SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL VS. COMP TURNER (DONNA), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000852-WC
SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-08-89310
DONNA TURNER; SIGNATURE HEALTHCARE
OF GEORGETOWN, FORMERLY KNOWN AS
GEORGETOWN HEALTHCARE; HONORABLE
LAWRENCE F. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; AND THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Select Specialty Hospital (“SSH”) petitions for review from a
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“the Board”) which vacated and
remanded an Administrative Law Judge’s order dismissing a claim for benefits by
Donna Turner. On appeal, SSH alleges that the Board exceeded its scope of
review by substituting its own findings of fact for those of the ALJ and for
considering issues not raised in a petition for reconsideration. SSH further alleges
that Turner waived the compensability of her medical benefits by failing to raise
the issue before the Board and that it was error for the Board to raise the issue sua
sponte. Turner did not file a responsive brief; however, her co-appellee, Signature
Healthcare of Georgetown (“SHG”), filed a responsive brief essentially reiterating
SSH’s claims of error. Upon a review of the record, we affirm the Board.
History
Donna Turner, a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”), filed two formal
claims for workers’ compensation benefits alleging two separate back injuries
while employed by two separate employers. The first injury alleged by Turner
occurred on October 15, 2007, while she was employed by SHG. Turner sustained
a back injury while she and another employee helped lift a patient into bed. Turner
reported the incident to her employer and was referred to a clinic located adjacent
to the hospital where she worked. Turner was seen by a physician’s assistant at the
clinic who treated her for the next couple of months. She was later referred by the
clinic to Dr. Travis Hunt, an orthopedic surgeon in Georgetown, Kentucky. Dr.
Hunt obtained an x-ray and ordered an MRI scan. He did not recommend surgery,
but rather chose to continue Turner on a course of physical therapy. Turner only
missed approximately one day of work as a result of this injury (as it occurred
before a long weekend), and then worked on “light duty” for SHG until January of
2008.
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Turner testified in her deposition that she felt her employer was
“going to get rid” of her after this extended period of light duty work, and thus,
began looking for another job. Thereafter, she interviewed with SSH. Turner was
extended a job offer by SSH, and Dr. Hunt “cleared” her for regular duty (instead
of light duty), at her request. Turner accepted the position with SSH, discontinued
her employment with SHG, and began working for SSH on January 15, 2008. She
did not return to Dr. Hunt’s care after she was released to return to work on
January 15, 2008.
Turner continued to work for SSH until April 28, 2008, when she
experienced a second work-related injury which is the subject of this action. Again
Turner was injured as she and other workers were lifting a patient into bed. Turner
reported feeling a sharp pain and pressure in her low back. Turner reported the
incident to her employer and was referred by her employer to the emergency room
of the hospital in which she worked. After being seen in the emergency room that
day, she later followed up with her family physician, Dr. Melicio Abordo on the
advice of the emergency room physician. Turner has continued to treat with Dr.
Abordo since that time. Turner has not worked since the April 28, 2008 injury.
An MRI was performed after each of the subject work-related
accidents. Turner testified that she continues to have low back pain and
intermittent numbness in both of her legs. Turner also testified that she developed
neck and shoulder pain in May of 2008. She claimed she could no longer engage
in activities she previously engaged in and also that she now experiences vertigo.
-3-
Turner testified that a typical day is spent lying on her couch at home or visiting
with her friend, Mrs. Noble.
Turner filed two applications for resolution of her injury claims. The
first was filed on July 14, 2008, wherein she alleged she was injured within the
scope of her employment for SSH on April 28, 2008. Turner’s claim was assigned
to Administrative Law Judge Lawrence F. Smith (“ALJ Smith”) on August 18,
2008. The defendant employer, SSH, filed a denial of the claim on September 26,
2008. Several months after filing the first claim, Turner filed a second claim on
December 17, 2008. Turner’s second claim was for the earlier injury of October
15, 2007, while employed by SHG. SHG also filed a denial of Turner’s claim.
Turner moved to consolidate the claims and, after several telephonic
conferences, the claims were consolidated by ALJ Smith on January 21, 2009.
Thereafter, the parties began taking proof in the case. Benefit review conferences
were held on June 12, 2009 and September 15, 2009, but the parties were unable to
ultimately agree on the issues. Hearings in the case were conducted on July 16,
2009 (hearing on interlocutory relief) and October 22, 2009 (final hearing). After
the final hearing on October 22, 2009, each party filed briefs with the court.
Turner testified on four occasions concerning her injuries in this case,
twice by deposition and twice during hearings. She provided inconsistent
testimony concerning her back pain after each of the accidents. On one occasion,
she testified that she continued to experience low back pain from the time of the
October 15, 2007 injury until the time of her second injury on April 28, 2008.
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However, at a different time she testified that her back pain from the first injury
had resolved itself before the second injury (or re-injury) occurred on April 28,
2008. Turner testified at times that she took prescription pain medication for her
injuries, but testified at other times that she could not afford her prescription pain
medication and did not take it.
Evidence was introduced at the hearings in the case concerning the
findings of two private investigators hired by the defendant employers. Cody
Kirchner testified that he is a field investigator who was assigned to conduct
surveillance on Turner. Kirchner testified that he conducted surveillance of Turner
on March 11 and March 12, 2009. On the first day of surveillance, Kirchner
traveled to Turner’s place of residence and determined that she was not home.
Thereafter, Kirchner traveled to the home of a Mrs. Cleta Noble upon information
that Turner may be at Noble’s residence. Upon arriving at Noble’s residence,
Kirchner observed a vehicle he believed to be Turner’s. Surveillance was
discontinued on that date after no further activity was observed. On March 12,
2009, Kirchner resumed surveillance and observed an unidentified female arrive at
Turner’s home. Kirchner observed Turner travel with the woman in the car,
making stops at local businesses. Kirchner testified that he saw no overt signs of
pain or limping when Turner entered and exited the vehicle with the woman after
the various stops.
A second private investigator, Mary Carol Burnette, also testified in
the case. Burnette undertook surveillance of Turner on May 13 and 14, 2009.
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Burnette arrived at Turner’s house at 7:30 a.m. on the morning of May 13, 2009
and observed that there were no vehicles in the driveway. She then proceeded to
the home of Cleta Noble, where she believed Turner was working.1 Upon arriving
at Noble’s residence, Burnette observed Turner’s vehicle. Burnette testified that
she observed Turner and an elderly woman (presumably Mrs. Noble) leave the
residence and drive the vehicle to perform some errands. Burnette testified that
Turner drove the vehicle while Noble sat in the passenger seat. Burnette observed
the pair stop at a First National Bank where Turner went inside, leaving Noble to
wait in the vehicle. Burnette also observed the pair travel to a Save-A-Lot store
where Turner went inside to shop for groceries while Noble waited in the car.
Burnette testified that when Turner emerged from the store, she was pushing a cart
loaded with groceries and that she proceeded to unload several bags of groceries
into the car. Burnette testified that she observed Turner bending, squatting,
stooping, and lifting, without any outward signs of difficulty or discomfort.
After Turner and Noble left the Save-A-Lot, Burnette followed Turner
to a Wal-Mart store. Burnette testified that Turner went into the store alone, again
leaving Noble to wait in the vehicle. When Turner emerged from the store, she
unloaded multiple bags of goods into the car. Burnette testified that she followed
the women back to Noble’s residence where she observed Turner unload all of the
bags and carry them into the home. She stated that she observed Turner carrying
multiple bags at a time without apparent difficulty. Burnette testified that she also
1
Turner adamantly denied that she worked for Mrs. Noble and testified that Noble was a dear
family friend.
-6-
observed Turner unload and carry a watermelon into the house. Burnette testified
that after unloading the groceries, Turner returned to the vehicle, retrieved a
wheelchair from the trunk, assisted Noble with a transfer from the vehicle into the
wheelchair, then proceeded to push Noble into the home. Burnette testified that
she did not observe any outward signs of difficulty or pain when Turner removed
the wheelchair and assisted Noble into the home. Thereafter, Burnette ceased
surveillance for that day, but resumed surveillance on May 14, 2009. On the
following morning, she was again able to locate Turner’s vehicle at Noble’s
residence. However, no other notable activity was observed on that date. Burnette
testified that the events of May 13, 2009 were recorded on DVD, and the DVD was
introduced into evidence along with Burnette’s report.
Evidence was also introduced that Turner was evaluated by Dr. Daniel
Primm on October 24, 2008, at the request of SSH. Dr. Primm issued a report of
said evaluation. Primm found that Turner walked well and did not limp, that she
could walk normally on heel and toe, and that she had normal ranges of motion and
rotation. Primm opined that Turner had pre-existing degenerative changes of the
lumbar spine with a history of lumber strains. Thus, he found that neither work
injury resulted in a permanent harmful change to Turner. He recommended that
she avoid heavy lifting for an additional six weeks before returning to work.
Primm testified that Turner could return to her regular employment as a CNA.
SSH also requested that Dr. Russell Travis review Turner’s medical
records. Dr. Travis noted that Turner was released to go back to regular work after
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the first injury and that she was told to return to work in two days with “light
lifting” restrictions after the second injury. Upon viewing her MRI, Dr. Travis was
of the opinion that her MRI showed only mild degenerative changes.
Evidence was also introduced concerning an evaluation of Turner by
Dr. William J. Lester. Dr. Lester obtained a history from Turner and reviewed her
medical records. His examination revealed no abnormality of reflexes. He further
found that Turner had a good range of motion and found her to be at maximal
medical improvement (“MMI”), assigning a 5% whole person impairment rating.
Dr. Lester found that all restrictions for the patient were based on the initial injury
of October 15, 2007.
In addition, Dr. Henry Tutt conducted an independent medical
examination (“IME”) of Turner. He noted that Turner exhibited normal sitting and
standing posture and a normal gait. He also noted her movements to be natural and
fluid, noting that she had no trouble getting on or off of the examining table, or in
removing and replacing her shoes. Dr. Tutt also viewed the surveillance footage of
Turner taken on May 13, 2009. Dr. Tutt observed that Turner was able to carry
several bags of groceries in each hand, naturally shift the bags from one hand to
the other while opening the door, and that she was able to lift a watermelon and
place it on her shoulder to carry it into the home. Dr. Tutt concluded that the
activities he saw Turner perform on the video were not significantly different from
the activities of an individual working as a CNA in a nursing home. He further
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concluded that her complaints were “inexplicable and ungrounded in physiologic
and pathologic principles.”
At the hearings, Turner admitted to often being at the home of Cleta
Noble, but insisted that Mrs. Noble was a close family friend whom she often
helped. Turner denied any allegation that she was employed by Mrs. Noble.
Turner introduced a limited power of attorney and designation of health care
surrogate by Cleta Noble designating Turner as her limited power of attorney and
health care surrogate in order to show that the nature of their relationship was not
employer-employee. In addition, Turner claimed that she did exhibit a limp when
walking on one of the days in question, but that it was not captured on videotape.
After the hearing, and upon reviewing the evidence, ALJ Smith
entered an opinion and order dismissing the case on December 21, 2009. Although
ALJ Smith found that Turner did suffer injuries to her back in 2007 and 2008, he
found that she did not suffer any permanent impairment in connection with those
injuries. Thus, ALJ Smith found that Turner was not entitled to any permanent
partial disability (“PPD”) benefits. ALJ Smith made no findings in regard to
Turner’s claim for temporary total disability (“TTD”) benefits or when she had
reached MMI. Turner appealed from the opinion and order dismissing, arguing on
appeal that ALJ Smith erred by failing to make a determination as to whether she
was entitled to TTD benefits. Although Turner disagreed with the ALJ’s
determination regarding PPD benefits, she did not appeal that part of the decision.
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The Board agreed with Turner, vacating in part and remanding. The
Board held that it was error for the ALJ to find that Turner sustained two work
related injuries, but failing to assess when she had reached MMI and whether she
was entitled to any period of TTD. The Board vacated and remanded to the ALJ
for a determination of whether Turner was entitled to TTD benefits, and if so, to
make findings as to a specific period of entitlement and as to which employer is
responsible for the payment of those benefits. The Board also raised the
compensability of medical benefits, sua sponte, stating that although the claim was
dismissed as it pertains to PPD benefits, no determination was made by the ALJ as
to the payment of medical benefits. Thus, the Board also remanded to the ALJ for
a determination regarding the compensability of medical benefits.
SSH petitioned this Court for review, and now argues that the Board
exceeded the scope of its review by remanding for a determination of whether TTD
benefits were warranted. SSH further argues that it was improper for the Board to
raise the issue of compensability of medical benefits since the claim was waived by
Turner when she failed to raise it before the Board. SHG filed a response,
essentially agreeing in all salient respects with SSH on appeal. Turner filed no
brief before this Court.
Analysis
Upon review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, we
will not reverse the Board unless the Board has “overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent” or has “committed an error in assessing the
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evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly,
827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). Upon reviewing the Board’s decision, we are
mindful that the ALJ, as the finder of fact, has the sole discretion to determine the
quality, character, and weight of the evidence. Paramount Foods, Inc. v.
Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985). In the present case, the Board determined
that Turner was not required to file a petition for reconsideration in order to
preserve her right to appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we agree and affirm the
Board.
Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 342.281 provides that a petition
for reconsideration may be filed with the ALJ within fourteen (14) days of the date
of an award, which petition should clearly set out any errors relied upon and an
argument for reconsideration. This Court has held that a petition for
reconsideration must be filed with the ALJ in order to preserve an issue for
appellate review in a workers’ compensation proceeding. Halls Hardwood Floor
Co. v. Stapleton, 16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky. App. 2000). Indeed, KRS 342.285 provides
that an award or order of the ALJ is conclusive as to questions of fact, and binding
on the Board, unless a petition for reconsideration is filed.
However, KRS 342.285 also authorizes the Board to review an award
or order in the absence of a petition for reconsideration. KRS 342.285 provides
that, although the Board may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ as to
questions of fact or weight of the evidence, the Board may determine whether:
(a) The [ALJ] acted without or in excess of his powers;
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(b) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud;
(c) The order, decision, or award is not in conformity to the provisions
of [KRS Chapter 342];
(d) The order, decision, or award is clearly erroneous on the basis of
the reliable, probative, and material evidence contained in the
whole record; or
(e) The order, decision, or award is arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
Indeed, the Board has the authority to decide questions of law regardless of
whether a petition for reconsideration is filed. See, e.g., Bullock v. Goodwill Coal
Co., 214 S.W.3d 890, 893-94 (Ky. 2007); Brasch-Berry General Contractors v.
Jones, 175 S.W.3d 81 (Ky. 2005). With regard to whether an issue presented for
review before the Board is a legal one, our Supreme Court has instructed that it is
the Board’s province on appeal to ensure that orders and awards of an ALJ are in
conformity with Chapter 342, and thus, that determinations of whether an ALJ’s
award or order is in conformity with Chapter 342 is a question of law. Whittaker
v. Reeder, 30 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Ky. 2000).
In the present case, the Board found that the ALJ’s opinion was not in
conformity with Chapter 342. Specifically, the Board noted that while ALJ Smith
found Turner had sustained work-related injuries on October 15, 2007 and April
28, 2008, and further found that Turner’s injuries had since fully resolved, ALJ
Smith failed to make findings with regard to when Turner had reached MMI and
whether she was entitled to TTD. Additionally, the Board found that ALJ Smith
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failed to render an opinion in conformity with Chapter 342 by failing to make any
finding with respect to the compensability of medical benefits. The Board noted
that it was not attempting to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ and that the
ALJ could find on remand that Turner was not entitled to TTD or medical benefits,
but that some findings on each were required under the statute.
We disagree with SSH and SHG that the Board exceeded the scope of
its review by vacating and remanding on the two above issues where no petition
for reconsideration was filed and where Turner failed to raise the compensability
of medical benefits in her appeal before the Board. Indeed, as previously stated, it
is within the Board’s purview on appeal to ensure that orders and awards of an ALJ
are in conformity with Chapter 342. Whittaker v. Reeder, 30 S.W.3d at 144. As
our Supreme Court has noted:
Workers’ compensation is a creature of statute. As set forth in
Chapter 342, workers’ compensation proceedings are
administrative rather than judicial. Although the principles of
error preservation, res judicata, and the law of the case apply to
workers’ compensation proceedings, they apply differently than
in the context of a judicial action.
Id. at 143. Where, as here, an ALJ fails to make essential findings under Chapter
342, the Board does not exceed the scope of its authority by reversing and
remanding for the ALJ to make findings in compliance with the Chapter.
Specifically, KRS 342.0011(11)(a) defines temporary total disability as the
condition of an employee who has not reached MMI and has not reached a level of
improvement which would allow her to return to work. Here, where the ALJ
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found that Turner was injured and had subsequently reached MMI, he clearly erred
as a matter of law by failing to find when Turner had reached MMI and whether
she was entitled to TTD during the period between injury and MMI. Further, the
ALJ based his finding that Turner was not entitled to PPD on the fact that she had
reached MMI, but again, made no finding as to when MMI was reached. The
ALJ’s finding that Turner was not entitled to PPD did not resolve the issue of when
MMI was reached and whether she was entitled to TTD, and it is not the place of
the Board or this Court to remedy this inconsistency in the opinion by making such
findings. See, e.g., Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. 2002)
(It is possible for an injured employee to fail to establish PPD, but nonetheless still
establish TTD). Without such findings, neither the Board nor this Court may
conduct a meaningful review. Finley v. DBM Technologies, 217 S.W.3d 261, 266
(Ky. App. 2007). For the same reasons, the ALJ’s failure to make any
determination with respect to the compensability of medical benefits was also
appropriately reversed and remanded by the Board under KRS 342.285(2)(c). See,
e.g., Whittaker v. Reeder, supra. (Board may review question of law, such as
whether opinion or award is in conformity with Chapter 342, sua sponte). See
also, Brasch-Berry General Contractors v. Jones, supra.2
2
We recognize that a clear standard has not yet been elucidated by our Courts, to date,
concerning how one is to distinguish between omitted findings on a contested issue (which must
be preserved by a petition for reconsideration) (see, e.g., Halls Hardwood Floor Co., supra) and
omitted findings that are required by statute (which may be reviewed without preservation) (see,
e.g., Brasch-Berry General Contractors, supra and Bullock, supra). Here, we are satisfied that
the omitted findings as to the contested issues may be reviewed absent a petition for
reconsideration as they effectively render the opinion in non-compliance with the Chapter
because they create an internal inconsistency in the opinion.
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We further disagree with SSH’s contention on appeal that the Board
exceeded its scope of review by improperly making its own findings of fact. SSH
contends that the Board “determined that ALJ Smith was . . . required to award
benefits for temporary total disability.” (Appellant’s brief). However, quite to the
contrary, the Board held that Turner might not be entitled to benefits for temporary
total disability on remand, but that it was a decision to be made by the finder of
fact rather than the Board. Indeed, the Board was careful not to make any findings
with regard to TTD or the compensability of medical benefits, noting that the ALJ
was free to reject either on remand. Instead, the core of the Board’s holding was
that the ALJ’s opinion and order was insufficient under Chapter 342 absent such
findings.
Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s opinion vacating and remanding
in part as the Board is authorized under KRS 342.285 to determine whether any
order, decision, or award is not in conformity with the Chapter.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Barry Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
Kimberly Van Der Heiden
Lexington, Kentucky
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