GARCIA (BOBBY) D/B/A AUTOBAHN AUTOMOTIVE VS. WHITAKER (LARRY)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 19, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001407-MR
&
NO. 2009-CA-001508-MR
BOBBY GARCIA
D/B/A AUTOBAHN AUTOMOTIVE
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00183
LARRY WHITAKER
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, NICKELL, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment of the Pulaski
Circuit Court enforcing a mechanic’s lien against the owner of an automobile. In
his direct appeal, Bobby Garcia argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his
claims against Larry Whitaker for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
However, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by granting a directed
verdict on these claims. In his cross-appeal, Whitaker argues that the trial court
erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on Garcia’s claims for
enforcement of the lien. We conclude that this issue is not preserved for review or
has otherwise been waived. Hence, we affirm on both the appeal and the crossappeal.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Garcia owned an
auto repair business in Somerset which operated under the name of Autobahn
Automotive. Whitaker was the owner of a 1995 Porsche 928. In August 2006, the
Porsche stopped running. After consulting with several other mechanics, Whitaker
was referred to Garcia and Autobahn Automotive for repairs in September of 2006.
Garcia conducted several tests and informed Whitaker that the repairs would cost
between $5,000.00 and $8,000.00. He also told Whitaker that he did not need the
money up front because the car would be collateral for the job. Garcia states that
Whitaker approved the repairs, but Whitaker states that he only approved
replacement of the timing belt.
Garcia did not conduct the repairs himself, but transported the car to a
Porsche dealer in Lexington for the repairs. In December of 2006, Porsche of
Lexington completed the repairs. Garcia wrote a cashier’s check to the dealer for
$6,689.40 and had the car hauled back to Somerset. After test driving the car,
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Garcia contacted Whitaker on December 3, 2006, and told him that the car was
ready.
On December 4, 2006, Garcia and Whitaker met to discuss the repairs.
Garcia provided Whitaker with a bill for $7,978.74 on an Autobahn Automotive
invoice. Whitaker declined to pay immediately, stating that he wanted detailed
receipts for the parts used in the repairs. Garcia then left with the Porsche. The
following day, Garcia again met with Whitaker. During this meeting, the two
argued over the repairs and the bill.
On December 6, 2006, Garcia was contacted by the Pulaski County
Attorney, who stated that Whitaker was filling out a warrant for theft. The County
Attorney told Garcia to bring the receipts to his office as soon as possible. Garcia
left his invoice and the Porsche of Lexington invoice at the County Attorney’s
office without speaking to anyone. He testified that Whitaker was at the office
“filling out the warrant” while he was there.
An arrest warrant was issued by the Pulaski District Court later that
afternoon. Around 6:00 p.m., a sheriff’s deputy went to Garcia’s home and placed
him under arrest for theft by failure to make required disposition of property.
Garcia testified that Whitaker was present at the time and that he was instructed to
tell Whitaker where the Porsche was located. Garcia showed Whitaker to the car
and Whitaker left with it. Thereafter, the officer handcuffed Garcia and took him
to the detention center. Garcia was held overnight at the detention center and his
bond was initially set at $10,000.00 full cash. The next day, Garcia was arraigned
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and his bond was reduced to $1,000.00. He paid the bond and was released soon
afterward. Garcia appeared at several later hearings, but Whitaker never appeared
and the charges were eventually dismissed.
In January 2007, Garcia filed a mechanic’s lien against Whitaker’s
Porsche for the repair cost of $7,978.74, plus a $50.00 towing fee. Shortly
thereafter, Garcia filed this action against Whitaker to recover on that lien. He also
sought damages against Whitaker for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, slander, libel, and outrageous conduct. Whitaker generally
disputed the bill and filed a counterclaim alleging that Garcia had improperly filed
the lien.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial in March of 2009. At the close of
Garcia’s case, Whitaker moved for a directed verdict on all tort claims. The trial
court granted the motion, finding no evidence that Whitaker had made any
materially false statement in filing the criminal warrant against Garcia. The trial
court submitted the remaining claim to the jury, which returned a verdict for
Garcia in the amount of $8,029.70. Garcia filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 59.05, and for a new trial
pursuant to CR 59.01, arguing that the trial court improperly dismissed his claims
for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The trial court denied those
motions. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
In his direct appeal, Garcia argues that the trial court erred by
directing a verdict in Whitaker’s favor on his claims for malicious prosecution and
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abuse of process. He argues that he made prima facie cases on both claims. On a
motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bierman
v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998). The motion cannot be granted “unless
there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of
fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.” Id. at 18-19. On appellate
review of a directed verdict, we will not disturb the trial court's decision unless it
was clearly erroneous. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814,
821 (Ky. 1992).
On Garcia’s first claim, there are six basic elements necessary to the
maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution: “(1) the institution or
continuation of original judicial proceedings, either civil or criminal, or of
administrative or disciplinary proceedings, (2) by, or at the instance, of the
plaintiff, (3) the termination of such proceedings in defendant's favor, (4) malice in
the institution of such proceeding, (5) want or lack of probable cause for the
proceeding, and (6) the suffering of damage as a result of the proceeding.” Raine
v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981). Historically, the tort of malicious
prosecution is one that has not been favored in the law. Prewitt v. Sexton, 777
S.W.2d 891, 895 (Ky. 1989); Reid v. True, 302 S.W.2d 846, 847-48 (Ky. 1957).
Accordingly, one claiming malicious prosecution must strictly comply with the
elements of the tort. See Prewitt, 777 S.W.2d at 895; Raine, 621 S.W.2d at 899.
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The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action has the burden of
establishing a lack of probable cause. Collins v. Williams, 10 S.W.3d 493, 496
(Ky. App. 1999). Whether probable cause exists is generally a question of law for
the court to decide. Id. Since the absence of probable cause is an essential element
of the tort, the fact that the plaintiff filed the action upon advice of counsel is a
complete defense. Mayes v. Watt, 387 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Ky. 1964). The advice of
counsel need not be sound. Id. All that is necessary is that the plaintiff acted upon
advice of counsel after full disclosure of all material facts. Flynn v. Songer, 399
S.W.2d 491, 494 (Ky. 1966). The rule applies regardless of whether the counsel is
a private attorney or a public prosecuting attorney. Smith v. Kidd, 246 S.W.2d 155,
159 (Ky. 1951).
In this case, the trial court found no evidence that Whitaker had made
any materially false statement on which the County Attorney or the district court
judge would have relied. Garcia argues that Whitaker failed to disclose that there
was an outstanding repair bill on the Porsche. Garcia also alleges that Whitaker
falsely stated that he refused to provide the receipts for the purchase of parts for the
automobile. Garcia testified that he turned those receipts over to the County
Attorney’s office prior to the issuance of the warrant. Garcia contends that the
warrant was false and misleading without these omitted facts. Consequently, he
maintains that Whitaker was not entitled to rely on the advice of the County
Attorney.
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However, Whitaker clearly alleged in the warrant that he had hired
Garcia to work on his automobile and that the dispute concerned Garcia’s failure to
provide detailed receipts for the parts. As the trial court noted, these facts are true
and clearly indicate that there was a dispute over a repair bill. Furthermore, Garcia
testified that he dropped off the receipts with a secretary at the County Attorney’s
office. Garcia did not speak with anyone at the time, but he saw Whitaker while he
was there. There was no evidence that Whitaker knew Garcia had turned over the
receipts at the time he prepared the warrant. Thus, while Whitaker’s statement in
the warrant may have been inaccurate, Garcia cannot show that it was knowingly
false or misleading at the time he made it. Consequently, Whitaker was entitled to
rely on the advice of the County Attorney in seeking the warrant.
We disagree with the trial court, however, that the abuse of process
claim directly flows from the malicious prosecution claim. While lack of probable
cause is an element of malicious prosecution, it is not an element of abuse of
process. Simpson v. Laytart, 962 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Ky. 1998). Rather, abuse of
process consists of the employment of legal process for some purpose other than
that which it was intended by the law to effect. Id. “The essential elements of an
action for abuse of process are (1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Id. “Some
definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not
legitimate in the use of the process is required and there is no liability where the
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defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized
conclusion even though with bad intentions.” Id. at 394-95.
While we disagree with the trial court’s initial reasons for dismissing
the abuse of process claim, we conclude that the trial court properly granted a
directed verdict on this claim. Garcia alleges that Whitaker obtained the warrant to
recover his vehicle without paying the repair bill. In its order denying Garcia’s
motion for a new trial, the trial court stated that the testimony did not support this
claim.
However, Whitaker admits that he sought the arrest warrant to obtain
possession of his automobile. We question whether this is a proper use of a
criminal warrant. Nevertheless, the gist of the tort of abuse of process is the use of
legal process as a means to secure a collateral advantage outside of the regular
course of the proceeding. Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d at 495. While advice of
counsel is not a defense to an abuse of process claim, id., Whitaker is not liable for
the County Attorney’s or the police’s mistake of law concerning the appropriate
remedy.
In this case, the sheriff’s deputy required Garcia to turn over the
Porsche to Whitaker when he was arrested. Even if this was in violation of
Garcia’s lien rights, the County Attorney and the police were responsible for the
action. There is no evidence that Whitaker took any action outside of the course of
the criminal process. Therefore, Whitaker is not liable for abuse of process.
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Garcia also alleges that the County Attorney told him that Whitaker
had agreed to pay the bill if Garcia would plead guilty to some charge. But on its
face, this allegation does not suggest that Whitaker was attempting to gain some
collateral advantage over Garcia. At most, it indicates only that Whitaker was
seeking some kind of stipulation to probable cause. While we do not necessarily
approve of this, we cannot say that it was clearly improper within the scope of the
criminal proceeding.
In his cross-appeal, Whitaker argues that the trial court erred by
allowing Garcia’s claim for recovery on the bill to go to the jury. Whitaker
maintains that Garcia’s only entitlement to recovery sounds in quantum meruit,
and that Garcia is barred from equitable recovery due to his unclean hands.
However, Whitaker provides no cite to the record indicating that he preserved this
argument for review, as required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). Furthermore, Whitaker’s
counsel conceded at trial that a jury issue existed concerning his allegations of
fraud against Garcia (Video Record 3/17/09, 3:28:42). Thus, Whitaker has waived
any objection to the trial court’s submission of this issue to the jury. Therefore, we
decline to consider this issue further.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Marcia A. Smith
Corbin, Kentucky
Nicholas C.A. Vaughn
Somerset, Kentucky
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