PERKINS (KEITH) VS. FORD (RACHEL)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 25, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001227-MR
KEITH PERKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JERRY J. BOWLES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-504523
RACHEL FORD A/K/A RACHEL PERKINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Keith Perkins appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court which found the entire value of an IRA account was marital property
and was to be equally divided between the two parties. Keith argues that: (1) the
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
trial court erred by failing to assign to him his nonmarital contribution to the
account; and (2) the trial court failed to consider all of the statutory factors in
dividing the marital property. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Keith Perkins began working for a family business in September
1992. He testified he contributed $30 per week to a 401k plan and that the
company matched that amount for a total contribution of $60 per week. Keith and
Rachel were then married on December 12, 1998. Floods had destroyed many of
the records and Keith was only able to provide documentation showing
contributions to the 401k beginning in August 2000, after the marriage. Keith left
the family business and rolled over his 401k into an IRA on May 7, 2001, when it
had a value of $106,974.30. There was evidence presented that showed the
balance of the IRA account as of December 31, 2008, was $134,249.35.
A decree of dissolution was entered on December 23, 2008, with all
issues settled by agreed orders except for the status of the IRA account. Keith was
the only witness at the hearing. The trial court held that “[w]ithout proof of the
value of the 401k account or of Mr. Perkins’ contribution to the account prior to
the parties’ marriage, the Court cannot properly determine the portion of the
account that is nonmarital.” The family court then found the “entire amount of the
IRA account” was marital property and equally divided it between the two parties.
Keith argues that the trial court erred by failing to assign him his
nonmarital contribution to the account. We disagree.
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In a dissolution proceeding, KRS 403.190(1) requires a trial court to
“assign each spouse's property to him.” The trial court's findings as to the marital
or nonmarital nature of property will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear error.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. See Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d
258, 269 (Ky. 2004) (citing Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Ky. App. 1980)).
A spouse can offer evidence to rebut the presumption that all property acquired
after the marriage is marital in nature by “tracing” property acquired during the
marriage to non-marital assets. See Chenault v. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d 575, 578
(Ky. 1990). Tracing is “[t]he process of tracking property's ownership or
characteristics from the time of its origin to the present.” Black's Law Dictionary
1499 (7th ed.1999). When showing that property is nonmarital in nature, the
nonmarital claimant bears the burden of proof on that issue by “clear and
convincing” evidence. Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. App. 1998).
In the present case, the trial court found that Keith failed to meet his
burden of proving the nonmarital character of the IRA account. It is undisputed
that the only documentation of Keith’s contributions to the account was dated
approximately two years after the parties’ marriage. We find that the trial court
properly concluded that the Keith did not adequately prove the nonmarital
character of the account.
Keith next argues that the trial court failed to consider the statutory
factors in dividing the account equally between the parties. We agree.
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Once the trial court determined that the entire account was marital
property, KRS 403.190(1) requires the division of the asset between the parties in
just proportions considering all relevant factors, including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b)
Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c)
Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to
live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
Here, the trial court did not specifically consider these factors and
simply concluded in its order that “the entire IRA is marital and must be divided
between the parties equally as of the date of the decree.” This was done in light of
uncontroverted evidence that this asset was derived entirely from Keith’s earnings
and the interest which accrued thereon and with no evidence having been presented
that Rachel made any direct or indirect contribution to this asset. Although Rachel
had an opportunity to present contribution evidence, if any she had, she failed to do
so.
The Kentucky Supreme Court held in the case of Gaskill v. Robbins,
282 S.W.3d 306, 316 (Ky. 2009), “[t]he law is clear that there is no presumption of
a 50-50 division without regard to the evidence.” (Citation omitted). Moreover,
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the manner in which “the trial court ends up splitting the property must be based on
record evidence, with an eye toward equity.” Id.
The only evidence presented at trial on the issue of contribution
compelled a decision awarding Keith 100% of the IRA.
Therefore, we affirm the determination that the account was marital
property, but reverse the finding of a 50-50 division, and remand this matter with
instructions to award Keith 100% of the IRA.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the majority but,
respectfully, I write separately to clarify my view on two points.
First, I do not believe that application of KRS 403.190(1) to
individual assets is always called for. In most cases, a division of the marital estate
in just proportions is better accomplished by considering marital assets
cumulatively. However, certain assets or certain circumstances sometimes make it
necessary to apply the KRS 403.190(1) factors to an individual asset. I believe the
circumstances of this case required that particularity. Specifically, the parties
agreed that all other assets, which many would consider substantial, were divided
by agreement of the parties, leaving only this one asset to be addressed. By
necessity, the factors of KRS 403.190(1) must be applied to this asset individually.
Second, while it is clear that none of Keith’s pre-marital contributions can be
attributed to Rachel’s efforts, the same cannot be said of the payments Keith made
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in the seventeen months after the parties were married and before the pension was
rolled into the IRA. During that period of time, Keith used $30 per week of his
income to acquire that marital property, for a total of about $3,200. The court must
consider Rachel’s contribution “to acquisition of the marital property, including
[her] contribution . . . as homemaker.” KRS 403.190(1)(a). “In this respect, the
concept of ‘joint or team effort’ will apply to the property in issue [i.e.,
contributions made during the marriage] because it is marital property.” Stallings
v. Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1980) (referring specifically to KRS
403.190(1)(a)). If that $3,200 increased in value proportionately to the remainder
of the IRA, its value when the marriage was dissolved would have been only about
$4,000. Given the division of the extent of the remainder of the marital property
and its division in this case, and the lack of precision in making these estimates, I
agree that awarding Keith 100% of the IRA would be consistent with a division of
the marital estate in just proportions.
For these reasons, I concur.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis R. Carrithers
Louisville, Kentucky
William D. Tingley
Louisville, Kentucky
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