CORNELIUS (ESLEY DEE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001624-MR
ESLEY DEE CORNELIUS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 09-CR-00122 AND 09-CR-00122-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART;
REVERSING IN PART;
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; LAMBERT, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580. Sr. Judge Henry
concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of senion judge service. Release of
the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Esley Dee Cornelius appeals from a judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court following a jury trial at which he was convicted of
possession of marijuana, tampering with physical evidence and being a first-degree
persistent felony offender (PFO). He argues that there was insufficient evidence
to support the tampering charge, and that the Commonwealth failed to prove an
element of the PFO charge. We affirm the judgment as to the first issue, but
reverse and remand as to the PFO charge.
Cornelius was arrested as the result of a controlled drug buy arranged by
Jesse Riddle, a deputy sheriff in McCracken County. Deputy Riddle received a
call from a confidential informant, Jose Hernandez, who stated that he had made
contact with an individual who might be able to sell him some cocaine. Hernandez
arranged to meet this individual, and a recording device was installed in
Hernandez’s vehicle. Deputy Riddle conducted surveillance. He observed
Hernandez pull up beside a pickup truck, which was the type of vehicle the seller
had said he would be driving. Riddle saw three black males in the truck.
Hernandez pulled over and parked. The pickup drove down the street, turned and
then came back and parked behind Hernandez. After a minute or two, one of the
men in the pickup got out and entered the passenger side of Hernandez’s car.
Hernandez used $1,500 provided to him by the police to purchase a baggy of a
white substance which resembled cocaine. The substance was later tested and
found not to be cocaine.
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Meanwhile, the pickup truck began to pull away. Riddle told other officers
to stop the truck. Deputy Tom Crabtree pulled over the pickup truck, drew his gun
and ordered the occupants to show him their hands. Cornelius was the driver of
the pickup. Deputy Crabtree testified that the driver’s window was down, that he
could see the driver moving and that his hands were out of sight and not on the
steering wheel. The officers eventually had to open the pickup door and remove
Cornelius. They handcuffed him, placed him on the ground and searched him.
Crabtree found a baggie of marijuana in Cornelius’s pocket. The passenger in the
truck was Cornelius’s seventeen-year-old son.
Matt Carter, a detective sergeant with the sheriff’s department, interviewed
Cornelius on the day of his arrest and received conflicting statements from him
about the marijuana. Initially, Cornelius told the detective that the marijuana was
in his hands when he was told by police to put his hands up. He explained that he
had discovered the marijuana in the vehicle when they were stopped, and he was
getting ready to give it to the officers. Detective Carter conferred briefly with
Deputy Crabtree, then returned to confront Cornelius with the fact that the
marijuana had been found in his pocket. According to Detective Carter, Cornelius
then told him that when the police stopped the truck, his son (the passenger) told
him that there was marijuana in the seat, so Cornelius grabbed it and put it in his
pocket. When Carter asked him why he put it in his pocket, he responded that he
did not try to hide it. “If I’d tried to hide it I’d have put it in my drawers. They
knew they’d find it in my pocket.”
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Cornelius was found guilty of tampering with evidence for concealing the
marijuana in the pocket of his pants. He received a sentence of two years on the
charge. He was also found guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first
degree. He received a sentence of two years on the tampering charge, but was
sentenced to serve eleven years on the PFO charge in lieu of the two years.
On appeal, Cornelius argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a directed verdict on the tampering charge.
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence
in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if
under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
The jury was instructed to find Cornelius guilty if it believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that he had concealed the marijuana in the belief that it was about
to be produced or used in an official proceeding; and that he did so with the intent
to impair its availability in the proceeding.
Cornelius points out that there was no eyewitness testimony that he actually
put the marijuana in his pocket when the police officers approached the pickup
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truck. He contends that his confession to Detective Carter that he had put the
marijuana in his pocket was insufficient to sustain his conviction under Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.60. RCr 9.60 provides that a defendant’s
confession, “unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction unless
accompanied by other proof that such an offense was committed.” Cornelius
argues that the mere presence of the marijuana in his pocket was insufficient
corroboration to support his confession. But Deputy Crabtree testified that when
he ordered the occupants of the truck to show him their hands, Cornelius’s hands
were out of sight, he was moving, and he refused to leave the truck. This
testimony was sufficient corroborative evidence for the jury to infer that Cornelius
had placed the marijuana in his pocket during that interval in order to impair its
availability in an official proceeding.
Cornelius contends that no one “in their right mind” would think that he
could successfully conceal drugs by placing them in his pocket when the police are
approaching to apprehend him. In our view, an individual in that highly stressful
situation might react in exactly in such a manner. Cornelius likens his situation to
that of concealment of contraband by shoplifters, which the Kentucky Supreme
Court has ruled typically does not rise to the level of tampering. Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 85 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Ky. 2002). The Court explained that because
shoplifters must conceal the contraband in order to escape without detection, the
concealment is directly incident to the underlying crime. Tampering “requires
more. The concealment must be to prevent the evidence from being used in an
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official proceeding, a fact that is lacking in the typical shoplifting situation.” Id.
Cornelius’s concealment of the marijuana was not part of the underlying crime;
rather, he placed it, albeit in a poorly chosen hiding place, in an effort “to prevent
law enforcement officials from finding the evidence and using it in an official
proceeding.” Id.
Next, Cornelius argues that he was denied due process of law because the
Commonwealth failed to prove each element of the first-degree persistent felony
offender charge, specifically, that one of the two prior felony convictions used to
prove the charge did not result in a sentence of one year or more. See Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080(3).
The jury instructions describing that
prior conviction (which occurred in Illinois for unlawful possession of firearm
ammunition by a felon) did not mention the length of the sentence imposed at all.
In fact, the sole penalty imposed in that case was a fine of $1,000. Because this
issue was not preserved for appeal, Cornelius requests that we review it under the
palpable error standard. See RCr 10.26. The Commonwealth concedes error.
A palpable error must be so grave in nature that if it were
uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the
proceedings. Thus, what a palpable error analysis boils
down to is whether the reviewing court believes there is a
substantial possibility that the result in the case would
have been different without the error. If not, the error
cannot be palpable.
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (internal quotations
and footnotes omitted).
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We agree with Cornelius that the jury instructions constituted palpable error.
“[T]he language of the statute [KRS 532.080(3)(a)] is clear and unambiguous. In
order for there to be a first-degree PFO prosecution based on convictions from a
foreign jurisdiction, the sentences imposed for each conviction must be for one
year or more or a sentence of death.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 635,
639 (Ky. App. 2009). Without this error, Cornelius could not have been convicted
of PFO in the first degree, which carries a possible sentence of ten to twenty years
when it is employed to enhance a conviction for tampering with physical evidence,
a Class D felony. See KRS 532.080(6)(b); KRS 524.100(2).
The Commonwealth contends that Cornelius could have been convicted of
being a PFO in the second degree on the basis of the other felony conviction
described in the jury instructions, and urges us to remand Cornelius to the
McCracken Circuit Court for resentencing as a persistent felony offender in the
second degree. While such a resolution might appear practical, it is prohibited by
the holding of our Supreme Court in White v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 222
(Ky. 1989), without a retrial on the charge of PFO second degree.
Accordingly, Cornelius’s conviction on the charge of being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
McCracken Circuit Court for dismissal of that charge and for further proceedings
in accordance with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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