SMITH (CHARLES E.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 21, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001340-MR
CHARLES E. SMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00004-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001374-MR
DEONTE SIMMONS
v.
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. JENNINGS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00004-002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-001340-MR
AND
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS
APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-001374-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND WINE, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Charles E. Smith brings Appeal No. 2008-CA001340-MR from a July 2, 2008, judgment of the Madison Circuit Court upon a
jury verdict finding him guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
degree, possession of marijuana, and with being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree. Deonte Simmons brings Appeal No. 2008-CA-001374-MR from a
July 2, 2008, judgment of the Madison Circuit Court upon a jury verdict finding
him guilty of complicity to commit trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
degree and with being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. We affirm
Appeal No. 2008-CA-001340-MR, and affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
with directions Appeal No. 2008-CA-001374-MR.
In November 2007, the Kentucky State Police, utilizing an informant
who had earlier been arrested for selling drugs, set up a drug sting operation at the
Days Inn in Richmond, Kentucky. Subsequently, Charles E. Smith and Deonte
Simmons were arrested at the hotel while attempting to sell cocaine in the presence
of an undercover police officer. The police also arrested Jamie L. Clay, who had
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driven Smith and Simmons to the hotel, but remained in the car during the drug
transaction.
Smith and Simmons were jointly indicted by a Madison County Grand
Jury upon the offenses of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and with
being second-degree persistent felony offenders. Smith was also charged with
possession of marijuana. Smith and Simmons were jointly tried. Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.12. Smith was found guilty upon the offenses of
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and with
being a second-degree persistent felony offender; Simmons was found guilty upon
the offenses of complicity to commit first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance and with being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Each was
sentenced to fifteen-years’ imprisonment. These appeals follow.
To assist this Court in resolution of these appeals, we shall initially
address an issue concomitantly raised by Smith and Simmons. Thereafter, we shall
address the issues raised in each appeal separately.
Smith and Simmons both argue that Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
29A.040 is unconstitutional. Specifically, Smith and Simmons assert that KRS
29A.040 is violative of the “fair cross-section” requirement of the Sixth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Smith
and Simmons, however, admit that they failed to notify the Attorney General of
this constitutional challenge as mandated by KRS 418.075 and Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 24.03.
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It is well-established that KRS 418.075 and CR 24.03 require a party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute to serve the Attorney General with
notice of such challenge. Brashars v. Com., 25 S.W.3d 58 (Ky. 2000); Benet v.
Com., 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008). KRS 418.075 specifically mandates that notice
to the Attorney General must be given prior to entry of the trial court’s judgment.
Benet, 253 S.W.3d 528. And, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently held “[w]e
have made plain that strict compliance with the notification provisions of KRS
418.075 is mandatory.” Benet, 253 S.W.3d at 532. More particularly, a party’s
failure to strictly comply with the notification provision of KRS 418.075 will result
in a constitutional challenge being deemed unpreserved and not subject to review
upon the merits. Brashars, 25 S.W.3d 58; Benet, 253 S.W.3d 528.
In the case sub judice, it is uncontroverted that neither Smith nor
Simmons gave notice to the Attorney General of their challenge to the
constitutionality of KRS 29A.040 as required by KRS 418.075 and CR 24.03.1 As
1
Charles E. Smith argues that his judgment of conviction is void because it was the duty of all
parties, not just the defendant, to give the required notice to the attorney general and the trial
court had to refrain from entry of judgment until the notice had been given, citing Maney v.
Mary Chiles Hospital, 785 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1990). Maney is a medical malpractice case where
the trial court upheld the constitutionality of a statute in its judgment, notwithstanding that the
attorney general had not been notified of the constitutional challenge. Smith’s case is clearly
distinguishable and is controlled by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s recent holding in Benet v.
Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008). Benet involved the appeal of a criminal conviction
where the defendant challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
439.3401 on appeal. The Supreme Court declined review for failure of Benet, not any other
party, to properly preserve the issue for review. The Supreme Court in Benet clearly states that
in criminal cases, the burden for notifying the attorney general is placed upon the defendant
challenging the statute and appellate courts will not address arguments that a statute is
unconstitutional unless the notice provisions of KRS 418.075 are fully satisfied. In this case,
Smith failed to comply with KRS 418.075 and the issue is thus not properly preserved for our
review.
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such, we conclude that their challenge to the constitutionality of KRS 29A.040 is
unpreserved and may not be reviewed on appeal. We now address Smith’s appeal.
APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-001340-MR
Smith argues that certain testimony of Detective Dustin Hon and
Detective Anthony Anderson was admitted into evidence in violation of the right
to confront witnesses during trial as secured under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. In particular, Smith objects to testimony of Detective
Hon recounting statements made to him by Detective Anderson and to testimony
of Detective Anderson that Jamie Clay admitted to Anderson “that she knew a drug
deal was going on.” Smith’s Brief at 12.
While every defendant possesses a constitutional right to crossexamine witnesses at trial, the violation of such right has been held subject to the
harmless error analysis in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.
Ed. 2d 705 (1967). See Gill v. Com., 7 S.W.3d 365 (Ky. 1999); Taylor v. Com.,
175 S.W.3d 68 (Ky. 2005). Pursuant to the rule enunciated in Chapman, “before a
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gill, 7
S.W.3d at 368 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). Simply put, if admission of the
evidence amounts to harmless error this Court will not disturb the conviction.
Taylor, 175 S.W.3d 68. To determine whether admission of particular evidence
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was harmless, the reviewing court must ascertain whether exclusion of the
evidence “would have changed the result.” Id. at 72.
In this case, the evidence presented at trial against Smith was
overwhelming. The record reveals that an informant arranged to purchase drugs by
calling Smith’s cell phone; Simmons answered the cell phone; the informant
relayed that he had $275 to purchase drugs; Smith and Simmons then arrived at the
hotel room with cocaine as arranged per the call; Smith pulled the cocaine from his
pocket; the delivery of the cocaine was witnessed by an undercover detective; and
the detective knew Smith “ran” with drug dealers. Thus, even if Detective Hon
and Detective Anderson’s objectionable testimony was excluded from evidence,
we cannot say the jury verdict would have been different; i.e., Smith would have
been acquitted. Stated differently, we believe the admission of Detective Hon and
Detective Anderson’s objectionable testimony constituted harmless error.
Smith next contends that the trial court erred in its instruction to the
jury on first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. Smith specifically asserts
that the instruction violated the unanimity requirement of Section 7 of the
Kentucky Constitution and resulted in an inconsistent verdict.
The instruction at issue reads as follows:
INSTRUCTION AS TO COUNT ONE - CHARLES E. SMITH
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1
PRINCIPAL
You will find the Defendant guilty of First Degree
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance under this
Instruction if, and only if, you believe beyond a
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reasonable doubt from the evidence presented at trial all
of the following:
a.
That in this County or about November 21,
2007, and before the finding of the Indictment herein he
sold or transferred cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled
Substance to Adrien Totty, AND
b.
That he knew the substance he sold or
transferred was cocaine.
If you find the defendant guilty under this
Instruction, you will so state in your verdict; and after
returning to the Courtroom you will receive further
instruction regarding punishment. [Emphasis added.]
Under KRS 218A.010, “sell” means “to dispose of a controlled
substance to another person for consideration or in furtherance of commercial
distribution,” and “transfer” means “to dispose of a controlled substance to another
person without consideration and not in furtherance of commercial distribution.”
The primary difference between the two instructions being whether the controlled
substance was disposed of for consideration or for commercial distribution. A sale
is the disposal for consideration or commercial distribution, while a transfer is not.
Smith concedes there was “some evidence” that a transfer of cocaine
took place but asserts there was no evidence that he sold cocaine. Smith argues
that without evidence to support that a sale occurred the jury instruction was
violative of the constitutional unanimity requirement of the Kentucky Constitution.
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution requires that a unanimous
verdict must be reached by a jury of twelve persons in a criminal trial. Burnett v.
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Com., 31 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000)(citing Wells v. Com., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978)).2
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction containing “alternate
theories of guilt” denies a defendant his right to a unanimous verdict if one of the
alternative theories is totally unsupported by the evidence. Hayes v. Com., 625
S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1981). The Supreme Court succinctly set forth the law on
“alternative theories” in Burnett v. Com., 31 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ky. 2000) as
follows:
[W]hen presented with alternate theories of guilt in an
instruction, the Commonwealth does not have to show
that each juror adhered to the same theory. Rather, the
Commonwealth has to show that it has met its burden of
proof under all of the alternate theories presented in the
instruction. Once that is shown, it becomes irrelevant
which theory each individual juror believed. This result
ensures that a defendant is convicted on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt by all twelve jurors. . . . [W]hen the
Commonwealth cannot show that it has met its burden of
proof on all alternate theories presented to the jury in the
instructions, then the defendant's right to a unanimous
verdict has been violated. This is because it cannot be
ascertained from the verdict form or otherwise from the
record that all of the jurors voted to convict the defendant
on a theory supported by the evidence.
Under Burnett, the Commonwealth must produce evidence to sustain a conviction
upon each alternate theory presented to the jury. Id. If the Commonwealth
presents such evidence, the unanimity requirement is satisfied; if the
Commonwealth fails to present such evidence, the unanimity requirement is not
satisfied. Id.
2
Barnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000) was overruled on other grounds by the
recent Supreme Court opinion of Travis v. Commonwealth,_____S.W.3d _____ (Ky. 2010).
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In this case, the record reveals that evidence was presented that the
informant knew Smith was a drug dealer, the informant called Smith’s cell phone
to arrange a purchase of drugs, the informant stated he had $275 to spend, some
fifteen to thirty minutes after the call Smith and Simmons arrived at the hotel room
with cocaine, and Smith presented the cocaine. Upon the above evidence, we
believe sufficient evidence existed upon which a jury could find that Smith
engaged in the sale of cocaine. Thus, we believe Smith’s contention is without
merit.
We now address Simmons’ appeal.
APPEAL NO. 2008-CA-001374-MR
Simmons contends that the trial court erred by proceeding with an
eleven-person jury without a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right
to a twelve-person jury.3 In support thereof, Simmons cites to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution, and KRS 29A.280(1).
In this case, the record reveals that Simmons’ jury trial lasted two
days. On the second day of trial, the court informed the jury that one juror would
not return to serve because of health issues. The trial court further stated that
Simmons, Smith, and the Commonwealth agreed to proceed with eleven jurors.
Later, the trial court again intimated that “everyone has waived” the objection to an
eleven person jury.
3
We note that appellant, Charles E. Smith, did not raise this error on appeal.
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It is uncontroverted that Simmons’ attorney consented to proceeding
with eleven jurors. We, thus, are asked to review this alleged error under the
palpable error rule of RCr 10.26. Thereunder, an unpreserved error is considered
palpable when the substantial rights of the defendant are impaired resulting in
manifest injustice. Stone v. Com., 456 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1970); Scott v. Com., 495
S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1972).
To begin, the sacred right to trial by jury is secured by both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 7 of the Kentucky
Constitution. This constitutional right to trial by jury is regarded as a fundamental
guarantee by the Courts. Com. v. Green, 194 S.W.3d 277 (Ky. 2006). A
distinction has been drawn, however, between the right to a jury trial and the right
to trial by a twelve-person jury. While the right to a jury trial is recognized under
the United States Constitution, the right to trial by a twelve-person jury is not.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1970).
By contrast, the Courts of this Commonwealth have for over a century
interpreted Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution as securing not only the right to
a trial by jury but also the right to trial by a twelve-person jury. Wendling v. Com.,
143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911); Branham v. Com., 209 Ky. 734, 273 S.W. 489
(1925)4; Short v. Com., 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975); Wells v. Com., 561 S.W.2d 85
4
Branham v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S.W. 489 (1925) was overruled on other
grounds by Short v. Commonwealth, 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975).
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(Ky. 1978); and Burnett v. Com., 31 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000).5 Similarly, KRS
29A.280(1) also extends a statutory right to a trial by jury of twelve persons in
circuit court actions.6 Hence, in this Commonwealth, there exists both a
constitutional and statutory right to trial by a twelve-person jury.
Presently, Kentucky Courts further recognize that constitutional rights
may be waived and specifically recognize waiver of the right to a jury trial or to
trial by a twelve-person jury. Short v. Com., 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975); Jackson
v. Com., 113 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2003). And, of course, a statutory right, such as the
right to a twelve-person jury under KRS 29A.280(1), likewise, may be waived.
American General Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688 (Ky. 2002).
A waiver is generally defined as “an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.” Moore v. Com., 556 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Ky. App.
1977)(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101
(1972)). When dealing specifically with a constitutional or statutory right, a
waiver of such right must be knowing and voluntary. Pangallo v. Kentucky Law
Enforcement Council, 106 S.W.3d 474 (Ky. App. 2003). We shall initially discuss
5
Branham v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S.W. 489 (1925) was overruled on other
grounds by Short v. Commonwealth, 519 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975). Short v. Commonwealth, 519
S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975) was superseded in part by statute as recognized by Commonwealth v.
Green, 194 S.W.3d 277 (Ky. 2006) and Jackson v. Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2003).
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes 29A.280(1) reads:
Juries for all trials in Circuit Court shall be composed of twelve
(12) persons. Juries for all trials in District Court shall be
composed of six (6) persons.
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waiver of the constitutional right to a twelve-person jury and then discuss the
statutory right.
Our case law is replete with decisions discussing the requirements to
effectuate a valid waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial in toto. There are,
nonetheless, no cases discussing the requirements to effectuate a valid waiver of
the constitutional right to a twelve-person jury in felony cases after the seminal
case of Short v. Commonwealth, 519 S.W.2d 828 decided in 1975. Prior to Short,
there appear sundry cases recognizing the constitutional right to a jury trial and to a
twelve-person jury as inviolable and as not subject to waiver in felony cases.
Branham v. Com., 209 Ky. 734, 273 S.W. 489 (1925); Jackson v. Com., 221 Ky.
823, 299 S.W. 983 (1927). Short marked a dramatic departure from precedent.
Short, 519 S.W.2d 828.
In Short, it was held that both the constitutional right to a jury trial
and to a twelve-person jury may be waived in felony cases. Short, 519 S.W.2d
828. To effectuate a valid waiver, the Court concluded the waiver must be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and the trial court must apply the same
standards as required upon acceptance of a guilty plea under Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); Short, 519 S.W.2d 828.
Hence, a colloquy with the defendant was required to properly waive the
constitutional right to a jury trial or to a twelve-person jury. Short, 519 S.W.2d
828.
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Subsequently, RCr 9.26(1) was promulgated in 1981 by the Supreme
Court. It reads:
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless
the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the
approval of the court and the consent of the
Commonwealth.
RCr 9.26(1). RCr 9.26(1) has been interpreted as codifying the holding of Short,
519 S.W.2d 828 but with an additional requirement that the waiver be in writing.
Jackson v. Com., 113 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2003). By using the phrase “jury trial,” we
believe RCr 9.26(1) only encompasses waiver of the right to jury trial in toto but
does not encompass the waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury. Thus, RCr
9.26(1) only sets forth the procedure for a valid waiver of the right to a jury trial in
toto.
To discern the proper procedure to effectuate a valid constitutional
waiver to a twelve-person jury, we must look to case law and, in particular, to
Short, 519 S.W.2d 828 and Jackson, 113 S.W.3d 128. As hereinbefore stated,
Short required a waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury to be knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent and also mandated the trial court to conduct a colloquy
with the defendant. Short, 519 S.W.2d 828. Thereafter, the Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Jackson, 113 S.W.3d 128. Although Jackson dealt with
waiver of the jury trial in toto and proper interpretation of RCr 9.26(1), its holding
also effectively modified the strict colloquy requirement previously announced in
Short, 519 S.W.2d 828; Jackson, 113 S.W.3d 128.
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The Jackson Court held that the trial court’s failure to comply with the
“writing” requirement of RCr 9.26(1) was not prejudicial if the trial court engaged
in a colloquy with defendant. Jackson, 113 S.W.3d 128. This holding is not
particularly helpful as RCr 9.26(1) is inapplicable to our case. However, it is
important that the Jackson Court also concluded that the failure to engage in a
colloquy was not prejudicial if the defendant’s waiver, nonetheless, was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. Jackson, 113 S.W.3d 128.
In Jackson, trial counsel for Jackson waived his right to a jury trial in
toto, and there was no evidence in the record regarding whether such waiver
represented a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice. Id. As the record was
silent, the Jackson Court remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Jackson’s waiver of the jury trial was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent. Id. At this hearing, the court specified that the Commonwealth carried
the burden of proof. Id.
From the holdings of Short, 519 S.W.2d 828 and Jackson, 113 S.W.3d
128, we believe the proper procedure to effectuate a waiver of the constitutional
right to a twelve-person jury to be as follows: the trial court shall conduct a
colloquy on the record with the defendant to discern whether his waiver of the
right to a twelve-person jury is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The failure of
the trial court to conduct such a colloquy is error. Nonetheless, the error is
harmless if the defendant’s waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. To so determine, the appellate court will look to the record for
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evidence to make such determination and, if none is available, may remand to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the
Commonwealth carries the burden to prove that defendant’s waiver of his
constitutional right to a twelve-person jury was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.7 If the Commonwealth fails in its burden of proof, defendant is entitled
to a new trial; on the other hand, if the Commonwealth succeeds in its burden of
proof, “the trial court should reinstate the judgment of conviction.” Jackson, 113
S.W.3d at 136.
Applying the above procedure to the case at hand, it is clear that the
trial court did not engage in a colloquy with defendant as to his waiver of the
constitutional right to a twelve-person jury. However, there was no objection to
the trial court’s error below. In light thereof, the error is only reversible if found to
constitute palpable error under RCr 10.26. If Simmons did not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waive the constitutional right to a twelve-person jury,
7
In Jackson v. Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 128, 136 (Ky. 2003), we note the dissent’s
discussion of the evidentiary hearing to be conducted upon remand to the trial court:
[T]he burden of proof will be on the Commonwealth; and unless
the Commonwealth can find, e.g., a jailhouse informant, the only
persons who could testify to the critical fact would be Appellant
and his attorneys. No doubt, Appellant, whose conviction is not
yet final, will assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify
against himself, U.S. Const., amend. V; and, no doubt, he will
assert his lawyer-client privilege to prevent his attorneys from
testifying against him. [Kentucky Rules of Evidence] KRE 503.
(This is not a malpractice action or an RCr 11.42-type proceeding
in which Appellant is claiming ineffective assistance of counsel so
as to constitute an automatic waiver. Appellant is claiming that he
did not make a written waiver of his right to trial by jury as
required by a rule adopted by this Court.)
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we believe the error would affect a substantial right resulting in manifest injustice
and, thus, constitute a palpable error.
The record is entirely void of any evidence reflecting upon whether
Simmons’ waiver of his constitutional right to a twelve-person jury represented a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice. As the record is silent, we vacate
Simmons’ judgment of conviction and, as previously stated, remand to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Simmons’ waiver of his
constitutional right to a twelve-person jury was knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.
Simmons also possessed a statutory right under KRS 29A.280(1) to a
trial by a twelve-person jury in a circuit court action. Under the circumstances of
this case, we believe disposition of Simmons’ waiver of his constitutional right to a
twelve-person jury necessarily disposes of waiver of his statutory right. Succinctly
stated, the requirements to waive a statutory right are certainly no more stringent
than those required to waive a concomitant constitutional right.
Simmons additionally argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
trial to continue with only eleven jurors after the jury was sworn in contravention
of KRS 29A.280(2). KRS 29A.280(2) provides:
In Circuit Court, at any time before the jury is sworn, the
parties with the approval of the court may stipulate that
the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12),
except that no jury shall consist of less than six (6)
persons.
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The statute is clear and requires no interpretation. KRS 29A.280(2)
recognizes that a defendant, with the approval of the Commonwealth and circuit
court, may waive the constitutional right to a twelve-person jury, but more
importantly, the statute specifies the time period in which such a waiver may
occur. Thereunder, the parties may agree to a jury of less than twelve with circuit
court approval “at any time before the jury is sworn.” KRS 29A.280(2). Simmons
correctly points out that the jury was already sworn when his trial counsel and the
Commonwealth agreed to proceed with eleven jurors. However, the time period in
which a defendant may waive his right to a twelve-person jury carries no
constitutional import, as opposed to the waiver of the right itself to a twelve-person
jury.
Considering the circumstances of this case, we believe the violation of
KRS 29A.280(2) constitutes harmless error under RCr 9.24. Stated simply,
Simmons has not demonstrated and we are unable to discern that this particular
error was prejudicial. See Abernathy v. Com., 439 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1969)
overruled on other grounds by Blake v. Com., 646 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1983). There
may undoubtedly be cases where the violation of KRS 29A.280(2) results in
prejudicial error; however, the facts of this case do not support such a conclusion.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court’s violation of KRS 29A.280(2) did not
constitute reversible error.
Simmons further alleges that the trial court erroneously instructed the
jury upon the charge of complicity to commit first-degree trafficking in a
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controlled substance. Specifically, Simmons argues that the jury instruction was
improper because it failed to “require the jury to find that the complicitor intended
that the principal commit the crime.” Simmons’ Brief at 17. Simmons believes
that the jury instruction fatally failed to include the element of intent in the
complicity instruction, thus resulting in reversible error. Simmons cites to Harper
v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. 2001) as support.
In the case sub judice, the relevant jury instructions read:
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7
COMPLICITOR
If you do not find the defendant Deonte Lamont
Simmons guilty under Instruction Number 6, you will
find Defendant guilty of Complicity to Commit First[-]
Degree Trafficking in a Controlled Substance under
this Instruction if, and only if, you believe beyond a
reasonable doubt from the evidence presented at trial all
of the following:
a.
That in this County or about November 21,
2007, and before the finding of the Indictment herein he
acted with complicity, as defined in the instructions, in
assisting Charles E. Smith to sell or transfer cocaine to
Adrien Totty, AND
b.
That Deonte Lamont Simmons knew that the
substance being sold or transferred was cocaine,
If you find the defendant guilty under this
Instruction, you will so state in your verdict; and after
returning to the Courtroom you will receive further
instructions regarding punishment.
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DEFINITIONS
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12
As used in these Instructions the following definitions
apply:
....
c.
Complicity –
(1) A person is guilty of an offense committed by
another person when, with the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, he:
(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy
with such other person to commit the offense[;] or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person
in planning or committing the offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission
of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do
so.
(2) When causing a particular result is an element
of any offense, a person who acts with the kind of
culpability with respect to the result that is sufficient for
the commission of the offense is guilty of that offense
when he:
(a) Solicits or engages in a conspiracy with another
person to engage in conduct causing such result[;]
or
(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid another
person in planning, or engaging in the conduct
causing such result; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the conduct
causing the result, fails to make a proper effort to
do so.
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Upon review of the above jury instructions, we believe the jury was
properly instructed. To be found guilty of complicity, the jury was specifically
instructed that the defendant must have possessed “the intention of permitting or
facilitating the commission of the offense.” This instruction was included in the
definition of the term complicity and is wholly proper. Additionally, we observe
that the Supreme Court has recently indicated its approval of a very similar jury
instruction upon complicity as properly setting forth the element of intent in
Crawley v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 197 (Ky. 2003). Upon the whole, we
conclude that the jury instructions for complicity were proper and adequately set
forth the element of intent.
Simmons finally contends that the trial court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury upon the offense of criminal facilitation. In particular, Simmons
maintains:
It was up to the jury to determine whether Mr.
Simmons’ [sic] was a drug trafficker or a complicitor –
they found the latter. Perhaps if they had had the option
of finding Mr. Simmons guilty of facilitation, that would
have been their verdict. However, the trial court’s failure
to give the requested instruction made that impossible.
Mr. Simmons was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal
to so instruct as he received a much longer sentence than
he would have if he was convicted of facilitation.
Simmons’ Brief at 24.
KRS 506.080(1) defines facilitation as:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation when,
acting with knowledge that another person is committing
or intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct
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which knowingly provides such person with means or
opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in
fact aids such person to commit the crime.
The distinction between criminal facilitation and intentional complicity has been
eruditely explained as follows:
Knowing assistance or encouragement constitutes the
offense of criminal facilitation. The offense is committed
when the defendant both knows of another's intent to
commit a crime and knows that his own conduct is
providing the other person with the means or opportunity
to commit the crime. Unlike intentional complicity
where the accomplice has some personal interest in the
successful commission of an offense, a criminal
facilitator assists a criminal venture toward which he is
indifferent. (Footnotes omitted.)
10 Leslie W. Abramson, Kentucky Practice Substantive Criminal Law § 3:6 (20092010). Succinctly stated, “[f]acilitation reflects the mental state of one who is
‘wholly indifferent’ to the actual completion of the crime.” Perdue v. Com., 916
S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995); see also, Thompkins v. Com., 54 S.W.3d 147 (Ky.
2001).
Generally, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory of
the case supported by the evidence. Tompkins, 54 S.W.3d 147. Yet, Simmons
does not point this Court to any specific evidence to support the facilitation
instruction. Upon our review of the record, we believe the facilitation instruction
is without any evidentiary foundation. See id. Moreover, the jury’s conviction of
Simmons upon intentional complicity demonstrates that the Commonwealth
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the intent to commit the crime
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and was not wholly indifferent to its commission. Hence, we hold that Simmons
was not entitled to a jury instruction upon facilitation.
For the foregoing reasons, Appeal No. 2008-CA-001340-MR is
affirmed and Appeal No. 2008-CA-001374-MR is affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and this cause is remanded with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon
whether Simmons’ waiver of a twelve person jury was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT CHALRES E.
SMITH:
Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT
DEONTE SIMMONS:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLE:
Jeffrey A. Cross
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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