YATES (RICHARD) VS. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000022-MR
RICHARD YATES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KEN M. HOWARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00771
SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: FORMTEXT TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; STUMBO, JUDGE;
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE.
SHAKE, SENIOR JUDGE: Richard Yates brings this appeal from a December 14,
2009, summary judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court in favor of Shelter Mutual
Insurance Company. The underlying dispute involved a summary judgment action
to adjudicate the bodily injury liability limits of an automobile insurance policy
issued by Shelter to Yates. Because we hold that Yates was not given satisfactory
notice of his policy’s changes, we reverse and remand.
The underlying material facts of this case are uncontroverted. In
2006, Yates and James Meredith traveled to Kansas in Yates’ automobile. Yates
became tired and requested that Meredith drive the vehicle. While Meredith was
driving and Yates was a passenger, the vehicle was involved in a single vehicle
accident. Yates was severely injured in the accident.
Yates had secured motor vehicle insurance coverage for his vehicle
with Shelter Mutual Insurance Company. Yates was a named insured under the
insurance policy, and the insurance policy specifically listed the vehicle as an
insured vehicle. The declarations page also listed the limits of liability coverage as
$50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident for bodily injury claims. Because
Meredith’s negligence led to the accident and Yates’ injuries were in excess of the
$50,000 bodily injury liability limit, Yates requested Shelter to tender the liability
limit of $50,000.
Shelter refused to tender the liability limit and cited Yates to the
permissive driver step-down provision found in the body of the insurance policy.
This provision is triggered when a driver other than an insured of the first class is
operating the covered vehicle with permission.1 The provision operates to lower
1
It must be noted that Yates is an insured of the “first class” and that the permissive driver of
Yates’ motor vehicle (James Meredith) was an insured of the “second class” at the time of the
accident. See James v. James, 25 S.W.3d 110 (Ky. 2000)(holding that insureds of the first class
include named insureds and those residing in his household and that insureds of the second class
are those who are not included in first class under the terms of the insurance policy). The
insurance policy issued to Yates by Shelter contained similar differentiations between first- and
-2-
the limits of Shelter’s liability for bodily injury to the minimum required by the
Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA).2 Under the MVRA, the minimum
liability limits for bodily injury are $25,000 each person/$50,000 each accident.
Because a permissive driver (Meredith) was driving Yates’ vehicle when Yates
was injured as a passenger, Shelter maintained that the lower bodily injury liability
limits of $25,000 each person/$50,000 each accident were applicable. Yates
rejected Shelter’s interpretation of the insurance policy and demanded the
remaining $25,000. Yates argues that as a named insured under the policy, he was
entitled to the higher bodily injury liability limit of $50,000.
Consequently, Shelter instituted the underlying declarations of rights
action seeking an adjudication of the parties’ respective rights and obligations
under the insurance policy. Eventually, Shelter filed a motion for summary
judgment. Shelter asserted that the policy’s permissive driver step-down provision
was valid and effectively limited its liability to $25,000 for bodily injuries
sustained by Yates. The circuit court agreed. By summary judgment entered
December 14, 2009, the circuit court held that the permissive driver step-down
provision validly limited Shelter’s bodily injury liability to the minimum of
$25,000 each person/$50,000 each accident. This appeal followed.
Yates contends that the circuit court erred by rendering summary
judgment in favor of Shelter. Yates asserts that the court erroneously applied the
second-class insureds as presented in James, 25 S.W.3d 110.
2
The Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) is codified at KRS Chapter 304.39.
-3-
permissive driver step-down provision to limit Shelter’s liability for bodily injury
to $25,000 each person/$50,000 each accident. For the reasons set forth below, we
agree.
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). In this appeal, the material facts are uncontroverted
and resolution centers upon a question of law – the validity of the permissive
driver step-down provision found in the insurance policy issued by Shelter to
Yates.
To begin, a permissive driver step-down provision in a motor vehicle
insurance policy may be broadly defined as a provision that lowers the insurer’s
limits of liability for bodily injury when an individual, who is not a first-class
insured, is driving the vehicle with permission to do so. In an insurance policy
containing a permissive driver step-down provision, the limits of bodily injury
liability differ depending upon the class of the insured. Thus, an insured of the
first class or named insured, which includes Yates, is entitled to the higher limits of
bodily injury liability coverage when driving the insured vehicle; whereas, a
second-class insured or a permissive driver is only entitled to the lower (or stepdown) limits of liability coverage when driving the insured vehicle.
In the insurance policy issued by Shelter to Yates, the particular
permissive driver step-down provisions read as follows:
-4-
PART I – AUTO LIABILITY
COVERAGE A – BODILY INURY LIABILITY;
COVERAGE B – PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS USED IN PART I
As used in this Part, insured means:
....
(5)
Any individual who has permission or general
consent to use the described auto. However, the
limits of our liability for individuals who become
insureds solely because of this subparagraph, will
be minimum limits of liability insurance coverage
specified by the financial responsibility law
applicable to the accident, regardless of the limits
stated in the Declarations.
....
LIMIT OF OUR LIABILITY
The limit of liability Coverages A and B are stated in the
Declarations. Those are subject to the following
limitations:
....
(5) Regardless of the limit of liability shown in the
Declarations, the limit of liability under Coverages
A and B for persons who meet the definition of
insured solely because they have permission or
general consent to use the described auto, will be the
minimum limits of liability insurance coverages
mandated by the financial responsibility law
applicable to the accident.
Yates makes several arguments on appeal regarding the alleged
validity of the step-down provision. However, for the purposes of this appeal, we
will address only one: that the permissive driver step-down provision is
unenforceable under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Yates points out that
-5-
he paid a premium for the higher bodily injury liability limits, for “full coverage
protection,” and was led to believe by the declarations page of the policy that the
higher bodily liability limits of $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident were
applicable. Yates argues that an insured would reasonably believe to be covered
by the higher limits of bodily injury liability coverage and, thus, is entitled to such
coverage. Given the particular facts of this action, we agree.
The interpretation of a contract presents an issue of law for the Court.
See Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. App. 1998). Generally, a contract of
insurance is recognized as a contract of adhesion and is to be interpreted liberally
in favor of the insured. See Woodson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York,
N.Y., 743 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1987). In this Commonwealth, our courts have
consistently upheld and protected the reasonable expectations of insureds of
insurance policies. Lewis v. W. Amn. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 829. By relying upon
the reasonable expectations of the insured, sundry exclusions or limitations upon
coverage in a motor vehicle insurance policy have been deemed unenforceable and
invalid. See Chaffin v. Ky. Farm Bureau Ins. Companies, 789 S.W.2d 754 (Ky.
1990); Hamilton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 S.W.2d 751 (Ky. 1990); and Lewis, 927
S.W.2d 829. Simply stated, the doctrine of reasonable expectations provides that
“when one has bought and paid for an item of insurance coverage, he may
reasonably expect it to be provided.” Hamilton, 789 S.W.2d at 753.
The declarations page of Yates’ policy lists the bodily injury liability
limits as $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident. The declarations page fails
-6-
to set forth the lower limits of bodily injury liability ($25,000 each person/$50,000
each accident) of the permissive driver step-down provision. Rather, the
permissive driver step-down provision is buried in the body of the policy. Yates
maintains that he relied upon the declarations page to inform him of Shelter’s
bodily injury liability limits pursuant to the following policy provision:
YOUR DUTY TO MAKE SURE YOUR COVERAGES
ARE CORRECT
You agree to check the Declarations page each time you
receive one, in order to make sure that:
(1) all the coverages you requested are included in this
policy; and
(2) the limit of our liability for each of those coverages
is the amount you requested.
You agree to notify us within ten days of the date you
receive any Declarations page if you believe the
coverages or amounts of coverage it shows are different
from those you requested. If you do not notify us of a
discrepancy, we will presume the policy meets your
requirements.
It is undisputed that Yates had been paying premiums for the
$50,000/$100,000 coverage to Shelter for many years. However, Yates’ original
plan did not include the permissive driver step-down provision. The step-down
provision was not inserted into Yates’ policy until 2004. Although Shelter sent a
vague letter to Yates indicating that his policy had changes, it failed to indicate
where in the policy these changes were located or that the changes were
specifically to the coverage which he had been receiving. In fact, the declarations
pages prior to the reduction in coverage and after the reduction in coverage were
-7-
identical. Furthermore, the premium difference on the policy before and after the
reduction in coverage was only a few cents. Shelter failed to provide adequate
notification to Yates of the policy changes, creating a reasonable expectation that
Yates’ coverage with the higher bodily liability limits of $50,000/$100,000 was
continuing, regardless of whether the driver was himself or a permissive driver.
Counsel for Shelter argues that a more specific notification, outlining the
changes to the policy, would discourage policyholders from reading their policies.
We disagree. A vague articulation that some changes have been made to the
policy, without indicating where in the fine print of the policy those changes are
located, presents a greater deterrence to reading one’s policy. Instead, Shelter’s
vague notice, in conjunction with the virtually unchanged declarations page, can be
viewed as a thinly veiled attempt to keep its policyholders in the dark about the
specificity of the plan’s changes. Such practices are, simply put, duplicitous. The
reduced coverage at the same cost was, under these circumstances, hardly a
bargained-for exchange.
Given the unique facts of this case, we hold that Shelter failed to
provide adequate notification of its reduction in coverage to Yates, promoting a
reasonable expectation that the coverage continued to encompass the higher bodily
liability limits. However, our holding has no bearing on the appropriateness of
step-down provisions in general. Because we have already held that summary
judgment against Yates was inappropriate, we need not address alternate grounds
for reversal.
-8-
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for
Yates for the $50,000/$100,000 limits of personal injury protection.
STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. I
believe the majority has misapplied and misinterpreted the doctrine of reasonable
expectations holding that the permissive driver step-down provision in the
insurance policy at issue was unenforceable. Additionally, I believe the step-down
provision was enforceable under applicable contract law.
As noted by the majority, our Courts have consistently upheld and
protected the reasonable expectations of insurance policyholders. The gist of this
rule is that an insured should reasonably expect to receive what he has paid for.
However, I do not believe the doctrine of reasonable expectations mandates
application of the higher bodily injury liability limits of $50,000 each
person/$100,000 each accident to a permissive driver of the insured auto as
opposed to the named insureds in the policy in this case.
In this case, Yates is seeking recovery under the bodily injury liability
provision of the policy as an injured party of a permissive driver, not as a named
insured, who could never receive monetary damages as a driver of the insured auto
under the liability provisions of his policy. This is where I believe the majority has
-9-
become confused in regard to the coverage provided. It must be emphasized that a
bodily injury liability provision in an auto insurance policy does not extend
coverage to bodily injuries sustained by the named insured driver; rather, it merely
extends coverage to protect the insured driver from claims of parties who suffer
bodily injuries occurring in an accident for which the named insured is liable.
At the time of the accident, Yates was a passenger in his motor
vehicle, and Meredith was operating the vehicle as a permissive driver, not the
named insured on the policy. It is beyond dispute that the permissive driver
(Meredith) was covered per the insurance policy step-down provision and was
provided with liability coverage for claims made by Yates for bodily injuries
sustained in the accident. Again, the step-down provision in the policy under the
facts of this case did not provide direct coverage to Yates as a named insured for
bodily injuries sustained in the accident; instead, the bodily injury liability
provision provided liability coverage to the permissive driver (Meredith), to the
extent of the step-down provision, for Yates’ claim of bodily injuries arising from
the accident while Meredith was driving the vehicle. This distinction is pivotal to
this case, in my opinion.
Since the bodily injury provision provided liability coverage to the
permissive driver of Yates’ motor vehicle, the relevant inquiry must focus upon the
reasonable expectations of the permissive driver for coverage thereunder, rather
than those of Yates. See James v. James, 25 S.W.3d 110 (Ky. 2000). The
permissive driver of Yates’ motor vehicle is classified as an insured of the “second
-10-
class.”3 An insured of the second class is not a party to the insurance policy and
pays no premiums for coverage. Accordingly, it is well established that such a
second-class insured generally possesses no reasonable expectations of coverage:
[B]y permitting the insured to stack his coverages it had,
“simply honored the reasonable expectations of the
‘named insured’ that his payment of an additional
premium will result in increased coverage for those
falling within the definition of the ‘named insured,’ and
where an expectation of this nature is in conflict with a
limiting clause in the policy, the resulting ambiguity must
be resolved in favor of the insured due to the nature of
insurance contracts.” . . . [S]ince an insured of the
second class was not a party to the contract his
expectations as to extent of his coverage does [sic] not
result in contract ambiguity and are not sufficient to
avoid the effect of the policy's limiting clause.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 558-559 (Ky. 1979)(quoting
Lambert v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 331 So.2d 260, 263 (Ala. 1976)); see also
James, 25 S.W.3d 110. Although the above reasoning pertained to stacking of
uninsured motorist coverage, the reasoning is broad enough to encompass the facts
of this case, in my opinion.
Since Meredith was insured as a permissive driver under the policy’s
step-down provision at the time of the accident, he was a second-class insured and
was neither a party to the contract of insurance nor paid premiums for such
insurance coverage. There is no reference on the declarations page of the policy
to coverage provided to a permissive driver and thus, contrary to the majority’s
3
For a discussion of the distinction between insureds of the first and second class, please note
the Supreme Court’s opinion of James v. James, 25 S.W.3d 110 (Ky. 2000), and also footnote 2
of this opinion.
-11-
position, I believe has no relevance to the legal analysis in this case. Thus, I
believe, Meredith possesses no reasonable expectations of entitlement to the higher
bodily injury liability limits of $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident, and
he is the only person entitled to the bodily injury liability coverage under the
policy when an accident occurs while he is driving. Accordingly, Yates’ argument
under the doctrine of reasonable expectations is simply without legal merit, in my
opinion.
I further believe that the insurance contract on its face is enforceable
as concerns the step-down coverage provision for permissive drivers. The
declarations page of the policy specifically sets forth the bodily injury liability
limits as $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident for the named insured. The
policy itself also contains the permissive driver step-down provision that plainly
lowers the bodily injury liability limits when a permissive driver is operating the
vehicle. There is no ambiguity present in the policy. The policy carefully sets
forth the applicable bodily injury liability limits and provides that each applicable
liability limit is dependent upon the class of driver. As a Court, we cannot create
ambiguities where none exists in an insurance policy. Snow v. W. Amn. Ins. Co.,
161 S.W.3d 338 (Ky. App. 2004). The policy plainly sets forth two distinct bodily
injury liability limits in terms readily understandable. In short, I do not believe the
policy terms are ambiguous regarding the two bodily injury liability limits as set
forth in the declarations page and in the permissive driver step-down provision,
and thus, must be enforced in accord with their plain meaning.
-12-
Additionally, the permissive driver step-down provision is not
unreasonably vague for providing that the available bodily injury liability limits be
commensurate with the “minimum limits” set forth in the state’s “financial
responsibility law” without identifying a specific dollar amount. The inclusion of
the term “basic limits” or “minimum limits” does not render the policy per se
ambiguous. Transport Ins. Co. v. Ford, 886 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. App. 1994).
Rather, an insurance policy provision that affords bodily injury liability coverage
equal to this Commonwealth’s minimum limits under the financial responsibility
law MVRA simply provides coverage in the amount of $25,000 each
person/$50,000 each accident as mandated by KRS 304.39-110. In so concluding,
I believe the Court should give the term “minimum limits” its ordinary and usual
meaning. See City of Louisville v. McDonald, 819 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. App. 1991);
Holzknecht v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., Co., 320 S.W.3d 115 (Ky. App. 2010).
Thus, I would, as did the circuit court below, not view the permissive driver stepdown provision as ambiguously vague. Consequently, I would reject Yates’
argument that the permissive driver step-down provision should have been
interpreted against Shelter so as to provide the higher limits of bodily injury
liability of $50,000 each person/$100,000 each accident for Yates’ injury claim.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the thoroughly written
Judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court in this case.
-13-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James W. Taylor
Amanda P. Thompson
Lexington, Kentucky
Chadwick N. Gardner
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Amanda P. Thompson
Lexington, Kentucky
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.