NORTH (ROGER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 21, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001393-MR
ROGER NORTH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RUSSELL D. ALRED, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00165
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Roger North appeals the Harlan Circuit Court’s judgment
convicting him of first-degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, second
offense, sentencing him to fifteen years of imprisonment, and ordering him to pay
court costs of $125.00. After a careful review of the record, we affirm in part
regarding North’s claims involving the expert’s testimony and the introduction of
prior convictions evidence because North has failed to demonstrate palpable error
pertaining to those claims. We also vacate in part, concerning the imposition of
court costs and the prosecutor’s statement during penalty phase closing arguments,
because those errors were palpable, and we remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
North was indicted on two counts of Trafficking in a Controlled
Substance in the First Degree, Second Offense, a Class B felony. He proceeded to
trial, and the jury acquitted him of one count, regarding an incident that occurred
on January 30, 2007. However, the jury found North guilty on the other count,
which pertained to events that occurred on February 6, 2007, when North sold pills
containing methadone to a confidential informant. The jury recommended, and the
circuit court imposed, a sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment. The circuit
court also ordered North to pay $125.00 in court costs.
North now appeals, contending that: (a) the prosecutor made a
comment during the penalty phase closing argument that substantially prejudiced
North; (b) the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of three police
citations from North’s prior convictions; (c) the Commonwealth did not provide a
foundation to show that its witness was an expert; and (d) the circuit court
improperly ordered North to pay court costs.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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North acknowledges that none of his appellate claims are preserved
for review, yet he asks us to review his claims for palpable error under RCr1 10.26.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 provides as follows: “A
palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered . . .
by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for
review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error.”
[T]he requirement of “manifest injustice” as used in RCr
10.26 . . . mean[s] that the error must have prejudiced the
substantial rights of the defendant, . . . i.e., a substantial
possibility exists that the result of the trial would have
been different. . . .
[The Kentucky Supreme Court has] stated that upon
consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must
conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the
result would have been different in order to grant relief.
Castle v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 790, 793-94 (Ky. App. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING PENALTY PHASE CLOSING ARGUMENT
North first alleges that during the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing
argument, he told the jury that North would not have to serve anything close to the
amount of time they recommended for his sentence because of parole. North
contends that this violated his due process rights and it caused substantial prejudice
to him.
1
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
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North cites, inter alia, Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30
(Ky. 2005), in support of his claim. In Robinson, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that “[t]he use of incorrect, or false, testimony by the prosecution is a
violation of due process when the testimony is material. . . . This is true
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor.” Robinson, 181
S.W.3d at 38. “When the prosecution knows or should have known that the
testimony is false, the test for materiality is whether there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”
Robinson, 181 S.W.3d at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, North contends that no evidence concerning
parole eligibility was introduced, but “the prosecutor told the jury that the penalty
range of ten (10) to twenty (20) years was only the maximum sentence [North]
could receive because it did not include good time or parole.” The prosecutor then
asked the jury to “keep in mind that [North’s] not going to get anything close to the
amount of time you set for his punishment.”
Pursuant to KRS 532.055(2)(a),2 during a sentencing hearing that is
conducted before a jury,
[e]vidence may be offered by the Commonwealth
relevant to sentencing including:
1. Minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the
defendant, both felony and misdemeanor;
2
A portion of this statute, specifically, KRS 532.055(2)(a)(6), was held to be unconstitutional in
Manns v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2002).
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2. The nature of prior offenses for which he was
convicted;
3. The date of the commission, date of sentencing, and
date of release from confinement or supervision from all
prior offenses;
4. The maximum expiration of sentence as determined
by the division of probation and parole for all such
current and prior offenses; [and]
5. The defendant’s status if on probation, parole,
conditional discharge, or any other form of legal release.
However, KRS 532.055(2)(a) refers to evidence that may be presented
to show parole eligibility, and Robinson involved “false testimony” concerning
parole eligibility. In the present case, upon review of the penalty phase closing
arguments, it is apparent that there was neither evidence nor testimony introduced
regarding parole eligibility. Rather, the prosecutor made the challenged statements
himself. Thus, KRS 532.055(2)(a) and Robinson are inapplicable to the case at
hand, in which the statement at issue was made by the prosecutor, rather than
introduced as evidence or testimony.
A case more on point to the present issue before us is Ruppee v.
Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 852, 853 (Ky. 1988). In Ruppee, the prosecutor
misstated the law concerning parole eligibility during the penalty phase argument.
Ruppee’s attorney objected, thereby preserving the issue for appellate review. The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed Ruppee’s conviction and held that “a jury
should not be misadvised by the Commonwealth’s Attorney as to the legal effect of
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its verdict, nor should a verdict based upon such a misstatement of the law be
allowed to stand.” Ruppee, 754 S.W.2d at 853.
In the present case, the jury instructions stated that the maximum term
of imprisonment the jury should recommend was no less than ten years and no
more than twenty years. The jury recommended a sentence of fifteen years of
imprisonment. Prior to that, during penalty phase closing arguments, the
prosecutor improperly advised the jury as to the legal effect of its verdict and told
the jury that, due to parole, North was not going to serve “anything close to the
amount of time” that the jury set for his punishment. This was improper, pursuant
to Ruppee, and a substantial possibility exists that North would have received a
shorter sentence of imprisonment if the prosecutor had not made this statement,
particularly considering that the confidential informant testified that North only
sold four pills to him on the date in question. Therefore, this error caused a
manifest injustice to North, and it was palpable.
B. CLAIM REGARDING INTRODUCTION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
EVIDENCE
North next alleges that the Commonwealth improperly introduced
evidence of three police citations from North’s prior convictions. He contends that
the jury received information exceeding the scope of KRS 532.055 when the
Commonwealth introduced three police citations from North’s prior convictions
with information of an original charge for which he was not convicted. North also
argues that the police citations should not have been admitted as evidence because
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they constitute hearsay and because their introduction constitutes a violation of the
Confrontation Clause.
We first note that a certified copy of a citation from the record of a
prior conviction is admissible, and it does not constitute hearsay. See Skeans v.
Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Ky. App. 1995). We also note that “the
[C]onfrontation [C]lause does not apply in sentencing proceedings.” U.S. v. Stone,
432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the hearsay and Confrontation
Clause aspects of North’s claim lack merit.
As noted previously, KRS 532.055(2)(a)(1) and (2) provide that the
Commonwealth may produce evidence relevant to sentencing that includes the
defendant’s prior convictions, particularly “[t]he nature of prior offenses for which
he was convicted.” In Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Ky. 2009),
the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of information contained in
a prior citation, but in doing so, the Court stated as follows:
[W]e do not create a rule that the contents of a citation or
other charging document are always admissible during
penalty phase. We know that such documents may
contain inaccurate or misleading information, as well as
information inconsistent with the final judgment. So
long as the information is limited to a fair, accurate and
general description of the nature of the prior offense, it
comports with KRS 532.055 and may be considered by
the jury.
Further, in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1996), the Court
held that “all that is admissible as to the nature of a prior conviction is a general
description of the crime.” Robinson, 926 S.W.2d at 855. The Court also held that
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“KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits the introduction of prior convictions of the defendant,
not prior charges subsequently dismissed.” Robinson, 926 S.W.2d at 854.
North contends that the Commonwealth improperly introduced
citations from three of his prior offenses, two of which stated that North was
charged with driving under the influence and another one which stated that he was
charged with public intoxication – controlled substance. One of the cases in which
he was charged with driving under the influence actually resulted in the charge
being amended and North pleading guilty to the amended charge of reckless
driving.
Because North was convicted of a different offense than the one
charged in that January 9, 1999 citation, the admission of that citation was
misleading to the jury, and it was improperly admitted as evidence during the
penalty phase. Additionally, the April 25, 2002 citation for driving under the
influence of intoxicants was admitted during the penalty phase and it stated that the
charge was based on North having slurred speech, admitting taking Xanax
prescription medicine and methadone, failing various field sobriety tests, and
refusing substance tests. The presentation of this information to the jury went
beyond the “general description of the crime” that is permitted. Therefore, this
information should not have been admitted. See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979
S.W.2d 106, 110 (Ky. 1998) (noting that reading to a jury “information regarding
the factual circumstances of each [prior] conviction from the warrants or uniform
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citations” is “clearly beyond the limitation set forth in Robinson[, 926 S.W.2d at
855] and therefore, should not have been admitted.”).
Furthermore, admitting into evidence the April 17, 2008 citation from
North’s public intoxication – controlled substance charge was improper because
that citation also included the factual circumstances which lead to the citation.
Therefore, the citation should not have been admitted.
Regardless, although we find the aforementioned citations were
improperly admitted in the present case, North failed to preserve this issue for
appellate review, and we must therefore review it for palpable error. North’s
conviction in the present case was for first-degree Trafficking in a Controlled
Substance, second offense, and evidence of his prior conviction for Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance was admitted as an exhibit in the trial court, and North does
not contest its admissibility. Therefore, we do not find that a substantial possibility
exists that the result of North’s trial would have been different if the three citations
charging him with driving under the influence and public intoxication had not been
admitted during the penalty phase, considering that the prior judgment for
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance was also admitted. Therefore, these errors
were not palpable, and this claim lacks merit.
C. CLAIM REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY
North next alleges that the Commonwealth did not provide a
foundation to show that its witness, Nancy Hibbits, who was employed by the state
crime lab, was an expert. North contends that Ms. Hibbits “testified and simply
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stated, without any foundation, that the pills had methadone in them.” He also
asserts that Ms. Hibbits “never testified as to any knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education which qualified her to render the opinion that the pills tested
contained methadone.” North argues that Ms. Hibbits “never testified as to the
principles and methods used in testing the drugs.”
However, because North did not raise these issues in the trial court, he
is essentially arguing that the trial court should have sua sponte held a hearing
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Because this issue is not preserved for our review,
we must review it for palpable error. In Clay v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 210
(Ky. 2008), the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that it had previously “ʻdecline[d]
to speculate on the outcome of an unrequested Daubert hearing, or to hold that the
failure to conduct such a hearing sua sponte constitutes palpable error.’” Clay, 291
S.W.3d at 217 (quoting Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Ky. 2000)).
The Court then noted that, in addition to the expert’s testimony, “there was DNA
evidence and testimony from two fellow inmates who claimed [Clay] had
confessed.” Clay, 291 S.W.3d at 217. Therefore, the Court held that the “claim
was unpreserved and there was no palpable error.” Clay, 291 S.W.3d at 217.
In the present case, in addition to Ms. Hibbits’s testimony, the
confidential informant testified that on February 6, 2007, he met officers at a park,
they searched him and his vehicle, and gave him a recording device. He attested
that he then drove to a car wash where he met North and bought four methadone
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pills from North.3 Additionally, North himself notes in his appellate brief that one
of the officers testified that on February 6, 2007, he followed the confidential
informant to the car wash and saw North in the vehicle that the informant alleged
he bought the pills out of, and after the alleged purchase of the pills, the informant
gave the officer suspected methadone pills. Thus, there was other evidence aside
from Ms. Hibbits’s testimony suggesting that the pills contained methadone.
North’s claim regarding Ms. Hibbits’s expert testimony is not preserved for
appellate review, and there was no palpable error in admitting it at trial.
D. CLAIM REGARDING FINE OF COURT COSTS
Finally, North contends that the circuit court improperly ordered
North to pay court costs. The Commonwealth concedes that the circuit court
should not have imposed court costs, and the Commonwealth states in its brief that
“[i]f this court finds manifest injustice, this Court should vacate the portion of the
judgment imposing court costs.”
The trial court’s record states that North was found by the trial court
to be indigent. Pursuant to KRS 31.110(1)(b), the trial court should have waived
all court costs, and we find that it was a manifest injustice for the court to order
North to pay court costs. Therefore, this error was palpable.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court is affirmed in
part, regarding North’s claims involving the expert’s testimony and the
3
The recording of the transaction was played for the jury, but when we reviewed the portion of
the video-recorded trial when the recording was played for the jury, the recording was largely
inaudible on the DVD of the jury trial.
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introduction of prior convictions evidence. The judgment of the Harlan Circuit
Court is also vacated in part, concerning the imposition of court costs and the
sentencing that was based on the prosecutor’s misleading statement during penalty
phase closing arguments, and the case is remanded for a new sentencing consistent
with this opinion.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN PART,
AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
VANMETER, JUDGE, DISSENTING IN PART: I respectfully
dissent from so much of the majority opinion as vacates and remands the judgment
for a new sentencing hearing.
Under RCr 10.26, an unpreserved error may be reviewed on appeal if
the error is “palpable” and “affects the substantial rights of a party.” Even then,
relief is appropriate only “upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted
from the error.” Id. An error is “palpable,” only if it is clear or plain under current
law. Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2006). Generally, a
palpable error “affects the substantial rights of a party” only if “it is more likely
than ordinary error to have affected the judgment.” Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160
S.W.3d 744, 762 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
An unpreserved error that is both palpable and prejudicial
does not justify relief unless the reviewing court further
determines that it has resulted in a manifest injustice,
unless, in other words, the error so seriously affected the
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding
as to be “shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006)). The Kentucky Supreme Court
current cases on palpable error review have, therefore, established three
requirements which must be satisfied in order for relief to be granted: (1) a clear or
plain error (2) which was prejudicial to the defendant and (3) and which resulted in
manifest injustice.
The majority opinion cites Ruppee v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d
852 (Ky. 1988), in support of the conclusion that North is entitled to a new
sentencing hearing. The facts in Ruppee, however, are that the prosecutor made a
misstatement of law and defense counsel objected. Ruppee, thus, did not involve
analysis under the palpable error rule.
While I agree that the Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence of
parole eligibility in compliance with KRS 532.055(2)(a), no question exists that
North is eligible for parole. In my view, North has failed to demonstrate that the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding is shocking or
jurisprudentially intolerable. A criminal sentence of fifteen years for a conviction
of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second offense, especially in
light of North’s criminal history, is neither shocking nor jurisprudentially
intolerable. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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