DRAPER (JOHN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 21, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000112-ME
JOHN DRAPER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. MITCHELL NANCE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-J-00087
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
EX REL. SHANNON C. HEACOCK; and
SHANNON C. HEACOCK
AND
NO. 2010-CA-000185-ME
SHANNON C. HEACOCK
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE W. MITCHELL NANCE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-J-00087
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
EX REL. JOHN DRAPER; and
JOHN DRAPER
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: John Draper (“Draper”), the biological father of A.N.H., appeals
from a November 30, 2009, order of the Barren Circuit Court which granted the
motions of Shannon Heacock (“Shannon”) to set aside earlier orders of paternity,
child support, and joint custody. Shannon filed an appeal challenging the trial
court’s sua sponte order entered the same day directing that she reimburse Draper
for $11,762.00 for child support he paid to her for A.N.H. For the reasons set out
below, we reverse and remand to reinstate the original orders adjudging Draper to
be the father of A.N.H., and ordering child support, temporary joint custody, and
visitation of A.N.H.
The underlying facts of this action are not in dispute. Shannon and
Jesse W. (“Jesse”) Heacock were married on December 15, 1997, and have
remained married since that time. During the early years of the marriage, Jesse
served in the United States Army and competed in the sport of boxing. On August
21, 1999, Jesse suffered a closed head injury while boxing and lapsed into a coma.
The record is not clear concerning Jesse’s current condition. While no medical
records were introduced, Shannon testified that Jesse came out of the coma several
weeks later. She also stated that Jesse has significant mental and physical
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impairments, but she maintains that he has shown some awareness of his
surroundings and is able to respond to others.
For some time thereafter, Shannon took care of Jesse in their home.
However, she began to date other men at some point. During the period from June
of 2002, through July of 2004, Shannon and Draper lived together at Shannon and
Jesse’s marital home. On November 21, 2004, Shannon gave birth to a child,
A.N.H. 1
On March 16, 2007, the Barren County Attorney, on behalf of Draper
and A.N.H., filed a paternity action against Shannon. A genetic test revealed a
99.995% probability that Draper was the father of A.N.H. Thereafter, on
September 4, 2007, the family court entered a judgment determining that Draper is
A.N.H.’s father. The court reserved the issues of custody, visitation, and child
support for later adjudication. Subsequently, on January 4, 2008, the court entered
a temporary support order requiring Draper to pay child support in the amount of
$401.00 per month. This amount included current child support as well as
retroactive support beginning October 1, 2007. The record indicates that Draper
remained current on his child support obligation during the entire period it was in
effect.
1
The trial court found that Jesse is currently institutionalized. The record does not indicate when
this occurred. However, the trial court found that Shannon and Draper maintained a cohabitation
living arrangement from June 2002 through July 2004. The trial court also found that during this
period, Shannon and Draper slept together in the same bed while Jesse occupied and slept in
another room. From the trial court’s findings, it is clear that Jesse was not institutionalized until
after the birth of A.N.H.
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On January 11, 2008, the trial court entered an agreed order granting
temporary joint custody of A.N.H. to Draper and Shannon. However, the parties
continued to have disputes over visitation after entry of this order. Both parties
sought primary custody of A.N.H., and the trial court appointed a custodial
evaluator to aid in this determination. On February 25, 2009, the trial court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the custody, visitation, and support issues. In
her post-trial memorandum, however, Shannon argued that, based on the recently
decided case of J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2008), the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
In response, the trial court reopened the evidentiary hearing to take
proof on whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter. After
reconsidering the evidence in the light of J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, the trial court entered
an order on November 30, 2009, setting aside all prior custody, visitation, and
support orders as void ab initio and dismissing Draper’s paternity action on the
grounds that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. However, the trial court also
ordered Shannon to reimburse Draper for all child support he had paid under the
temporary order, totaling $11,762.00. These appeals followed.
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Analysis of J.N.R. v. O’Reilly
The parties agree that the determination of this case turns on
applicability of the recent opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court in J.N.R. v.
O’Reilly. The facts of J.N.R. were as follows. J.G.R. filed a Petition for Custody
and Support in the family court, alleging that DNA tests confirmed him to be the
biological father of J.A.R (“the child”), a three-month-old baby boy who lived with
his mother, J.N.R. (“wife”). At the time of the child’s birth, the wife was married
to J.S.R. (“husband”). The husband and wife jointly objected to J.G.R.’s petition,
arguing that J.G.R. lacked standing to assert paternity of the child due to the
statutory presumption that a child born to a married woman is presumed to be the
child of her husband. Id. at 588.
After the family court refused to dismiss the petition, the husband and
wife brought an action for a writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This
Court denied the writ, holding that the husband and wife had failed to show
irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy by appeal. On further appeal, a
closely divided Supreme Court granted the writ. In the primary opinion, (now
Chief) Justice Minton examined the statutory prerequisites for bringing a paternity
petition. He first noted that Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (“KRS”) Chapter 406
provides the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction over “an action brought
under this chapter” to establish support for “children born out of wedlock.” KRS
406.051(1). KRS 406.051(2) states that the circuit court and district court share
concurrent jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues “in cases where paternity
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is established as set forth in this chapter.” Further, KRS 23A.100(2)(b) confers the
general jurisdiction of the circuit court on a family court division of the circuit
court for proceedings under the Uniform Act on Paternity. Id. at 590.
However, Justice Minton noted that subject-matter jurisdiction under
Chapter 406 is specifically limited to “children born out of wedlock.” KRS
406.011 defines who is included in the class of persons considered to be “born out
of wedlock.”
A child born during lawful wedlock, or within ten (10)
months thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the
husband and wife. However, a child born out of wedlock
includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband where evidence shows that the marital
relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten
(10) months prior to the birth of the child.
Based on this definition, Justice Minton concluded that a third party
asserting paternity must establish that the marital relationship between the husband
and wife ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child. Since this evidentiary
threshold was not met, Justice Minton concluded that the family court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider J.G.R’s petition. Id. at 591. Justice Minton
also found that the family court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction under KRS
403.270, since that Chapter deals exclusively with dissolution proceedings. Id. at
594.
Although four members of the Court joined in the result granting the
writ of prohibition, only then-Chief Justice Lambert joined Justice Minton’s
opinion. Justices Cunningham and Scott concurred in result only. They concluded
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that only parties to the marriage have standing to challenge the presumption of
legitimacy under KRS 406.011. Id. at 596-600 (Cunningham, J., concurring).
The Limited Holding of J.N.R.
As an initial matter, there is some question concerning the
precedential authority of Justice Minton’s primary opinion in J.N.R. “When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of [four] Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds . . . .” Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct. 990, 993, 51 L. Ed. 2d
260 (1977). Moreover, a “minority opinion has no binding precedential value
...[and] if a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a
majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare
decisis effect.” Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17, 21-22 (Ky. 2006),
citing Fugate v. Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Ky. 2001).
Recently, in Bailey v. Bertram, 2010 WL 1641115 (Ky. 2010)(2009SC-000210-MR), the Kentucky Supreme Court called into question the
precedential value of J.N.R. v. O’Reilly. Since only one other justice joined in
Justice Minton’s primary opinion, the Court suggested that the opinion in J.N.R. is
not entitled to stare decisis effect. Id. at 4, citing Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202
S.W.3d 17, 21-22 (Ky. 2006), and Fugate v. Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 15, 19
(Ky. 2001).
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Unfortunately, this discussion in Bailey v. Bertram tends only to
muddy the water rather than clarify it. Bailey v. Bertram is an unpublished case
and may only be cited for consideration if there is no published opinion that would
adequately address the issue before this Court. Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil
Procedure (“CR”) 76.28(4)(c). Moreover, while we recognize this Court is bound
to follow precedents set by published opinions set by the Kentucky Supreme
Court,2 we also recognize that there are circumstances and facts in this case which
distinguish it from those in J.N.R.
With the limited precedential value of J.N.R. and the distinguishable
facts and circumstances of this case in mind, we are required to determine the
question posed in this case of whether the pleading requirements set out in KRS
406.011 are a prerequisite for the family court to have subject-matter jurisdiction
or for a third party to have standing to bring the paternity petition. As noted in
Justice Minton’s primary opinion in J.N.R., subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the
family court’s “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief
sought[,] the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the
status of things.” J.N.R., 264 S.W.3d at 589, quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed. 2004). Standing, on the other hand, is defined as a “sufficient legal interest
in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain some judicial decision in the
controversy.” Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433, 439 (Ky. 1994).
2
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986), citing Rule(s) of the Supreme Court
(“S.C.R.”) 1.030(8)(a).
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In the case of the former, a judgment entered by a court without
subject-matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. See Commonwealth Health Corp. v.
Croslin, 920 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Ky. 1996). In addition, since subject-matter
jurisdiction concerns the very nature and origins of a court's power to act at all, it
“cannot be born of waiver, consent or estoppel.” Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d
733, 738 (Ky. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, a
challenge to standing must be made before the trial court or the issue is waived for
appellate purposes. Tabor v. Council for Burley Tobacco, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 466,
468 (Ky. App. 1980); Hyde v. Haunost, 530 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky.1975).
Although the plurality in J.N.R. concluded that these evidentiary
requirements of KRS 406.021 were prerequisites for invoking the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, a majority of the Court did not agree with this analysis.
In fact, two concurring justices and one dissenting justice specifically held that the
elements are a prerequisite for a stranger to the marriage to have standing and do
not implicate the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, 264
S.W.3d at 600 (Scott, J., concurring), 606-07 (Noble, J., dissenting). Moreover, in
the more recent opinion by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Harrison v. Leach, 323
S.W.3d 702 (Ky. 2010), the Kentucky Supreme Court revisited the distinction
between standing and jurisdiction as applied to the de facto custodian provisions of
KRS 403.270.
In Harrison, the maternal grandparents had been awarded temporary
custody of their three grandchildren and they eventually petitioned the circuit court
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for full custody of the children. The children’s father opposed the petition and
sought custody of the children. The parties stipulated that the grandparents did not
qualify as de facto custodians. However, the court concluded that nonparents who
are not de facto custodians but who have physical custody must prove either of the
following two exceptions to a parent's superior right or entitlement to custody: (1)
that the parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit custodian;
or (2) that the parent has waived his or her superior right to custody by clear and
convincing evidence. Citing KRS 403.420. See also Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d
336, 339, 340 (Ky. 2003).
The trial court found that the grandparents had met their burden of
showing that the father was not a fit custodian and awarded them full custody of
their grandchildren. On appeal, this Court reversed, noting that KRS 403.420 had
been repealed at the time the custody action was initiated. Consequently, this
Court found that a nonparent’s right to bring a custody petition was limited to the
de facto custodian provisions of KRS 403.270. Under that section, a nonparent
seeking custody of a child must first establish that the person is a de facto
custodian as defined by KRS 403.270(1)(a). Once the court determines that the
person is a de facto custodian, that person will be afforded the same standing as is
given to a parent. This Court concluded that the statute sets out prerequisites for
standing of a nonparent and for invoking the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial
court. Since the grandparents had stipulated that they did not qualify as de facto
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custodians, this Court found that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider their petition for full custody.
On further appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed. In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Minton, the Court emphasized that standing and
subject-matter jurisdiction are not synonymous
The key difference is that subject-matter jurisdiction
involves a court’s ability to hear a type of case while
standing involves a party’s ability to bring a specific
case. Our predecessor Court quoted, with approval, an
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals that held that
“subject matter does not mean ‘this case’ but ‘this kind of
case.’” [Citing Duncan v. O’Nan, 451 S.W.2d 626, 631
(Ky. 1970), quoting In re Estate of Rougeron, 17 N.Y.2d
264, 270 N.Y.S.2d 578, 217 N.E.2d 639, 643 (1966).]
As previously mentioned, however, standing focuses
more narrowly on whether a particular party has the
legally cognizable ability to bring a particular suit.
Although the concepts bear some resemblance to each
other, standing is distinct from subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Harrison v. Leach, 323 S.W.3d at 705-706.
The Supreme Court went on to find that the trial court had subjectmatter jurisdiction to consider the grandparents’ petition, since it is a court of
general jurisdiction and there was no family court division in that circuit.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the father had never challenged the
grandparents’ standing before the trial court. The Court concluded that, unlike
subject-matter jurisdiction, a challenge to a party’s standing may be waived if not
timely raised. Id. at 4.
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We find no meaningful distinction between the statutory scheme at
issue in Harrison v. Leach, and the scheme at issue in this case. There is no
dispute that the family court division of the Barren Circuit Court has jurisdiction
over paternity petitions. Furthermore, KRS 406.011, like KRS 403.270, sets out a
presumption and the elements of proof necessary to rebut that presumption. KRS
406.011 establishes a presumption that a child born during lawful wedlock, or
within ten (10) months thereafter, is the child of the husband and wife. However,
KRS 406.011 also sets out an exception to that presumption, “where evidence
shows that the marital relationship between the husband and wife ceased ten (10)
months prior to the birth of the child.”
Given the similarities between these statutory schemes and the
respective significance of the rights involved, we conclude that KRS 406.011 sets
forth standing requirements for a third party to assert paternity of a child born
during the lawful wedlock of a husband and wife. Unlike subject-matter
jurisdiction, an objection to standing may be waived if not timely raised. Harrison
v. Leach, supra at 707-708. Shannon failed to object until well after the paternity
judgment was entered. Indeed, Shannon made affirmative representations
acknowledging that Draper is the biological father of the child. She entered into
agreed orders allowing him to have visitation with the child, and she accepted over
$11,000.00 in child support from Draper under the temporary support order.
Shannon did not challenge Draper’s right to bring the action for nearly two years
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after he brought the paternity petition. Under the circumstances, we must conclude
that Shannon has waived any objection to Draper’s standing to assert paternity.
In this case, the trial court reasonably concluded that it was bound by
the primary opinion of J.N.R. and attempted to apply that rule. However, we
conclude that the result in J.N.R. must be applied on the narrowest possible
grounds because it was a plurality opinion. Furthermore, the more recent analysis
in Harrison v. Leach, tends to undermine the reasoning of the plurality in J.N.R.
Consequently, we find that this matter concerned Draper’s standing to assert
paternity rather than the subject-matter jurisdiction of the family court to address
the petition. Since Shannon waived any objection to Draper’s standing, we
conclude that the family court erred by setting aside the paternity judgment as void
and by dismissing Draper’s petition. Therefore, we reinstate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings on the remaining issues relating to custody,
visitation, and support. Furthermore, since we are reinstating the paternity
judgment, the issues raised in Shannon’s appeal concerning recoupment of child
support are now moot.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE
JOHN DRAPER:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE
SHANNON HEACOCK:
Benjamin D. Rogers
Glasgow, Kentucky
J.B. Hines
Brownsville, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY:
Dennis Wilcutt
Glasgow, Kentucky
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