RECALDE (EDWIN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 7, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001744-MR
EDWIN RECALDE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00555
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Edwin Recalde appeals from the final judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts) and
sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment. For the following reasons, we vacate
the judgment of sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
During the sentencing phase of Recalde’s trial, the Commonwealth
called a probation and parole officer to testify as to parole eligibility for convicted
offenders. The parole officer testified that the crime of sexual abuse in the first
degree was a Class D felony that carried a sentence of one to five years in prison
on each count and that an offender convicted of a Class D felony with an aggregate
sentence of one to five years would have his case reviewed by the Parole Board
after serving 15% of the sentence pursuant to KRS1 439.340.2
The parole officer
also testified regarding the eligibility of a reduction in sentence pursuant to “good
time credits.” Thereafter, the jury recommended three years on each count to be
served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment, which
the trial court imposed. This appeal followed.
Recalde claims the Commonwealth’s presentation of the parole officer’s
testimony violated the due process guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.
Specifically, he contends he would become eligible for parole after serving 20% of
his sentence, rather than 15%, and the parole officer’s incorrect testimony in this
respect led the jury to recommend a more severe sentence than it would have
otherwise recommended. Additionally, the parole officer explained the concept of
“good time credit” to the jury, including that by operation of statute, any inmate
may receive a reduction in his sentence of ten days per month of his sentence; an
inmate who achieves certain education levels while incarcerated may receive an
additional ninety days reduction in his sentence; and an inmate may also receive a
1
Kentucky Revised Statute.
2
KRS 439.340(3)(a) provides: “A nonviolent offender convicted of a Class D felony with an
aggregate sentence of one (1) to five (5) years who is confined to a state penal institution or
county jail shall have his or her case reviewed by the Parole Board after serving fifteen percent
(15%) or two (2) months of the original sentence, whichever is longer.”
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reduction of seven days per month of his sentence for merit service. See KRS
197.045. But the parole officer failed to disclose that Recalde, as a sex offender,
was not eligible to receive the credit, except for educational credit, until
completion of the Sex Offender Treatment Program. Thus, it is undisputed, and
the Commonwealth concedes, that the parole officer erroneously testified before
the jury in regard to the amount of time Recalde would have to serve before he
would become eligible for parole.
While deliberating, the jury returned a question to the court: “Is length of
time you are monitored dependent on length of sentence?” The court heard from
counsel for Recalde and the Commonwealth and the issue of good time credit was
specifically discussed in determining how the court would answer the question for
the jury. The court responded to the jury’s question with “yes.”
Recalde admits these errors were not preserved for our review and thus
implores us to address it under the palpable error standard of RCr3 10.26. Under
that rule,
an unpreserved error may be noticed on appeal only if the
error is “palpable” and “affects the substantial rights of a
party,” and even then relief is appropriate only “upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted from
the error.” An error is “palpable,” we have explained,
only if it is clear or plain under current law and in general
a palpable error “affects the substantial rights of a party”
only if “it is more likely than ordinary error to have
affected the judgment.” An unpreserved error that is
both palpable and prejudicial still does not justify relief
unless the reviewing court further determines that it has
resulted in a manifest injustice, unless, in other words,
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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the error so seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the proceeding as to be “shocking or
jurisprudentially intolerable.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009) (citations omitted).
The Commonwealth’s response to Recalde’s argument is that the
parole officer’s incorrect testimony did not amount to palpable error and is
harmless. We disagree and are perplexed at the argument that an inmate’s
potentially serving additional time in prison before becoming parole eligible -- due
to erroneous information presented to a jury-- does not rise to substantial injustice
or can amount only to harmless error.
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the issue of a parole officer’s
incorrect testimony during the sentencing phase of trial in the case of Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30 (Ky. 2005). In Robinson, the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of a probation and parole officer who incorrectly testified
about good time credits as it related to the defendant’s parole eligibility. The Court
stated:
The use of incorrect, or false, testimony by the
prosecution is a violation of due process when the
testimony is material. This is true irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. When the
prosecution knows or should have known that the
testimony is false, the test for materiality is whether
“there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”
Id. at 38 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized the Commonwealth “relied,
almost solely, on [the officer’s] testimony to persuade the jury to recommend the
maximum sentence[,]” and held “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
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was influenced by the incorrect testimony.” Id. The defendant received
consecutive sentences on felony charges totaling thirty years’ imprisonment, with
misdemeanor sentences set to run concurrently. The Court held the incorrect
testimony of the parole officer to be palpable error.
Following Robinson, we cannot agree with the Commonwealth that
the inaccurate and misleading testimony by the parole officer before the jury
during the sentencing phase does not amount to palpable error. In Robinson, the
Supreme Court stated
The question remains whether the testimony influenced
the jury to render a sentence greater than what it might
otherwise have given absent the incorrect testimony. We
believe it did and, for sure, can’t say it didn’t. . . . The
jury was given information to consider that was
obviously confusing to the very people who deal with it
on a daily basis. There is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury was influenced by the incorrect testimony.
181 S.W.3d at 38.
Here, not only did the parole officer incorrectly testify as to eligibility
requirements for “good time credits” as in the Robinson case, but also as to the
percentage of time Recalde would have to serve before he became parole eligible.
We see no rational way to distinguish Robinson from this case. Consequently, we
must conclude that there is at least a reasonable likelihood that the two errors in the
testimony of the parole officer during Recalde’s sentencing phase could have
influenced the jury’s decision, and to quote from the Supreme Court, we “for sure,
can’t say it didn’t.” Id.
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Recalde’s sentence is hereby vacated, and we remand this case to the Kenton
Circuit Court for a new sentencing hearing.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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