MCKENZIE (JAMES RYAN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 29, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000115-MR
JAMES RYAN MCKENZIE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE V, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00338
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
VACATING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: James McKenzie appeals from a Campbell Circuit
Court judgment convicting him of first-degree possession of a controlled substance
and sentencing him to serve one year. McKenzie entered a plea of guilty to the
1
Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
charge conditioned upon his right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence. He also appeals the imposition of court costs and a public
defender fee.
McKenzie was detained when police in Newport executed a search
warrant on a residence at 412 Constance Alley. The police obtained the warrant
after learning from an informant that an individual named Randall Pearson was
selling heroin at that address. Officers also conducted a controlled buy of heroin
from the residence. The warrant authorized a search of the house and the person of
Randall Pearson. The warrant was executed by officers of the Newport Police
narcotics directive unit and the Newport Police SWAT team. The SWAT team
broke through the front door of the house with a battering ram and secured the
occupants of the residence. Officer Chris Carpenter found McKenzie, whom he
did not know, standing in the kitchen. He ordered McKenzie to lie face down on
the floor and secured his wrists with flex cuffs. As he patted McKenzie down for
weapons, Officer Carpenter spotted the tip of a plastic baggie sticking out of
McKenzie’s pocket. Carpenter later testified that he believed, based on his
experience, that the baggie would contain drugs. Office Carpenter removed the
baggie from McKenzie’s pocket. It was later shown to contain heroin. McKenzie
was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled substance.
McKenzie moved to suppress the evidence. After a hearing, the trial
court denied his motion on the grounds that suppression was not the remedy for a
violation of the “knock and announce” rule; that the officers lawfully detained
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McKenzie during their search of the residence; and that the plastic bag in
McKenzie’s pocket was in plain view and its incriminating nature readily apparent
to Officer Carpenter. McKenzie entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge
of first-degree possession of a controlled substance and this appeal followed.
An appellate court’s standard of review of the trial court's
decision on a motion to suppress requires that we first
determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then they
are conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we must
then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
application of the law to those facts to determine whether
its decision is correct as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (footnotes omitted).
“[T]he Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement
that police officers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their
identity and purpose before attempting forcible entry.” Adcock v. Commonwealth,
967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 933, 115
S.Ct. 1914, 1918, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995)). Not every entry must be preceded by
an announcement; the police may justify a no-knock entry if they have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile.
Id. at 9. Whether the rule was violated in this case is not at issue; the
Commonwealth does not dispute the trial court’s finding that the police did violate
the “knock and announce” rule. But, as the trial court correctly stated, the remedy
for this violation is not the suppression of the evidence. In Hudson v. Michigan,
the United States Supreme Court balanced the societal costs of applying the
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exclusionary rule against the need to deter such behavior on the part of the police
and concluded that “[r]esort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of
guilt is unjustified.” 547 U.S. 586, 599, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2168, 165 L.Ed.2d 56
(2006). We can find no support in Kentucky law to justify the imposition of the
exclusionary rule to evidence recovered as a result of the violation of the knock
and announce rule.
McKenzie next argues that the search warrant was facially invalid
because it did not describe the person to be searched, Randall Pearson, with
sufficient particularity. The warrant simply identified the person to be searched as
“Randall Pearson – M/W” [male, white]. Even if, solely for the sake of argument,
we assume that the description of Pearson was inadequate, it did not invalidate the
remainder of the warrant, which described the residence at 412 Constance Alley
with great specificity. As an occupant of the residence at the time the search was
conducted, McKenzie’s detention was lawful because “a warrant to search [a
house] for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is
conducted.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595, 69
L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
McKenzie nonetheless argues that under Johantgen v.
Commonwealth, 571 S.W.2d 110 (Ky. 1978), the terms of the warrant were not
broad enough to include his detention. But Johantgen expressly permits a limited
detention of precisely the type experienced by McKenzie. In Johantgen, the police
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had a warrant to search an individual named Daryl Driver, his car, his residence
and “any other person present believed to be involved in the illegal use of,
possession of, or trafficking in controlled substances.” When the officers arrived
at the Driver residence, the only people there were a woman and a child. The
police began the search and a few minutes later Driver arrived, accompanied by
Johantgen. Johantgen was searched and heroin was found in his pocket. On
appeal, it was held that the evidence recovered from Johantgen had to be
suppressed because
[t]he mere fact that the appellant arrived at the residence
where a search was being conducted in the company of
one named in the search warrant and on whom drugs
were found does not meet the test of probable cause.
Absent some other incriminating circumstances or
behavior, any search of his person beyond the “patdown” search was unjustified. . . . The fact that appellant
was in the company of the person described in the
warrant is not sufficient to legitimize a search of him
beyond that necessary to reveal any weapons.
Johantgen, 571 S.W.2d at 112-113.
Under Johantgen and Summers, therefore, the pat-down search of
McKenzie by Officer Carpenter was permissible. It was also fully in keeping with
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which held that a
brief investigative stop, detention, and frisk for weapons do not violate the Fourth
Amendment as long as the initial stop is supported by reasonable suspicion.
McKenzie argues that there was no justification for a Terry stop and frisk because
there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal
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activity or that he was armed and dangerous. He contends that once police
discovered that he was not Randall Pearson, he should have been free to leave. We
disagree. McKenzie was found in the kitchen of a house where the police had
probable cause to believe heroin was being sold. In a factually similar case, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated
when occupants of a house being searched for narcotics were handcuffed and
forced to lie face down.
When occupants of a residence are detained during the
execution of a search warrant, the circumstances
ordinarily will justify more intrusive behavior by the
police than in a typical on-the-street detention. . . .
Concern for safety of the agents and the need to prevent
disposal of any narcotics on the premises, justified the
restraint of the occupants[.] . . . And those concerns are
the same regardless of whether the individuals present in
the home being searched are residents or visitors.
United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 663 (6th Cir.1993). Concern for the officers’
own safety and the potential destruction of evidence justified Officer Carpenter’s
decision to handcuff and frisk McKenzie.
McKenzie further contends that even if the detention and frisk were
lawful, Officer Carpenter exceeded the bounds of what is permissible under Terry.
“[T]he extent of a Terry pat-down is quite limited – only a search of outer clothing
is justified unless the officer finds what he believes to be a weapon or anything that
might be used as a weapon. If no weapons are discovered, a Terry search may
proceed no further.” Johantgen, 571 S.W.2d at 112. The trial court nonetheless
found that the seizure of the baggie was permissible because it was in “plain view.”
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In order for the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement to apply, three
elements must be met:
First, the law enforcement officer must not have violated
the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place where the
evidence could be plainly viewed. Second, not only must
the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the
object can be plainly seen, but he or she must have a
lawful right of access to the object itself. Finally, the
object’s incriminating character must also be
immediately apparent.
Hazel v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1992) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
As we have previously determined, the first two elements were met in
this case because Officer Carpenter was lawfully on the premises executing a valid
search warrant, and McKenzie had not been seized in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. As to the third element, McKenzie argues that because the
officer only saw the tip of the baggie in his pocket, the incriminating character of
the item seized was not immediately apparent.
The Commonwealth contends that the incriminating nature of the
baggie was immediately apparent because people do not normally carry baggies in
their pockets and, furthermore, because the stop and frisk took place in a residence
where the sale of illegal drugs was suspected, by an experienced officer who
testified that narcotics are commonly trafficked in plastic baggies. But “the court
must not evaluate whether the incriminating nature of an item is immediately
apparent from the viewpoint of a law enforcement officer with extensive training
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and experience.” United States v. Guzman-Cornejo, 620 F.Supp.2d 917, 922 (N.D.
Ill. 2009). Rather, the court is required to determine “whether the facts available to
the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain
items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime.” Id.
(citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502
(1983)). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that, under the plain
view doctrine,
probable cause cannot be established solely on the
observation of material which can be used for legitimate
purposes, even though the experience of an officer
indicates that such material is often used for illegitimate
purposes. Moreover, it is not sufficient probable cause to
seize an item from inside the suspect’s clothing if the
officer has no more than an educated ‘hunch’ . . . that the
item might be contraband.
Cauls v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 847, 851- 852 (Va.Ct.App.2009) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). There is nothing inherently incriminating
about plastic baggies, which are widely used for legitimate purposes and not solely
for packaging illegal narcotics. “[T]he court cannot say that a man of reasonable
caution who was aware of the facts surrounding the investigation would have
believed, rather than suspected,” that the baggie contained contraband. GuzmanCornejo, 620 F.Supp. 2d at 922. Plastic baggies “are not single purpose containers
such that their contents could be readily inferred from their outward appearance.”
Id.
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Although the seizure of the baggie was impermissible under the plain
view exception, it was nonetheless ultimately justified under the “inevitable
discovery” doctrine. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d
377 (1984), the United States Supreme Court adopted the “inevitable discovery”
rule to permit the admission of evidence unlawfully obtained by police upon proof
by a preponderance of the evidence that the same evidence would have been
inevitably discovered by lawful means. Id., 467 U.S. at 444, 104 S.Ct. at 2509.
After McKenzie was detained, it was discovered that he had an active warrant
against him on a charge of giving a police officer a false name. Officer Arnberg,
who swore out the probable cause affidavit in support of the search warrant and
was present at the execution of the warrant, testified that he recognized McKenzie
and that McKenzie would have been arrested on the basis of the outstanding
warrant even if narcotics had not been found on his person.
In Nix, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule was to deter police from constitutional violations and then explained that the
inevitable discovery rule operated conversely to ensure that the prosecution should
not be put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error or
misconduct. Thus, even if Officer Carpenter had not spotted and removed the
baggie, McKenzie would have been searched and the heroin lawfully recovered
when the outstanding warrant was discovered. Indeed, the Ohio Court of Appeals
has extended the rule to hold that because “an outstanding arrest warrant operates
to deprive its subject of the reasonable expectation of privacy the Fourth
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Amendment protects, the exclusionary rule does not apply to a search and seizure
of the subject that would otherwise be illegal[.]” State v. Walker-Stokes, 903
N.E.2d 1277, 1282 - 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
McKenzie has argued otherwise, relying on State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d
1263 (Or.Ct.App. 1975), in which the Oregon Court of Appeals reasoned that
failing to suppress evidence illegally recovered from an individual who was later
shown to have three arrest warrants would encourage the police to conduct
unlawful searches in the hope that probable cause would be developed after the
fact. 536 P.2d 1263, 1264. A similar concern was expressed by this Court in
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 714 S.W.2d 494 (Ky.App. 1986), that extending the
inevitable discovery rule “would open the door to virtually every pretext for
upholding an unlawful search.” 714 S.W.2d at 497. The facts in this case are
sufficiently distinguishable, however. In Elliott, the police improperly entered a
room of the defendant’s sister’s house while conducting a warrantless arrest and
saw illegal drugs in plain view. In Crossen, the police were in a house without a
warrant and noticed a bulge in the shirt pocket of an individual whom they
subsequently searched before discovering he had three outstanding arrest warrants.
By contrast, the detention and pat-down of McKenzie was entirely legal up until
the moment Officer Carpenter retrieved the baggie; the discovery of the evidence
was purely incidental to the primary purpose of executing the search warrant of the
residence.
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We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress,
because an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on other grounds as
long as the lower court reached the correct result. McCloud v. Commonwealth,
286 S.W.3d 780, 786, n.19 (Ky. 2009).
McKenzie’s second main argument concerns the assessment of court
costs and a partial public defender representation fee totaling $355.
McKenzie argues that the imposition of these charges violated KRS
23A.205(2), which states as follows:
The taxation of court costs against a defendant, upon
conviction in a case, shall be mandatory and shall not be
subject to probation, suspension, proration, deduction, or
other form of nonimposition in the terms of a plea
bargain or otherwise, unless the court finds that the
defendant is a poor person as defined by KRS 453.190(2)
and that he or she is unable to pay court costs and will be
unable to pay the court costs in the foreseeable future.
McKenzie argues that throughout the proceedings his indigent status
was never in dispute because he was appointed a public defender who represented
him throughout the proceedings. He was also allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the imposition of costs on an
indigent criminal defendant in Wiley v. Commonwealth,___ S.W. 3d. ___, No.
2009-SC-000702-MR, 2010 WL 4146148 (Ky. Oct. 21, 2010).2 In reviewing the
issue under a palpable error standard, the Supreme Court ruled that:
2
Wiley became final on March 24, 2011, and is designated for publication.
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Under KRS 23A.205(2), a trial court shall impose court
costs on a defendant unless it finds that the defendant is a
“poor person.” In this regard, we have previously found
it to be “manifestly unjust” to impose court costs on an
indigent defendant. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Nos.
2008–SC–000216–MR, 2008–SC–000264–MR, 2009
WL 3526653, at *10 (Ky. Oct. 15, 2009); see also
Edmonson v. Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 595 (Ky.
1987) (finding that the wavier [sic] of all costs for
indigent defendants language of KRS 31.110(1)(b)
controlled over KRS 23A.205(2), which provides the trial
court discretion in imposing court costs). As we see no
reason to depart from the reasoning in Jackson, we now
reverse and vacate the trial court's imposition of court
costs against Appellant.
Wiley, slip opinion at pp. 4-5.
In Wiley, beyond the fact that Wiley was indigent, we are not given
many facts surrounding his status. However, the facts regarding indigent status in
Jackson, which the Supreme Court relied upon in Wiley, are similar to
McKenzie’s.
In Jackson, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent
Jackson after his private counsel withdrew. Jackson, 2009 WL 3526653, at *10.
After Jackson was found guilty, the court assessed a fine and court costs against
him. Id. The trial court explained to Jackson that he was entitled to have a public
defender represent him on appeal and entered an order allowing Jackson to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal.
On review by the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that fines could not
be levied against Jackson pursuant to KRS 534.030. The Court further held that:
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Nor may court costs be levied upon defendants found to
be indigent. KRS 23A.205(2). As noted above, at the
time of his trial and sentencing, Jackson was receiving
the services of a public defender and he was granted the
right to appeal in forma pauperis. Thus, the trial court
clearly erred in imposing a fine and court costs upon
Jackson.
Jackson, 2009 WL 3526653, at *11.
In McKenzie’s case, he was appointed a public defender throughout
the circuit court proceedings. The circuit court granted his motion to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal, and McKenzie is represented on appeal by counsel with
the Department of Public Advocacy. Accordingly, following the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Wiley that it could “see no reason to depart from the reasoning
in Jackson,” we likewise can discern no reason to do so in the case presently under
review.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and
the order imposing costs is vacated.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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