ACOSTA (SAMANTHA MONAHAN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001445-MR
SAMANTHA MONAHAN ACOSTA
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-01349
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: On October 18, 2005, a Fayette County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Samantha Monahan1 with one count of first-degree criminal
abuse. In the same indictment, the grand jury charged Roy D. Rankin with one
count each of murder and first-degree criminal abuse. The charges arose from the
1
Since trial, Monahan is now known as Samantha Monahan Acosta.
death of Monahan’s six-month-old daughter, Cecilia Alvarado, on August 22,
2005.
The matter proceeded to a joint trial of both Monahan and Rankin in
late April and early May of 2009. Monahan moved for a directed verdict at the
close of the Commonwealth’s case and again at the close of proof. The trial court
denied the motion both times. The trial court instructed the jury on two separate
theories of first-degree criminal abuse: that Monahan intentionally abused Cecilia
and that Monahan intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. The court also
instructed the jury on similar theories of second-degree and third-degree criminal
abuse. The jury found Monahan guilty of first-degree criminal abuse under the
instruction that she had abused Cecilia. The jury fixed Monahan’s sentence at ten
years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Monahan now appeals.2
Monahan first argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict on the
charge of first-degree criminal abuse. When ruling on a directed verdict motion, a
trial court must assume that all the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, and
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
However, the Commonwealth is required to present evidence “of substance,” and
not more than a mere scintilla of evidence from the Commonwealth requires that
the trial court grant the motion. Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky.
The jury also found Rankin guilty of murder and first-degree criminal abuse. Since Rankin
received a twenty-year sentence, his appeal proceeded directly to the Kentucky Supreme Court
(Rankin v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-000385-MR; 2010 WL 5135333 (Ky)).
2
-2-
1983). Upon appellate review, the test for a directed verdict is whether “under the
evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the
defendant guilty.” Id.
For purposes of this appeal, the circumstances surrounding the death
of Cecilia Alvarado are not in dispute. Cecilia was born in Florida in February of
2005. Shortly after Cecelia’s birth, Monahan moved to Tennessee to live with her
mother. She regularly took Cecilia to the doctor while they lived in Florida and
Tennessee. Monahan also began a relationship with Rankin about the same time.
She moved to Kentucky to live with Rankin and Rankin’s family around July 4,
2005. She brought both Cecilia and her two-year old son, M.A. From this time on,
Rankin regularly cared for both Cecilia and M.A. while Monahan was working.
Cecilia’s last doctor’s visit before moving to Kentucky was on June 7,
2005. No unusual circumstances were reported at that time. On August 18, 2005,
four days before her death, Cecilia was examined by Susan Hays, a nurse
practitioner at Baby Health in Lexington. Monahan reported that Cecilia was
suffering from acid reflux, colic, and a potential liver problem. She did not report
any other problems. Nurse Hays noted a bruise on Cecilia’s left forehead and two
scabbed areas on each of Cecilia’s legs. Nurse Hays also noted that Cecilia’s
muscle tone was poor, but she did not notice any signs of fractured bones.
On August 22, 2005, Monahan was scheduled to go to work at 2:00
p.m. Her car would not start and she was late for work. Monahan testified that she
arrived at work around 2:35 p.m., but there was conflicting testimony that it may
-3-
have been as late as 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. Rankin watched Cecilia and M.A. at his
parent’s house next door.
Rankin testified that he left Cecilia in her car seat in the bedroom. He
stated that he returned to the bedroom around 7:00 p.m. and found the car seat
knocked over, Cecelia on the floor, and M.A. on top of her, digging his knees into
her neck. He picked up Cecilia, noticed her head was limp and took her out to the
porch where his parents were sitting.
When the police and emergency responders arrived shortly thereafter,
Cecelia lacked a pulse and was pale and not breathing. She had dark red/purple
bruises on both sides of her neck. The doctor at the emergency room noted this
bruising, as well as additional bruising on her legs and scalp. Cecilia briefly
regained a pulse at the emergency room, but after thirty minutes of resuscitation
efforts, she was pronounced dead.
An autopsy revealed that Cecilia’s skull was fractured and she had
multiple subdural and epidural hemorrhages. The Commonwealth introduced
expert testimony that these fatal injuries were likely caused by blunt force trauma.
The experts also opined that Cecilia’s injuries could not have been caused by a
two-year old as claimed by Rankin. The autopsy also revealed that Cecelia also
had suffered multiple fractures to her arms, legs and ribs, round, cigarette-type
burn marks to her legs, a tear to the frenulum inside the upper front of her mouth,
and a dislocated shoulder joint. These latter injuries showed signs of various
-4-
stages of healing, indicating that they occurred between two and twelve weeks
prior to Cecelia’s death.
Under Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 508.100(1), a person may
be guilty of first-degree criminal abuse under two different theories. The
Commonwealth must prove the offense by showing either that the defendant
intentionally abused another person, or intentionally permitted another person of
whom she has actual custody to be abused. Under either theory, the
Commonwealth must further show that a defendant thereby:
(a) Causes serious physical injury; or
(b) Places him in a situation that may cause him serious
physical injury; or
(c) Causes torture, cruel confinement or cruel
punishment;
to a person twelve (12) years of age or less, or who is
physically helpless or mentally helpless.
Monahan maintains that there was no evidence that she intentionally
abused Cecilia or that she intentionally permitted Rankin to abuse Cecilia. In her
initial brief, Monahan primarily contends there was no evidence showing that she
was aware Rankin was abusing Cecilia and that she was intentionally permitted
him to continue the abuse. The Commonwealth responds that the jury found her
guilty of intentionally abusing Cecilia and did not reach the instruction allowing it
to find her guilty for intentionally permitting the abuse. Consequently, the
Commonwealth argues that her complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence on
the alternative theory is moot. In her reply brief, however, Monahan notes that she
moved for a directed verdict under both theories of first-degree criminal abuse.
-5-
We agree with Monahan that her timely motions for a directed verdict
preserved her objection to the sufficiency of the evidence under both theories. We
are also concerned that the language of the trial court’s instruction may have been
misleading to the jury. The focus of the first element of first-degree criminal abuse
concerns the action of the defendant, either inflicting the abuse or permitting
another to inflict the abuse. The focus of the second element concerns the result of
that action. However, the wording of the trial court’s Instruction No. 3 suggests
that the jury could find that Monahan intentionally abused Cecelia by permitting
Rankin to abuse her. Such an interpretation would meld the two theories of firstdegree criminal abuse.
However, the trial court directly followed the wording of the statute.
Moreover, Monahan did not object to the wording of the instruction, so this issue is
not preserved.3 In any event, we must look to the sufficiency of the evidence under
both theories.
At trial, the prosecution did not argue that Monahan abused Cecilia on
August 22, 2005. Rankin suggested that Monahan could have done so given her
opportunity within the time frame of the events on that date. On appeal, the
Commonwealth picks up on that suggestion. However, Monahan was not charged
We note that Monahan tendered a combined instruction for both theories of first-degree
criminal abuse. A combined instruction might have resolved the apparent ambiguity caused by
the separate instructions submitted by the trial court. On the other hand, a combined instruction
could also create problems in determining whether there was a unanimous verdict, since some
jurors might find guilt under one theory, while others might find guilt under another. Davis v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 574, 582 (Ky. 1988).
3
-6-
with murder, and the jury’s finding of guilt on the charges against Rankin would
appear to eliminate that possibility.
The medical evidence, as noted above, showed that Cecilia suffered
numerous injuries over an extended period prior to August 22, 2005. While the
autopsy revealed evidence of broken bones, Monahan maintains that these injuries
were not apparent to Nurse Hays, who examined Cecilia four days prior to her
death. Monahan maintains that she had no reason to suspect that Rankin was
abusing Cecilia or that Cecilia was suffering from conditions caused by physical
abuse.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth produced evidence that
Monahan had reason to know that Cecilia had suffered serious injuries. Multiple
people testified they noticed Cecilia crying in an unusual manner and that she was
not able to hold a bottle on her own. The Commonwealth also pointed to
Monahan’s statements and conduct before and after Cecilia’s death as showing that
she knew of the abuse. Rankin’s sister, Wanda Goodlet, noticed Cecilia had a
fever that would not go away and threatened to call social services if Monahan
would not take her to the doctor. Goodlet also testified that Monahan was reticent
about taking the child to the doctor because Cecilia had a bruise on her head and a
cigarette burn on her leg.
Monahan told Nurse Hays that Cecilia had fallen off a bed several
times. After Cecilia’s death, Monahan also stated that she had been in an
automobile accident with Cecilia several weeks prior to the accident. However,
-7-
there was no evidence that Monahan and Cecilia had been involved in an accident.
Furthermore, Cecilia’s injuries were not consistent with either a fall from a bed or
an automobile accident. While the evidence was circumstantial, we conclude that
it would support a reasonable inference that Monahan intentionally permitted
Rankin to abuse Cecilia.
The inferences do not as strongly support a finding that Monahan
personally inflicted any of the abuse. However, the evidence establishes that the
injuries Cecilia suffered were caused intentionally. Furthermore, those injuries
were inflicted during a period while Cecilia was in the exclusive custody of either
Monahan or Rankin. While it seems more likely that Rankin inflicted the majority
of the injuries, a jury could reasonably infer that Monahan committed at least one
of the acts of abuse. See Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 771 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Ky.
1989). Consequently, we conclude that the trial court properly submitted both
theories of first-degree criminal abuse to the jury.
Monahan next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Murray Marks, to testify concerning the age of the
injuries Cecilia suffered prior to August 22, 2005. She contends the
Commonwealth failed to establish that Marks’s method of dating infant bone
injuries was scientifically reliable, as required by Kentucky Rule of Evidence
(“KRE”) 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). However, Monahan concedes that this
issue was not preserved for review.
-8-
Prior to trial, Monahan moved in limine to exclude several of the
Commonwealth’s expert witnesses, including Dr. Marks. The court stated that it
would address any Daubert challenges on a “witness-by-witness” basis. Monahan
raised Daubert challenges to several other witnesses, but did not request a Daubert
hearing specifically with regard to Dr. Marks’s testimony. This Court cannot
speculate on the outcome of an unrequested Daubert hearing or hold that the trial
court’s failure to conduct such a hearing sua sponte constitutes palpable error.
Clay v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 210, 217 (Ky. 2009), citing Tharp v.
Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Ky. 2000).
Finally, Monahan contends that the trial court improperly denied a
motion to strike a juror for cause. During voir dire, the Commonwealth asked if
any juror or someone they knew had been abused by a parent or care provider.
Juror 462 approached the bench and informed the court that she had been a victim
of childhood sexual abuse. The Commonwealth explained that this case involved
only physical abuse, and asked Juror 462 if she would be able to decide the case
based solely on the evidence. Juror 462 answered that “it would be hard,” but
stated that she believed she could decide the case based on the evidence.
Rankin’s counsel moved to strike Juror 462, but Monahan’s counsel
did not join in the motion. Consequently, any error with respect to Monahan was
not preserved. Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. 1989).
Furthermore, a determination whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
-9-
clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83
S.W.3d 522, 527 (Ky. 2002). Juror 462 stated that she could decide the case based
on the evidence despite her childhood experience.4 We find no basis to disturb the
trial court’s denial of the motion to strike.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Fayette Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
4
We note that the Kentucky Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in the case of Acosta’s
co-defendant and found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rankin’s motion to
strike Juror 462. Rankin v. Commonwealth, 2009-SC-000385-MR (2010 WL 51353333).
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.