HAWES (JESSICA) VS. HAWES (MICHAEL STEVEN)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 28, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001658-MR
JESSICA HAWES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER UPCHURCH CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00362
MICHAEL STEVEN HAWES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Jessica Hawes appeals from an order denying her motion to
reconsider the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of
marriage entered by the Russell Circuit Court, Family Court Division, on August
11, 2009. Upon review of the record, the briefs and the law, we affirm.
FACTS
Jessica and Michael Steven Hawes were married in Lexington,
Kentucky, in March of 2001. Two children were born of their union; Michael is
not the biological father of a third child born during the marriage. Michael and
Jessica separated on or about August 18, 2007, and on September 1, 2007, Michael
filed a petition in the Russell (Kentucky) Circuit Court to dissolve the marriage.
Jessica filed a similar petition in Arkansas on September 28, 2007. In his petition,
Michael averred that he had been a Kentucky resident for more than 180 days prior
to commencement of the dissolution action.
On October 1, 2007, Jessica moved the Russell Circuit Court to
dismiss the petition due to lack of jurisdiction over her, improper venue and
insufficient service of process. The motion asserted that both Jessica and Michael
were Arkansas residents and “neither have been residents of the State of Kentucky
or the County of Russell for more than 180 days prior to the commencement of this
action.” On November 26, 2007, the Russell Circuit Court entered an order1
denying Jessica’s motion to dismiss because Michael “has met his burden of proof,
that he is a resident of Russell County, Kentucky, and that this Court has
jurisdiction over the matter currently before the Court.”
According to proposed findings of fact filed by Michael, prior to the
marriage, on July 20, 2000, Michael received a partial settlement of $87,000.00 for
a workers’ compensation award and $55,000.00 in severance pay for a total
settlement of $142,000.00. Settlement proceeds were used to: 1) build a home in
2006 in Powell County, Kentucky, on land valued at $8,500.00 that is jointly
1
This order was entered by Russell Circuit Court Judge Phillip Morgan before the case was
assigned to Russell Circuit Court Judge Jennifer Upchurch Clark of the Family Court Division.
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owned by Jessica and her two sisters; 2) purchase a home in Pike County,
Arkansas, mortgaged in the amount of $75,000.00; and, 3) purchase approximately
forty acres of unimproved land in Hot Spring County, Arkansas, on which there is
a lien of approximately $16,000.00. The couple’s other property and debt includes
a 2001 Mercury Sable on which there is no lien; a 2001 Dodge Ram truck on
which there is a $10,000.00 lien; and approximately $10,000.00 in credit card debt
that was incurred jointly. Michael argued all the real estate should be awarded to
him because it was purchased with funds from his workers’ compensation
settlement which were obtained prior to the marriage; the Mercury Sable should be
awarded to him, or, if awarded to Jessica, she should be required to pay him
$5,000.00 which is one-half of the vehicle’s fair market value; and, the credit card
debt should be equally divided.
Attached to Michael’s proposed findings was a deed showing Arnold
Ledford and his wife, Etta Louise Ledford, sold the Powell County property to
Jessica and her two sisters for $1,400.00 cash in 1984. The deed contradicted
Jessica’s allegation that her parents gave the property to her and her sisters as a
gift. Testimony during the final hearing on September 12, 2008, indicated Michael
knew he did not own the Powell County land when he built the house upon it.
On October 1, 2008, the Russell Circuit Court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree of dissolution of marriage in which it: concluded
“[t]he parties hereto and the subject matter of this action are properly before the
court, and this Court has jurisdiction over both parties and the subject matter
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herein[;]” awarded Jessica the Powell County, Kentucky, residence with the
requirement that she pay Michael $50,000.00 for his interest in the property;
awarded Michael the property in both Pike County, Arkansas, and Hot Spring
County, Arkansas; awarded Michael the 2001 Dodge Ram truck; awarded the 2001
Mercury Sable to Jessica; and made Jessica solely responsible for the $10,000.00
in credit card debt.
On October 14, 2008, Jessica moved the court to reconsider the
findings of fact and conclusions of law. She asked that the requirement that she
pay Michael $50,000.00 for his interest in the Powell County property be vacated
because her sisters, with whom she owns the land as tenants in common, objected
to the property being mortgaged and as a result she could not raise the $50,000.00
to pay Michael. The court did not rule on the motion.
A few days later, Michael moved the court to alter, amend or vacate
the findings of fact and conclusions of law to rescind the child support order since
the children receive social security disability benefits from him. The court vacated
the child support award.
In April of 2009, Jessica renewed her motion to reconsider based on
the same reasoning, namely impossibility to pay Michael $50,000.00. Michael
responded that the court had denied the motion upon hearing it in December of
2008. Michael argued the property awarded to him is mortgaged and has value
only if he continues making the mortgage payments whereas the residence awarded
to Jessica is not mortgaged and therefore, he is entitled to one-half the fair market
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value of the Powell County residence. In June of 2009, Jessica filed a
memorandum in support of her motion to reconsider alleging Michael’s workrelated accident occurred during the marriage, not before, as asserted by Michael.2
She also alleged that indispensable parties, her sisters, had not been joined in the
action. On August 11, 2009, without elaboration, the court entered an order
overruling Jessica’s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Jessica advances three issues on appeal. First, she argues the Russell
Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the dissolution action because neither
party had resided in Kentucky for more than 180 days before the filing of the
petition. Second, she claims the court abused its discretion in awarding Michael
two pieces of property in Arkansas and requiring her to pay Michael $50,000.00
for his interest in the Powell County residence. Third, she argues the court abused
its discretion in ordering her to pay the entire $10,000.00 in jointly incurred credit
card debt.
Findings supported by substantial evidence are not clearly erroneous.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003). “[I]n reviewing the decision of
a trial court the test is not whether we would have decided it differently, but
whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his
discretion.” Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted).
2
Michael conceded in a memorandum filed in response to Jessica’s renewed motion to
reconsider that his work-related injury “occurred during the course of the marriage between the
parties.”
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Abuse of discretion occurs when a court's decision is unreasonable, unfair,
arbitrary or capricious. Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, KRS 403.140(1)(a) states:
[t]he Circuit Court shall enter a decree of dissolution of
marriage if:
(a) The court finds that one (1) of the parties, at the time
the action was commenced, resided in this state, or was
stationed in this state while a member of the armed
services, and that the residence or military presence has
been maintained for 180 days next preceding the filing of
the petition[.]
In his petition for dissolution, Michael alleged he met the residency requirement
and supported his assertion with a Kentucky drivers’ license and Kentucky vehicle
registration. In an attempt to show Michael and she were both Arkansas residents,
Jessica submitted invoices for utilities in Arkansas, a letter from an Arkansas
school showing the couple’s daughter had been enrolled there, and an Arkansas
mortgage. However, none of these exhibits conclusively established Michael was
residing in Arkansas. Thus, we conclude the trial court’s finding that Michael had
established Kentucky residency was supported by substantial evidence and
therefore, will be affirmed because it was not clear error. Cherry; CR3 52.01.
We turn next to Jessica’s complaints about the property division,
beginning with her claim that Michael was not entitled to one-half of the
improvements made to the Powell County property with marital funds because he
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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knew he did not own the real estate at the time he built the two-story home to be
inhabited by himself, Jessica and Jessica’s parents. According to the brief for
appellant, the claim is based upon Anglin v. Pennington, 296 Ky. 142, 144, 176
S.W.2d 277, 278 (1943), which confirms that “[o]nly a bona fide purchaser, that is,
one who actually believes, and has no reason to believe to the contrary, that his
title is good, is entitled to recover the enhancement in value resulting from the
improvements which he erects.” See also Stepp v. Leslie, 263 S.W.2d 122, 123
(1953); Mullins v. Mullins, 797 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. App. 1990). While Jessica’s
claim has merit, it is not properly before us because it was not argued to the trial
court4 and therefore has not been preserved for our review.
A statement of preservation is required to ensure the trial court was
given the opportunity to rule on the issue before we can consider it on appeal.
Hines v. Carr, 296 Ky. 78, 81, 176 S.W.2d 99, 100-101 (1943). Appellate review
is based on the principle that the lower court has first had a chance to deliberate
and decide upon the issues. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. Partnership, 207 S.W.3d 593
(Ky. App. 2006). Jessica asserts the issue is preserved by the filing of multiple
motions to reconsider. We have reviewed her motions to reconsider; neither cites
the line of cases relied upon by Jessica in her brief. Thus, we are convinced the
trial court was not given the opportunity to rule on this precise issue. In fact, in her
motion to reconsider, Jessica states, “Respondent would request that the property
remain in the division currently ordered but that Respondent not be required to pay
4
Jessica is represented by different counsel on appeal.
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to the Petitioner the sum of $50,000 for his interest in the property in Powell
County, Kentucky.” Jessica is attempting to assert a different argument on appeal
than was argued to the trial court. Therefore it is not properly before us and will
not be considered on appeal.
We next consider Jessica’s claim that her two sisters, co-owners of the
Powell County property, should have been included as indispensable parties. We
disagree.
Jessica asserts her sisters are indispensable parties because she cannot
comply with the court’s order that she pay Michael $50,000.00 unless she can
mortgage the Powell County property, an action at least one of her sisters opposes.
However, Jessica’s inability to raise $50,000.00 without being able to mortgage the
Powell County property does not mean the trial court’s division of the couple’s
marital assets constitutes an abuse of discretion. The joinder of indispensable
parties is governed by CR 19.01 which reads:
[a] person who is subject to service of process, either
personal or constructive, shall be joined as a party in the
action if (a) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (b) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so
joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If
he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in a proper case an involuntary
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
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joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he
shall be dismissed from the action.
First, neither sister has filed a claim, nor has a claim been asserted on their behalf.
Second, the trial court awarded the Powell County house to Jessica but directed her
to pay Michael $50,000.00 for his interest in the property. The trial court’s award
did not impact the interests of Jessica’s sisters in the Powell County real estate;
they remain tenants in common with her. Therefore, the sisters are not
indispensable parties to the dissolution action.
Finally, Jessica claims the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
her to pay $10,000.00 in credit card debt that Michael testified was jointly incurred
during the marriage. Jessica argues the court erred in making her responsible for
the debt without any proof that it exists or to whom it is owed.
During the final hearing, Jessica testified she was unsure of the
amount of credit card debt owed by the couple. Michael testified that Jessica had
$900.00 in credit card debt and the couple had jointly incurred $10,000.00 in credit
card debt. As asserted by Jessica in her brief, Michael offered to pay one-half of
the couple’s credit card debt.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) requires the argument of the brief to begin with “a
statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly
preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.” Jessica’s brief does not comply
with the rule. Furthermore, no allegation about the unfairness of making Jessica
solely responsible for the marital credit card debt appears in either motion to
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reconsider. Thus, the issue was not presented to the trial court and will not be
considered on appeal. Hines.
For the foregoing reasons, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
dissolution of marriage entered by the Russell Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan J. Ham
Somerset, Kentucky
Michael S. Hawes, pro se
Jamestown, Kentucky
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