PUCKETT (LEON) VS. PUCKETT (NOW ROBINSON) (STEPHANIE)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001722-ME
LEON PUCKETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-502288
STEPHANIE PUCKETT
(NOW ROBINSON)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Leon Puckett (Leon) appeals, pro se, from an order of the
Jefferson Family Court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
Leon and Stephanie Puckett, now Stephanie Robinson (Stephanie),
were divorced on March 11, 1994. There was one child born of the marriage,
Jessica. On March 11, 1994, the parties entered into a Marital Settlement
Agreement (the separation agreement), which was incorporated in their divorce
decree. Under the separation agreement, Leon agreed to “pay one-half of the cost
of all of [Jessica’s] new school clothes as reasonably determined by [Stephanie].”
This obligation continued until Jessica reached the age of majority, and for up to
one year beyond the age of majority provided that Jessica was still a full-time high
school student. Additionally, Leon agreed to pay “100% of the cost of [Jessica’s]
college books and parking while [Jessica] is in college, including both
undergraduate and graduate school.”
On June 20, 2007, Stephanie filed a motion seeking reimbursement
for Jessica’s clothing expenses for the “past ten to twelve years,” and a hearing was
held in the Jefferson Family Court on October 19, 2007. At the time of the
hearing, Jessica was seventeen years old. On October 25, 2007, the family court
entered a judgment against Leon in the amount of $1,375.00 for reimbursement of
Jessica’s school clothing for the past ten years with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of judgment until paid.
On June 23, 2009, Stephanie filed another motion in the Jefferson
Family Court to have Leon pay for Jessica’s college books and parking and for an
order requiring Leon to pay the October 25, 2007, judgment. A hearing was held
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on August 11, 2009. At the time of this hearing, Jessica was nineteen years old
and was entering her sophomore year of college at Jefferson Community and
Technical School (JCTS). The family court entered an order on August 21, 2009.
In its order, the family court made findings which we summarize as
follows. The trial court noted that at the time of the hearing, Jessica had already
attended JCTS for the Fall 2008, Spring 2009, and Summer 2009 semesters and
was registered for the Fall 2009 semester. She had recently purchased books for
the Fall 2009 semester and paid the $35.00 fee for her annual parking pass at
JCTS. Jessica received need and merit based financial aid in the form of grants
and scholarships, which covered her tuition and expenses. The family court also
noted that Jessica has other expenses associated with her college education, such as
transportation, computer expenses, food, and clothing.
Leon paid for Jessica’s college books for the Fall 2008 semester and
the parking expense for the 2008-2009 school year. However, Leon did not pay
for Jessica’s book expenses for the Spring 2009 and Summer 2009 semesters. For
the Spring 2009 and Summer 2009 semesters, Jessica incurred book expenses of
$427.70 and $216.25, respectively.
The family court granted Stephanie’s motion for Leon to pay for
Jessica’s college books and parking and entered a judgment against Leon in the
amount of $643.95 for books for the Spring 2009 and Summer 2009 semesters.
Additionally, the family court ordered Leon to reimburse Jessica for her future
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book and parking expenses within 30 days after receiving documentation and proof
of payment from Stephanie for those expenses.
With respect to the October 25, 2007, judgment against Leon in the
amount of $1,375.00 plus interest for his nonpayment of Jessica’s clothing
expenses, the family court noted that Leon had only paid Stephanie $400 since the
entry of that order. With interest, the family court concluded that the current
balance on the judgment was $1,238.66. The family court ordered Leon to pay a
sum of $400.00 per year on the judgment on or before September 30 of every year
with interest to accrue as previously ordered. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The terms of a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce
decree “are enforceable as contract terms.” Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
403.180(5). The interpretation and construction of an incorporated separation
agreement are questions of law for the courts and are subject to de novo review.
Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656 (Ky. App. 2003). Furthermore, findings of fact
will “not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01; see also Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793,
796 (Ky. App. 2007).
ANALYSIS
At the outset, we note that Leon’s briefs fail to provide any citations
to authority. If a party does not cite to any authority for an argument, we are not
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required to address his arguments. See CR 76.12; Cherry v. Augustus, 245 S.W.3d
766, 781 (Ky. App. 2006). Nevertheless, because of the leniency afforded pro se
litigants, we will address what we believe to be the merits of Leon’s appeal. See
Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1983).
It appears that Leon first argues that the family court erred when it
concluded that he was required to pay for Jessica’s college books and parking pass
pursuant to the separation agreement. Specifically, Leon contends that he should
not be responsible for the payment of Jessica’s college books and parking pass
because Jessica was receiving grants and scholarship money that covered these
expenses. We disagree.
KRS 403.180(5) provides that the terms of a separation agreement
“set forth in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement
of a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms.”
(Emphasis added). As noted above, the separation agreement provides that Leon is
to pay “100% of the cost of [Jessica’s] college books and parking while [Jessica] is
in college, including both undergraduate and graduate school.” Leon argues that
he is only required to pay for Jessica’s college books and parking if these expenses
are not already covered.
However, we believe that Leon has erroneously interpreted the above
provision of the settlement agreement. By its plain terms, Leon is to pay 100% of
the cost of Jessica’s college books and parking. The settlement agreement does not
state that he has to pay for these expenses unless Jessica receives scholarships,
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grants, or some other form of financial assistance. Thus, under the clear and
unambiguous terms of the separation agreement, Leon is required to pay for
Jessica’s college books and parking.
Furthermore, as correctly noted by the family court, the scholarship
and grants Jessica received covered her tuition and expenses. The trial court noted
that Jessica has other expenses associated with her college education, such as
transportation, computer expenses, food, and clothing. Thus, while Jessica may be
receiving financial aid in the form of grants and scholarships, she has other
expenses besides her books and parking pass to which she can apply the money she
receives from her financial aid. Accordingly, the family court did not err in
enforcing the provision in the separation agreement requiring Leon to pay for
Jessica’s college books and parking.
It also appears that Leon is arguing that the family court erred in
finding that the separation agreement obligates him to pay for Jessica’s
transportation, computer expenses, food, and clothing. We agree that the
separation agreement does not include a provision requiring Leon to pay for these
expenses. However, a review of the family court’s order reflects that it did not
conclude that the separation agreement required him to pay for these expenses.
Instead, the family court noted that Jessica has other expenses associated with her
college education, such as transportation, computer expenses, food, and clothing.
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
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Leon further argues that at the hearing held on August 11, 2009,
Stephanie presented Jessica as a witness even though Jessica was not sworn in as a
witness. Leon also contends that his counsel did not have an opportunity to
question Jessica. A review of that hearing reflects that while Jessica was present at
the hearing, she was not a witness. Thus, this argument is also without merit.
Finally, although it is unclear from his brief, it appears that Leon
argues that in its order entered on October 25, 2007, the family court incorrectly
ordered Leon to reimburse Stephanie for half of the cost of Jessica’s school clothes
from the past ten years. However, Leon did not file a motion to alter, amend or
vacate this judgment within ten days as required by CR 59.05. Nor did he file a
notice of appeal of this judgment within thirty days of its entry as required by CR
73.02(1)(a). Accordingly, his appeal from the October 25, 2007, order is not
properly before this Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Jefferson Family
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leon Puckett, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephanie Robinson, Pro Se
Louisville, Kentucky
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