SIMMONS (FIDEL) VS. TERRY (SHANTE)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000020-ME
FIDEL SIMMONS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-501242
SHANTE TERRY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, JUDGE; HENRY AND ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGES.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Fidel Simmons appeals from a ruling of the Jefferson
Circuit Court which ordered him to pay $210 monthly in base child support to his
former wife, Shante Terry. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
arriving at this amount because it failed to give sufficient weight to evidence that
the parents have substantially similar incomes and share equal parenting time.
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Senior Judges Michael L. Henry and Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judges by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Fidel and Shante have one child, a daughter, who was born in 2005. Their
marriage was dissolved on August 3, 2007. Under the terms of the judgment
which dissolved the marriage, Fidel and Shante were awarded joint custody.
Because the child was dividing her time equally between the parents, and their
monthly incomes were nearly equal ($2,140 for Fidel and $2080 for Shante),
neither party was required to pay child support. Fidel has paid for the child’s
health insurance since her birth.
On June 26, 2008, the Jefferson County Attorney, acting on behalf of the
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, filed a paternity complaint on behalf of
Shante. Allegedly, Shante had applied for and received K-TAP (Kentucky
Transitional Assistance Program) benefits by representing that her child was born
out of wedlock and had no insurance benefits. Fidel filed an answer to the
complaint to which he attached documentary evidence that the child was born in
wedlock, that child support issues were addressed in the dissolution decree, and
that he had provided health insurance for the child since her birth. He moved the
court to dismiss the paternity complaint, and to hold Shante in contempt of court
for fraudulently representing that the child was born out of wedlock and had no
insurance coverage.
The Cabinet filed for leave to intervene in the dissolution action on behalf of
Shante in order to establish child support, as a means of obtaining reimbursement
for Title IV-D child support services that Shante had received from the state. The
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family court granted the Cabinet’s motion to intervene, and a hearing on the
Cabinet’s motion, and on Fidel’s motion to hold Shante in contempt of court was
held on June 23, 2009, and continued to September 8, 2009.
On October 26, 2009, the family court entered an order awarding Shante
$210 per month in child support. It found that Fidel earns 55 percent ($2,153) and
Shante earns 45 percent ($1,733) of their combined monthly income of $3,886.
The court observed that if the parties had a standard parenting schedule with the
child residing primarily with Shante, Fidel would have to pay monthly child
support in the amount of $306.35 under the guidelines. Because the parties have
an equal parenting schedule, however, the family court set Fidel’s base monthly
child support at $210 per month. Fidel also pays $137 per month for the child’s
health and dental insurance and $152 per month for child care costs. The court
ordered Shante’s 45 percent share of the responsibility for these costs ($130) to be
deducted from the base amount, resulting in a total of $80. Fidel was ordered to
pay this amount of $80 per month effective on March 24, 2009 (the date the
Cabinet filed its motion to intervene).
The court further noted that there had been recent changes in Shante’s
weekly income and in the cost of child care. Specifically, Shante had testified that
her work hours had been reduced from 40 hours per week to 37.5 hours per week
effective August 3, 2009, and Fidel had provided proof that child care costs had
increased to $272 per month. The court concluded that the reduction in Shante’s
income was insufficient to meet the 15 percent change necessary to modify child
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support under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.213(2). It further ruled that
Shante’s contribution to the child care costs would have to rise to $122. Effective
August 19, 2009, therefore, Fidel was ordered to pay $26 in child support, which
reflected the deduction for Shante’s 45 percent portion of the child’s insurance
premiums and child care costs from the base amount of $210.
Shante filed a motion to reconsider which was denied. Fidel filed his notice
of appeal on December 30, 2009. On January 6, 2010, the Cabinet filed a motion
to withdraw as a party from the action on the grounds that Shante was no longer
receiving TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) benefits for the child,
and that the Commonwealth was closing the case because the debt owed to the
Cabinet for reimbursement of those benefits was less than $500. The Cabinet was
dismissed as a party to the appeal by order of this Court on July 12, 2010.
On appeal, Fidel argues that because the Cabinet initiated the child support
action, and has withdrawn, the terms of the original dissolution judgment, under
which he was not required to pay child support, should be reinstated. But the
Cabinet withdrew from this case long after the entry of the family court’s order
setting child support, and the filing of the notice of appeal. The fact that the
Cabinet is no longer a party to this appeal does not render the child support order
moot. It is still binding on Shante and Fidel, the remaining parties to the action.
Fidel next argues that the award of child support was an abuse of discretion
because the family court failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that he and
Shante share equal residential custody.
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Kentucky trial courts have been given broad discretion in
considering a parent's assets and setting correspondingly
appropriate child support. A reviewing court should
defer to the lower court’s discretion in child support
matters whenever possible. As long as the trial court's
discretion comports with the guidelines, or any deviation
is adequately justified in writing, this Court will not
disturb the trial court’s ruling in this regard. However, a
trial court’s discretion is not unlimited. The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.
Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
Fidel argues that in calculating the award, the court unfairly used as its
starting point the amount Fidel would have to pay under the child support
guidelines if he were the noncustodial parent. He points out that if the court had
treated Shante as the noncustodial parent, she would have to pay Fidel monthly
support in the amount of $250.56. But the family court did not use this guideline
amount as its starting point in calculating child support. Its order clearly states that
the parties do not have a standard parenting schedule, and that it would
consequently deviate from the guidelines.
Fidel further argues that the court arrived at the amount of $210 by using
half the difference in the parties’ gross incomes, a means of calculation which he
contends is a clear abuse of discretion. As support for his argument, he relies on
Plattner v. Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. App. 2007). In Plattner, this Court
found it unreasonable for the father to pay any child support in a situation where
the parents’ incomes were roughly equivalent (the division was 53 percent to 47
percent), they shared equal residential time, and they both incurred the expenses
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necessary to provide a home for the children. In addressing Fidel’s motion to
reconsider, the trial court distinguished the factual circumstances by pointing out
that in Plattner, both parties had significant earning capacity ($6,838 and $6,175),
whereas Shante’s $1,733 monthly income is close to the poverty line. The court
further noted that there was a wider disparity between the incomes of Fidel and
Shante (10 percent) than between the Plattners (6 percent). We find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s analysis nor in its statement “that the court must be
conscious of how a deviation from the child support guidelines or an award of no
support affects the well being of the child.”
Finally, Fidel argues that the trial court should have employed the split
custody calculation method set forth in KRS 403.212(6). Under this method,
support calculations under the guidelines are prepared for each parent, and then the
parent with the greater obligation pays the other the difference in the two amounts.
Under Fidel’s calculations, this would result in a monthly obligation for him of
$55.70.
During the course of one of the hearings in this case, the trial judge
suggested that she might employ the split custody method to calculate child
support, but ultimately chose not to do so in her final order. The court was not
bound by its statements at the hearing. “[A] court of record speaks only through its
records, . . . and an oral pronouncement is not a judgment until it is reduced to
writing[.]” Holland v. Holland 290 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Ky. App. 2009) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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KRS 403.211(2) provides that the “[c]ourts may deviate from the guidelines
where their application would be unjust or inappropriate.” The trial court was not
bound to follow any of the methods for calculating child support outlined in KRS
403.212 if it specifically identified an extraordinary factor which would make the
application of the guidelines inappropriate. KRS 403.211(3)(g). In this case, the
extraordinary factors identified by the court were Shante’s low income, the 10
percent difference between the parties’ incomes and concerns for the child’s wellbeing. The trial court acted within its discretion in ruling that these were
extraordinary factors that justified deviating from the guidelines.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court setting child support at $210 is
therefore affirmed.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
Although this is an unusual situation because neither parent was designated the
primary residential custodian, the trial court is not permitted to simply devise its
own method of child support calculation without respect to the evidence and
without presenting reviewable findings. See McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d
130, 133 (Ky. App. 2008) (trial court’s findings must be supported by substantial
evidence). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion because it based its
formulation on the premise that Fidel was the non-residential parent, which is not
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supported by the uncontroverted facts in the record. I would remand to the trial
court for a reasonable calculation based upon the evidence. The trial court’s earlier
statement in June 2009 that it would calculate the amount by determining the
amount of support each party would provide the other under the guidelines to
support the child full time and then offset the amounts and with the appropriate
percentage reimbursements on daycare and health insurance, is a reasonable
calculation.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sheila Berman
Louisville, Kentucky
Elizabeth A. Coleman
Louisville, Kentucky
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