HUMPHREY (SARAH ELIZABETH) VS. HUMPHREY (EDWIN JEROME)
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RENDERED: JULY 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORDERED PUBLISHED: OCTOBER 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002241-ME
SARAH ELIZABETH HUMPHREY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT D. MATTINGLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00604
EDWIN JEROME HUMPHREY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, LAMBERT, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Sarah Elizabeth Humphrey, appeals the
November 12, 2009, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the
Marshall Family Court, awarding custody of the parties’ two minor children to
their father, Appellee Edwin Jerome Humphrey. After a thorough review of the
arguments of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm.
The parties were married on July 10, 1999, and were divorced by
decree of the Livingston Circuit Court on November 6, 2002. The parties had two
minor children, C.L.H. and C.W.H, both born on April 7, 2000. Upon divorce, the
parties entered into a property and settlement agreement in which the parties
agreed that they would share joint custody, with Sarah as the primary residential
custodian. No child support was ordered at that time.
On January 4, 2008, Sarah filed a motion for review of visitation in
the Livingston Circuit Court. Thereafter, on April 14, 2008, an order was entered
setting a visitation schedule establishing that visitation would be conducted in
accordance with the McCracken County Standard Visitation Schedule. Sarah
remained the residential parent at that time. Thereafter, in May of 2008, Edwin
was ordered to pay child support to Sarah in the amount of $550.00 per month.
The divorce action was subsequently transferred to the Marshall
Circuit Court, where Sarah had moved with both boys. Below, Sarah testified that
she moved to Marshall County for the schools, but acknowledged that she has no
connection to Marshall County other than her boyfriend, Danny, who also resides
there. At the time the action below was filed, both boys attended Marshall County
Schools.
Edwin and his current wife, Patrice, relocated to Colorado for a job
opportunity in approximately 2007, but later relocated to Marion, Illinois,
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approximately one year ago. Edwin testified that he did so in order to see his sons
more regularly. On July 2, 2009, Edwin filed a motion to modify custody. In that
motion, Edwin requested that the parties continue to share joint custody of the
children and that he be named primary residential custodian. Edwin argued that
said modification was necessary to serve the best interests of the children.1 A
hearing was held below on November 4, 2009.
Upon commencement of the hearing in this matter, the parties differed
as to the appropriate standard to be applied by the court. Sarah asserted that the
court should apply the standard set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
403.340 for modification of custody decrees, while Edwin’s counsel argued that
the best interest of the child standard should apply. The trial court, citing its
reliance on Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008), chose to apply the
best interest of the child standard. In its order, the court indicated that even though
Edwin had filed a motion to modify custody, it was treating the case as an action
for modification of timesharing.
Testimony was heard from the parties; Wendy Lay, a guidance
counselor at the children’s school; Kelly Cox, a social worker with the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services; an education director at Sylvan Learning Center
where the children had attended a brief course; and various relatives and character
1
In particular, Edwin cited concerns that the children were being abused by Sarah’s boyfriend,
Danny, that the boys desired to live primarily with their father, and that he takes their education
more seriously than Sarah.
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witnesses for each party. The children were also interviewed by the court in
chambers.
Following the hearing, the court issued its findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment on November 12, 2009. As noted, the court
found that although Edwin styled his motion as one to modify custody, he was
actually seeking a modification of the parties’ current timesharing arrangement, as
both parties would still have custody. The modification would name Edwin as the
primary residential custodian instead of Sarah. In its order, the trial court stated
that it found insufficient evidence to support the claim that Sarah’s boyfriend
abused the children. It nevertheless found that on the basis of the wishes of the
parents and the children,2 it would be in the best interest of the children to make
Edwin the primary residential parent. The court also set forth the respective
support and financial obligations of the parties.3 It is from that order that Sarah
now appeals to this Court.
As her first basis of appeal, Sarah argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in applying the standard set forth in Pennington. Sarah asserts that
Pennington should only apply when triggered by either an objection to, or request
for, relocation. She argues that in the matter sub judice, Edwin was seeking a
2
There is dispute between the parties as to the true wishes of the children. Edwin asserts that the
children want to live with him, while Sarah asserts that Edwin coached the children to make this
request. The court below found that the boys were well-behaved, articulate, and intelligent, and
adamantly stated that they wanted to live with their father. The court found no indication that
they had been coached.
3
We decline to discuss this aspect of the order herein as it is not pertinent to the issues before us
on appeal.
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modification of custody and not timesharing, and points out that his arguments for
becoming primary residential custodian centered not on reasons of relocation but
around objections to the atmosphere of Sarah’s home and the parenting styles she
implemented. Accordingly, Sarah asserts that the court should have applied KRS
403.340 instead of KRS 403.320(3). Sarah argues that under the standards set
forth in KRS 403.340, the court did not have a sufficient basis for changing the
primary residential custodian from her to Edwin.
In response, Edwin argues that the trial court correctly applied
Pennington. He argues that although he styled his motion as a motion to modify
custody, in reality, he sought a modification of timesharing. Edwin therefore
asserts that pursuant to Pennington, the best interest standard of KRS 403.320(3)
was correctly applied. Edwin asserts that Pennington was not intended to apply
solely to situations involving relocation, and that relocation was merely part of the
specific set of facts that gave rise to that appeal. Edwin therefore argues that the
holding of Pennington applies to every modification of timesharing, whether
sought in response to relocation or for other practical reasons.
Alternatively Edwin asserts that, even if the court did misapply
Pennington, that error was harmless because he sought modification more than two
years after the initial custody determination and, therefore, the threshold to be met
for modification was not as stringent as it would otherwise have been had the
motion been made earlier.4 Edwin also asserts that regardless of whether the court
4
In making this argument, Edwin relies upon the statement of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Pennington that “after two years from the date of the custody decree, the standard reverts to
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used the best interests of the child standard, or the factors set forth in KRS
403.340, the evidence to support its findings was sufficient.
In addressing the issues raised by the parties, we note that our
standard of review is set forth in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01,
and that findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. See Murphy v. Murphy, 272 S.W.3d 864 (Ky.App. 2008). Thus, the
question before this Court is not whether we would have decided it differently, but
whether the findings of the family court are clearly erroneous, whether it applied
the correct law, or whether it abused its discretion. See B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d
213, 219-220 (Ky.App. 2005). See also Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153 (Ky.
1974). We review the arguments of the parties with this in mind.
Stated simply, we believe that Pennington speaks clearly to the
primary issue raised by the parties herein. In Pennington, our Kentucky Supreme
Court held that a motion seeking to change the primary residential parent was in
reality a motion to modify visitation/timesharing and not a motion to modify
custody. Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008). We cannot agree
with Sarah that the holding in Pennington was intended to be limited only to cases
review of the best interests of the child, either under KRS 403.270 or KRS 403.340(3).”
Pennington at 767. Edwin uses this as a basis to argue that although the statute requires the court
to consider the enumerated factors, it did not have to find that serious endangerment to the
children existed prior to modifying custody.
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involving relocation and, in fact, this Court has already found otherwise on several
occasions.5
While a relocation was the particular context in which Pennington
was decided, we believe that the intent of our Supreme Court was to establish a
distinction between a modification of custody (either from joint custody to sole or
split custody, or vice-versa), and a modification of timesharing. A modification of
timesharing maintains the basic custodial framework agreed upon by the parties
but changes the amount of time that each parent spends with the child within that
framework. In the matter sub judice, Sarah and Edwin retain joint custody. Edwin
did not seek sole custody of the children, but instead sought to change the primary
custodian from Sarah to himself. Pennington is clear that this is not a modification
of custody, but of timesharing, and we decline to find otherwise herein.
Having found that Edwin’s motion was, in reality, a motion to modify
timesharing, Pennington is the controlling case. Pennington is clear that motions
to modify visitation/timesharing are brought under KRS 403.320(3), which permits
modification when it “would serve the best interests of the child.” The court
below, in making this determination, heard evidence from numerous sources. It
clearly considered the interactions between each of the adults involved and the
children, the disciplinary styles of the parents, and the children’s wishes.
5
See Gaskins v. Gaskins, 2009 WL 3321408 (Ky.App. 2009)(Unpublished); Gardner v.
Gardner, 2009 WL 1811730 (Ky.App. 2009)(Unpublished); and also Warren v. Warren, 2010
WL 135174 (Ky.App. 2010)(Unpublished).
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While Sarah attacks the findings of the trial court that the children
wished to live with their father, we note that there was conflicting evidence on this
issue.6 As we have noted, it is within the discretion of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, and to make a determination after reviewing the
evidence as a whole. In the matter sub judice, the court not only heard the
testimony of the witnesses on this issue, but also conducted its own interview with
the children themselves. We believe that these interviews, in conjunction with the
evidence presented during the course of the trial, formed a sufficient basis for the
trial court to make the determination that it did. We simply cannot conclude that
the court abused its discretion, or that its findings of fact were clearly erroneous.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the November
12, 2009, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the Marshall
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Abigail C. Barnes
Smithland, Kentucky
L. Christopher Hunt
Paducah, Kentucky
6
Witness Cox testified as to her belief that the children had been coached by their father, but
Witness Lay testified that it was her belief that they had not been coached.
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