ATKINS (KERRY PAUL) VS. ATKINS (EMILY STRAUS)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001892-ME
KERRY PAUL ATKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOAN L. BYER, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 09-D-502886 AND 09-D-502886-001
EMILY STRAUS ATKINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Kerry Paul Atkins, appeals the issuance of
a September 17, 2009, Domestic Violence Order (DVO) by the Jefferson Family
Court modifying the existing joint custody arrangement between Appellant and
Appellee, Emily Straus Atkins, and restricting Kerry’s contact with the minor child
of the parties to one hour per week in a supervised facility. Having reviewed the
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we hereby vacate the
portion of the DVO modifying custody, as well as the September 17, 2009, Order
of Supervised Access entered by the court.
The parties were married on July 5, 2003, and divorced on August 18,
2009. The parties had one minor child, H.A., who was three years old at the time
of the filing of Kerry’s brief. Pursuant to the August 7, 2009, Marital Settlement
Agreement between the parties, they agreed to share joint custody of H.A., with
Kerry to have custody on Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Sunday of each week.
Thereafter, on August 30, 2009, Emily filed a domestic violence
petition wherein she alleged that Kerry had engaged in intimidating behavior
directed toward herself.2 With respect to H.A., Emily stated, “I am concerned for
the welfare of me and my minor child,” and “All of his erratic behavior is in front
of our daughter.”3 An ex parte emergency order of protection and summons was
issued on August 30, 2009.
The case was heard on September 17, 2009, at which time both parties
appeared and testified. During the course of the hearing, Emily testified to a verbal
altercation between herself and Kerry during an exchange of their child on August
30, 2009. According to Emily, after H.A. was transferred from her vehicle to
Kerry’s vehicle, Kerry initiated a conversation in which he requested the return of
2
Having reviewed the record, we note that these behaviors apparently included verbal abuse
beginning shortly after the marriage, a threat to kill Emily made at the time she asked for the
separation, ongoing harassment and derogatory commentary, and other erratic behaviors, all of
which Emily asserts occurred in front of H.A. Kerry denies the majority of these behaviors, both
that they occurred, and that they occurred in front of H.A.
3
See Record, pp. 9-17.
2
a necklace purchased for H.A. According to Emily, when she refused, Kerry then
climbed upon her vehicle and spat on the window. Emily also stated that
throughout the transfer from one car to the other, H.A. remained in her car seat,
and could have been asleep, although Emily was not certain. Kerry testified that
H.A. was asleep when the altercation occurred. Kerry denied climbing on top of
the vehicle, but did concede to spitting in Emily’s direction.
Emily stated that this was the incident which prompted her to obtain
the DVO, as it was one of a string of other incidents which she felt indicated an
escalation in Kerry’s erratic behavior. Emily also expressed a belief that Kerry
was bipolar and exhibited such tendencies, which Kerry denied. Emily testified
that after she filed for the DVO, she saw Kerry again shortly thereafter on his bike
while she was driving H.A. to daycare. Emily testified that Kerry was within 3035 feet of her car at the time and that he spat in her general direction upon seeing
her. Again, Kerry denies that such an incident occurred.
During the course of the hearing concerning custodial and visitation
matters, Emily specifically testified that the relief sought incident to the DVO was
an exchange point at The Home of the Innocents, or a place similar thereto, which
did not involve direct contact between the parties. When asked whether she was
seeking a modification of the custodial and visitation arrangement between the
parties, Emily expressed that she was “conflicted.” Generally, she stated that she
knew father and daughter loved one another and denied that Kerry had ever
physically or sexually abused H.A. Indeed, she stated that she knew H.A. loved
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her father. Nevertheless, upon questioning, Emily stated that she was concerned
about Kerry’s escalating erratic behavior and about what he might do when he had
H.A. for visitation alone and overnight. Accordingly, Emily stated that she was
“not sure” what she was requesting in that regard.
Following the hearing, the court entered the aforementioned DVO,
which included standard findings and terms, including a 1000-foot distance
restriction. However, in the “Additional Findings” section, the DVO also provided
that: “In accordance with the criteria of KRS 403.270, 403.320, and 403.822,
temporary custody of H.A. be awarded to Petitioner, Emily Atkins.”
Simultaneously, the court entered an order of supervised access, wherein Kerry’s
visitation was restricted to one hour per week, with a “monitor in room with family
at all times.”4 It is from the portion of the DVO awarding sole custody to Emily
and from the order of supervised access that Kerry now appeals to this Court.
On appeal, Kerry argues that there was simply no evidence in the
record to justify the court’s modification of custody/visitation, nor the
implementation of supervised contact and that, accordingly, the findings made by
the court were not supported by the evidence pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil
4
We also note that after the parties had left the courtroom, the trial court indicated that it wished
to speak, “on the record” with counsel. During a conversation with counsel from both parties,
the court expressed its concern about a number of “red flags” which it felt were evident in this
case, including in the dissolution action over which the court had also presided. Specifically, the
court was troubled by the allegation that Kerry had threatened to kill Emily and had made a
reference to a well-known murder-suicide which had taken place in the Louisville area several
years ago. The court also noted concerns over Kerry’s increasingly erratic behavior, both as
described during the course of the DVO hearing and as indicated through evidence presented
during the dissolution action, over which the court was also presiding. The court expressed that
it made its decision out of concern for the safety of both the child and the mother.
4
Procedure (CR) 52.03. Emily has filed no response to the arguments made by
Kerry.5
At the outset, we note that in addressing the issues raised on appeal,
our standard of review is set forth in CR 52.01, which provides that findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Thus, the question before this Court
is not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the findings of the
family court are clearly erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or whether it
abused its discretion. Absent a finding in this regard, we shall not substitute our
opinion for that of the family court. See B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219-220
(Ky. App. 2005). See also Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. App. 2008).
Further, with regard to the trial court's application of law to those facts, this Court
will engage in a de novo review. Keeney v. Keeney, 223 S.W.3d 843, 848-49 (Ky.
App. 2007).
In reviewing this matter, we certainly acknowledge the authority of
the court below to enter an award of temporary custody and to modify or restrict
visitation in accordance with KRS 403.320. However, in order to do so, the court
must utilize the criteria set forth in KRS 403.270, KRS 403.320, and KRS 403.822.
In the matter sub judice, our review of the record indicates that the court made no
findings as to how the actions allegedly taken by Kerry adversely affected H.A.,
nor as to how and why it would be in her best interest to have her custodial
situation modified from one in which the parents shared joint custody to one in
5
To this end, we note that from the record, it appears that Emily previously filed a brief in this
matter, which was stricken by this Court on February 22, 2010, for failure to comply with CR 98.
It appears that no new brief was filed on Emily’s behalf.
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which she saw her father only one hour per week under supervision. Likewise,
under KRS 403.320, the court must have made findings that visitation would
endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. We
address these provisions in turn.
Turning first to KRS 403.270, we note that KRS 403.270(3) provides
that:
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.
If domestic violence and abuse is alleged, the court shall
determine the extent to which the domestic violence and
abuse has affected the child and the child's relationship to
both parents.
Indeed, we have clearly held that in the determination of custody, the court may
consider evidence of a custodian's misconduct. However, the court must then
conclude that such misconduct has affected or is likely to affect the child
adversely. Once such a determination has been made the trial court may consider
the potential adverse effect of such conduct as it relates to the best interests of the
child. Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1983).
While this Court certainly understands the concerns of the court below
relative to the behaviors on Kerry’s part prior to the divorce, we note that these
behaviors clearly occurred prior to the parties’ decision to enter into a marital
settlement agreement in which they agreed to share joint custody. Indeed, Emily
testified that while Kerry has spoken to her in a derogatory manner,6 he has not
6
Examples of this included demeaning references to Emily’s weight, and disparaging remarks
about her parenting style.
6
made any threats to her physical safety nor that of H.A. in the time since the
separation.7
KRS 403.340(3) clearly provides that a court shall not modify a prior
custody decree unless after a hearing it finds, based upon facts that have arisen
since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the entry of
the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his
custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the
child. In this matter, it is certainly clear that Emily was aware of Kerry’s actions at
the time she entered into the separation and custody agreement. Whether or not
she made that threat clear to the court is unclear, but in any regard is not
determinative in our opinion.
We believe that Emily’s decision to enter into a joint custody
arrangement with Kerry after he made this alleged threat implicitly indicates a
belief on Emily’s part that Kerry was not a dangerous individual or unfit custodian
at that time. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 407 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. App. 1966).8 See also
Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008)(modifying Ward in light of
KRS 403.340, thereby increasing the burden when seeking modification of custody
within two years of entry of the decree). Further, if Emily believed the facts were
7
Further, while we understand the court’s concern about “red flag” behaviors, we note that the
only behavior specifically referenced by the court was Kerry’s reference to the murder-suicide at
the time of the parties’ initial separation. It was after that time that Emily voluntarily entered
into an agreement with Kerry for joint custody of H.A.
8
Wherein divorced father withdrew first motion for modification of divorce decree which
gave custody of child to mother, trial court properly treated withdrawal as admission that welfare
of child had not been placed in jeopardy by anything that had occurred up to that time and
properly refused at time of second motion to consider any claimed change of conditions prior to
first motion.
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not indicative that Kerry was a dangerous individual or unfit custodian, then we
find it difficult that a court could view them as proving danger and unfitness absent
additional facts which, when combined together with the initial facts, would
indicate danger and unfitness. The latter is not the case sub judice. Emily knew of
the facts, consciously disregarded them when entering into an agreement, and then
sought to use those facts as a basis to set aside a decree based on the agreement.
This should not be allowed. Accordingly, we cannot find that those behaviors
constitute a sufficient basis for modification of custody pursuant to KRS 403.340.
Left to assess the evidence included in the record provided to this
Court, it appears that Kerry may have climbed onto and spat upon Emily’s vehicle,
spoke disparagingly toward her concerning her weight and parenting style, and
may have spit towards her vehicle while riding his bicycle. Further, while Emily
asserted that these actions “all” occurred in front of H.A., her testimony to the
court was that H.A. may have actually slept through these events which led Emily
to obtain the DVO itself. Thus, it is unclear from the record whether H.A. was
even aware of the actions allegedly taken by Kerry nor is it clear that the
relationship between Kerry and H.A. was in any way adversely affected by these
incidents. Accordingly, Kerry’s actions, if they occurred as alleged, are certainly
not commendable but do not, in the opinion of this Court, constitute a sufficient
basis for the restrictive custody modification instituted by the court below absent
appropriate findings.
8
Just as the court is required to make certain findings in order to
modify custody, it must also make certain findings in order to modify or restrict
visitation, in accordance with KRS 403.320, namely that would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Having reviewed the
court’s order in detail, and for the reasons already outlined herein, we note that the
findings which would have been necessary for restricting Kerry’s visitation are not
included therein.
Wherefore we hereby vacate the September 17, 2009, portion of the
order of protection which modifies custody, as well as the order of supervised
access entered on that same date, and remand this matter to the trial court below
for appropriate findings pursuant to KRS 403.270, KRS 403.320, and KRS
403.822, and all other necessary proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent
from the majority opinion.
While the majority has rendered a technically accurate statement of
Kentucky law with respect to the timing and circumstances of the parties’
agreement and the occurrence of events subsequent to that agreement, I fear the
majority has failed to take account of the explosive nature of the conflict between
the parties and what appears to be a high level of anger by Appellant toward
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Appellee. In such circumstances I am convinced the better practice is to defer to
the views of the trial court, a court that saw and observed the parties, heard their
testimony, and presided over the underlying divorce, a divorce that was granted
less than two months prior to the trial court’s order of protection. Further, it should
be noted that the order from which this appeal is taken is subject to subsequent
modification by the trial court.
To err on the side of caution is no license to disregard the law. I am
convinced, however, that in this case a high level of caution is called for.
Moreover, the findings of the trial court were sufficient and the evidence upon
which those findings were based was likewise sufficient to justify the relief
granted.
I would affirm the trial court’s order of protection.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Katie Marie Brophy
Louisville, Kentucky
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