FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET, ET AL. VS. WADE (WANDA FAYE), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001822-MR
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, FINANCE
AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET; AND
JONATHAN MILLER, APPOINTING AUTHORITY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 06-CI-00821, 06-CI-00870, 07-CI-00024
WANDA FAYE WADE; AND PERSONNEL
BOARD, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580. Senior Judge
Henry concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of senior judge service.
Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
DIXON, JUDGE: The Finance and Administration Cabinet appeals from an order
of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming two opinions rendered by the Kentucky
Personnel Board in favor of Wanda Faye Wade, an employee of the Cabinet. We
affirm.
In its August 12, 2008, opinion, the Franklin Circuit Court set forth
the facts of this case as follows:
This case involves three separate appeals to the Franklin Circuit
Court from final orders of the Personnel Board. Ms. Wade was a
career employee at the time of her dismissal from employment with
the Finance and Administration Cabinet, Department of Revenue
(Cabinet). Ms. Wade was notified of the Cabinet’s intent to dismiss
her in a letter dated February 14, 2005. Pursuant to the requirements
of KRS 18A.095, Ms. Wade was advised in the pre-termination letter
that she had five (5) days from the date the letter was received to
request a pre-termination hearing. Ms. Wade’s attorney, Mr. Dave
Emerson[,] contacted the Cabinet’s Human Resource director in a
timely manner and the pre-termination hearing was scheduled for
February 23, 2005. Before the pre-termination hearing was to take
place, Mr. Emerson contacted Cabinet’s Counsel by telephone to
postpone the pre-termination hearing.
Mr. Emerson advised Cabinet Counsel that Ms. Wade had been
injured and was physically incapable of attending the scheduled
hearing. Mr. Emerson explained that Ms. Wade was scheduled to
visit her specialist on March 8, 2005, and after that visit, he would be
in a better position to determine when the pre-termination hearing
could be rescheduled. Cabinet Counsel agreed to postpone and
reschedule the pre-termination hearing, on the condition that Mr.
Emerson contact her no later than March 9, 2005, to reschedule the
pre-termination hearing.
Having received no call from Mr. Emerson on the afternoon of
March 9, 2005, counsel called Mr. Emerson to schedule the pretermination hearing. Cabinet Counsel then received a fax from Ms.
Wade requesting ninety days of Family Medical Leave, claiming that
she was too physically ill to appear for work or a pre-termination
hearing. Cabinet Counsel advised Mr. Emerson that the Family
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Medical Leave would not be approved and that if the pre-termination
hearing was not rescheduled, the termination letter would be issued.
The following day, the Cabinet issued notice of termination to
Ms. Wade, effective at the close of business on March 10, 2005. In
that notice of termination, Ms. Wade was advised that she was
considered to have waived her right to a pre-termination hearing and
that she was dismissed for cause as required by the provisions of 101
KAR 1:345.
Soon thereafter, Ms. Wade found new counsel and filed a
timely appeal to the Personnel Board, asserting that she had been
improperly terminated. Ms. Wade claimed that she had not been
given the opportunity for a pre-termination hearing as required in
KRS 18A.095, and as a matter of law, her appeal should be sustained
and her dismissal set aside. A hearing on this issue was held before a
Hearing Officer on September 19, 2005.
In Personnel Board Appeal No. 2005-120, the Board ruled as a
matter of law that Ms. Wade was not given a pre-termination hearing
and, therefore, her dismissal by letter dated March 10, 2005 was
improper, illegal and violated her rights. The Board found that she
had not waived her Merit System rights to a pre-termination hearing.
However, the Board did believe that there had to be a determination as
to what relief she was entitled to. Accordingly, a hearing was held
[on February 16, 2006,] to determine the remedy for Ms. Wade. The
Board concluded that, while she was entitled to back pay, it was not to
include back pay for the period of March 10, 2005 to June 9, 2005.
The Board then concluded that she was entitled to receive her pay
through January 11, 2006.
The final order was appealed to this Court by both Ms. Wade
and the Department of Revenue. Ms. Wade’s appeal was solely for
full back pay for the period of March 10, 2005 to January 11, 2006.
The Department of Revenue contended that the Board’s order was
incorrect as to Ms. Wade’s pre-termination hearing and the dismissal
was proper.
Ms. Wade was advised in a letter dated January 6, 2006, that
she was to report to work on January 11, 2006. On January 11, 2006,
Ms. Wade called Ms. Bonnie Waldridge, and advised her that she was
not going to report to work and that any further questions should be
directed to her attorney. Ms. Wade failed to report to work or to call
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in for ten consecutive work days. On January 11, 2006, the Cabinet
also reissued the intent to dismiss letter to Ms. Wade. As with the
first notice, Ms. Wade was advised of her right to a pre-termination
hearing. Pursuant to the provisions of 101 KAR 2:102, §9(3), the
Cabinet advised Ms. Wade in writing on January 27, 2006, that she
was considered to have resigned her position. The Cabinet, having
not received a request for a pre-termination hearing, reissued the
dismissal letter, effective January 27, 2006, finding that there was
sufficient cause to support Ms. Wade’s dismissal. Ms. Wade also
appealed these actions in Personnel Board Appeal No. 2006-128.
The Board ruled as a matter of law that the Department of
Revenue could not unilaterally reinstate an employee whom it had
terminated without a resolution of the first appeal. The Board’s final
order did result in an order of reinstatement as of January 11, 2006
with her full back pay as of that date, and ordered that she otherwise
be made whole. The Department of Revenue appealed the Board’s
final order.
The Franklin Circuit Court upheld the Board’s finding that Wade did not
waive her right to a pre-termination hearing and that the Cabinet acted improperly
by terminating her employment without a hearing. As to the second appeal by the
Cabinet, regarding Wade’s reinstatement, the court upheld the Board’s finding that
the Cabinet acted without authority by reinstating and then terminating Wade’s
employment in January 2006. Finally, the court also upheld the Board’s decision
regarding Wade’s back pay.
On appeal, the Cabinet raises the same arguments as it did before the Board
and the circuit court. First, the Cabinet asserts that Wade’s March 2005
termination was proper because she waived her right to a pre-termination hearing.
Secondly, the Cabinet contends that the subsequent reinstatement and termination
of Wade in January 2006 was permissible.
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When this Court reviews an administrative decision, “if there is substantial
evidence in the record to support an agency's findings, the findings will be upheld,
even though there may be conflicting evidence in the record.” Kentucky Comm’n
on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981) (citation omitted).
“In weighing the substantiality of the evidence supporting an agency's decision, a
reviewing court must hold fast to the guiding principle that the trier of facts is
afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of
witnesses appearing before it.” Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409-10 (Ky. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
If substantial evidence supports the agency’s decision, “the reviewing court must
then determine whether the agency applied the correct rule of law to its factual
findings.” Id. at 410 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Cabinet’s first argument relates to the termination of Wade’s
employment in March 2005. The Cabinet asserts that the evidence clearly
supported a finding that Wade waived her statutory right to a pre-termination
hearing before the head of the Cabinet. KRS 18A.095(4). The Cabinet insists that
Wade’s conduct constituted a waiver because her attorney improperly sought to
postpone the pre-termination hearing to avoid “what she likely perceived to be
inevitable termination.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13).
At the hearing before the Board, counsel for both parties testified regarding
the circumstances of Wade’s request to postpone the pre-termination hearing. The
Board weighed the conflicting evidence, noting that the conversation between the
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attorneys “was fraught with ambiguity and misunderstanding.” The Board
concluded that, while Wade sought to delay the hearing, she did not knowingly
waive her right to the pre-termination hearing by seeking a postponement.
As noted by the Board, “The essential requirements of due process . . . are
notice and an opportunity to respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 546, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). The Board cited
D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86, 92 S. Ct.
775, 31 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1972), in concluding that waiver of the right to a pretermination hearing must “be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.” The
Board further stated that the Cabinet could “not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights.” Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S. Ct. 724, 81 L. Ed. 1093 (1937).
Although the Cabinet disputes the judgment of the Board regarding the
credibility of the evidence, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s
finding that Wade did not waive her right to a pre-termination hearing. While the
Cabinet characterizes Wade’s attempt at postponing the hearing as improper, the
Cabinet was without authority to dispense with the “minimal requirement” of a
hearing in the interest of “convenience or expediency, or because of a natural
desire to be rid of harassing delay[.]” Id. at 305. We are mindful that the pretermination hearing “need not be elaborate” to satisfy due process. Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 545. However, in the case at bar, the Cabinet’s action deprived Wade
of a fundamental right, “[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in
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writing, why proposed action should not be taken . . . .” Id. at 546. After careful
review, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings, and
the Board correctly applied the law.
Next, we address the Cabinet’s argument regarding Wade’s reinstatement
and subsequent termination in January 2006. On December 2, 2005, the Cabinet
filed a motion with the Board requesting an order reinstating Wade to her former
position. The Board denied the motion to reinstate Wade because her appeal was
still pending at that time. Thereafter, the Cabinet notified Wade to report to work
on January 11, 2006. When Wade failed to report to work, the Cabinet began the
termination process anew. Wade appealed this second termination, and the Board
concluded the Cabinet had acted without authority by unilaterally reinstating Wade
to her former position “while continuing to support her dismissal” in the thenpending first appeal. The Board pointed out that KRS 18A.005(34) defines
“reinstatement” as the restoration of employment pursuant to a Board order or a
court order.
On appeal, the Cabinet asserts that it properly reinstated Wade’s
employment in order to mitigate its damages and carry out the implicit mandate of
the Board’s interim order that found the March 2005 termination improper. We
disagree.
KRS 18A.095(22) delineates the remedies available to the Board upon the
resolution of an appeal, and the statute provides for the Board to order
reinstatement of employment if appropriate. KRS 18A.095(22)(b). That this is an
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accurate assessment of the law is evidenced by the fact that the Cabinet initially,
though unsuccessfully, moved the Board to order Wade’s reinstatement in
December 2005. Indeed, the Cabinet has not cited any law granting it the authority
to unilaterally reinstate a terminated employee during the appeal process.
After careful review, we agree with the Board’s conclusion that the Cabinet
simply did not have the authority to reinstate Wade’s employment without an order
from the Board. As the Board’s findings and conclusions were properly supported
by the evidence, we find no error in the Board’s decision.
Finally, the Cabinet raises a third argument relating to the sufficiency of the
evidence regarding Wade’s physical condition. Because we believe the Board’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence, we decline to address this
argument.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Celia M. Dunlap
Travis Powell
Frankfort, Kentucky
Paul F. Fauri
Frankfort, Kentucky
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