FAIRCHILD (CHRISTOPHER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 12, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000448-MR
CHRISTOPHER FAIRCHILD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00144
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Appellant, Christopher Fairchild, appeals from a Johnson
Circuit Court order denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence. After careful review, we
affirm the court’s denial of the motion without an evidentiary hearing because
Appellant’s grounds for the order, ineffective assistance of counsel, lack merit.
This case stems from the September 2006 murder of James Mollette.
Fairchild’s conviction was largely based upon the eyewitness testimony of Thomas
Baldridge. As Baldridge testified, after he and Fairchild were out hunting for
ginseng, they stopped by Mollette’s home to purchase marijuana. Baldridge
alleged that he had stayed outside while Fairchild went inside the residence. After
hearing a single gunshot, Fairchild came back outside and ordered Baldridge, at
gunpoint, to cut off Mollette’s head. Baldridge was then handed what is described
as a modified hoe axe, but did not finish the decapitation. The two men then left
the scene in Mollette’s four-wheeler along with a few other stolen items.
At trial, the Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist, Dr. Jennifer Shot
was called to give her expert opinion on the cause of death. Though there is no
controversy that Mollette’s death was caused by a gunshot wound, she was also
asked to discuss what type of tool would be consistent with the wounds on the neck
that resulted from the attempted decapitation. To this, Dr. Shot replied that though
the wounds could be consistent with an axe, there were also signs that the tool
could have been something sharper and less blunt.
At the trial’s conclusion, Fairchild was found guilty of murder by
complicity, two counts of receiving stolen property and one count tampering with
physical evidence by complicity. Fairchild received a twenty-year sentence and
the conviction was later affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in September of
2009. Fairchild then filed an RCr 11.42 motion pro se, alleging ineffective
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assistance of counsel, which was denied without an evidentiary hearing. This
appeal followed.
Fairchild contends that because Dr. Shot was unclear as to the tool
used to cause the neck wounds and because his former counsel had not called upon
their own pathologist, this negatively affected his ability to cast doubt on
Baldridge’s version of the events. Fairchild maintains his version of the story,
which is that he and Baldridge had split up to hunt for ginseng and that he was
never at the scene of the murder. He therefore argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing because his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel could not be refuted from the face of the record.
A trial court judge may deny an evidentiary hearing for an RCr 11.42
motion when the allegations in the motion can be resolved on the face of the
record. Fraser v. Com., 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001). The denial is valid so
long as there is no material fact at issue. Id. An RCr 11.42 motion is not to be
used to re-litigate previously determined issues. Harris v. Com., 296 S.W.2d 700,
701 (Ky. 1956). Nor is the motion to be used to merely “fish for claims.” Baze v.
Com., 23 S.W.3d 619, 628 (Ky. 2000); Ford v. Com., 453 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1970).
Thus, in a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[a] reviewing court must always
defer to the determination of facts and witness credibility made by the circuit
judge.” Simmons v. Com., 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), overruled on other
grounds by Leonard v. Com., 279 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Ky. 2009).
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For Fairchild to prevail upon his RCr 11.42 motion, he must show:
(1) that trial counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency was
prejudicial and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
In order to show deficiency in counsel, a defendant must identify acts
or omissions of counsel that are professionally unreasonable. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct.
at 2066. The standard for assessing counsel’s performance is whether the alleged
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms
based on an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688–89, 104 S. Ct. at
2065. Attorneys are given great discretion in determining proper trial strategy.
Harper v. Com., 978 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998). As such, when analyzing their
performance, the court must be “highly deferential,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,
104 S. Ct. at 2065, meaning mere speculation that a different strategy may have
been advantageous is not enough. Hodge v. Com., 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky.
2003), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Com., 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009).
For a counsel’s deficiency to be prejudicial, Fairchild must show “that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Moore v. Com., 983 S.W.2d
479, 488 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068)). A
reasonable probability is defined as, “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. Further still, an error by counsel, even if
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professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S
at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Kentucky courts have articulated this standard as,
“counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below professional
standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have
won.” Brown v. Com., 253 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Ky. 2008); Haight v. Com., 41
S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ky. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir.
1992)). “The critical issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel
was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable
victory.” Brown, 253 S.W.3d at 499.
Turning to the case at hand, we find the conduct to be within the
bounds of reasonable professional judgment. The Commonwealth’s pathologist,
Dr. Shot, was effectively cross-examined by defense counsel. Dr. Shot’s testimony
was that Mollette’s neck injuries could have been caused by an ax. The item in
question has apparently been referred to in many different ways. Fairchild’s own
brief described the item as “a tool, similar to an axe.” At trial, the tool was
described as “a hoe with an axe on the opposite end.” Thus, these descriptions
seem to accurately convey the pathologist’s assessment that the tool could have
been an axe, and justifies her vague description.
Even assuming agruendo that the trial counsel erred in not calling on
their own forensic pathologist, such error would not constitute prejudice. Had this
been done, it is unlikely that the result of the proceeding would have been
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different. Appellant’s reasoning fails to connect how additional testimony
describing the tool would somehow undermine Baldridge’s testimony. Further,
Mollette did not die of the wounds to his neck but by a gunshot wound.
Finding no material fact at issue, the Johnson Circuit Court’s denial of
the RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing was valid. The trial
counsel’s decision not to call upon their own forensic pathologist was not in error
nor prejudicial.
Accordingly, the Johnson Circuit Court Order is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
M. Brooke Buchanan
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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