EADS (PARKER W.) VS. EADS (MAUREEN FOLAN)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 6, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002364-MR
PARKER W. EADS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE DONNA DELAHANTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 93-FD-003231
MAUREEN FOLAN EADS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Parker W. Eads brings this appeal from a September
16, 2009, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Court, denying his motion to
terminate maintenance. We affirm.
Parker and Maureen Folan Eads met in 1979, while Parker was a
student at Harvard Law School. Maureen had emigrated from Ireland and was
working as a nurses’ assistant. In 1981, the parties moved to Kentucky and were
married. Parker accepted a position as an attorney with the firm of Wyatt, Tarrant,
and Combs in Louisville, Kentucky. Maureen never returned to work after the
parties married. Parker and Maureen’s only child was born in 1983. Apparently,
both Parker and Maureen abused alcohol during the marriage. In fact, Parker
admitted that he abused alcohol from 1982 until 1988. Despite his alcoholism,
Parker was able to maintain his employment with the law firm. In 1991, some
three years after achieving sobriety, Parker became a partner in the law firm. The
parties ultimately separated in 1993, whereupon Parker filed a petition to dissolve
the marriage. Maureen apparently received treatment for her alcohol dependency
in 1997.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved by decree of dissolution of
marriage entered on February 13, 1997. The decree dissolved the marriage but
reserved ruling on all other issues. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment (judgment) was subsequently entered on October 1, 1997, adjudicating
all remaining issues. Relevant to this appeal, the judgment provided:
The Court has reviewed the expense list of each
party and the evidence as to the financial obligations and
income of [Parker]. The Court concludes that [Maureen]
is entitled to an award of permanent maintenance in the
sum of $1,500.00 per month, which is to be nonmodifiable for a period of twenty-four months. Said
maintenance award shall remain in effect, but subject to
the modification and termination provisions set forth in
[Kentucky Revised Statutes] KRS 403.250 thereafter.
For some twelve years, Parker paid Maureen $1500 per month in
maintenance. Then, on April 16, 2009, Parker filed a motion to terminate
-2-
maintenance based upon a change in circumstances under Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 403.250. Parker stipulated that he voluntarily resigned as a partner
in the law firm in November 2007 and further admitted his income in years prior to
2008 exceeded $200,000. Parker also had subsequently remarried and at the time
of filing this motion, he stayed at home taking care of his two minor children. By
order entered September 16, 2009, the family court denied Parker’s motion in part
and granted in part. The circuit court ordered Maureen to apply for social security
benefits and, if ultimately awarded same, the court would then adjust the
maintenance award proportionately. The family court made the following findings
and orders:
The change in circumstance that [Parker] alleges is
his voluntary resignation from a partnership in a large
and well known law firm. [Parker] holds a degree from a
prestigious law school. He has made a six figure income
for at least sixteen years, with the exception of 1993,
when he made close to $100,000.00 He is relatively
young and in good health. For the most part, his
financial needs, as well as a portion of his adult son’s
needs, are met by his current wife’s income. He did
testify that their house has been refinanced to save
approximately $300.00 per month. He is unaware of his
current stocks and bonds as his wife handles all
investments. The Court cannot find that his current
situation is a changed circumstance beyond his own
control. It was noted in the [Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment] that the parties had
lived beyond their means prior to the dissolution, and the
Court specifically stated when [Parker] objected to the
maintenance award as beyond his financial means,
“[Parker] has sufficient funds available to meet his
obligations, and that it is incumbent upon him to manage
his finances so as to meet the obligation.” See Order
entered January 13, 1998.
-3-
[Parker] is capable of some employment and he
has had time to seek and secure employment, whether it
might be employment that appeals to him or not. It
appears to this Court that [Parker], knowing of his
responsibility to pay maintenance, earning a substantial
salary over a long period of time, being aware that he had
voluntarily resigned and that an income stream would
end on a future date certain could have set aside an
amount of monies sufficient to cover his legal
responsibility for the payment of maintenance. Instead,
[Parker] has waited until his income has dried up to
throw up his hands. [Parker] was not forthcoming as to
the details of his resignation contract nor what, if any,
alternate benefits flowed from such voluntary
resignation. Further, [Parker] voluntarily supports the
parties’ adult son who has finished his schooling, with an
amount of money nearly equal to that of the maintenance
award.
[Maureen] has not achieved self-sufficiency. Far
from it. However, she is of retirement age. As such, she
may be entitled, based on the length of her marriage to
[Parker], to receive social security benefits in an amount
equal to or close in amount to what she has been entitled
to receive through maintenance. Once in receipt of such
benefits, she could be said to have achieved selfsufficiency which would be the changed circumstance
necessary to terminate the maintenance award in the
circumstances surrounding this particular case. Based on
[Maureen’s] fragile demeanor in the current hearing,
which is in contrast to the erratic behavior described at
the time of the dissolution, and the possibility that she
may need to obtain foreign documents, [Maureen] may
need assistance in applying for such benefits.
Based on the record, the testimony, the
documentary evidence of which there was very little, and
the arguments of counsel,
IT IS ORDERED that [Parker’s] motion for
modification or termination of maintenance be and it
hereby is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. This
Court shall give [Maureen] a period of ninety days from
the date of entry of this Order to apply for social security
-4-
benefits. [Maureen] shall submit proof of such
application to [Parker’s] attorney who shall assist with
any information required to establish eligibility. If
eligibility for social security is established and such
monthly payment equals or is greater than the current
maintenance award, then [Parker] may terminate
maintenance effective on the first day of receipt of such
social security award. If eligibility is established and
such monthly benefit is less than the established
maintenance award, the current maintenance award may
be modified to the amount necessary to make up the
difference between the maintenance currently awarded
and the social security payment received. Such
modification would become effective on the first day of
receipt of such social security award. If [Maureen] is not
eligible for social security benefits, then this Court
cannot find such changed circumstances exist that would
allow termination or modification of the maintenance
award.
This appeal follows.
Parker contends that the family court erred by denying in part his
motion to terminate maintenance. Parker specifically asserts that the family court
abused its discretion by failing to consider the passage of time (twelve years) “as a
substantial and continuing change in circumstances making spousal support
unconscionable” per KRS 403.250. And, Parker maintains that the court erred by
finding that Maureen was unable to work for medical reasons.
KRS 403.250 controls modification or termination of maintenance.
Subsection (1) of KRS 403.250 provides that “the provisions of any decree
respecting maintenance may be modified only upon a showing of changed
circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.”
Generally, the trial court possesses broad discretion when ruling upon
-5-
maintenance. Barbarine v. Barbarine, 925 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. App. 1996). Absent
an abuse of discretion, the appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling if
it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.
In its order, the family court considered whether “changed
circumstances” had occurred that would render the maintenance award of $1,500
per month to Maureen unconscionable. In finding that no such changed
circumstances occurred, the court considered the following facts: (1) Parker
voluntarily resigned from his six-figure employment, (2) Parker was highly
educated and possessed vast experience which would allow him to find suitable
employment, (3) Parker was only fifty-two years of age and was in good health, (4)
Maureen was not self-sufficient, (5) Maureen was older (sixty-two years old) and
had not been employed since the parties moved to Kentucky in 1981, and (6)
Maureen had relied upon maintenance as her sole means of support since the
divorce in 1997.
From review of the entire record, it was apparent that Maureen’s
circumstances had not significantly changed since the court’s original award of
maintenance. And, the prospect of improvement in her circumstances was bleak
absent her entitlement to social security benefits. As to Parker, the family court
noted his recent lack of employment but found that such did not constitute a
change in circumstances since Parker was highly educated and could easily find
suitable employment.
-6-
Upon the whole, we cannot say that the family court’s factual findings
were not supported by sufficient evidence of a probative value or that the family
court otherwise abused its discretion in ordering the continuation of maintenance.
The record clearly supports the family court’s finding that a change in
circumstances had not occurred so as to render its original maintenance award
unconscionable per KRS 403.250. As such, we perceive no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
J. Russell Lloyd
Louisville, Kentucky
Scott E. Powell
Louisville, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.