MAHANES (DONALD LEE) VS. SHUGARS (MICHAEL R.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002047-MR
DONALD LEE MAHANES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GEOFFREY P. MORRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-011289
MICHAEL R. SHUGARS1
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, NICKELL AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Following a jury trial, Donald Lee Mahanes appeals the
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on October 8, 2009, finding in
favor of Michael R. Shugars. On appeal, Mahanes advances two arguments
1
Nationwide General Insurance Company and American Family Insurance Company were
named defendants in the circuit court action but were not named in the Notice of Appeal. All
claims against Nationwide were dismissed with prejudice following trial.
regarding the court’s instructions. Upon careful review of the record, the briefs,
and the law, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal flows from a car/truck collision that occurred on
November 3, 2006, on the Watterson Expressway near the interchange with
Interstate 64 in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The collision occurred about 7:00
p.m. as Shugars was returning home after working as a schoolteacher. Shugars
admitted causing the collision but alleged he suffered a blackout that caused him to
lose control of his car and eventually strike Mahanes’ truck. Mahanes claimed
personal injuries and property damage as a result of the collision. Shugars asserted
the “blackout” defense recognized by Kentucky courts in Rogers v. WilhelmOlsen, 748 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. App. 1988).
Trial evidence covering two days showed Shugars’ blood pressure
was 240/136 soon after the crash. He was treated for hypertension, kidney failure
and swelling of the brain. The defense argued Shugars had no known history of
medical problems or treatment prior to the crash and the accident was
unforeseeable. In contrast, Mahanes argued Shugars had experienced insomnia,
headaches, nausea, daily vomiting, shortness of breath, and an unexplained thirtypound weight loss in the weeks prior to the collision and as a result, should not
have been driving at the time of the crash.
Jurors found in favor of Shugars. This appeal followed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
-2-
This appeal is limited to two questions regarding the court’s
instructions. First, Mahanes argues the “blackout” defense instruction was
erroneously tailored to Shugars rather than worded in terms of the ordinary person.
Shugars responds that the court’s instruction is nearly verbatim to the version
appearing in John S. Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 16.60 (4th Ed.,
1989), and was therefore appropriate.
Under the “blackout” defense,
where the driver of a motor vehicle suddenly becomes
physically or mentally incapacitated without warning, he
is not liable for injury resulting from the operation of the
vehicle while so incapacitated. However, once a prima
facie case of negligence has been made against the
defendant he must demonstrate that the sudden illness or
incapacity could not have been anticipated or foreseen.
Rogers, 748 S.W.2d at 673, (citing Lutzkovitz v. Murray, Del., 339 A.2d 64, 93
A.L.R.3d 321 (1975)). The evidence elicited at trial supported the giving of an
instruction on the “blackout” defense. The issue on appeal is whether the
instruction given by the court was an accurate statement of the defense.
Mahanes bases his argument on a single reference to the phrase
“ordinary and reasonable person” in Rogers, which states:
[t]he defense is unavailable where the defendant was put
on notice of facts sufficient to cause an ordinary and
reasonable person to anticipate that his or her driving
might likely lead to the injury of others. The defense is
neither available if at the time of the accident the
incapacitated driver was violating a statutory duty such
as to refrain from driving while intoxicated, or to drive
within the posted speed limit.
-3-
Rogers does not set forth a sample instruction.
The court instructed the jury as follows:
Do you find from the evidence that Michael Shugars
suddenly became incapacitated immediately before the
accident, that such incapacity was not reasonably
foreseeable by him, and that the accident was a result of
such incapacity?
By comparison, Palmore’s sample version of the “blackout” defense instruction,
which references Rogers, reads:
Even though you might otherwise find for P under
Instruction ___, if you are satisfied from the evidence
that immediately before the accident D suddenly became
incapacitated, that such incapacity was not reasonably
foreseeable by him, and that the accident resulted from it,
you will find for D.
The instruction given by the court was consistent with Palmore’s suggested
language. Moreover, we note that the comment to Palmore’s sample instruction
does not reference the ordinary and reasonable person standard. Mahanes has not
cited any case wherein an approved “blackout” defense instruction uses the phrase
“ordinary and reasonable person” and our search of caselaw has not revealed such
an instruction. Therefore, discerning no error, we affirm the court’s “blackout”
defense instruction as given.
Second, Mahanes argues the trial court erred in not instructing jurors
on a driver’s duty to maintain ordinary care on the roadway. Shugars argues there
was no alleged violation of duty so it was unnecessary to give the requested
instruction.
-4-
Shugars admitted causing the collision but alleged it resulted from an
unforeseen blackout. Because Shugars admitted fault, the court correctly
summarized the issue for the jury as an “all or nothing” proposition. If jurors
accepted Shugars’ “blackout” defense, they would find for Shugars. If they
rejected the “blackout” defense, they would find for Mahanes. Thus, there was no
need to instruct jurors on the standard of care to be observed by drivers on the
roadway.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth H. Baker
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael E. Krauser
Louisville, Kentucky
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