DEMIR (SLAVEN) VS. KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001863-MR
SLAVEN DEMIR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00483
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION; AND DOTSON ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: Slaven Demir appeals from a denial of benefits by the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission which was affirmed by the Warren Circuit
Court. On appeal, Demir argues that he did not engage in any “misconduct,” as
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
delineated by Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 341.370(6), which would warrant
a denial of benefits. Upon a review of the record, we reverse and remand.
History
Slaven Demir was hired by Dotson Electric Company on June 8,
2005. Demir was a student at Western Kentucky University, and Dotson Electric
allowed Demir to work around his class schedule. He was employed as a general
laborer, with his duties including such tasks as cleaning up the shop and
warehouse, putting away materials, making pickups and deliveries to job sites, and
occasionally acting as an electrician’s helper on jobs. Demir’s immediate
supervisor at Dotson Electric was Robert Dotson (“Robert”).
In September of 2007, Dotson Electric instructed Demir to report to
work at a farm in Allen County, Kentucky. The farm was owned by one of the
principals at Dotson Electric.2 Demir’s duties that day included picking up rocks
in a field on the farm and removing them to another location. Demir was provided
an all terrain vehicle (“ATV”) to accomplish this task. The ATV was the property
of Dotson Electric.3 Dotson Electric maintains that Demir damaged the ATV while
loading the rocks into the metal bed of the vehicle. Demir was fired from his
position for this alleged misconduct.
2
Although Demir was employed by Dotson Electric Company, it appears that he was also
instructed to do work unrelated to the Electric Company for the principals of the company
individually.
3
Again, it appears that although the ATV was owned by the Electric Company, it was used on
the owners’ or principals’ private farm.
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Robert testified on behalf of Dotson Electric at the hearing. From his
testimony, it appears that the ATV in question was a small “four-wheeler” type
vehicle with a metal bed on the back of it. He testified that the bed of the ATV
was dented and scratched from when Demir loaded the rocks into it. Robert
acknowledged that the rocks Demir loaded into the vehicle ranged in size from
“softball” size to “football” sized rocks, and that some of the rocks weighed as
much as fifty to sixty pounds or more. He stated that Demir was instructed to pick
up the rocks from the field, load them into a three-gallon bucket, empty the threegallon bucket into the bed of the ATV, and then unload the rocks from the ATV at
a designated rock pile on the premises. Robert admitted that some of the rocks
were so large that they would not even fit into the three-gallon bucket. Demir’s
task on the day in question was to remove all of the rocks from a freshly plowed
six-acre field.
Robert testified that the ATV had been owned by the company for
approximately two years at the time of the incident and that it was originally
purchased as a used vehicle by Dotson Electric. It had previously been used for
such tasks as hauling deer carcasses, hauling rocks, hauling lumber, hauling
firewood, and hauling feed or corn. Demir also testified at the hearing, and stated
that he had been asked to wash this particular ATV on previous occasions and that
there were “dings and scratches” all over it. He further noted that, on one
particular occasion, Mr. Dotson had failed to put the ATV in gear and that it had
rolled down a hill and struck a tree, breaking the windshield. Demir further stated
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that the only thing in the bed of the ATV to protect it from the heavy rocks being
loaded onto it was a carpet remnant. Apparently, there were no pictures to depict
the condition of the ATV before it was allegedly damaged.4 However, Robert
testified to the condition of the ATV before Demir loaded the rocks into it, stating
that it did not have dents and scratches before Demir used it to load rocks from the
field.
Demir testified at the hearing that he held his employers in high
regard and that they frequently entrusted him with company vehicles and
machinery. Demir testified that he was not disgruntled or unhappy about the
request to remove the rocks from the field, stating: “I was never unhappy to do
anything for them. . . Larry Dotson didn’t have problems paying, so I didn’t have
problems working.” Demir further testified that he was often asked to do tasks at
the farm such as put corn out for the deer, clean the barn, clean the garage, operate
forklifts, trucks, boom lifts, scissor lifts, and other machinery. Demir testified that
he spent two days clearing rocks from the fields and that he had to load the ATV
approximately thirty-five to forty times on the first day. Demir noted that some of
the rocks were so large that it would have been helpful for him to have a second
person or a piece of machinery to assist him in loading them in the truck bed. As
to the allegation that Demir “threw” rocks into the bed of the ATV, he stated as
follows: “I don’t think I meant, you know, ‘throw’ as, throw it ten (10) yards
4
We also note that the pictures in the record taken after Demir used it for rock-loading appear to
be photostatic copies of pictures and are of such poor quality as to make it virtually impossible to
discern the bed of the truck or any dents or scratches thereon.
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away. When I threw the rocks it was probably [from within] a hands reach of the
ATV. . . .”
Demir testified that he was contacted by his superior after the first day
of work in the field and was advised that he damaged the bed of the ATV. Demir
testified as follows:
Yes, Mr. Dotson called me and told me that the bed was
damaged. I didn’t, I didn’t know that I did it and that’s
why I told him, you know, I didn’t do it, I don’t know if I
did it. And I still don’t know if I did it. But, you know,
he, he was my boss and I had to agree and take the fault
either way.
(T.E., p 72). Although Demir was told that he damaged the truck bed after the first
day of work, he was directed to continue with his task the very next day, albeit
with the additional caution that he not further dent or scratch the ATV. Demir
testified that, at the end of the second day, he believed he had done exactly what
his employer requested that he do. Demir did acknowledge that, as the second day
wore on, he did have more trouble loading the fifty to seventy pound rocks into the
ATV. He further stated that he knew he caused one particular dent to the ATV on
the second day when attempting to load an eighty-pound rock into the bed, which
slipped and hit the side of the ATV before falling into the bed.
Demir was fired by Dotson Electric after this second day of work in
the field. He sought unemployment insurance benefits which were denied by the
Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (“the Commission”) on the
grounds that he was discharged for statutory misconduct. Demir appealed his
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denial of benefits to the Warren Circuit Court. The circuit court found that the
Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the
Commission’s denial.
Demir now appeals the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court,
alleging that the Court misapplied the facts of this case to the statutory definition,
and that his behavior was not “misconduct” as contemplated by KRS 341.370(6).
Standard of Review
Upon review of a denial of benefits by the Commission, we will
accept the agency’s decision so long as its findings are supported by substantial
evidence of probative value and the agency has correctly applied the law to the
facts. Competitive Auto Ramp Services, Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins., 222
S.W.3d 249, 252 (Ky. App. 2007). Substantial evidence is defined as such
evidence as would “induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). Where it
is determined that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we
then ask whether the agency has correctly applied the law. Kentucky
Unemployment Ins. Com’n v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc.,
91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2002).
Analysis
The sole question on review is whether the Warren Circuit Court erred
by finding that Demir had engaged in “misconduct” as contemplated by KRS
341.370(6). We find that the court did err in this respect.
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“Discharge for misconduct” as used in this section shall
include but not be limited to, separation initiated by an
employer for falsification of an employment application
to obtain employment through subterfuge; knowing
violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of
an employer; unsatisfactory attendance if the worker
cannot show good cause for absences or tardiness;
damaging the employer’s property through gross
negligence; refusing to obey reasonable instructions;
reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs
on employer’s premises during working hours; conduct
endangering safety of self or co-workers; and
incarceration in jail following conviction of a
misdemeanor or felony by a court of competent
jurisdiction, which results in missing at least five (5) days
work.
KRS 341.370(6) (emphasis added). While Demir was found to have caused
damage to his employer’s property (the ATV), KRS 341.370(6) requires that such
damage be caused, not by simple negligence, but by gross negligence.
As this Court has previously stated, gross negligence is something
more than the failure to exercise slight care. Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power
Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985). Rather, “there must be an element either of
malice or willfulness or such an utter and wanton disregard of the rights of others
as from which it may be assumed the act was malicious of (sic) willful.” Cooper
v. Barth, 464 S.W.2d 233, 234 (Ky. 1971). In the unemployment compensation
context, this Court has defined misconduct sufficient to disqualify a worker from
benefits as something more than mere unsatisfactory conduct. Holbrook v.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n, 290 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. App. 2009). Indeed,
we have stated that “‘an act of wanton or wilful disregard of the employer’s
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interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules’ would support exclusion
from benefits whereas ‘mere mistakes, inefficiency, [or] unsatisfactory conduct’
would not.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251
(Ky. App. 1983), quoting 76 Am.Jur.2d Unemployment Compensation §52
(Emphasis in original). Moreover, in unemployment compensation cases, “a
misconduct allegation is in the nature of an affirmative defense to an employee’s
claim for benefits under the chapter, and although the employee bears the overall
burden of proof and persuasion, the employer has the burden of proving
misconduct.” Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ky. App.
1985). Further, we have also recognized that, when reviewing unemployment
compensation cases, our courts must keep in mind that “the underlying principle of
the statutory scheme for unemployment compensation evinces a humanitarian
spirit and it should be so construed.” Alliant Health System v. Kentucky
Unemployment Ins. Com’n, 912 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Ky. App. 1995).
Here, there is no evidence that Demir’s actions were willful or taken
with malice, nor is there any evidence that he acted with a wanton disregard toward
his employer’s interest or property. See, e.g. Shamrock Coal, supra. (A dozer
operator, who caused damage to a dozer when overturning it on a job site, did not
engage in misconduct, but merely “an isolated case of poor judgment or minor and
unintentional negligence.”)
In the present case, the circuit court found that:
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While [Demir] did place the smaller rocks in the bucket,
toward the end of the day he became tired and was
throwing the bigger rocks into the bed. The larger rocks
were heavy, however Demir was very strong –he was
capable of bench-pressing three hundred pounds.
Demir would get within six inches of the rail and
toss the rocks over the rail into the bed. One eighty
pound rock did not clear the rail and hit the side of the
vehicle, causing a dent.
From these findings, the trial court agreed with the Commission that Demir’s
intentional failure to heed his employer’s warning not to further damage the
vehicle after he had been warned equated to gross negligence. However, the
record is clear that Demir attempted to follow his employer’s instructions by
loading rocks into the three-gallon bucket. Demir was not given instruction on
how to load rocks which were so large that they would not fit into the bucket. We
find that it is in the nature of such a difficult and laborious task with a material
such as rock that is so inherently prone to causing denting and scratching to metal
surfaces, that dings and scratches may result to the vehicle and that to expect
otherwise would be unreasonable.
The situation may be analogized to asking someone to fill a pail with
water from a well, while at the same time instructing them not to get the pail wet.
We find that “getting the pail wet” in this instance, cannot be considered gross
negligence. Likewise, we find that the Commission and the trial court erred by
finding that Demir’s actions amounted to gross negligence. While arguments
could be made as to whether this was even ordinary negligence, this is not the
standard the statute uses. KRS 341.370(6).
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Accordingly, we reverse and remand. While the agency’s findings of
fact were supported by substantial evidence, the agency failed to correctly apply
the law to those facts. Thus, the circuit court’s judgment must be set aside and this
matter remanded to the Commission with directions to enter an order consistent
with this opinion.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur in Judge
Wine’s well-written Opinion, both for the reasons stated therein and for the reasons
expressed by Senior Judge Graves in his dissent in Holbrook v. Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission, 290 S.W.3d 81, 88-89 (Ky. App. 2009).
Even when viewed in the harshest light consistent with the record,
Demir’s conduct, as a matter of law, does not manifest a deliberate, malicious
intent to harm his employer’s business interests, nor more than simple negligence
at most. All the man did was cause a little more cosmetic damage to a piece of
used farm equipment while he was doing inherently strenuous menial labor. It
would be a miscarriage of justice and a tortured application of KRS 341.370(1)(b)
and (6) to deny him the humanitarian assistance of unemployment compensation
under these circumstances.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION:
James C. Maxson
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE DOTSON
ELECTRIC COMPANY:
Stephen L. Hixson
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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