MONACO (RAYMOND J.) JR. VS. STEWART (MELINDA J.)
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RENDERED: APRIL 8, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009 CA-001193-MR
RAYMOND J. MONACO, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID A. TAPP, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00741
MELINDA J. STEWART
and her attorney,
MICHAEL DAVIDSON
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND MOORE, JUDGES; ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Raymond Monaco, appeals from a judgment of the
Whitley Circuit Court concerning property division, maintenance and allocation of
debt in this domestic relations matter. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Sheila Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS. 21.580.
Facts
The parties herein were married on May 2, 1987. Raymond is an
anesthesiologist and a partner in Definitive Medical Solutions (“DMS”), which
provides anesthesia services to hospitals and clinics located in central and eastern
Kentucky. Although Melinda had been employed as an oil and gas attorney with
Shell Oil Company in Louisiana prior to the marriage, she did not work after the
couple moved to Corbin, Kentucky. Two children were born during the marriage,
a son born in 1987 and a son born in 1991. The record is undisputed that during
the marriage, the parties’ standard of living was extravagant, and they accumulated
substantial assets including personal belongings, several stock portfolios, a large
marital residence, and a condominium in Lexington, Kentucky.
The parties separated in June 2004, and Raymond filed for dissolution
of marriage in October 2004. The trial court bifurcated the matter, entering the
decree of dissolution of marriage on September 14, 2005, and reserving all other
issues for trial. Following a bench trial, the court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a final judgment on November 18, 2008, dividing the
parties' non-marital and marital property and allocating the parties' debts.
Raymond thereafter appealed to this Court raising numerous claims of error. For
the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
Standard of Review
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In dissolution proceedings, appellate review is constrained by
procedural rules, statutes, and case law. Reversal is only appropriate if the trial
court has abused its considerable discretion. We must defer to the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; i.e., not supported by credible
evidence. CR 52.01; Bennett v. Horton, 592 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1979). The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. McKinney v. McKinney, 257
S.W.3d 130, 133 (Ky. App. 2008). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” is evidence of substance
and relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of
reasonable people. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409,
414 (Ky. 1998).
As to the division of property within a dissolution proceeding, the trial
court likewise must apply the facts to the law of the case. “The property may very
well have been divided or valued differently; however, how it actually was divided
and valued [is] within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Cochran v. Cochran,
746 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ky. App. 1988) (citation omitted). As such, this Court, as
an appellate court, exists to correct errors of law made by lower courts, not to
provide the parties with a trial de novo.
Division of Marital Property
Raymond first argues that the trial court was biased in favor of
Melinda and did not divide the marital property in just proportions in accordance
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with KRS 403.190. Raymond contends that the trial court did not properly take
into consideration the non-marital assets awarded to Melinda or the long periods of
separation during the marriage. It is Raymond’s position that the trial court did not
consider or appreciate what his future economic circumstances would be.
A trial court is to divide marital property in just proportions considering the
relevant factors set forth in KRS 403.190, which provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for
legal separation, or in a proceeding for disposition of
property following dissolution of the marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse
or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court
shall assign each spouse's property to him. It also shall
divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the
marital property, including contribution of a spouse as
homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the
division of property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family home or the right to
live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
(2) For the purpose of this chapter, “marital property”
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent
to the marriage except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent
during the marriage and the income derived therefrom
unless there are significant activities of either spouse
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which contributed to the increase in value of said
property and the income earned therefrom;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal
separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the
marriage to the extent that such increase did not result
from the efforts of the parties during marriage.
(3) All property acquired by either spouse after the
marriage and before a decree of legal separation is
presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether
title is held individually or by the spouses in some form
of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, tenancy by the entirety, and community
property. The presumption of marital property is
overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by
a method listed in subsection (2) of this section.
It is well-established that marital property must be divided without regard to
marital misconduct. McGowan v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. App. 1983).
However, while the equitable division of assets means that such must be divided
“in just proportion,” the division need not necessarily be equal. Wood v. Wood,
720 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. App. 1986).
While Raymond claims the trial court was biased against him, he fails
to provide any evidence to support such conclusion and we certainly find none.
Furthermore, the trial court was painstakingly thorough in its evaluation and
division of all assets and debts based on the relative positions of the parties at the
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time of dissolution. Admittedly, Raymond was assigned a significantly larger debt
amount than Melinda. However, the majority of such debt related to a second
home and other items that Raymond purchased after the parties separated but prior
to the decree of dissolution, for the purpose of cohabitating with his then-girlfriend
and now wife.
Maintenance
Raymond argues that the trial court erred in awarding Melinda any
maintenance under KRS 403.200 because she was awarded sufficient property and
was capable of finding appropriate employment. Initially, the trial court ordered
temporary maintenance of $5,500 per month. At trial, Melinda sought an award of
permanent maintenance in the amount of $8,000 per month. Ultimately, however,
the trial court awarded Melinda maintenance in the amount of $3,000 per month
until she reached the age of fifty-nine and a half (59 ½) years.
KRS 403.200(1) provides that a trial court may award maintenance
only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to her, to provide for her reasonable needs,
and the spouse is unable to support herself through appropriate employment. It is
appropriate to award maintenance when a party is not able to support themselves in
accordance with the same standard of living that they enjoyed during the marriage.
Powell v. Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Ky. 2003); Robbins v. Robbins, 849
S.W.2d 571, 572 (Ky. App. 1993). The burden of proof is on the party seeking
maintenance. See Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980).
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Under KRS 403.200, the trial court has dual responsibilities: one, to
make relevant findings of fact; and two, to exercise its discretion in making a
determination on maintenance in light of those facts. In order to reverse the trial
court's decision, a reviewing court must find either that the findings of fact are
clearly erroneous or that the trial court has abused its discretion. Weldon v.
Weldon, 957 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Ky. App. 1997).
The trial court herein engaged in a detailed analysis of each factor to
be considered under KRS 403.200(1) when determining the amount and duration
of maintenance:
The first factor a court considers . . . is the financial
resources of the party seeking the award of maintenance.
This Court has awarded substantial marital and nonmarital assets to Melinda. Notably, the Court awarded
Melinda approximately $975,743.09 in retirement
accounts. Given Melinda’s age, she will be able to
access these retirement accounts in approximately eight
(8) years. Additionally, this Court awarded Melinda
approximately $377,883.95 in other marital and nonmarital assets. . . .
Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that
Melinda will not be able to access the bulk of these assets
. . . until she reaches retirement age. As such an award of
maintenance for a period of eight (8) years, or until
Melinda reaches the age of sixty-five (65) is appropriate.
. . .2
The second factor is the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment. . . .
Although Melinda testified that it will take her five years
2
Upon learning that Melinda could, in fact, access her accounts without penalty at age 59½, the
trial court modified the award to reflect that maintenance would end when Melinda reached such
age.
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to obtain her PhD in counseling psychology, Melinda
currently holds a juris doctor. Additionally, Melinda
obtained her realtor’s license during the pendency of this
action. Accordingly, Melinda’s need for maintenance is
somewhat mitigated because she has sufficient education
or training to enable her to find appropriate employment.
The third factor is the standard of living established
during the marriage. Testimony at trial revealed that the
parties became accustomed to a very high standard of
living during the marriage. The parties lived in lavish
homes, drove luxury cars, and took opulent vacations.
Accordingly, an award of maintenance is appropriate in
order to allow Melinda to enjoy a similar standard of
living subsequent to the dissolution of marriage.
The fourth and fifth factors are the duration of the
marriage, as well as the physical and emotional condition
of the spouse seeking maintenance. . . . The parties were
married for approximately eighteen (18) years. Melinda
is currently fifty-seven (57) years of age. Ray is
currently forty-nine (49) years of age. Melinda was
diagnosed with breast cancer during the pendency of this
action; however, her cancer is currently in remission.
Accordingly, consideration of the length of the marriage,
the disparity in ages between the parties, and Melinda’s
health justifies an award of maintenance.
The final factor . . . is the ability of the spouse from
whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. . . .
Ray is an anesthesiologist and a partner in DMS. Ray
earns a substantial income. Indeed in 2006 Ray’s
adjusted gross income was approximately $407,000. In
2005 and 2004, Ray’s adjusted gross income was
$408,000 and $475,000 respectively. In 2003, Ray’s
adjusted gross income was $577,000. Ray argues that
despite his rather large income, he has significant debts
and is unable to pay maintenance. This Court disagrees.
Given Ray’s substantial income, an award of
maintenance will not create an “undue burden” on Ray.
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Although Melinda is entitled to an award of maintenance,
this Court finds that her award . . . must be reduced
because Melinda is voluntarily under-employed.
Although Melinda obtained her Kentucky realtor’s
license during the pendency of this action, she has earned
less than $1,000 in several years from this employment.
Prior to the marriage Melinda worked as a successful oil
and gas attorney for Shell; however, Melinda has not
practiced law in approximately twenty years and she is
not licensed to practice law in Kentucky. Considering
Melinda’s age and the length of time she has been absent
from the practice of law, it is unrealistic to expect
Melinda to begin practicing law again. Nevertheless,
Melinda holds a juris doctor as well as her Kentucky
realtor’s license. Additionally, Melinda is an intelligent
and highly-motivated individual. Clearly, Melinda is
capable of earning much more than $1,000 in several
years.
The amount and duration of maintenance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that
discretion. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Ky. 1990); Newman, 597
S.W.2d at 140. The trial court herein was in the best position to observe the
credibility of the parties and evidence. Based upon consideration of all of the
relevant factors, we cannot conclude that the amount and duration of maintenance
was erroneous.
Deferred Compensation Accounts
Raymond next challenges the trial court’s allocation of Melinda’s
deferred compensation accounts. Specifically, Melinda had two retirement
accounts with her former employer Shell Oil, Inc. - a Shell Provident Fund (“SPF”)
and a Shell Pay Deferral Investment Fund (“SPDIF”). On the date of the parties’
marriage, the SPF had an approximate value of $52,824.43 and the SPDIF had an
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approximate value of $11,448.89. The trial court determined that although
Melinda primarily contributed to these funds prior to the marriage, the parties did
contribute small amounts to both accounts shortly after they were married.
Accordingly, the trial court ruled:
Melinda’s retirement accounts have increased in value
primarily due to economic conditions and not from the
combined efforts of the parties. . . . Accordingly, the
increase in value of Melinda’s Shell retirement accounts
is predominately non-marital property. Nevertheless, the
Court is mindful that a portion of Melinda’s Shell
retirement accounts is marital property and must be
equitably divided between the parties.
As of the date of the bifurcated decree, Melinda’s SPF
account had a total account balance of $308,358.00. Of
this amount, $295,006.10 is non-marital property and is
awarded to Melinda. The remaining balance of
$13,351.90 is marital property. Of this amount,
$6,675.95 is awarded to Ray and the remainder is
awarded to Melinda. As of the date of the Bifurcated
Decree, Melinda’s SPDIF account had a total balance of
$50,694.55. Of this amount, $45,019.60 is non-marital
property and is awarded to Melinda. The remaining
balance of $5,674.95 is marital property. Of this amount,
$2,837.47 is awarded to Ray and the remainder is
awarded to Melinda.
Raymond now argues that the trial court erred by only characterizing as nonmarital property those contributions made shortly after the marriage. Citing to
Mercer v. Mercer, 836 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1992), Raymond contends that although
the retirement accounts themselves were non-marital property, the entire growth of
the funds that occurred during the marriage should have been deemed marital
property. We disagree.
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All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree
of legal separation is presumed to be marital property. KRS 403.190(3). However,
KRS 403.190(2)(e) specifically exempts from the category of marital property
“[t]he increase in the value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent
that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during the
marriage.” Thus, an increase in the value of non-marital property may be marital
or non-marital depending on why the increase in value occurred. Stallings v.
Stallings, 606 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1980).
In Goderweis v. Goderweis, 780 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Ky. 1989), our Supreme
Court acknowledged that if non-marital property increases in value during the
marriage, the trial court must first determine the reason for the increase in value. If
the increase in value of non-marital property is attributable to general economic
conditions, the increased value of that property is also considered non-marital. See
also Smith v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1973). However, “[a]n increase in value
of non-marital property during a marriage which is the result of a joint effort of the
parties establishes the increase in the value of the non-marital property as marital
property.” Godeweis, 780 S.W.2d at 40.
Raymond’s reliance on Mercer v. Mercer is misplaced. In Mercer,
the issue was whether the accumulation of interest from non-marital funds
deposited in a financial institution was income to be treated as marital property or
was merely an increase in value of a non-marital asset which would be treated as
non-marital property. The Court explained:
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Here the interest income has been realized and could
have been used by the parties at any time. There is a
distinct and clear difference between the increase in
value of a non-marital asset and income earned from that
non-marital asset. There is a difference between an
appreciation in the value of principal and the earning of
interest on principal and the accumulation of that interest.
Income may be used by the parties at any time. As an
example, the amount of interest must be included in gross
income for tax purposes, but when an asset increases in
value, the amount of the increase in value is not
necessarily used by the parties and is not included in
gross income for purposes of taxation. Interest income is
clearly income earned on a non-marital asset and must be
treated as marital property.
Mercer, 836 S.W.2d at 899.
Here, other than the small contribution made at the beginning of the
marriage, the parties took no action to induce or further the growth of Melinda’s
accounts. Further, as the trial court noted, Melinda did not have access to those
accounts until she reached retirement age. Thus, unlike the parties in Mercer,
Melinda was not entitled to the interest from the accounts at any time. As such, we
agree that the growth of the retirement accounts was not income but was rather
simply an increase in the value of a non-marital asset.
401(k) Account
In its final judgment, the trial court ruled that Melinda was entitled to onehalf of the value of Raymond’s 401(k) as of the date of the bifurcated decree, or
approximately $588,000. Raymond thereafter filed a motion to alter, amend or
vacate arguing, in part, that the final judgment was ambiguous in that it specified
both a percentage and a set amount of money. Raymond claimed that economic
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conditions subsequent to the date of the bifurcated decree had resulted in a
decrease of the fund, and that the court should modify the initial order to reflect
that Melinda was only entitled to 50% of the decreased amount. However, by
order entered June 8, 2009, the trial court ruled:
It is a well-established rule of construction that a specific
provision will prevail over a general one where there is
conflict between the two. . . . In this case, the provision
that [Melinda] is awarded $588,000 of [Raymond’s]
401(k) is a more specific award than “one-half.” Also
less specific than that award is the Court’s award to
[Raymond] of the “remaining portion,” using no more
specific language. . . . The Court hereby alters its
division of [Raymond’s] 401(k) to more clearly provide
that [Melinda] is awarded $588,000 of [Raymond’s
401(k) and [Raymond] is awarded the remaining portion.
“Kentucky courts have consistently held that pensions in divorce
proceedings are to be valued as of the date of decree of dissolution.” Perry v.
Perry, 143 S.W.3d 632, 633 (Ky. App. 2004) (citing Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d
223 (Ky. App. 1979)). The value of Raymond’s 401(k) on the date of the
bifurcated decree was $1,176,000.00. Had the account experienced a growth
following the entry of the decree, Raymond would have been the sole beneficiary
of the growth and Melinda would have still only been entitled to $588,000.00.
However, because the law is clear that valuation occurs at the time of the decree,
any loss of the account that subsequently occurs was to Raymond’s detriment.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to modify the original award.
Value of Definitive Medical Solutions
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At trial, each party presented experts on the valuation of Raymond’s interest
in DMS. Raymond’s expert, Calvin D. Cranfill, employed the excess earning
methodology to value the business. Using income figures from 2002 to 2005,
Cranfill calculated the weighted average income at $212,959.00. Cranfill then
divided this figure by the capitalization rate which he estimated to be
approximately 20%. Next, Cranfill added in the net tangible assets to calculate the
value of common equity. The common equity figure was then discounted for a
lack of control since Raymond only had a 25% interest in the business. The figure
was further discounted for personal goodwill and other marketability
considerations for a final fair market value of the 25% interest in common equity
in DMS of $176,249.00.
Melinda’s expert, James M. Roller, used an income approach and weighted
average earnings for the years 2002-2005. Roller “normalized” the assets by
adding back items such as depreciation and unnecessary expenses. Roller
employed the same 20% minority discount but only a 5% marketability discount.
Ultimately, Roller concluded that the value of Ray’s 25% interest in DMS was
approximately $365,000.00.
The trial court, recognizing the disparity between the two experts’
valuations, undertook its own detailed analysis beginning with the most obvious
difference in the calculations – marketability discount. Marketability is essentially
the ease with which a business interest could be sold or converted into cash. The
trial court noted that while the two experts essentially agreed to the definition of
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“marketability,” they nevertheless arrived at drastically different discount rates.
Cranfill discounted the value by 45%, while Roller believed only 5% was
appropriate.
The trial court explained that the difference in the experts’ marketability
discount rates was attributable to each expert’s treatment of goodwill. Cranfill
testified that although enterprise goodwill is a marital asset, Raymond’s personal
professional goodwill is not and must be removed from the value of DMS. Roller,
on the other hand, argued that all of the goodwill would be classified as enterprise
goodwill and thus, there should be no deduction for Raymond’s personal goodwill.
In disagreeing with both experts’ treatment of goodwill, the trial court noted
that although the issue is of limited impression in Kentucky, a panel of this Court
in Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Ky. App. 1984), drew no distinction
between “personal professional” goodwill and “enterprise” goodwill in holding
that “the value of goodwill incident to a professional practice is a divisible marital
asset.” Accordingly, the trial court herein observed:
With this being said, the Court cannot allow Cranfill to
reduce the value of a marital asset, Ray’s interest in
DMS, by removing another marital asset, Ray’s
“personal professional” goodwill. Therefore, the amount
of Cranfill’s applied marketability discount attributable
to “personal professional” goodwill must be removed
from the calculation. Unfortunately, Cranfill did not
itemize his marketability discount. Therefore, the Court
will determine the marketability discount to be applied.
...
In the case of professional service entities, a prospective
buyer must ask what exactly he or she is buying. Take
the case of a doctor for example. . . . Each patient has an
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inalienable right to see whichever doctor he or she
chooses. Add to the fact that the law greatly disfavors
non-compete clauses among professionals and you are
left with little reason to buy at a premium. What would
prevent the selling doctor from opening a new practice
down the street? Furthermore and perhaps more
importantly, why would a prospective buyer pay such a
premium for something he or she is capable of starting
from scratch for vastly less money?
For these reasons, the Court believes that the
marketability discount must be greater than Roller’s five
(5%) percent. As previously stated, Cranfill’s estimate of
forty-five (45%) percent includes an inappropriate
discount attributed to goodwill. Roller submits that the
foremost text on the subject, “Valuing a Medical
Practice,” states the marketability discount is usually less
than fifteen percent. The Court, however, believes even
15 percent is too low. Given all market considerations,
the Court believes a marketability discount of twenty
(20%) percent should be applied.
Recalculating both expert’s numbers with the modified marketability
discount, the trial court arrived at estimated values of $256,362.00 using Cranfill’s
methodology and $306,439.00 using Roller’s methodology. The trial court
concluded that Roller’s overall calculations were more credible and therefore
assigned a $306,439.00 fair market value to Raymond’s 25% interest in DMS. The
court ordered that such amount was to be equally divided between the parties.
On appeal, Raymond argues that the trial court erred in refusing to find a
distinction between personal professional goodwill and enterprise goodwill.
Raymond submits that the recent decision in Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 306
(Ky. 2009) is controlling. We disagree.
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In Gaskill v. Robbins, our Supreme Court observed that while it was
generally accepted that goodwill is a factor to be considered in arriving at the value
of a business, “whether goodwill can be divided between the business and the
individual is a question of first impression.” Id. at 312 (emphasis in original).
After analyzing case law from various jurisdictions, the court concluded that in
some circumstances personal goodwill and enterprise goodwill must be valued
separately. In Gaskill, Julie Ann Gaskill was the sole proprietor and only
practitioner in her oral and maxillofacial surgery practice. As the Court noted,
“[e]very patient of the practice is treated by her. Only
she exercises the professional judgment and skill required
to perform surgery on her patients. . . . Gaskill alone has
performed the treatment in this practice for over thirteen
years. Clearly, the practice is, in general, marital
property, and therefore subject to division, but how are
we to divide a person's reputation, skill and
relationships? To what extent can a buyer of a business
assume that his performance will equal that of the present
owner? To what extent can he take on the seller's
reputation in the community?
...
The distinction between enterprise and personal goodwill
has a rational basis that accepts the reality of specific
business situations. In a case such as this one, there can
be little argument that the skill, personality, work ethic,
reputation, and relationships developed by Gaskill are
hers alone and cannot be sold to a subsequent
practitioner. In this manner, these attributes constitute
non-marital property that will continue with her
regardless of the presence of any spouse. To consider
this highly personal value as marital would effectively
attach her future earnings, to which Robbins has no
claim.
Id. at 312-315.
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Certainly, we cannot fault the trial court for failing to consider a decision
that was not in existence at the time of the final judgment. Notwithstanding, we do
not find Gaskill applicable to the facts herein. Raymond had a 25% interest in an
anesthesia practice that operated throughout central and eastern Kentucky. Unlike
Gaskill, where the skills and reputation of a single individual were at issue, the
value and reputation of DMS would be based upon the whole of the practice.
Further, contrary to Raymond’s argument, the trial court clearly and thoroughly
considered the goodwill aspects of DMS. Quite simply, we are of the opinion that
any analysis of Raymond’s personal goodwill, separate from the enterprise
goodwill of DMS, was negligible and its removal from consideration by the trial
court did not affect the overall calculation of business value.
Dissipation of Marital Funds
Raymond also challenges the trial court’s award of $70,000.00 to Melinda
for his dissipation of marital funds. Essentially, Raymond does not dispute that
after the parties’ separation but prior to the decree of dissolution he expended
substantial marital funds for jewelry and vacations with his then-girlfriend, as well
as furnishings, landscaping and improvements to his new home that he purchased
to cohabitate with her. Rather, it is Raymond’s position that he “had provided for
all of Melinda’s needs and Melinda was not deprived because of Ray’s spending
during a time in which Melinda was in no way contributing to Ray’s ability to earn
money.” Raymond submits that this case is analogous to Shively v. Shively, 233
S.W.3d 738 (Ky. 2007). We disagree.
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Dissipation of marital assets occurs when “marital property is expended (1)
during a period when there is a separation or dissolution impending; and (2) where
there is a clear showing of intent to deprive one’s spouse of her proportionate share
of the marital property.” Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Ky. App. 1998)
(citing Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. App. 1987)). Once a party
establishes a dissipation of marital assets by a preponderance of the evidence, the
burden shifts to the party charged with dissipation to account for those assets.
Bratcher v. Bratcher, 26 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Ky. App. 2000). In ruling on this issue,
the trial court correctly determined:
The first element requires a finding that marital property
was expended prior to an impending separation or
dissolution. Brosnick, 974 S.W.2d at 500. As evidenced
by the testimony at trial, Ray spent large sums of money
subsequent to the parties’ separation. Furthermore, Ray
knew that the dissolution was forthcoming. Accordingly,
the first element is satisfied.
In order to satisfy the second element, the trial court must
find a clear showing of intent to deprive the other spouse
of her proportionate share of the marital property. Id.
During the period of separation Ray spent substantial
amounts of marital funds on a second residence,
vacations, and jewelry for his paramour, Courtney.
Indeed, Ray married his paramour within a few months
after this Court entered the Bifurcated Decree. This
Court finds that Ray intended to deprive Melinda of
access to her proportionate share of marital assets, given
the vast sums of money Ray spent during the relatively
short period of time between the parties’ separation and
the entry of the Bifurcated Decree. . . . Accordingly, Ray
shall pay Melinda the sum of $70,000 to account for his
dissipation of marital assets.
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We also agree with the trial court that Raymond’s reliance on Shively v.
Shively is misplaced. Significantly, Shively did not concern a claim of dissipation
but rather the division of income earned after the parties’ separation but prior to the
decree of dissolution. In holding that the husband’s post-separation income was
not subject to equitable distribution, a panel of this Court noted that the substantial
distribution of assets as well as both parties’ sizable incomes supported the trial
court’s ruling allowing each party to keep the income earned after the date of
separation and the purchases and debts associated with those earnings. Id. at 740.
Here, unlike in Shivley, Raymond was the only party with a substantial income and
his post-separation spending was intended to deprive Melinda of marital assets.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Gordon Hill Residence
Raymond challenges the trial court’s allocation of proceeds from the Gordon
Hill residence. In the September 2005 Bifurcated Decree, the trial court ordered
that the Gordon Hill property be sold. In November 2006, Raymond re-purchased
the home at a public auction for $285,000.00. The proceeds from the sale, after the
payment of all fees and costs were $131,429.12. At trial, Melinda claimed that
$63,509.02 of the initial purchase of the Gordon Hill property in 1987 came from
the sale of her non-marital home in Louisiana. Additionally, she claimed that her
mother had gifted her $65,962.46 for the construction of a pool house at Gordon
Hill, and that such payment was actually an advance on her inheritance. Raymond
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disputed both claims and asserted that all of the proceeds from the sale of Gordon
Hill were marital property. In its final judgment, the trial court determined:
Melinda testified that the proceeds generated from the
sale of her New Orleans home were utilized to purchase
Gordon Hill. Melinda also produced documentary
evidence to support her claim. Melinda produced bank
statements, an income tax return, and other
documentation.
...
Given the evidence provided by Melinda, . . . this Court
finds that Melinda has adequately traced her non-marital
contribution to Gordon Hill. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Melinda made a non-marital contribution to
Gordon Hill in the amount of $63,509.02.
However, with respect to Melinda’s purported non-marital contribution to the pool
house, the trial court found that Melinda presented “no evidence to support her
assertion that her mother’s contribution to Gordon Hill was an ‘advance’ on
Melinda’s inheritance.” Finally, the court awarded Raymond a credit in the
amount of $21,047.00 for the amount he reduced the principal balance on the
mortgage pursuant to previous orders of the court.
KRS 403.190(3) creates a presumption that all property acquired
during the marriage is marital property. However, KRS 403.190(2)(b), exempts
from the definition of marital property “[p]roperty acquired in exchange for
property acquired before the marriage . . . .” As a result, “an item of property will
often consist of both non-marital and marital components, and when this occurs, a
trial court must determine the parties’ separate non-marital and marital shares or
interests in the property on the basis of the evidence before the court.” Travis v.
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Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 909 (Ky. 2001). Numerous decisions of Kentucky Courts
interpreting KRS 403.190 have led to the creation of the concept of “tracing,”
which requires a party to trace any non-marital property owned before the marriage
to a specific asset or assets currently owned by the parties. Chenault v. Chenault,
799 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Ky. 1990). With respect to the tracing requirements, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has explained:
While such precise requirements for non-marital assettracing may be appropriate for skilled business persons
who maintain comprehensive records of their financial
affairs, such may not be appropriate for persons of lesser
business skills or persons who are imprecise in their
record-keeping abilities.
Id.
While Raymond now complains that Melinda did not sufficiently
trace the proceeds from the Louisiana house, it was for the trial court to resolve
any conflicting evidence in the record. Property may be divided or valued
differently; however, how it actually is divided and valued is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d at 570. We do not find that the
trial court abused that discretion. Nor do we find any merit in Raymond’s claim
that the court’s award was yet further evidence of its bias in favor of Melinda. As
evidenced from the judgment, the trial court evaluated the marital contributions
alleged by both parties, and determined that some were adequately proven and
others failed to meet the burden of proof.
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Zoeller Court Condominium
In its November 2008 final judgment, the trial court ordered that the Zoeller
Court condominium where Melinda was residing in Lexington be sold. After its
remaining indebtedness was satisfied, Raymond was to be given credit for courtordered3 payments in the amount of $8,288.00, with the remaining proceeds
divided equally between the parties. However, in response to Raymond’s motion
to alter, amend or vacate, the trial court clarified it ruling in its June 8, 2009 order:
The parties have apparently experienced some confusion
as to who is responsible for payments on the mortgage,
condominium association fees, homeowner’s insurance,
and property taxes on the Zoeller Court condominium
pending its sale. Upon review of the Final Judgment, the
Court finds it to be unclear in that respect, and hereby
amends the final Judgment to provide that Petitioner and
Respondent shall split evenly all the Zoeller Court
expenses until the property sells.
Raymond now argues that the trial court erred in essentially imposing a joint
venture upon the parties and refusing to give him an additional credit for the
principal payments.
Clearly, it was within the trial court’s discretion to order that the property be
sold and require the parties to allocate costs between them until such occurs.
Admittedly, we are perplexed by Raymond’s objection as he was previously
ordered to pay all the liabilities associated with the condominium. Further, as the
record indicates that Melinda was required to make numerous repairs to the
property without contribution from Raymond, the trial court may have found that
3
Pursuant to the September 2005 Bifurcated Decree, Ray was required to pay the mortgage,
condominium association fees, homeowners’ insurance, and property taxes on the Zoeller Court
property.
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the initial credit awarded to Raymond was sufficient and he was not entitled to any
further monies until the property is sold. In any event, as we cannot conclude the
trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous, they will not be set aside.
Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001); CR 52.01.
Melinda’s Health Insurance
In its final judgment, the trial court ordered Raymond to “continue to
maintain health insurance on Melinda until Melinda is able to find suitable
employment and obtain coverage for herself.” The trial court subsequently denied
Raymond’s motion to require her to pay her own coverage. Raymond now argues
that such was error. We disagree.
Prior to trial, the trial court granted Raymond’s request for an independent
medical examination of Melinda regarding her treatment and recovery prognosis
after her breast cancer surgery, which occurred during the pendency of these
proceedings. Dr. Mitchell Carl, who conducted the examination, testified by
deposition. Given Melinda’s health, the disparity in income between the parties
and the award of maintenance, we simply cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion in directing Raymond to continue to pay Melinda’s health care coverage.
Contrary to Raymond’s claim, the trial court did not require him to pay the
coverage indefinitely, but only until she obtained employment that would permit
her to assume the expense.
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
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At trial, Melinda requested an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the
amount of $116,527.17, which represented seventy-five percent of the fees and
costs she incurred in the proceedings below. In its final judgment, the trial court
order Raymond to pay $58,263.59 or 50% of her requested fees.
Under KRS 403.220, the trial court may award a party a reasonable amount
of attorney fees and costs associated with a dissolution action. To justify such an
award, there must exist a disparity in the parties' financial resources. Neidlinger v.
Neiglinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001). Additionally, “‘obstructive tactics and
conduct, which multiple[s] the records and proceedings’ are proper considerations
‘justifying both the fact and the amount of the award.’” Sexton v. Sexton, 125
S.W.3d 258, 273 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (Ky.
1990)). However, the award of attorney fees and costs is not mandatory, and
appellate review is limited to abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion
occurs when the circuit court's decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
In awarding Melinda attorney fees and costs, the trial court noted:
Ray earns a substantial income. Although Melinda’s
earning power is significantly less than Ray’s, this Court
is mindful of the fact that Melinda has access to ample
financial resources. Moreover, the record is replete with
examples where Ray used obstructive tactics, such as
failing to timely respond to discovery, in order to hinder
and prolong the instant litigation. Finally, the instant
action was extraordinarily complex when compared to
other dissolution actions and required tremendous labor,
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time and skill. Accordingly, Melinda is awarded fees in
the amount of $58,263.59 or 50% of her requested fees.
Considering the facts of this case, we are simply unable to conclude that the
trial court's award of attorney fees and costs was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by legal principles. Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion.
Raymond has challenged virtually every ruling of the trial court.
However, we are of the opinion that the trial court was extremely detailed in its 69page judgment and went to great pains to thoroughly consider every issue
presented. Trial courts have very broad discretion to fashion a fair and appropriate
remedy, in accord with the statutory scheme, which is specific to the particular
action as no two dissolution actions are alike. We conclude that all of the trial
court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and it acted well
within its discretion in its rulings herein.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment of the Whitley
Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
C. Wayne Shepherd
Corbin, Kentucky
Michael Davidson
Lisa J. Oeltgen
Lexington, Kentucky
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