ISON (JOHN M.) VS. BROWN BROS. CADILLAC CHEVROLET, INC., ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002345-MR
JOHN M. ISON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-008978
BROWN BROTHERS CADILLAC CHEVROLET,
INC.; AND PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, JUDGE; HENRY AND ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: The appellant, John Ison, appeals an order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Brown Brothers
Cadillac Chevrolet, Incorporated (Brown Brothers). Ison asserts that the circuit
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Senior Judges Michael L. Henry and Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judges by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky
Revised Statute(s) (KRS) 21.580. Senior Judge Henry concurred in this opinion prior to the
expiration of his term of senior judge service. Release of the opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
court improperly granted summary judgment because Brown Brothers owed him a
duty to prevent the intervening criminal acts of third persons and there was no
superseding cause. Further, Ison argues that even if Brown Brothers did not owe
him a duty to prevent intervening criminal acts, it voluntarily undertook a duty to
provide security on its premises and could be liable for the negligent performance
of this assumed duty. We disagree. Because Brown Brothers did not owe a duty
to Ison, summary judgment was appropriate and we affirm.
Ison was severely injured on October 11, 2005, when he was struck by a
2006 Cadillac STS operated by Christopher Montgomery. The police found the
factory Cadillac key in Montgomery’s possession. Later, it was determined that
the Cadillac had been stolen from Brown Brothers. However, Montgomery denied
stealing the car.
Brown Brothers was unaware that the theft occurred until notified by the
police that the car was found. Gary Brown, the owner of Brown Brothers, stated in
his deposition that he was never able to determine how the car was stolen. Indeed,
it appears that this fact remains a mystery to Brown, as well as to his new car sales
manager and his office manager.
During the hours when the dealership is closed, at least one security guard
remains on the lot. Further, the lot is surrounded by a large fence and concrete
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wall and each of the exits are blocked when the dealership is closed. The extensive
security measures used to protect the vehicles at night led Mr. Brown to believe
that the theft occurred during the day.
At the time of the accident, Montgomery was fourteen years old and was
driving for the first time. In his deposition, Montgomery stated he received a call
from a friend, who was also in middle school, who asked him to pick up the car
which was parked on the street with the key hidden under the wheel well. Despite
never having driven, he claims he picked up the car and started driving around.
Shortly thereafter, the accident occurred.
The stolen vehicle was a fully accessorized Cadillac STS. This particular
model was equipped with a keyless starter. This starter was not easy to operate
and required knowledge of specific operating instructions. It is unknown how
Montgomery learned to use the keyless starting system.
Ison asserts that Brown Brothers had a duty to prevent the theft of the
vehicle because it was foreseeable that if a theft occurred, the thief might drive
negligently. The circuit court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of
Brown Brothers without making any written findings. We review the circuit
court’s decision de novo. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv.Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476,
483 (Ky. 1991).
A party moving for summary judgment in a negligence
case is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
moving party shows that (1) it is impossible for the nonmoving party to produce any evidence in the non-moving
party’s favor on one or more of the issues of fact, (2)
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under disputed facts, the moving party owed no duty to
the non-moving party, or (3) as a matter of law, any
breach of a duty owed to the non-moving party was not
the proximate cause of the non-moving party’s injuries.
Bruck v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Ky. App. 2004). This case requires us
to consider whether Brown Brothers owed Ison a duty of care, and if so, whether
Brown Brothers’ alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Ison’s injuries.
Ison cites Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, to support his
assertion that a “universal duty of care” exists. See 736 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1987).
Ison argues that this universal duty required Brown Brothers to protect him from
the criminal acts of third parties. It is clear, however, that if Brown Brothers does
not owe a duty of care to Ison, there can be no breach, and therefore no actionable
negligence. See Ashcroft v. Peoples Liberty Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 724 S.W.2d
228, 229 (Ky. App. 1986).
On several occasions, this court has pointed out that “Grayson is often cited
by parties advocating a theory of liability or a cause of action where none
previously existed and legal authority is otherwise lacking.” Jenkins v. Best, 250
S.W.3d 680, 689 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 891
(Ky. App. 2002). “In other words, parties turn to Grayson’s sweeping statement of
‘universal duty’ where the facts of their case do not support a duty based on
recognized legal relationships.” Jenkins, 95 S.W.3d at 689. Therefore, at the
outset, we note that “our courts have never found liability in tort unless we first
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found circumstances giving rise to a relationship of some kind in which one
particular party owed a duty to another particular party.” Id. at 691.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Brown Brothers relied on
this court’s decision in Bruck v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d 764 (Ky. App. 2004), and
argued that Brown Brothers did not owe a duty of care to Ison. In Bruck, we
determined that although the defendant left his car unlocked with the keys inside,
he did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, who was injured when the car was
stolen and negligently driven by the thief. Id. at 767. This was so even though
another of the defendant’s cars was previously stolen from the same location, and
the defendant’s home was burglarized twice before the second vehicle theft
occurred. Id. at 775-76. In Bruck, we noted that KRS 189.430(3) – sometimes
referred to as the key-in-the-ignition statute – did not create a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff when the car was left in a private driveway. Id. at 767.
Any duty created by KRS 189.430(3) only exists when a car is stolen on a public
street. Id. Even if Ison could establish a duty on the part of Brown Brothers, the
thief’s negligence constituted a superseding cause; therefore, any breach of such a
duty by the defendant would not constitute the proximate cause of Ison’s injury.
Id. 767-68.
In Frank v. Ralston, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
applied Kentucky law and determined that a defendant who left his car in an
unattended parking lot, unlocked, with the key in the ignition, was not liable for
injuries incurred by the plaintiff when the car was stolen and negligently driven.
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248 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1957). The Sixth Circuit “held that the defendants could
not as a matter of law be charged with the duty of anticipating that their unlocked
and unattended vehicle would be stolen and negligently operated so as to injure the
plaintiffs.” Id. at 542 (quoting Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ky.
1956)). The district court also noted “that the negligent driving of the thieves was
the proximate cause of the decedent’s death and that the negligence of the
defendant, if any, was too remote in the eyes of the law to be regarded as
connected as cause therewith.” Frank, 145 F. Supp. at 294-95. We agree with this
analysis.
In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that the vehicle was stolen from
Brown Bothers’ premises and not from a public street. Under such circumstances,
KRS 189.430(3) does not impose a legal duty on the car dealership that would
render it liable to a third party even if someone at the dealership had left the keys
in the ignition. Bruck, 131 S.W.3d at 767 (quoting Estridge v. Estridge, 333
S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky. 1960)(“this statute is a ‘part of the regulations of traffic on
public ways and may not be regarded as applicable to a private driveway.’”)).
We find unpersuasive Ison’s argument that the car lot here should be treated
differently than a driveway because it is open to the public. A typical private
driveway is even less secure than the lot at Brown Brothers and, therefore, by
Ison’s argument, more open to the public; a typical private driveway is often more
open to the public than a public parking lot which is designed to control the
comings and goings of automobiles. In Frank, the car was parked in a public
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parking lot and yet the owner’s negligence was determined not to be the proximate
cause of the decedent’s death. The same is true here. Even if we could find a duty
here, the undisputed security measures on the premises would make untenable the
finding of a breach that could be cognizable as the legal and proximate cause of
Ison’s injuries.
For the reasons stated above, Bruck is controlling. Because the vehicle was
stolen from private property, any duty that may have been imposed by KRS
189.430(3) does not apply. Further, even if Brown Brothers acted negligently, its
negligence was not the proximate cause of Ison’s harm. Therefore the decision of
the circuit court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick S. McElhone
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, BROWN
BROTHERS CADILLAC
CHEVROLET, INC.:
Carol Schureck Petitt
Louisville, Kentucky
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