COMPUTER SERVICES, INC. VS. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002012-MR
COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00118
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET, COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON AND WINE, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Computer Services, Inc. (“CSI”), appeals from an
opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court upholding the Kentucky
Department of Revenue’s decision that prewritten computer software purchased in
2002 was tangible personal property subject to sales and use tax.
CSI is a Kentucky Corporation that provides data management services to
over 3,000 financial institutions across the nation. In June and July 2002, under a
Master Agreement for Products and Services, CSI paid Unisys Corporation
$3,645,717 for prewritten computer software, the hardware to run it, and the
services required to install and maintain the system. CSI purchased the software
for a 60-month term, at the conclusion of which it was required to either return,
renew or destroy the software. Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
139.160, Unisys initially collected sales and use tax from CSI on the purchases and
remitted such to the Kentucky Department of Revenue (“Department”). However,
Unisys subsequently sought a refund of $219,823.02 at CSI’s request on the basis
that the software portion of the purchase was not tangible personal property.
On July 3, 2007, the Department issued a final ruling denying the refund
claim, finding:
The software at issue is not some intangible right or
property but is instead something that exists in a physical
form that has a physical existence, takes up space on a
tape, disc, or hard drive, makes physical things happen
and can be perceived by the senses. It is therefore
tangible personal property within the meaning of the
sales and use tax law.
Unisys thereafter authorized CSI to pursue the tax refund in its own name. CSI
then appealed the Department’s ruling to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals
(“Board”). On December 22, 2008, the Board upheld the Department’s ruling,
noting in pertinent part:
-2-
CSI urges that this software delivery system is only
incidentally tangible and that it is the software that is
being used, not the tangible medium of delivery. The
Board believes this to be a distinction without a
difference. The software came loaded on a tangible
medium, the only hardware upon which it could be used,
also provided by Unisys as part of that which it delivered
under the same Master Agreement for Products and
Services. In effect, there is no difference between the
sale of the medium and the message here and the sale of
Window[s] 3.0 in a package at Wal-mart.
CSI subsequently sought review in the Franklin Circuit Court, arguing that
the Board’s decision was contrary to the sales and use tax laws in effect at the time
of the purchase, as well as to the decision in WDKY-TV v. Revenue Cabinet, 838
S.W.2d 431 (Ky. App. 1992). However, by opinion and order rendered September
28, 2009, the circuit court disagreed with CSI and upheld the administrative
agency’s rulings. In so doing, the circuit court devoted much of the opinion to an
analysis of Kentucky caselaw regarding statutory construction. The court applied
federal caselaw relating to the deference afforded to an administrative agency’s
contemporaneous construction of a statute and ultimately determined that it was
bound to follow the Department’s interpretation of the law so long as it was
reasonable. The court further ruled that the WDKY-TV decision was inapplicable
to the facts herein and that it was reasonable for the Department to tax the software
because it was delivered to CSI on a tangible medium. This appeal ensued.
Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
The standard of review, when addressing an appeal from an administrative
decision, “is limited to determining whether the decision was erroneous as a matter
-3-
of law.” McNutt Constr. v. Scott, 40 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Ky. 2001). Kentucky
Courts have long held that “judicial review of administrative action is concerned
with the question of arbitrariness . . . . Unless action taken by an administrative
agency is supported by substantial evidence it is arbitrary.” American Beauty
Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n.,
379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964). Substantial evidence is defined as “that which,
when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Bowling v. Natural
Resources and Envtl. Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky. App. 1994).
The judicial standard of review of an agency’s decision is largely
deferential. KRS 13B.150(2) requires that when reviewing an administrative
agency's decision, “[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” “In its role as finder
of fact, an administrative agency is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the
evidence heard and in the credibility of the witnesses, including its findings and
conclusions of law.” Aubrey v. Office of Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 298, 309
(Ky. App. 1972). See also Bowling, 891 S.W.2d at 409-410. The court's role as an
appellate court “is to review the administrative decision, not to reinterpret or to
reconsider the merits of the claim, nor to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence.” 500 Associates, Inc. v. Natural
Resources and Envtl. Protection Cabinet, 204 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Ky. App. 2006)
(citation footnote omitted). When it comes to an agency's findings of fact, “[a]s
-4-
long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision,
the court must defer to the agency, even if there is conflicting evidence.” Id. at
132.
Once a reviewing court has determined that the agency's decision is
supported by substantial evidence, the court must then determine if the agency
applied the correct rule of law to those factual findings in making its
determination. If so, the final order of the agency has to be upheld. Bowling, 891
S.W.2d at 409-410. On the other hand, matters of statutory construction are
subject to de novo review. Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law
reserved for the courts, we are not bound by the circuit court's interpretation.
Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. App. 2000).
Prior to embarking on a discussion of the issues herein, it is necessary to
provide a history of the relevant taxing provisions. Kentucky sales and use tax
applies to all retail sales of tangible personal property that are not exempted by
statute. KRS 139.120; Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 689 S.W.2d 14, 17
(1985). In 2002, at the time of CSI’s purchase of the software in question,
“tangible personal property” was defined as:
[P]ersonal property which may be seen, weighed,
measured, felt or touched, or which is in any other
manner perceptible to the senses and includes natural,
artificial and mixed gases, electricity, water, and prepaid
calling arrangements. For the purposes of this chapter,
the term “prepaid calling arrangements” means any right
to purchase communications service, which must be paid
in advance and which enables the origination of calls
using an access number or authorization code, whether
-5-
manually or electronically dialed. “Prepaid calling
arrangements” includes, but is not limited to, prepaid
cards and prepaid accounts which are decremented as
calls take place.
KRS 139.160.1 Aside from the items relating to utilities and prepaid calling
arrangements, the statute enumerated no particular types or categories of property,
but encompassed the whole of tangible personal property. In addition, 103
Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR) Section 28:051, entitled “Leases and
Rentals,” provided that leases and rentals were taxable in the same manner as sales
under KRS 139.120, and included leases or rentals of computer software and
hardware, which the regulation itself classified as “tangible personal property.”
103 KAR 28:051 § 2(1)(1).
At the hearing before the Board in this matter, Richard Dobson, the
Department’s Executive Director of the Office of Sales and Excise Taxes, testified
that prior to 2004, the taxation of prewritten computer software was based solely
upon the method in which it was delivered. The Department took the position that
if the software was delivered on a physical, tangible medium, such as a disk or
hard drive, the software itself was tangible property subject to sales tax. However,
software electronically downloaded directly from the Internet and installed on a
purchaser’s computer was classified as intangible property that was exempt from
taxation. Dobson explained that the Department’s policy was based upon the fact
that software downloaded from the Internet was not something that could be “seen,
weighed, measured, felt or touched, or . . . in any other manner perceptible to the
1
Repealed. 139.010(30), see page 16 of this opinion.
-6-
senses,” and thus did not fit within the definition of “tangible personal property”
found in KRS 139.160. Dobson conceded that the Department’s taxing of
essentially the same item based solely upon its method of delivery was
inconsistent. Nevertheless, the Department followed this policy until July 2004,
when KRS 139.160 was amended to specifically include prewritten computer
software “regardless of the method of delivery” within the definition of “tangible
personal property.” It is within the context of the above provisions, that we will
address each of the issues in turn
Before this Court, CSI first argues that the trial court erred in disregarding
the decision in WDKY-TV. Specifically, CSI contends that the Department’s policy
of taxing software based upon its method of delivery was in direct contravention of
the ruling in WDKY-TV, which CSI claims held that intangible property cannot be
taxed simply because it is delivered on a tangible medium.
We must agree with the circuit court that CSI has oversimplified the holding
in WDKY-TV. Therein, the issue was whether an intangible broadcasting right was
made tangible, and therefore taxable, when purchased at the same time as the
videotape that was used to deliver and transmit the broadcast. In determining that
such was not tangible taxable property, a panel of this Court held:
The Cabinet and the cases on which it relies have simply
failed to perceive the distinction between the right to own
an object and the right to make use of an object that one
owns. For example, a bookstore buys individual copies of
a book for resale, while a publishing house buys the right
to make copies of a book; and an appliance store sells
certain brand name appliances, while a manufacturer
-7-
buys the right to make a brand of appliances. In each
example, one party buys things and one party buys the
intangible (meaning not capable of being “seen, weighed,
measured, felt or touched” and not otherwise perceptible
to the human senses, KRS 139.160) right to make
reproductions of a thing.
WDKY-TV, 838 S.W.2d at 434.
CSI analogizes its software to the intangible broadcasting rights in WDKYTV. It argues that as in WDKY-TV, there were two distinct purchases – the
hardware, which CSI concedes is taxable, and the right to use the software for a
specific period of time. However, in distinguishing WDKY-TV, the circuit court
herein noted,
CSI has misread the context surrounding the Court of
Appeal’s utilization of the word “use.” The Court of
Appeals was obviously not referring to the difference
between outright ownership (e.g., purchase) and a limited
right of ownership (e.g., license). Rather, the Court of
Appeals was referring to the difference between
ownership, whether limited or otherwise, and the right to
“make use” of a copyright. . . . CSI had a limited right of
ownership, i.e., a license. CSI did not have a right to
“use,” or more specifically “make use,” e.g., reproduce,
disseminate, etc., of the software.
CSI also alleges that its “software licensing
agreement with Unisys is more akin to a broadcast
agreement than it is to a Bart Simpson T Shirt or a can of
Pepsi or a Cadillac – which were examples of taxable
tangible property listed by the Court in the WDKY-TV
opinion.” This point is simply incorrect. . . . . CSI
acquired restricted ownership rights through its license
agreement, that is, the right to “use” the software, but it
did not acquire the right to “use” or “make use” of the
software as articulated by the Court of Appeals in
WDKY-TV. . . . Just as the purchaser of a Bart Simpson tshirt “uses” his or her shirt, CSI “used” the software for
-8-
its benefit, and consequently, for the benefit of its
customers. The right to resell or dispose of the software
is simply not relevant. Again, it is the right to “make
use” of the property which is critical to WDKY-TV’s
decision. With respect to this fundamental facet, CSI’s
license is plainly more like a Bart Simpson t-shirt than
copyright. Thus, CSI’s reliance on WDKY-TV is
misplaced.
We agree that, contrary to CSI’s interpretation, the WDKY-TV decision did
not simply hold that intangible property delivered on a tangible medium was not
taxable. The WDKY-TV Court explicitly made no finding on the applicability of
taxing statutes to computer software:
We make no decision here on the applicability of KRS
139.310 to computer software. The numerous computer
software cases cited by the parties seem to fall into two
basic categories: 1) those cases which say that a
computer disk or tape is like a book and therefore taxable
as tangible property (a result which we believe to be
consistent with our reasoning); see e.g. Hasbro
Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124 (R.I.1985); and
2) those cases which say that computer software is
intangible (a result which, although favorable to the
appellant here, is at odds with our analysis; the results
may be justifiable, however, on other grounds and for
reasons not at issue here); see e.g. First Nat. Bank of
Springfield v. Dept. of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d 84, 51 Ill.Dec.
667, 421 N.E.2d 175 (1981).
Id. at 434 (Footnote 5).
Here, CSI made no purchase analogous to broadcast rights. It purchased a
“thing” - software that came installed on a tangible medium, the only hardware
upon which it could be used. CSI acquired the right to use the software strictly for
its own operations. It did not purchase the right to reproduce or distribute the
-9-
software. We discern no part of the purchase price that can be attributed to some
intangible right that is separate from the right to possess and use the software.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that the holding in WDKY-TV is inapplicable to
the facts herein.
CSI next argues that the circuit court ignored the standard of review and the
rules of statutory construction as set forth in City of Maysville v. Maysville St. Ry.
& Transfer Co., 128 Ky. 673, 108 S.W. 960 (1908), and George v. Scent, 346
S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1961). Clearly, once the trial court determined that WDKY-TV
did not apply, it was tasked with deciding whether, in the absence of any
controlling Kentucky law, the Department’s interpretation of the taxing statutes
was reasonable.
In City of Maysville, Kentucky’s then-highest court adopted the general rule
of resolving doubtful language in statutes imposing taxes in favor of the taxpayer,
stating,
It is elementary that taxing laws will not be enlarged by
intendment, and no property will be held as embraced
within the terms of a taxing statute by mere implication.
To impose taxes on property requires a clear and explicit
command of the sovereign power; and the courts will
never strain a taxing statute in order to make it embrace
property which would otherwise not fall within its
purview.
128 Ky. 673, 682, 108 S.W. 960, 962. The appellate courts of this Commonwealth
have properly continued to apply this elementary rule of tax imposition. See
WDKY-TV, 838 S.W.2d at 433. Again, in George v. Scent, the Court noted:
-10-
Taxing laws should be plain and precise, for they impose
a burden upon the people. That imposition should be
explicitly and distinctly revealed. If the Legislature fails
so to express its intention and meaning, it is the function
of the judiciary to construe the statute strictly and resolve
doubts and ambiguities in favor of the taxpayer and
against the taxing powers. This is particularly so in the
matter of pointing out the subjects to be taxed. (Citations
omitted, emphasis added).
346 S.W.2d 784, 789.
CSI argues that rather than construing the statutes strictly and
resolving all doubts and ambiguities in favor of the taxpayer, the circuit court
herein instead applied the doctrine of contemporaneous construction to effectively
find that the software was subject to sales tax simply because the Department said
it was. In Revenue Cabinet v. Lazarus, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 172 (Ky. 2001), the Court
observed:
The doctrine of contemporaneous construction
means that where an administrative agency has the
responsibility of interpreting a statute that is in some
manner ambiguous, the agency is restricted to any longstanding construction of the provision of the statute it has
previously made. “Practical construction of an
ambiguous law by administrative officers continued
without interruption for a very long period is entitled to
controlling weight.” Grantz v. Grauman, 302 S.W.2d
364 (Ky. 1957).
Lazarus, 49 S.W. 3d at 174 (quoting GTE v. Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788,
792 (1994)). In applying the doctrine of contemporaneous construction herein, the
trial court noted:
[T]he Court has a choice. First, it can habitually apply
strict construction to “ambiguous” tax statutes which
-11-
impose a tax burden and resolve these ambiguities in
favor of the taxpayer. George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784,
789 (Ky. 1961). Likewise, the Court will be forced to
habitually resolve ambiguities granting an exemption in
favor of the government. Id. In the alternative, the Court
can take a more sensible approach and attempt to resolve
the ambiguity with the assistance of agency expertise.
Obviously, there is only one rational conclusion. An
agency’s interpretation must be afforded deference
before the Court shifts to a strict construction of tax
statutes.
Certainly, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to great deference only
when the statute is in some manner ambiguous. However, CSI contends that in
2002, the statute was unambiguous as the definition of tangible personal property
did not contain a clear directive that computer software was to be taxed.
In the 2002 version of KRS 139.160, only six specific items were included
within the definition of “tangible personal property” – natural, artificial, and mixed
gases, electricity, water, and prepaid calling arrangements. To accept CSI’s
position, that unless the statute provided a clear directive an item was not subject to
taxation, would undoubtedly lead to an absurd result. Clearly, the legislature did
not intend for sales and use tax to apply only to the six enumerated items. Rather,
the statute leaves to the Department the interpretation of how the remainder of
personal property sales fit into the general definition of “tangible personal
property,” which included a broad catch-all phrase for property that was “in any
other manner perceptible to the senses.”
In our view, the resolution of this case turns not upon the WDKY-TV
decision, but rather upon the language of the statute at the time of CSI’s purchase.
-12-
The WDKY-TV Court noted that it found nothing within KRS 139.160 that
purported to tax “intangible” property as tangible, other than services associated
with the transfer of tangible property. 838 S.W.2d at 432. However, in 2000, after
the decision in WDKY-TV but prior to the purchase at issue, KRS 139.160 was
amended to include prepaid calling arrangements, which are clearly intangible in
nature.
Much confusion exists concerning categorizing software for sales and use
tax purposes. Apparently this conundrum extends across the nation as,
There is a split among the jurisdictions as to whether
computer software is tangible property subject to a
personal property tax or intangible property, not capable
of being taxed.
In many jurisdictions, for purposes of a business
personal property tax or a municipal tangible personal
property tax, computer software is intangible property.
84 C.J.S. Taxation § 127. This issue is the subject of an American Law Reports
article which noted,
In 1969, IBM announced a separate pricing policy for
software; no longer would computer software be
“bundled” with the cost of the hardware. The taxation of
this now distinct component became a matter of dispute
between taxing authorities which treated the computer
software as tangible personal property subject to sales
and use taxes and taxpayers who argued that the software
was intangible. The majority of courts which addressed
this issue in the decade subsequent to “unbundling” held
that computer software was intangible. In the last
decade, however, a number of courts have taken a
contrary position.
-13-
Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Computer Software or Printout Transactions as
Subject to State Sales or Use Tax, 36 A.L.R. 5th 133 (1996). This annotation
examines how various jurisdictions have grappled with the difficulty in attempting
to classify software in terms of “tangibility.” Jurisdictions which have determined
that software is intangible have primarily focused on the idea that the purchaser is
buying knowledge, not a physical object, so that the mode of transmittal is
irrelevant in determining taxability; rather it is the compilation, synthesis,
organization and creation of information that has value - things which are
inherently intangible. Id. at 144-148.
Generally, those jurisdictions holding that software is tangible and
thus subject to sales and use tax have, similarly to the Department’s position,
stressed the recorded nature of the information contained in “magnetic tapes”
which renders software tangible. Id. at 148-154. It would seem to us these courts
reach to extraordinary lengths in their efforts to support statutes similar to our own
by permitting taxation of items as tangible which are in reality intangible. To
classify one item in such a way as to impose a significant tax consequence while
one item is exempt merely because of the mode of delivery makes little sense.
Regardless, our own legislature has since chosen, perhaps by necessity given
the rapidly changing technology in today’s society, to create what can only be
termed a legal “fiction,” by specifically rendering intangible software now most
certainly tangible. In 2004, KRS 139.160 was amended to include prewritten
computer software in its definition of tangible property, regardless of the method
-14-
of delivery.2 Thus, it is obvious that whether an object is tangible or intangible is
of little consequence when the legislature has deemed it tangible for tax purposes.
With this principle in mind, we turn to KRS 139.160, as it existed at the time
of the transaction herein. As previously stated, the statute included as examples of
personal property subject to tangible sales taxes: natural, artificial and mixed
gases, electricity, water, and prepaid calling arrangements. Clearly, these items are
outside the traditional ideas of tangible personal property. One cannot imagine
something more intangible than gas, electricity or prepaid calling arrangements.
Therefore, it is more than plausible that our legislature intended the tangible tax to
extend to computer software. Moreover, the accompanying regulations
specifically include computer software within enumerated examples of tangible
property. Thus, the Department had ample legislative authority to levy taxes
against computer software under KRS 139.160.
Furthermore, although the decisions in City of Maysville and George hold
that tax laws should be construed in favor of the taxpayer, a panel of this Court in
J. Sutter’s Mill, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 793 S.W.2d 838, 839-840 (Ky. App.
1990), noted:
The Appellant reminds us that tax laws must be strictly
construed in favor of the taxpayer. . . . However, we
must also take into account KRS 139.260, which
provides that “it shall be presumed that all gross receipts
are subject to the [sales] tax until the contrary is
established.” This throws the burden of establishing “the
contrary” squarely upon the taxpayer. (Citations
omitted).
2
Currently, this statute has been repealed and the content is largely located in KRS 139.010(30).
-15-
CSI failed to convince the Department, the Board, or the circuit court of “the
contrary.” Given the language of KRS 139.160, along with its corresponding
regulations, we are of the opinion that at the time CSI made its purchase in 2002,
taxing software as tangible property was proper.
Finally, CSI argues that the circuit court failed to consider that the General
Assembly changed the law in 2004 to include prewritten computer software within
the definition of “tangible personal property.” CSI believes that this is a clear
indication that the software was not subject to taxation in 2002. We disagree.
Richard Dobson testified at the hearing before the Board that the change in
the law that occurred in 2004 was intended to remove the distinction that was
being made with software based on its method of delivery. In other words, it was
intended to clarify that the Department should tax all prewritten computer software
“regardless of method of delivery,” a phrase added to KRS 139.160(a) in the same
amendment that added prewritten computer software to the list of enumerated
examples of tangible personal property. As previously noted, CSI has provided no
indication, and we find none, that all prewritten computer software was exempt
from the sales and use tax provisions prior to 2004.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the opinion and order of the Franklin
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
-16-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael D. Kalinyak
Lexington, Kentucky
Leslie M. Saunders
Frankfort, Kentucky
-17-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.