BALES (NORMA JEAN) VS. HUGHES (CHARLES E.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 4, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001266-MR
NORMA JEAN BALES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00274
CHARLES E. HUGHES;
AND PATRICIA HUGHES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Norma Jean Bales brings this appeal from Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (judgment) rendered by the Pulaski
Circuit Court on May 28, 2009, adjudicating that Charles E. Hughes and Patricia
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
21.580.
Hughes had adversely possessed a portion of an adjoining residential lot owned by
Bales. We affirm.
Norma Jean Bales is the owner in fee simple of Lots 5 and 6 in the
Randy Place Subdivision on Lake Cumberland in Pulaski County. Bales and her
late husband acquired the real property by deed dated May 5, 1978. The Bales also
constructed a home on the property sometime prior to 1984. Charles and Patricia
Hughes purchased the adjoining property, Lots 7 and 8, in 1992. A home and
driveway were built upon the property in 1987 by the Hughes’ predecessor in title,
Leon and Wanda Isaacs. At the time the Hughes purchased Lots 7 and 8, a survey
was conducted which did not reveal any discrepancy with the location of the
boundary line between the Hughes and the Bales’ property.
Later, in 1996, other subdivision property owners caused a survey to
be conducted of the subdivision. The 1996 survey revealed that some lots within
the subdivision did not comport with the boundary lines as called for in the
respective deeds. Relevant to this appeal, the 1996 survey revealed that the
Hughes’ driveway and a portion of their front lawn were actually part of the Bales’
property.
The parties do not agree regarding the events that transpired
immediately following the 1996 survey. Charles testified that he knew there were
problems with the boundaries of several lots in the subdivision but did not know
about any specific problem with the boundary line he shared with the Bales.
Charles maintained that he and Norma did not discuss their common boundary line
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following the 1996 survey. Conversely, Norma Bales’ son, Mike Bales, testified
that the boundary line between the properties was discussed immediately following
the 1996 survey and that Norma gave Charles permission to encroach upon her
property as long as they remained neighbors. Charles disavowed that such a
discussion with Norma occurred in 1996.
In October 2005, Norma caused a survey of her property, Lots 5 and
6, to be conducted (2005 survey).2 The 2005 survey indicated that the Hughes’
driveway and a portion of their front yard encroached upon Norma’s property.
Charles testified that the first time he and Norma discussed the problem with their
common boundary line was in early 2006.
In an attempt to quiet title, the Hughes filed a complaint against
Norma in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Following a bench trial, the circuit court
found that the Hughes:
[A]dversely and continuously possessed the property
from the time of their purchase in 1992, and tacked the
time from 1987 to 1992 from the Isaacs, with whom the
[Hughes] are in privity, [and] the [Hughes] have
possessed the property for the statutory period required
by KRS 413.010.
Thus, the circuit court concluded that the Hughes acquired title to the disputed
property by adverse possession. This appeal follows.
We begin our analysis by noting that findings of fact made by a circuit
court in a bench trial shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Kentucky
2
The survey was conducted in October 2005 but the report was not prepared until February
2006. The circuit court referred to the survey as the “2005 survey” and for consistency this
Court will as well.
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Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. This rule is applicable to boundary line
dispute litigation. Croley v. Alsip, 602 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1980).
To sustain a claim under adverse possession, the claimant must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that possession of the property is: (1) actual, (2)
exclusive, (3) open and notorious, and (4) under a claim of right that is hostile to
the owner, and (5) continuous for the requisite statutory period of fifteen years.
Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 824 S.W.2d
878 (Ky. 1992).
Norma contends that the circuit court erred by determining that the
Hughes had adversely possessed the disputed property. Norma specifically
contends that the Hughes’ possession was neither exclusive nor continuous for the
statutory period of fifteen years.
In the case sub judice, the record indicates that the Hughes purchased
Lots 7 and 8 in 1992. The Hughes’ predecessor in title, the Isaacs, built the present
home and driveway upon Lots 7 and 8 in 1987. Also, Charles testified that he first
became aware of a boundary line issue in 2006 as the result of the 2005 survey and
that he possessed the disputed property under claim of ownership until that time.
Although there was evidence that Norma gave the Hughes permission to use the
disputed property after the 1996 survey, the evidence was conflicting, and the
circuit court found the contrary evidence more compelling:
The Court makes the finding that, according to the
required standard of law, [the Hughes] were not aware of
the problems with their common property line with
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[Norma]. . . . Further, [the Hughes’] behavior never
changed after the Ernst survey and they continued to act
as if they owned the property including the driveway and
the southern portion of the yard. [Norma]’s son admits
he did not start using the driveway for parking cars and
stacking wood until after the 2005 Daulton survey. The
driveway and southern portion of the yard were treated as
belonging to the [Hughes] until the results of the 2005
Daulton survey were received. [Charles] Hughes only
recalls a [sic] discussing a problem with the property line
in 2006, after the Daulton survey, when he was told
[Norma] was not going to make an issue out of it as long
as they were neighbors. [Charles] Hughes additionally
testified that [Norma] never made any claim to the
property prior to the Daulton survey. The behavior of the
parties before the Daulton survey is very revealing and
persuasive to this Court as it is consistent with the
[Hughes] not having actual knowledge of any problems
with their property line. (Citations omitted.)
As the circuit court possesses the sole authority as fact finder to access the weight
and credibility of evidence, the evidence is more than sufficient to support the
finding that the Hughes exclusively possessed the disputed property for the
statutory period of fifteen years. See Ironton Fire Brick Co. v. Burchett, 288
S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1956).
Additionally, Norma contends that the Hughes did not continuously
possess the disputed property for the statutory period of fifteen years. Specifically,
Norma asserts that the Hughes’ continuous possession was interrupted by their
annual stays in Florida during the winter months beginning as early as 1987. As
explained in Thompson v. Ratcliff, 245 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Ky. 1952), the element of
continuous possession “does not mean that the disseizor in person need be present
on the premises at all times.” Rather, the important consideration is whether the
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claimant continues to assert “dominion over the property.” Id. at 593. The
Thompson Court further recognized that a claimant’s continuous possession of
property may only be broken by “(1) an act of the real owner; (2) intrusion of a
stranger; or (3) abandonment by the occupant.” Id. at 593.
Upon the issue of continuous possession, the circuit court specifically
found:
[T]he Court will deal with the claim that [the Hughes]
have not occupied the contested property continuously.
[The Hughes] admit to spending their winters in Florida.
They would usually leave in December and return in
February. However, by 2002, they were leaving by
October. (Citations omitted.)
....
[The Hughes] have lived in their Kentucky home for
approximately 8 to 9 months out of each year. The
nature of the home, i.e. being on Lake Cumberland,
makes it such that seasonal use is common in the area.
Nonetheless, [Norma] knew of [the Hughes’] use of the
driveway and southern portion of the yard and knew the
[Hughes] would return in early [s]pring to begin the next
season at their employment with a marina. [The
Hughes’] use was sufficiently open and notorious to put
[Norma] on notice that the [Hughes] thought the
driveway and southern portion of the yard were owned
by them. [The Hughes] even took care of the grass on
the southern portion of the yard and [Norma], or her son,
only mowed just that portion of the lawn after the 2005
Daulton survey. The Court finds the [Hughes] have met
the continuous element of achieving title by adverse
possession. (Citations omitted.)
Here, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the Hughes
continued to assert “dominion over the property” despite their winter stays in
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Florida. Furthermore, the Hughes’ possession of the disputed property was not
broken by an act of the Bales, an intrusion by a stranger, or abandonment by the
Hughes. See Thompson, 245 S.W.2d 592. Thus, there were sufficient facts to
demonstrate that no break in the Hughes’ possession of the disputed property
occurred from 1987 to 2006 and that their possession was continuous for at least
fifteen years.
Upon the whole, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists to
support the circuit court’s finding that the Hughes exclusively and continuously
possessed the disputed property for the statutory period of fifteen years. As such,
we do not think the circuit court erred by holding that the Hughes adversely
possessed the disputed property and there was otherwise sufficient evidence
admitted to support the judgment.
For the foregoing reasons the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEES:
D. Bruce Orwin
Somerset, Kentucky
John B. Adams
Somerset, Kentucky
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