MCCOMBS (VERNON L.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JANUARY 14, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2007-CA-000890-MR
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000682-MR
VERNON L. MCCOMBS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00135
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; ISAAC,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
ISAAC, JUDGE: Vernon L. McCombs appeals from the denial of his motions for
post-conviction relief under Kentucky Rule(s) of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
and Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. He argues: (1) that his
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Senior Judge Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
counsel failed to adequately investigate the facts of the case before advising him to
plead guilty; (2) he did not understand the sentence he was to receive due to
ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) counsel failed to investigate alleged
misconduct before the grand jury. We affirm.
McCombs was indicted by the Hardin County Grand Jury on one
count each of first-degree rape, incest, and distribution of obscene matter to a
minor. Pursuant to a plea bargain, McCombs pled guilty to criminal attempt to
first-degree rape and to the other charges and in exchange, the Commonwealth
recommended a total sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. Approximately one
month later, McCombs filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial
court denied. The trial court entered judgment and sentenced McCombs in
accordance with the plea agreement. McCombs appealed and this Court affirmed
the judgment in an unpublished opinion. McCombs v. Commonwealth, 2006 WL
574415 (Ky.App. 2006)(2005-CA-000252-MR).
In 2007, McCombs filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant
to RCr 11.42. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Subsequently, McCombs filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR
60.02. His appeal from the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion was abated pending the
determination of his motion for relief under CR 60.02. Following an evidentiary
hearing at which issues concerning both the RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 motions
were heard, the trial court denied the motion for relief. This appeal followed.
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McCombs first argues his counsel was ineffective by failing to
adequately investigate the facts of his case. Specifically, McCombs contends that:
(1) his trial counsel failed to adequately assess the victim’s version of events; (2)
failed to assess the extent of his mental disorder; and (3) failed to investigate DNA
evidence to support a claim of actual innocence.
The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
following a guilty plea is well established. In order for a defendant to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel when a guilty plea has been entered, he must
show: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that,
but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky.App.1986).
We have reviewed the record. McCombs did not raise the issue of
counsel’s alleged failure to assess the victim’s statement until his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his CR 60.02. A party cannot use a motion to
reconsider, which is equivalent to a motion to alter, amend, or vacate judgment, to
raise issues that could have been presented in the proceedings prior to entry of the
judgment. Hopkins v. Ratliff, 957 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Ky.App. 1997). Therefore,
we will not address that claim.
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McCombs argues counsel failed to adequately investigate the extent
of his mental disorder. McCombs pled guilty and the guilty plea was affirmed by
this Court on direct appeal. Although McCombs was diagnosed by the Army as
having an unspecified personality disorder in 1994, he neither brought this to the
attention of the trial court during his plea colloquy nor did he raise the issue on
direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea. Importantly, even now,
McCombs does not allege that he was actually incompetent to enter a guilty plea.
He simply states that counsel should have requested a competency hearing to
determine whether or not he was competent to enter the guilty plea. Therefore, as
McCombs has not demonstrated that he was actually incompetent at the time of the
guilty plea, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a
psychological evaluation.
McCombs next argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to insist
that linens from the victim’s bed be tested for DNA evidence to prove his
innocence. As the trial court noted, the victim’s bed was not the crime scene.
Moreover, this evidence was known to McCombs prior to the entry of his plea, yet
he still chose to plead guilty. This argument amounts to a sufficiency of the
evidence claim, which was forfeited by the guilty plea. Taylor v. Commonwealth,
724 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky.App. 1986). We agree with the trial court that this
evidence was of marginal relevance at best. Therefore, we cannot conclude that if
this evidence was developed that there was a reasonable probability that McCombs
would have insisted on going to trial.
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McCombs next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately explain the terms of the agreed-upon sentence. Specifically, he argues
counsel guaranteed that he would be released from jail in seven months (in
addition to his time already served) rather than simply be eligible for parole.
At the plea colloquy, the trial court fully explained the terms of the
agreed-upon sentence. The record reflects that McCombs was informed that the
amended charge of attempted first-degree rape brought McCombs into the 20%
parole eligibility rule rather than the 85% he would have faced had he been
convicted of the indicted offense. McCombs stated that he fully understood the
circumstances surrounding his guilty plea and that no one promised him anything
different from the terms as they were explained at the plea colloquy. At the
evidentiary hearing, trial counsel stated that in explaining the parole eligibility to
McCombs, she was presenting the “best case” scenario and offered no guarantees
because the actual grant of parole is within the jurisdiction of the parole board.
McCombs has not established that counsel was ineffective in this regard.
Finally, McCombs argues that counsel was ineffective by failing to
investigate misconduct before the grand jury and that counsel failed to challenge
the sufficiency of the indictment.
McCombs argues that a detective lied to the grand jury and that trial
counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment. After the allegations were
made, the victim was examined by a doctor. The detective read a portion of the
report to the grand jury. The report stated, “The normal anogenital examination is
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normal except for the vaginal discharge which does not appear to be physiologic.”
However, the detective stated, “The normal anogenital examination is not normal
except for the vaginal discharge which does not appear to be physiologic.” At the
evidentiary hearing, the detective admitted that he inadvertently made a
misstatement, but also added that the grand jury was provided with the written
report which was accurate.
In Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585, 588-89 (Ky.App. 2000),
this Court stated:
Generally, a defendant must demonstrate a flagrant abuse
of the grand jury process that resulted in both actual
prejudice and deprived the grand jury of autonomous and
unbiased judgment. A court may utilize its supervisory
power to dismiss an indictment where a prosecutor
knowingly or intentionally presents false, misleading or
perjured testimony to the grand jury that results in actual
prejudice to the defendant. The requirement that the
defendant show both a flagrant abuse of the process and
actual prejudice was explained in United States v. Roth:
The first requirement, that the government know the
evidence was perjured, is intended to preserve the
principle that an indictment cannot be challenged on the
basis of the insufficiency of the evidence on which the
grand jury acted . . . . What makes the government's
knowing use of perjured testimony different is that it
involves an element of deceit, which converts the issue
from the adequacy of the indictment's evidentiary basis to
fraudulent manipulation of the grand jury that subverts its
independence. The second requirement in the cases, that
the indictment would not have been issued except for the
perjured testimony, confines judicial intervention to cases
of prejudicial misconduct, that is, to cases where the
misconduct made a difference to the defendant.
(Internal citations omitted).
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McCombs has not demonstrated a flagrant abuse of the grand jury
process nor was this isolated misstatement the only evidence linking him to the
alleged crimes. McCombs complains about other inconsistencies and
misstatements. However, McCombs waived the right to cross-examine any
witnesses by pleading guilty. Moreover, under Baker, McCombs has simply not
demonstrated the flagrant abuse of process or willful deceit that is necessary to
invalidate the indictment. He has merely raised possible issues of fact and issues
regarding the credibility of witnesses.
McCombs next argues that his counsel was ineffective to failing to
challenge the indictment on the grounds that the indictment named the victim by
the initials, J.M., instead of L.M. As the trial court noted, this is an error that could
have easily been corrected. McCombs clearly had notice of the charges against
him and had notice of the identity of the victim. McCombs has not demonstrated
any prejudice from this error in the indictment. Relief is unwarranted. See
McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1969).
McCombs next argues that the prosecutor committed a Brady
violation. Issues raised in an RCr 11.42 motion are limited to those “that were not
and could not have been raised on direct appeal.” Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116
S.W.3d 463, 467-68 (Ky. 2003). This argument regarding alleged Brady violations
could and should have been raised in his direct appeal and are thus improperly
raised for the first time in this collateral attack on his conviction.
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Finally, McCombs argues that he is entitled to relief based upon the
cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors. We have reviewed the record and hold
that McCombs has not demonstrated circumstances warranting relief from his
guilty plea.
Accordingly, the orders of the Hardin Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian Thomas Ruff
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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