JONES (THOMAS), ET AL. VS. MYLES (ROBERT), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002225-MR
THOMAS JONES AND
LISA JONES
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00257
DIANNE STUCKER AND
ROBERT MYLES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, NICKELL, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal of a decision of the Shelby Circuit Court
dismissing a party, finding the party was not an indispensible party and should not
have been joined. For the following reasons, we afirm.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Dianne and Tom (now deceased) Stucker owned a farm comprised of
real and personal property in Shelby County, Kentucky. In May of 2004,
appellants Thomas Jones and Lisa Jones entered into an agreement to purchase
both real and personal property. The agreement stated that the appellants would
pay cash for the real property and sign a promissory note for the personalty, which
included livestock and farm equipment. No security agreement was filed to secure
the Stuckers’ interest in the personalty.
The Stuckers were represented by Robert Myles in this transaction.
Myles filed a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)-1 financing statement asserting a
lien on the personalty. The appellants contend that the filing was without their
knowledge or consent and that this action slandered the title to their property.
Appellants sold the livestock and farm equipment to make payments
on the promissory note. Diane Stucker aided in the bringing of criminal charges
against Thomas Jones for the sale of these items. The charges were later dismissed
and on April 23, 2007, Stucker brought this action asserting breach of contract
under the promissory note. On January 3, 2008, the trial court entered judgment
against appellants on Stucker’s complaint.
The appellants filed counterclaims against Diane Stucker asserting
malicious prosecution, libel, slander, abuse of process, and slander of title. The
counterclaims are still pending. Appellants then moved to add Myles as an
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indispensible party after Stucker contended that her actions were based upon
Myles’s advice as her counsel.
On September 3, 2008, the trial court granted the appellants’ motion
to add Myles as a party. On November 17, 2008, Stucker filed a third-party
complaint against him. A default judgment was entered against Myles on January
22, 2009. Myles then moved the court to set aside the default judgment and to
bifurcate the third-party claim. Myles also filed an answer to the third-party
complaint and, on March 30, 2009, the default judgment entered against him was
set aside. Myles’s motion to bifurcate, however, was denied.
On June 8, 2009, Stucker asked the court to reconsider its decision to
add Myles as an indispensible party. She asserted that the court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to entertain the third-party claim against him. She argued that
her claim against Myles was not ripe in that her damages were indefinite and
speculative.
On October 1, 2009, the trial court granted Stuckers’ motion to
reconsider and dismissed the third-party complaint against Myles. This appeal
followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s decision under an abuse of discretion
standard. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was
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arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Com. v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Therefore, we affirm the lower court’s
decision unless there is a showing of some “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Gross
v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983). With this standard in mind, we
examine the trial court’s ruling.
DISCUSSION
The appellants first argue that the trial court erred in granting
Stucker’s motion to reconsider and, subsequently, dismissing the third-party
complaint against Myles. They assert that a court must employ the test set forth in
Davidson v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. App. 2006),
to rescind a prior ruling. First, “a judge may reexamine an earlier ruling and
rescind it if he has a reasonable conviction that it was wrong and it would not
cause undue prejudice to the party that benefited from it.” Id. at 602 (quoting
Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 n.4 (Ky. App. 2004)).
Appellants argue that they would suffer undue prejudice and hardship with the
dismissal of the third-party complaint and removal of Myles as a party. They
contend that the time which passed during which Myles was a party led them to
develop their trial strategy, hire experts, research and draft preliminary jury
instructions and undertake discovery with the understanding that Myles would be
an involved participant. We do not find this a convincing argument.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 19 sets forth that it is within
the sound discretion of the trial court to make a determination as to whether
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additional parties are necessary to ongoing litigation and should be joined. West v.
Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Ky. 1992). This rule provides that a party should
be joined where:
(a) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (b) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reasons
of his claim interest.
CR 19.01(a)
Here, appellants do not have a case against Myles. The third-party
complaint was solely Stucker’s. There is no indication as to why the original trial
court judge decided Myles was an indispensible party. There is no proof that
Myles’s absence will subject the appellants or Stucker to the risk of multiple
obligations. Thus, we do not believe the appellants are prejudiced in any way by
the trial court’s dismissal of Myles as a party. We also agree that Stucker’s
damages are uncertain. If the appellants do not prevail on their counterclaims then
Stucker will recover everything that she was entitled to under the promissory note
and will have no claim against Myles.
The appellants also argue that the original ruling set forth by Senior
Status Judge Tom McDonald was an exercise in sound discretion. They contend
that the test set forth in Davidson, 202 S.W.3d 597, requires the court find the
original ruling to be wrong. Judge McDonald did not issue an opinion regarding
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his ruling. The oral ruling with a notation did not set forth his reasoning for
joining Myles as an indispensible party. We find that any such reasoning would be
flawed and, therefore, agree with the trial court’s subsequent dismissal of the
action against Myles.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
Preston Scott Cecil
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DIANNE
STUCKER:
David P. Nutgrass
Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ROBERT
MYLES:
C. Gilmore Dutton, III
Shelbyville, Kentucky
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