WINN (CHRISTOPHER B.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001807-MR
CHRISTOPHER B. WINN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00111
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON, MOORE, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Christopher B. Winn, proceeding pro se, appeals the Fayette
Circuit Court’s order denying his motion to vacate, alter, or amend his sentence
pursuant to RCr1 11.42. After a careful review of the record, we affirm because
Winn did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and because his
remaining claims should have been brought on direct appeal.
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Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following a jury trial, Winn was convicted of: (1) trafficking in a
controlled substance, first degree; (2) trafficking in marijuana less than eight
ounces; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, first offense; and (4) being a
persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. Winn was sentenced to serve
ten years of imprisonment for the first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance
conviction, and that sentence was enhanced to fifteen years of imprisonment due to
his PFO-1st conviction. Winn was also sentenced to serve six months for his
trafficking in marijuana conviction and six months for his possession of drug
paraphernalia conviction, and those sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
Therefore, Winn’s total sentence for these convictions was fifteen years of
imprisonment, and this sentence was ordered to run consecutively with any prior
felony sentence he had to serve.
Winn moved, pursuant to RCr 11.42, to vacate, alter, or amend his
sentence. In his motion, Winn alleged, inter alia, that he had received the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the plea process. The circuit court
entered an order holding that Winn had properly been found to be an indigent
person during the trial proceedings and that the court was not required to consider
the financial circumstances of Winn’s family in determining whether he was
indigent, thus requiring the appointment of counsel. The circuit court also held
that Winn’s claim that the trial court denied him the right to be represented by
counsel of his choosing when the court denied his motion for a continuance of his
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trial was a claim that should have been brought on direct appeal rather than in his
RCr 11.42 motion. The court then held an evidentiary hearing concerning Winn’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and subsequently entered an order denying
his RCr 11.42 motion. In its order, the court reasoned as follows:
Based upon the testimony and the arguments of counsel,
the Court finds there to be no credible evidence that [trial
counsel] gave the Defendant bad advice regarding the
law of Persistent Felony Offender First Degree. The
Court also finds there to be no credible evidence that
[trial counsel] was deficient in explaining the law so that
the Defendant was confused.
Winn now appeals, contending as follows: (1) his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance during the plea process; and (2) the trial court erred
in denying his claim that he was not indigent when he had a paid and retained
attorney to represent him and the court erred in denying his motion for a
continuance to provide that attorney enough time to prepare for trial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[t]he movant has the burden of
establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction
proceeding. . . . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts
and witness credibility made by the circuit judge.” Simmons v. Commonwealth,
191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Ky. 2009). An RCr 11.42 motion is
“limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Winn first alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
during the plea process. Specifically, Winn contends that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by mistakenly informing Winn that the PFO statute could not
be used to enhance his trafficking in a controlled substance charge because his
prior offenses included a first-degree possession of a controlled substance
conviction, and the offenses had to be the same to apply the PFO statute. Winn
argues that his trial counsel told him that because all of his prior felony convictions
concerned the “Controlled Substances Act,” the persistent felony offender statute
should be applied like a second or subsequent offense enhancement because the
prior offense must be exactly the same or have a much more severe penalty than
the current charge for the persistent felony offender statute to be used to enhance a
current conviction.
To prove that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, thus
warranting a reversal of his conviction, Winn must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, in that it fell outside “the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance”; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
During the evidentiary hearing, Winn testified in accord with the
claim he now raises on appeal, i.e., that he rejected the plea offer because his trial
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counsel told him that the persistent felony offender statute could not be used to
enhance his trafficking conviction because his prior offense had merely involved
possession. However, Winn admitted that based on his prior convictions, he could
have been charged in this case with trafficking, second or subsequent offense, but
in lieu of charging him with that, he was charged with trafficking and PFO-1st. He
acknowledged that he understood he could not have been charged with both
trafficking, second or subsequent offense, and PFO-1st, because to do so would
require the same prior conviction to be used to enhance his current sentence both
ways, i.e., as a second or subsequent offense and as a PFO.
Winn’s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he
remembered advising Winn, whom he said did not want to plead guilty, that if he
went to trial, and he was convicted of trafficking, he could have received a
sentence of ten to twenty years of imprisonment. Trial counsel attested that he told
Winn he was eligible to receive a PFO-1st conviction. Counsel testified that, if the
jury had convicted Winn of possession of a controlled substance rather than
trafficking in a controlled substance, because he had been convicted of possession
of a controlled substance previously, the prosecutor in the case at hand would then
have had the choice of either seeking Winn’s conviction as a second or subsequent
offense, or as a PFO-1st conviction. Trial counsel also attested that he would have
never told Winn that the prosecutor could not obtain a conviction for PFO-1st in
the current case.
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The circuit court denied Winn’s RCr 11.42 motion, finding that there
was “no credible evidence that [trial counsel] gave the Defendant bad advice
regarding the law of Persistent Felony Offender First Degree.” Additionally, the
court found “there to be no credible evidence that [trial counsel] was deficient in
explaining the law so that the Defendant was confused.”
A reviewing court must “defer to the findings of fact and
determinations of witness credibility made by the trial judge.” Commonwealth v.
Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96, 99 (Ky. 2007). Upon reviewing the video tape of the
evidentiary hearing, we do not find that the circuit court clearly erred in its findings
of fact and credibility determinations. Winn’s trial counsel, who had
approximately twenty-five years of experience, testified that he told Winn he was
eligible to receive a PFO-1st conviction. Therefore, because the testimony of
Winn’s counsel contradicted the ineffective assistance of counsel claim that Winn
made, and because we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding counsel’s
testimony more credible than Winn’s, Winn has failed to show that the circuit
court erred in denying his RCr 11.42 motion based on this claim.
B. CLAIMS THAT CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING WINN’S
CLAIM REGARDING INDIGENCY AND HIS CLAIM REGARDING
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE
Winn next contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that
he was not indigent when he had a paid and retained attorney to represent him and
that the court erred in denying his motion for a continuance to provide that attorney
enough time to prepare for trial. However, because these claims could have been
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raised on direct appeal, we will not consider them in regard to an RCr 11.42
motion. Simmons, 191 S.W.3d at 561.
Accordingly, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher Winn
Pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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