GAFFNEY (CARTER) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001752-MR
CARTER GAFFNEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-002851
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, JUDGE; HENRY AND ISAAC,1 SENIOR JUDGES.
ISAAC, SENIOR JUDGE: Carter Gaffney appeals pro se from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motions for post-conviction relief pursuant to
the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, for an evidentiary hearing,
for appointment of counsel, and to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
1
Senior Judges Michael L. Henry and Sheila R. Isaac sitting as Special Judges by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 21.580.
A jury convicted Gaffney of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual
abuse against his minor daughter and he was sentenced to thirty years’
imprisonment. Gaffney appealed as a matter of right to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, which affirmed both convictions.2 Thereafter, Gaffney moved the trial court
for RCr 11.42 relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The
trial court denied his motion, holding that RCr 11.42 was not an appropriate
avenue for relief since each of Gaffney’s claims of error could have been raised on
direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Gaffney then filed a motion for the
trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its order denying him RCr 11.42 relief, which
was denied. This appeal followed.
Gaffney contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. He alleges his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to (1) call a witness at trial, (2) object to prosecutorial
misconduct during opening and closing statements at trial, and (3) conduct a pretrial investigation into the child’s contraction of genital herpes and advocate the
issue at trial.
Since no evidentiary hearing was held by the trial court prior to
denying Gaffney’s RCr 11.42 motion, our standard of review is “confined to
whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by
the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v.
2
Gaffney v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-0144-MR, 2005 WL 2317978 (Ky. Sept. 22, 2005).
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Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967) (citations omitted). We find
Gaffney’s claims to be conclusively refuted by the record.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show counsel’s representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, measured against prevailing professional norms, and
the defendant was prejudiced by such deficient performance. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);
Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1985) (adopting Strickland
standard).
First, Gaffney claims his trial counsel was deficient for failing to call
a certain witness to testify at trial. Specifically, Gaffney contends this witness
would have testified as to specific acts of dishonesty to show the child’s propensity
for untruthfulness.
In addressing evidence of character and conduct of witnesses, “KRE
608 does not permit proof of specific instances of conduct by extrinsic evidence,
but they may, ‘in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.]’” Purcell v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 398 (Ky. 2004) (quoting KRE 608(b)). Indeed,
“the Commentary to the 2003 amendment clarifies that ‘the cross-examiner may
not go beyond the answers he gets from such inquiry and later introduce extrinsic
evidence to contradict the answers.’” Purcell, 149 S.W.3d at 398.
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In this case, the record reflects that Gaffney’s counsel attacked the
credibility of the child on cross-examination by discussing, in part, her inconsistent
statements and her failure to report the incidents to law enforcement. The
additional presentation of extrinsic evidence through another witness’ testimony of
specific instances of the child’s dishonesty would not have been allowed under
KRE 608 and thus counsel for Gaffney was not deficient for failing to present this
witness at trial.
Next, Gaffney asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to prosecutorial misconduct during the Commonwealth’s opening and closing
statements at trial. Specifically, he avers the Commonwealth misrepresented to the
jury that the child contracted genital herpes as a result of sexual intercourse with
him; improperly bolstered the credibility of witnesses and vouched for their
credibility; used the prestige of Commonwealth’s office to guarantee its witnesses
were truthful; implied that Gaffney’s failure to produce any proof of innocence
equated to guilt; advised the jury to ignore favorable defense evidence; equated
Gaffney’s drinking, arrest, and uncharged assault with his guilt of the crimes
charged; and overstated the child’s testimony.
Our review of the record reveals that the Commonwealth’s comments
during opening and closing remarks remained within the permissible boundaries
established under Kentucky law. See Parker v. Commonwealth, 241 S.W.3d 805,
808 (Ky. 2007) (“The purpose of opening statement is to outline for the jury what
the proponent expects his proof to be.”); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d
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407, 412 (Ky. 1987) (Counsel is granted great leeway in a closing argument to
comment on tactics, evidence, and the falsity of opposing counsel’s position);
Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006) (“[C]ounsel has wide
latitude while making opening or closing statements.”).
Indeed, the record reflects the Commonwealth articulated the
“reasonable doubt” standard to the jury and then stated that based on the facts of
this case, the jury could hold the Commonwealth to a “no doubt” standard since no
doubt exists as to what happened to the child. The Commonwealth further advised
the jury to draw its conclusions from the evidence presented, in the form of witness
testimony, rather than from the opening and closing statements of counsel, and that
the Commonwealth’s job was not to alter witness testimony but to have people
who are under oath tell the truth. The Commonwealth summarized the testimony
of the child, emphasizing that other evidence corroborated her testimony and that
the child had no reason to lie.
In addition, the Commonwealth recapped the testimony of its medical
expert; specifically, that the medical examination of the child after the abuse
revealed the existence of genital herpes, as well as a well-healed scar, defect, and
thinning of the hymen, which are consistent with penile-vaginal penetration. Since
the child testified that she did not have sexual intercourse with anyone other than
Gaffney prior to this medical examination, the Commonwealth reasonably inferred
that the child contracted genital herpes from him. In summary, the
Commonwealth’s remarks are within the wide latitude afforded to opening and
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closing statements and Gaffney’s counsel was not deficient by failing to object to
them.
Finally, Gaffney argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to
conduct a pre-trial investigation into the child’s contraction of genital herpes and to
advocate the issue at trial. In particular, Gaffney asserts that his counsel failed to:
follow up on the investigation of Gaffney’s previous attorney regarding the child’s
contraction of oral herpes; introduce a 1990 medical report showing the child has
oral herpes; request the trial court to take judicial notice of medical literature which
distinguishes between oral and genital herpes; and move in limine to preclude the
introduction of evidence that the child has genital herpes on the basis that such
evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
Under Kentucky law, counsel has a duty to conduct an investigation
for mitigating evidence. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Ky.
2001). To determine whether counsel has fulfilled this duty we employ a threepart analysis:
First, it must be determined whether a reasonable
investigation should have uncovered such mitigating
evidence. If so, then a determination must be made
whether the failure to put this evidence before the jury
was a tactical choice by trial counsel. If so, such a
choice must be given a strong presumption of
correctness, and the inquiry is generally at an end.
Id. (quoting Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1009, 115 S.Ct. 532, 130 L.Ed.2d 435) (citation omitted and emphasis in
original).
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In this case, the record reflects that Gaffney filed a bar complaint
post-trial against his counsel, who he now claims was ineffective, for refusing to
respond to Gaffney’s attempts to contact him to discuss grounds for a new trial. In
responding to Gaffney’s complaint, counsel indicated that prior to his
representation of Gaffney, Gaffney was represented by another attorney. This
other attorney had indicated to Gaffney’s counsel prior to trial that the medical
expert with whom she had consulted concurred with the findings of the
Commonwealth’s medical expert that the genital herpes and hymenal findings are
consistent with the disclosure of repeated penile-vaginal penetration and supportive
of that disclosure. In an attempt to establish a defense, this other attorney had
moved the court to allow Gaffney to be tested for herpes, for which he tested
positive.
At trial, Gaffney’s defense strategy was a complete denial of the
alleged acts. Since no physical evidence was introduced linking Gaffney to the
sexual abuse and rape of the child, and both parties’ experts agreed that the genital
herpes and hymenal findings are consistent with repeated penile-vaginal
penetration, arguably no additional medical expert testimony on behalf of Gaffney
was necessary to the defense. As noted in trial counsel’s response to Gaffney’s bar
complaint:
Based on the evidence provided, the only need for a
medical expert would have been to explain how Mr.
Gaffney’s having herpes did not necessarily mean that he
gave herpes to his daughter. Since the Commonwealth
did not know that Mr. Gaffney tested positive for herpes,
there was no need to have an expert explain away the fact
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that Mr. Gaffney and his daughter had herpes. In order to
make such medical testimony relevant, one would have
to introduce the fact that Mr. Gaffney had tested positive
for the herpes virus.
Clearly, the record reflects that counsel was aware of the herpes findings,
investigated the same, and made a tactical choice to not present evidence of
Gaffney’s test results or additional medical expert testimony on this issue. As
such, we afford counsel’s choice a strong presumption of correctness and hold that
counsel’s representation in this regard was not deficient. Furthermore, contrary to
Gaffney’s assertion, introduction of evidence that the child had genital herpes was
relevant since it tended to prove that the child had engaged in sexual activities.
Thus, Gaffney’s counsel was not deficient for failing to move in limine to prevent
introduction of this evidence.
Since Gaffney’s claims concerning ineffective assistance of counsel
are conclusively refuted by reference to the record alone, the trial court did not err
by denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59
S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted) (“A hearing is required if there is a
material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively
proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.”). Further, with respect to
Gaffney’s motions for appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis,
RCr 11.42 provides for the appointment of counsel “[i]f the answer raises a
material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record[.]” RCr
11.42(5). If the trial court determines that “an evidentiary hearing is not required,
counsel need not be appointed, ‘because appointed counsel would [be] confined to
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the record.’” Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 453 (quoting Hemphill v. Commonwealth, 448
S.W.2d 60, 63 (Ky. 1969)). In this case, since the trial court properly determined
that Gaffney’s allegations of error were conclusively refuted on the face of the
record, an evidentiary hearing was not required and thus the court did not err by
denying Gaffney’s motions for appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma
pauperis.
The order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Carter Gaffney, Pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K. R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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