HARRIS (MARK WINFIELD) VS. HARRIS (JACQUELINE TUSSEY)
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002116-ME
MARK WINFIELD HARRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT, FAMILY DIVISION
HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00376
JACQUELINE TUSSEY HARRIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Mark Harris appeals from the October 9, 2009, order of the
Greenup Circuit Court, Family Division, addressing visitation and the payment of
child support arrearages by his former wife, Jacqueline Tussey. He also appeals
the order denying his motion to alter, amend, or vacate that ruling. Mark contends
that the family court abused its discretion by refusing his request to watch the
children during Jacqueline’s visitation time while she worked and by only ordering
her to pay $20.00 per month toward past-due child support. We affirm.
Mark and Jacqueline were married in 1998 and separated in 2003. Mark
filed a petition to dissolve the marriage on July 7, 2003, and moved for and was
granted temporary custody of their two young children.1 Following a hearing
before the domestic relations commissioner, the court entered a decree of
dissolution on July 28, 2005. In the decree, the court ordered the parties to have
joint custody of the children, named Mark as the primary physical custodian, and
awarded Jacqueline visitation. The court also ordered Jacqueline to pay $215.00
per month in child support.
In 2007, the parties returned to court, arguing about visitation.2 In addition,
Mark stated that Jacqueline was five months in arrears on her child support
obligation. In an order entered August 28, 2007, the family court ordered
Jacqueline to pay off the five-month arrearage at a rate of $20.00 per month. It
also set up summer visitation schedules.
On September 24, 2009, Mark filed another motion concerning child
support. He indicated that following the 2007 order, Jacqueline only paid five
months of support at the increased rate of $235.00 per month, and that she had
fallen further behind in her support obligation. Mark also requested that
Jacqueline’s Wednesday evening visitation with the children be suspended because
1
At the time the petition was filed, Ian was 2½ years old, and Rachel was one year old.
2
Following the entry of the decree by Judge Lewis D. Nicholls, the remainder of the case was
heard by Judge Jeffrey L. Preston.
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no meaningful visitation was being conducted. Rather, she was taking the children
to a different location to be watched.
In her response, Jacqueline admitted that she was in arrears on her child
support payments, but she blamed this on expensive car repair bills and her low
wages. Until April 2009, Jacqueline had worked at a fast food restaurant thirtytwo to thirty-five hours per week, earning $6.85 per hour. That month, she began
working as a certified nursing assistant (CNA) at Kingsbrook Lifecare Center
working forty hours per week, at a rate of $9.30 per hour. Regarding Wednesday
evening visitation, Jacqueline explained that she had been attending a six-week
course, which she had since completed and that she no longer had any conflict on
Wednesday evenings. She did, however, state that she might have future conflicts
due to her college courses and work as a CNA.
On October 9, 2009, the family court held a brief hearing on the issues
raised in the motion, at which both Jacqueline and Mark testified. Mark introduced
evidence without any real dispute that as of that month, Jacqueline owed $2,171.00
in arrearages on child support. Mark also introduced testimony that Jacqueline was
having her mother watch the children while she worked during summer visitation.
He requested an order permitting him to watch the children during periods of time
that Jacqueline was working, rather than have the children watched by other
relatives. At this juncture, we note that John is retired and that he collects
disability benefits through his former employer, CSX. Jacqueline testified that she
did not want Mark to watch the children during that time as she preferred her
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family to be with them during her time of visitation. She also testified that she
attended classes during the day on Monday and Wednesday and that she worked
the other five days of the week from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
Following the hearing, the family court entered an order ruling on the
pending motion. In pertinent part, the order reads as follows:
[Jacqueline] admits she is in arrears in child
support. The Court finds the arrears amount to be
$2,171.00. [Jacqueline’s] current child support
obligation is $215.00 per month. The Court Orders
[Jacqueline] to pay-off the arrearages at the rate of an
additional $20.00 per month for a total of $235.00 per
month to be paid by way of wage assignment.
....
The Court declines to change the visitation
schedule previously Ordered by this Court with the
exception that the parties, during the hearing, agreed that
the mid-week visitation could be altered depending on
the time [Jacqueline] is working. The Court does not see
any reason to change the visitation times. The mere fact
that [Jacqueline] may be working during part of the time
she had the children is not enough, under this Court’s
interpretation, to change the current visitation schedule.
Mark moved the family court to alter, amend, or vacate the October 9, 2009,
order on two grounds. First, Mark argued that the family court’s decision not to
amend the visitation schedule was illogical and against his fundamental rights, as
he should be the proper person to watch the children while Jacqueline works
during her periods of visitation. Mark also argued that the family court abused its
discretion when it ordered Jacqueline to pay only an additional $20.00 per month
toward the $2,171.00 arrearage. He asserted that Jacqueline should be required to
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pay the arrearage in a much quicker fashion. The family court denied Mark’s
motion in an order entered October 28, 2009, and this appeal follows.
On appeal, Mark continues to argue that the family court abused its
discretion in refusing to alter the visitation schedule and in ordering the payment of
only an additional $20.00 per month toward Jacqueline’s child support arrearage.
Jacqueline disputes Mark’s arguments and contends that the family court did not
abuse its discretion on either ruling.
Mark’s first argument addresses Jacqueline’s visitation with the children.
He asserts that the family court abused its discretion by essentially permitting the
children to be placed with a non-parent during periods of Jacqueline’s visitation
when he, their father, was able to watch them. This, he contends, is not in the
children’s best interest as no meaningful visitation between Jacqueline and the
children was taking place and they were being deprived of their father during the
times in question. Jacqueline counters that Mark has failed to establish that it
would not be in the children’s best interest to be in the care of their grandmother at
times when Jacqueline was at work. She also contends that the added pressure of
additional visitation exchanges would not benefit the children.
The applicable statute in this case is Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
403.320(3), which permits the court to “modify an order granting or denying
visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the
child[.]” In Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 769 (Ky. 2008), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky addressed modification of custody or timesharing, albeit related
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to the issue of relocation, and set forth the applicable standard as that of abuse of
discretion:
Every case will present its own unique facts, and the
change of custody motion or modification of
visitation/timesharing must be decided in the sound
discretion of the trial court. This is true whether the child
lives with one parent in an arrangement like a sole
custody arrangement or whether there is equal
timesharing or something in between. Since “serious
endangerment” or “best interests” is not defined, it is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court whether the party
opposing relocation has met his burden on either a
modification of custody or visitation/timesharing.
Id. at 769. “Abuse of discretion in relation to the exercise of judicial power
implies arbitrary action or capricious disposition under the circumstances, at least
an unreasonable and unfair decision. The exercise of discretion must be legally
sound.” Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Ky. 1994) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
In the present case, the family court declined to change the visitation
schedule, holding that “[t]he mere fact that [Jacqueline] may be working during
part of the time she has the children” was insufficient to justify Mark’s requested
change. We agree. During times when Jacqueline is at work, the children are in
the care of their maternal grandmother, who Jacqueline testified is alert and in
good health. Mark has failed to establish that this arrangement is not in the
children’s best interest. Ideally, Jacqueline would be with the children during the
entirety of her visitation periods rather than only during the periods she is not
working, but this is not currently possible due to the demands of her present work
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schedule. However, there is nothing in the record to show that having the
children’s grandchildren watch them while Jacqueline works is not in their best
interest. Consequently, we hold that the family court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to modify the visitation schedule.
Next, Mark argues that the family court abused its discretion by only
requiring Jacqueline to pay an additional $20.00 in child support per month toward
her arrearage. He points out that at that rate, the $2,171.00 arrearage will not be
paid off for nine years, by which time the oldest child will have reached the age of
eighteen. Mark contends that this ruling amounts to the application of a double
standard based upon gender. Jacqueline argues that the repayment schedule did
not constitute an abuse of discretion based upon her minimal income and wellestablished car problems. She states that she needs to keep her 1991 Chevrolet
Lumina automobile in working order so that she may get back and forth from work
and her college classes.
Based upon Jacqueline’s financial situation, we do not perceive any abuse of
discretion in the family court’s decision to add $20.00 per month to her child
support obligation, raising the total monthly payment to $235.00. Jacqueline has
amply established she is supporting herself earning $9.30 per hour as a CNA, is
attending college classes to better her potential income, and has had to pay
expensive car repair bills. Furthermore, Mark has not set forth any suggestion as
to what he believes a reasonable payment would be under the circumstances.
While this Court certainly does not condone her failure to stay current on her child
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support obligation, we believe the family court carefully considered the evidence
before it in determining a proper sum for her to pay toward her arrearage each
month. We specifically disagree with Mark’s assertion that the order demonstrated
any type of double standard based on gender. Accordingly, we hold that the family
court did not abuse its discretion in regard to the additional amount it ordered
Jacqueline to pay.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Greenup Circuit Court, Family
Division, are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Jeffrey Scott
Grayson, Kentucky
Roger R. Cantrell
Greenup, Kentucky
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