HALE (JEFFREY L.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 21, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002273-MR
JEFFREY L. HALE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00064
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS AND DIXON, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Jeffrey L. Hale appeals from a Christian Circuit Court
judgment sentencing him to serve ten years in prison after a jury found him guilty
of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor. Hale contends that his
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
conviction rests on a misinterpretation of the unlawful transaction statute and that
he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. He further contends that
comments made by the Commonwealth attorney constituted palpable error
warranting reversal of his conviction. In our view, Hale’s argument regarding the
interpretation of the statute is well-founded, but we are constrained by the
precedent of our Supreme Court from reversing his conviction and, therefore, we
affirm.
Hale confessed to committing one act of sexual intercourse with a family
friend, C.P. She was fourteen years of age at the time the act occurred. KRS
530.064(1)(a) provides in relevant part that “[a] person is guilty of unlawful
transaction with a minor in the first degree when he or she knowingly induces,
assists, or causes a minor to engage in . . . [i]llegal sexual activity[.]” Unlawful
transaction with a minor in the first degree is a Class B felony “if the minor so used
is less than sixteen (16) years old at the time the minor engages in the prohibited
activity[.]” KRS 530.064(2)(b).
Hale contends that the plain meaning of the statute requires the
Commonwealth to prove that the minor engaged in activity that is illegal for the
minor to perform. Because C.P. was the victim of a crime committed against her
by Hale, he contends that the proper charge in the case should have been rape
under KRS 510.060(1)(b), which provides that a person is guilty of rape in the
third degree when “[b]eing twenty-one (21) years old or more, he or she engages in
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sexual intercourse with another person less than sixteen (16) years old[.]” Rape in
the third degree is a Class D felony. KRS 510.060(2).
As additional support for his argument, Hale emphasizes that other sections
of the unlawful transaction statutes require a finding of illegal conduct on the part
of the minor, such as illegal controlled substances activity, illegal gambling
activity, and any other criminal activity constituting a felony. See KRS
530.064(1)(b) and KRS 530.065(1). Furthermore, KRS 530.064(2) provides that
the classification of the felony is dependent on the age of the minor at the time “the
minor engages in the prohibited activity[,]” which further reinforces the view that
the activity must be prohibited for the minor.
Hale further contends that the interplay between the unlawful transaction
statute, if it is interpreted to include conduct which is not illegal on the part of the
minor, and the rape statutes, leads to absurd results and violates the rule of lenity,
which provides that when
[i]t is not possible to determine which meaning [of a
statute] the General Assembly intended ... the movant is
entitled to the benefit of the ambiguity. . . . Doubts in
the construction of a penal statute will be resolved in
favor of lenity and against a construction that would
produce extremely harsh or incongruous results or
impose punishments totally disproportionate to the
gravity of the offense [.]
White v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 470, 483-484 (Ky. 2005) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
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Hale has provided numerous examples of the anomalous results which could
result from the interplay of the statutes. For instance, under KRS 510.040(2), if an
adult defendant has sexual intercourse with an eleven-year-old child, the offense
qualifies as rape in the first degree, a Class A felony. If, however, an adult
defendant has sexual intercourse with a child of the same age, and the
Commonwealth can also prove that the defendant induced, assisted or caused the
child to participate willingly, the offense qualifies as unlawful transaction with a
minor in the first degree, which is only a Class B felony.
Although Hale’s arguments are compelling, our Supreme Court has already
addressed whether KRS 530.064 should apply “to a circumstance in which the
defendant induced, assisted or caused a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity
with the defendant, himself[,]” or whether such a circumstance should instead “ be
governed by the offenses described in KRS Chapter 510.” Young v.
Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Ky.1998) (overruled on other grounds by
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11 (Ky. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the argument had some appeal,
but ultimately concluded that
our function is not to legislate, but to ascertain the
legislative intent. This statute, which was originally
compiled within KRS 530.070(1)(b), was enacted
contemporaneously with KRS Chapter 510. 1974
Ky.Acts, ch. 406, §§ 81-95 and § 263. If the legislature
had intended to limit the scope of this offense, it would
have been a simple matter to have written the statute with
that limitation, e.g., “to engage in illegal sexual activity
with another.” Nor does the 1974 Commentary indicate
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any intent to so limit the scope of this statute. . . . Any
possible overlap of this statute with the offenses
described in KRS Chapter 510 is but another
circumstance where the same act may constitute either of
two offenses, permitting the grand jury to elect to indict
on either offense.
Id.
“The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable
precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor
court.” Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 1.030(8)(a). Although we are hopeful
that our highest court will reconsider its ruling in this matter, we are powerless to
act because we simply “cannot overrule the established precedent set by the
Supreme Court[.]” Smith v. Vilvarajah, 57 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Ky.App. 2000).
In a related argument, Hale also contends that he was entitled to a
directed verdict because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that he had
induced, assisted or caused C.P. to engage in illegal activity. He argues that an
overly expansive interpretation of these terms leads to the result that any act of
consensual sex with a minor qualifies as an unlawful transaction with a minor and
thereby invalidates statutory rape laws. Upon appellate review, the test for a
directed verdict is whether, “under the evidence as a whole it would not be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt.” Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5
(Ky. 1983). Hale points to C.P.’s statement that the intercourse “just happened”
and to the fact that she wrote a letter to Hale afterwards saying she felt as though
she had taken their relationship to a new level and that she hoped it would happen
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again soon. Hale contends that he could not have “induced” C.P. to do something
that she already wanted to do and that there was no evidence that C.P.’s
willingness to engage in sexual activity was induced by Hale’s actions. Even if
there was no evidence of inducement, however, C.P. could not have committed the
illegal activity, even if she initiated the idea, without Hale’s assistance. C.P.
testified that Hale became a “father figure” to her after her own father passed
away. Before she engaged in sexual intercourse with Hale, he told her that he
loved her and asked her if she was a virgin. She also testified that he took her by
the hand into his bedroom, helped her to undress and that the two then engaged in
sexual intercourse. This constituted sufficient evidence that Hale assisted her or
caused her to engage in the illegal activity.
Finally, Hale asks us to review various remarks of the prosecutor
under the palpable error standard. A palpable error is one that “affects the
substantial rights of a party” and will result in “manifest injustice” if not
considered by the court. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr 10.26). The
law is clear that RCr 10.26
is not a substitute for the requirement that a litigant must
contemporaneously object to preserve an error for
review. ... In determining whether an error is palpable, an
appellate court must consider whether on the whole case
there is a substantial possibility that the result would have
been any different.
Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky.2002) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Hale contends that the prosecutor improperly stressed
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the victim’s innocence and virginity, factors which were irrelevant to the jury’s
determination of guilt and appealed to the jury’s emotions and prejudices, rather
than stressing that the case should be decided on the evidence. Specifically, the
prosecutor made repeated references to C.P.’s virginity; read aloud a prop “story
book” written for toddlers that was not entered into evidence, stated that the story
was about innocence and made references to the rabbits mentioned in the book;
remarked to the jury that they should be offended or that “it’s offensive” in regard
to Hale and his attorney; remarked that Hale had failed to accept responsibility for
his actions or to show remorse; exhorted the jury to “think with your mind and
your heart;” and told the jury that the trial was not about fairness but about a 44year-old man who slept with a 14-year-old girl. We agree with Hale that these
remarks were highly inappropriate and prejudicial. Nonetheless, Hale has failed to
make the required showing of a “probability of a different result or error so
fundamental as to threaten . . . [his] entitlement to due process of law. Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).
The judgment of the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William G. Deatherage, Jr.
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Michael John Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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