportunity to rule on the legal question.
Though this policy of placing the burden on the
appealing party to have raised an issue before the trial
court may appear unfair, since it essentially favors
affirming the lower court, the simple fact is that the
burden must be placed on someone and there must be a
default position, either favoring affirming or reversing,
with which to approach cases. Our cases have
recognized the potential dissonance of such a rule but
have still approved it. See [Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 812 n.
3 (Ky. 2010)] (noting that a court may affirm for any
reason appearing in the record but must reverse only for
preserved issues). Ultimately, it is the responsibility of
the movant to put the legal ground before the court,
because it is, after all, his motion, and he bears the
burden of proof and persuasion.
Fischer v. Fischer, --- S.W.3d ----, 2011 WL 1087156, *6 (Ky. March 24, 2011),
pet. for reh. pending.
Furthermore, Ms. Thompson has not asked this Court to review the
issue under the palpable error standard. Therefore, we are perforce concluding that
the case before us presents “extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial
miscarriage of justice [.]” Shepherd, 251 S.W.3d at 316. Although I am not
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entirely convinced that the injustice here is so extreme as to justify the
implementation of this extraordinary level of review, I do agree with the majority
that the circuit court’s “find[ing] that [Ms. Thompson] is required to present expert
testimony in support of her medical negligence claims” is not supported by a
consideration of the entire record. CR 56.03; see also Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d
218, 222 (Ky. 1997) (citation omitted) (“[P]alpable error must result from action
taken by the Court rather than from an act or omission by the attorneys or
litigants.”).
Our decision today gives Ms. Thompson, and her legal counsel, the
opportunity – arguably a second opportunity – to get to the merits of her claim. In
the larger context, I fear it will do nothing to elevate the practice of law.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael J. Curtis
Ashland, Kentucky
Laura L. Mays
John M. Famularo
Lexington, Kentucky
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