CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, ET AL. VS. HICKS (DONNA K.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002186-MR
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES; STEVE EVERIDGE, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A SOCIAL
WORKER FOR THE CABINET; AND
CARLA GIBSON, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A SOCIAL WORKER
FOR THE CABINET.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM ENGLE, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00553
DONNA K. HICKS; KENTUCKY PAIN
PHYSICIANS; CHARLOTTE CRAWFORD;
BILLY CRAWFORD; BILLY WILLIAMS;
AND PENNY FORD.
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND COMBS, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
CLAYTON, JUDGE: The Cabinet for Health and Family Services,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Steve Everidge and Carla Gibson, in their official
capacities only, appeal from an order of the Perry Circuit Court that recognized the
sovereign immunity of the state agency but did not extend the defense of sovereign
immunity to the state employees in their official capacities. Thus, the circuit court
did not dismiss Donna K. Hicks’ suit against the state social workers in their
official capacities. Because we agree with the Cabinet that official immunity
claims fall under the umbrella of sovereign immunity, we reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 9, 2008, Donna Hicks filed a lawsuit in Perry Circuit
Court against Penny R. Ford, Billy R. Crawford, Billy R. Williams, Charlotte
Crawford, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (hereinafter “Cabinet”),
James East (Hazard police officer), the Hazard City Police Department, Steve
Everidge (employee of the Cabinet), Carla Gibson (employee of the Cabinet) and
unknown defendants. East, Everidge, and Gibson were sued in their “individual
and official capacities.” In her complaint, Hicks alleged that she had been held
captive and physically abused and neglected by her former companions and
housemates, Ford, Williams, and the Crawfords during the months May 2007
through November 2007. She sued them for assault, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and battery.
(KRS) 21.580.
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Furthermore, Hicks claimed in the suit against the Cabinet and its
employees that, despite notice of a duty to investigate, the Cabinet and its
employees failed to respond to and/or investigate Hicks’ situation. Accordingly,
she sued the Cabinet and its employees for negligence, gross negligence, violation
of a statute, and negligence per se.
The individuals that held her captive were indicted and eventually
pled guilty. They were all sentenced to prison terms for the crimes. None has
responded to the civil action and their liability is not an issue on appeal. But, on
November 3, 2008, the Cabinet, with Everidge and Gibson in their official
capacities only, replied to Hicks’ complaint and said that the Perry Court lacked
jurisdiction and preserved the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity.
Moreover, the Cabinet maintained that the complaint against the Cabinet
employees in their official capacities is also barred by sovereign immunity because
suing the Cabinet and the Cabinet’s social workers in their official capacities is
redundant. According to the Cabinet’s reasoning, both claims are tantamount to
suing the state itself.
Shortly thereafter, on November 10, 2008, Hicks filed a motion in
Perry Circuit Court to amend the complaint and add the City of Hazard, Kentucky,
as a defendant. And on November 10, 2008, she filed another complaint against
Kentucky Pain Physicians alleging that, because they provided her medical
treatment during the time of her captivity, it knew or should have known the abuse
that was taking place and should have reported it. By court order, entered on
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February 20, 2009, the two separate actions were consolidated.
With regard to this appeal, the next significant action occurred on
August 27, 2009, when the Cabinet, along with its social workers, defendants
Everidge and Gibson in their official capacities, made a motion to the circuit court
for a judgment on the pleadings or dismissal for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity and the Perry Circuit Court’s lack of jurisdiction. They
argued in a joint memorandum of law that the Cabinet and its employees, when
named in their representative capacities, are immune from suit under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. In a memorandum entered on September 25, 2009, Hicks
countered that while sovereign immunity is a defense in most cases involving
negligent state actors, Kentucky courts have made it clear that the defense will
only shield the state when the act is discretionary. Hicks further suggested in the
memorandum that the actions here were clearly ministerial and, therefore, the
sovereign immunity defense is inapplicable and the Cabinet’s motion should be
overruled.
After a hearing and the submission of trial memorandums, the circuit
court entered an order on November 20, 2009, where, in the relevant portion of the
order, it granted the Cabinet’s motion insofar as it requested the dismissal of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, but denied
the motion to dismiss the state employees from the action in either their personal or
official capacities. At the hearing, the judge agreed that the Commonwealth of
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Kentucky and the Cabinet had sovereign immunity but held that state employees
sued in their official capacities do not share in that immunity because a jury must
ascertain as a question of fact whether the state actor’s actions were ministerial or
discretionary.
Meanwhile, on November 5, 2009, prior to the entry of the abovecited court order, Hicks gave notice for the depositions of Everidge and Gibson.
The Cabinet and the social workers filed a motion to quash the notice of deposition
citing their immunity and intention to file an interlocutory appeal. After the
motion was heard on November 13, 2009, it was denied.
Subsequently, the Cabinet, Everidge, and Gibson - in their official
capacities only - appealed from the November 20, 2009, order and the November
13, 2009, order denying the motion to quash the deposition. They filed an
interlocutory appeal on the issue of immunity, pursuant to KRS 22A.020(2) and
the holding in Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2009).
ISSUE
The first issue is whether the Perry Circuit Court erred by failing to
dismiss the official capacity claims against state employees after the court held that
the action against the Cabinet was barred by sovereign immunity. Also, we are to
consider whether depositions of employees sued for damages in their official
capacities should be quashed while the matter of sovereign immunity is under
appellate review.
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The Cabinet and its employees in their official capacities argue that
suing state employees in their official capacities is merely another way of pleading
the same claims against the state agency and, consequently, the action against the
state employees in their official capacities falls under the umbrella of sovereign
immunity and should have also been dismissed. Conversely, Hicks maintains that
sovereign immunity does not apply to negligent performance of ministerial acts
and lawsuits filed against state employees in their official capacities are not the
same as suing the state agency and, therefore, the suit against them should proceed
in circuit court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicability of sovereign or governmental immunity is a question
of law. See Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006). The
standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Floyd County Bd. of Educ. v.
Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.1997).
ANALYSIS
Before we begin our examination of sovereign immunity, we will
address Hicks’ argument that, because the Cabinet was dismissed from the action,
it has no standing to appeal this matter. We disagree. As noted in Commonwealth
of Kentucky Board of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Ky. 2001), quoting
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Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114,
121 (1985):
Official capacity suits “generally represent only another
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent. As long as the government entity
receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity.”
Simply put, Hick's claim against the social workers in their official capacities is
legally indistinguishable from her claim against the Cabinet.
Sovereign immunity “is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that
precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its
consent or otherwise waived its immunity.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517
(Ky. 2001), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895B(1) (1979). Within the
ambit of sovereign immunity are numerous terms that have been discussed over
and over. Here, we are concerned with the implication of whether a state
employee is sued in his official/representative capacity or her individual capacity
within the context of sovereign immunity.
One confusing aspect of the sovereign immunity law is the influence
of the term “official immunity.” In the aforementioned case, Yanero, 65 S.W.3d
510, which was an influential and decisive case on the issue of sovereign
immunity, the Kentucky Supreme Court discusses “official immunity:
“Official immunity” is immunity from tort liability
afforded to public officers and employees for acts
performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions.
It rests not on the status or title of the officer or
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employee, but on the function performed. Salyer v.
Patrick, 874 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.1989). Official immunity
can be absolute, as when an officer or employee of the
state is sued in his/her representative capacity, in which
event his/her actions are included under the umbrella of
sovereign immunity as discussed in Part I of this opinion,
supra. Similarly, when an officer or employee of a
governmental agency is sued in his/her representative
capacity, the officer's or employee's actions are afforded
the same immunity, if any, to which the agency, itself,
would be entitled, as discussed in Part II of this opinion,
supra.
Id. at 521-22. We can surmise from this reasoning that when a state employee is
sued in his or her official or representative capacity, such actions are under the
umbrella of sovereign immunity. See also Autry v. Western Kentucky University,
219 S.W.3d 713, 716-717 (Ky. 2007). Therefore, in the case at hand, Everidge and
Gibson, in their official - that is representative - capacities, are shielded by
sovereign immunity.
Continuing with the analysis, we note the thorough discourse in
Yanero about an employee of the state or one of its agencies sued in his or her
individual capacity. In such a case, see above, the employee enjoys qualified
official immunity. Qualified official immunity “affords protection from damages
liability for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.”
Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522, (citing 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees
§ 309 (1997)). The primary significance of this statement here is that qualified
official immunity is only relevant when a state employee is sued in his or her
individual capacity.
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Application of the qualified official immunity defense “rests not on
the status or title of the officer or employee, but on the [act or] function
performed.” Id. at 521, (citing Salyer v. Patrick, 874 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1989)).
To apply the defense, it is necessary to classify the particular acts or functions of
the state employee in his individual capacity in one of two ways: discretionary or
ministerial. Qualified official immunity applies only where the act performed by
the official or employee is one that is discretionary in nature. Id. Discretionary
acts are, generally speaking, “those involving the exercise of discretion and
judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment[.]” Id. at 522, (citing
63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees § 322 (1997)). Discretion in the
performance of an act occurs when the act may be performed in one or two or
more ways, either of which would be lawful, and the state actor has the will or
judgment to determine the performance. Upchurch v. Clinton County, 330 S.W.2d
428, 430 (Ky. 1959). In contrast, ministerial acts (functions without immunity) are
those that require “only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer's
duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific
act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522, (citing
Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Ky. 1997)).
In appealing the decision of the circuit court, the Cabinet and the
employees maintain that sovereign immunity is a bar to suit against state
employees who are acting in an official capacity. We agree with this reasoning.
And we note again that Hicks’ discussion of discretionary and ministerial acts by
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employees is only pertinent when the employee is sued in his or her individual or
personal capacity. Hence, the circuit court erred when it failed to dismiss the
action against the social workers in their official capacities. Whether the social
workers’ acts were discretionary or ministerial and subject to qualified official
immunity only becomes an issue in claims against the social workers’ actions in
their individual capacities.
Finally, regarding the issue of whether depositions of employees sued
for damages in their official capacities should be quashed while the matter of
sovereign immunity is under appellate review, since it has been determined that
sovereign immunity bars suit against the state employees in their official
capacities, the issue as to the motions to quash the depositions has been rendered
moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Perry Circuit Court is
hereby reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
D. Brent Irvin
Deputy General Counsel
Cabinet for Health and Family
Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DONNA K.
HICKS:
Brooks Stumbo
Richmond, Kentucky
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