R. (B.) VS. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES , ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002193-ME
B.R.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISA O. BUSHELMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-AD-00022
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
AND S.R., A JUVENILE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Kenton
Family Court, which involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the appellant
mother and her husband to their daughter. The husband is not a party to this
appeal, and the judgment terminating his parental rights is final. The mother
argues that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the family
court’s findings, and that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services failed to
exercise reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We affirm.
The mother gave birth to the child on April 23, 2006, when she was
sixteen years of age. She and the child’s father were married shortly afterwards.
The Cabinet filed two petitions on behalf of the child, on October 12 and October
13, 2006, following an incident in which the Covington police were dispatched to
the couple’s residence because someone was banging on their door using a gun.
The child was discovered in a room which also contained marijuana and scales.
Several minors were in the residence with alcohol and marijuana present. The
father was arrested and convicted of possession of marijuana, drug paraphernalia
and wanton endangerment of a minor.
In its petitions, the Cabinet alleged that the parents were neglectful as
a result of the father’s drug use and the mother’s alcohol consumption. The case
worker expressed concern about domestic violence, and noted that the family had
failed to comply with her case plan recommendations. The Cabinet also alleged
that the child was in danger due to her mother’s refusal to distance herself from the
father and the criminal activity in the home. The father ultimately admitted that
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the child was dependent and she was put in the joint custody of her mother and
maternal grandmother. The mother was ordered to participate in parenting classes,
and to undergo a psychological and parenting assessment.
About one month later, the Cabinet filed for a review of the joint
custody order, requesting that custody of the child be temporarily awarded to the
maternal grandmother and that visitation with the father be supervised. After the
Cabinet filed the review request, the mother distanced herself from the father, and
began a relationship with another man, A.A. She filed a domestic violence petition
against the father in Kenton District Court, alleging that he had threatened to find
her, knock out her teeth and kill her. She further alleged that he had entered her
home and broken many objects. The Kenton Family Court entered a domestic
violence order against the father on March 19, 2007. The mother ended her
relationship with A.A. shortly afterwards, and reconciled with the father. She filed
a motion to amend the domestic violence order, claiming that it was no longer
necessary as she and her husband had worked things out and come to an
agreement. The family court granted the motion. The father continued to have
problems, however. In 2007, he was convicted on two separate occasions of
use/possession of drug paraphernalia, then in 2008 of cultivating marijuana,
possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct and possession of marijuana.
On April 10, 2008, the couple’s second child, a son, was born. About
one month later, the mother obtained another domestic violence order against the
father, alleging that he was angry and violent, broke dishes, threw things around
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and raised his fist. After the father moved out of the residence, the mother
resumed her previous relationship with A.A., who moved in with her and the two
children. The mother’s father also lived in the residence.
In June 2008, the Cabinet filed a petition in the family court on behalf
of the children, based on a report that the daughter had slap marks on the corner of
her mouth, that the mother had said she beat the daughter, and that the mother
refused to make contact with the assigned case worker.
Before this petition could be heard, the infant son died as a result of
injuries inflicted by A.A. on August 1, 2008. These injuries included a skull
fracture, brain bleeding, leg fractures, a wrist fracture, multiple rib fractures and
bruising all over his body. The autopsy showed that he had also suffered numerous
prior injuries. The Cabinet filed a petition on behalf of the daughter, alleging that
she was at risk for physical abuse. The petition reported that the daughter told the
Cabinet workers that A.A. had hit her on the head, that she was afraid of him, and
was afraid of being locked in a room. A.A., on the other hand, claimed that the
mother was physically aggressive towards the daughter.
The Cabinet worker assigned to investigate the death of the infant son
spoke with the mother regarding his injuries. The mother said she had noticed
some redness in his eyes. On the day he died, she reported that he had been sick,
crying and throwing up. The mother had nonetheless gone out to get her nails
done, leaving the baby with her father, who she admitted was a violent man,
although she claimed that he only becomes abusive when he is drunk. A.A.
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returned home while she was out, and inflicted the injuries which ultimately led to
the infant son’s death. A.A. eventually admitted that he had caused the baby’s
injuries by pulling and shaking him, hitting his head on a door frame and falling
down the stairs. The mother denied any awareness of the child’s healing fractures.
According to the Cabinet worker, the mother showed little emotion after A.A. was
indicted for murder in the death of her son. She continued to visit him in jail,
purchased a telephone card for him and accepted at least five calls from him. She
also contacted his family on his behalf. She eventually stopped accepting the calls
because she believed that jail personnel were monitoring and recording their
conversations. When she was questioned about maintaining contact with A.A., she
explained her actions by stating that A.A.’s family “did a lot for her.” The mother
eventually reunited with her husband in the fall of 2008.
On October 23, 2008, the mother admitted to neglect of her daughter
in Kenton Family Court. The child was committed to the Cabinet and placed in
foster care. The mother was allowed weekly visits with her daughter. The court
ordered the parents to complete the services recommended in the Cabinet’s court
report. The mother was required to abide by all recommendations of Dr. James
Rosenthal, a licensed psychologist, to submit to random drug screens, and to
participate in parenting classes and demonstrate what she learned in those classes.
Dr. Rosenthal completed a psychological evaluation of the mother,
and diagnosed her as having an adjustment disorder with depressed mood and antisocial personality traits. He opined that this diagnosis would affect her parenting
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abilities in the following ways: she would not monitor her children closely, would
expose them to dangerous situations, or leave them with people with whom the
children would be at risk of harm. He recommended that she seek outpatient
mental health treatment, and attend a support group for parents of deceased
children.
The mother failed to complete the mental health counseling
recommended by Dr. Rosenthal. She did attempt to attend a support group for
bereaved parents, but was informed that it was for families only and that her
daughter was too young to attend. The mother had completed parenting classes in
2006, and completed two more sessions of parenting classes after the removal of
her daughter from her care in 2008, but according to the Cabinet’s social worker,
she failed to demonstrate improved parenting abilities during her supervised
visitation with her daughter, on one occasion “cursing and throwing a fit” in front
of the child. Her behavior was described as childish, and she was prone to saying
inappropriate as well as hurtful things to her daughter during visitation. She also
brought unauthorized guests and continued to use her cell phone during visitation.
She continued to have contact with the father of her children and the relationship
continued to be troubled. In June 2009, for example, he filed a domestic violence
petition alleging that she was stalking him.
The Cabinet filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights
and a trial was held on August 24, 2009, and September 25, 2009. On October 26,
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2009, the family court entered an order terminating the parents’ rights to their
daughter. This appeal by the mother followed.
Involuntary termination proceedings are governed by KRS 625.090,
which provides that a circuit court may involuntarily terminate parental rights only
if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a three-pronged test has
been met. First, the child must be deemed abused or neglected, as defined by KRS
600.020. KRS 625.090(1)(a). Second, termination of parental rights must be in the
child’s best interest, and the court is provided with a series of factors that it shall
consider when making this determination. KRS 625.090(1)(b); KRS 625.090(3).
Third, the court must also find at least one of a number of grounds listed in the
statute. KRS 625.090(2).
When we examine the family court’s application of this three-pronged
test, our review
is confined to the clearly erroneous standard in
[Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure] CR 52.01 based
upon clear and convincing evidence, and the findings of
the trial court will not be disturbed unless there exists no
substantial evidence in the record to support its findings.
Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily
mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is
proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying the
weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily
prudent-minded people.
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116 -117 (Ky. App.
1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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On appeal, the mother argues the following: (1) that she was not
responsible for her son’s death, and that his death should not be imputed to her for
purposes of supporting a termination of her parental rights in her daughter; (2) that
she had substantially complied with the December 2008 dispositional order of the
court; (3) that it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate the mother’s
parental rights; and finally (4) the Cabinet failed to exercise reasonable efforts to
reunify the family.
The mother contends that the death of her infant son was unfairly used
by the family court to justify terminating her parental rights in her daughter, even
though on the day of his death she had left the baby with her father, not with A.A.,
and she was not present when the assault took place. She contends that she had no
cause to believe that her boyfriend had any violent tendencies, and that the abuse
of a child, standing alone, is not enough to justify the termination of parental rights
to a different child. In its findings of fact, the family court observed only that the
mother continued to have contact with A.A. after he apologized to her for killing
the child. There is no other mention of the incident in the family court’s findings,
and there is no indication that the family court placed the blame for the infant’s
death on the mother, or that the incident was the sole or even the decisive factor in
the court’s decision to terminate parental rights.
Moreover, although the mother was not responsible for the death of
the infant son, she exhibited poor judgment in leaving the child with her father,
who in turn left him with A.A., the individual who inflicted the fatal injuries. Even
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more troubling is the fact that the mother was apparently oblivious to the signs of
previous abuse and injury that the baby had suffered, even though the physicians at
the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, where he was examined and pronounced dead,
said the child would have been showing symptoms of pain and distress.
[W]hile abandonment or abuse of an older child alone is
not clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support
termination of parental rights to a younger child, such
evidence coupled with other evidence of abuse or neglect
of the younger child may be sufficient.
Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Ky.
2006). The fact that the mother had not noticed the prior injuries inflicted on her
infant son, that she had left him in her father’s care in order to get her nails done,
even though her father has violent tendencies and the child appeared to be ill, and
her decision to maintain friendly contact with the man who admitted to inflicting
the fatal injuries on her infant constitute substantial evidence to support the family
court’s conclusion that she had repeatedly failed to provide or was substantially
incapable of providing essential parental care and protection.
Next, she argues that insufficient weight was given to the fact that she
substantially complied with the family court’s order of December 2008, which
required her to submit to random drug screens, to comply with the
recommendations of Dr. Rosenthal, and to complete parenting classes. She
correctly states that she had no positive drug screens. She also explains that she
was unable to follow Dr. Rosenthal’s recommendation that she attend grief
counseling at Fernside. As to Dr. Rosenthal’s recommendation that she attend
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mental health counseling, she explains that she had two therapists at Family First
during her first five sessions. The second therapist then moved to Ohio. This
would have meant she had to see a third therapist by her sixth visit, which she
argues constituted noncooperation and inconsistency on the part of Family First,
and justified her decision to stop attending therapy. She points out that she also
completed parenting classes and attended four one-hour sessions at the Women’s
Crisis Center.
Although she did complete some parts of the family court’s
recommendations, her decision to stop attending her counseling program, simply
because the therapists had changed, was significant in that she appears not to have
accepted Dr. Rosenthal’s diagnosis that she needs help for her mental problems.
Furthermore, although she testified that Fernside turned her away, there is no
indication that she sought assistance in finding a different grief counseling
program. As to the parenting classes, the testimony from the Cabinet’s workers
indicated that she was unable to demonstrate that she had learned anything of
benefit at the classes, and continued to display immature behavior at her meetings
with her daughter.
Next, the mother disputes that she is incapable of providing essential
parental care, and that her mental illness on its own is not enough to terminate
parental rights. Furthermore, she argues that the Cabinet did not sufficiently
perform its duty to ensure that she had access to appropriate and consistent mental
health treatment. There is no indication that the family court terminated parental
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rights solely on the ground of her mental illness. We agree that mental illness is
not sufficient in itself to terminate parental rights, but it is certainly a factor that the
court is directed to consider under KRS 625.090(3)(a). Although the change in
therapists may have been inconvenient to the mother, it was not a sufficient reason
to stop attending the counseling sessions, and certainly did not constitute any sort
of “noncooperation” on the part of the counseling services.
The mother also disputes the family court’s finding that she did not
have the ability to provide food and clothing for her daughter. She acknowledges
that there was testimony that she was in arrears for child support, but also states
that the court referred to the existence of the docket sheet in the record indicating
that the child support was set at “zero.” The Cabinet acknowledges that the order
to pay child support was not in the juvenile court record. (There is a child support
arrears calculation sheet in the record, but it appears to pertain only to the father,
not the mother.) The Cabinet also states that a certified copy of her child support
record establishes that she had an arrearage. This copy is not in the record.
Despite the conflicting evidence regarding child support arrears, it is undisputed
that she has never paid child support. Furthermore, although the family court
noted that she claims she works, there is no reference to evidence in the record to
support this contention. The family court did not err in concluding that there was
no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in this regard.
Finally, she argues that the Cabinet had no intention of reunifying the
family. She contends that the reference by a Cabinet worker to a “foster-to-adopt”
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family indicates that it was the worker’s intent from the very beginning to place the
child with a family that would permanently adopt her. The Cabinet worker also
testified that it was inappropriate for the mother to criticize her daughter for calling
her foster parents “mom” and “dad.” The mother contends that the Cabinet worker
was thus latently encouraging the child to see the placement with her foster family
as permanent.
KRS 625.090(3) directs as follows: “In determining the best interest
of the child and the existence of a ground for termination, the Circuit Court shall
consider the following factors:”
(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether
the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made
reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite
the child with the parents unless one or more of the
circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not
requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a
written finding by the District Court;
“Reasonable efforts” are defined as
the exercise of ordinary diligence and care by the
department to utilize all preventive and reunification
services available to the community in accordance with
the state plan for Public Law 96-272 which are necessary
to enable the child to safely live at home[.]
KRS 620.020(10).
The mother argues that the Cabinet failed to make “reasonable
efforts” to reunify the family, and that none of the circumstances under KRS
610.127 were present to justify a waiver of the reasonable efforts requirement.
Our review of the record indicates that the Cabinet did make reasonable efforts to
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assist the family by referring the mother to various services. Although the mother
did complete some of the services, she failed to show any improvement that would
justify reunification of the family. Her continuing relationship with the father, and
the fact that the violent nature of that relationship did not improve, also militated
against reunification.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of the Kenton
Family Court terminating parental rights are therefore affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Derek R. Durbin
Fort Thomas, Kentucky
Cynthia Kloeker
Newport, Kentucky
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