AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES VS. NOT BE PUBLISHED ALVAREZ (BENJAMIN A.)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001615-MR
AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-01975
BENJAMIN A. ALVAREZ
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
NICKELL, JUDGE: AmeriCredit Financial Services has appealed from the
Hardin Circuit Court’s August 7, 2009, findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment which enforced a settlement agreement between AmeriCredit and
Benjamin A. Alvarez. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
Initially, we note Alvarez has not filed a brief in this Court. When an
appellee fails to file a brief, CR1 76.12(8)(c) provides three possible avenues of
action for the reviewing court:
If the appellee’s brief has not been filed within the time
allowed, the court may: (i) accept the appellant’s
statement of the facts and issues as correct; (ii) reverse
the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to
sustain such action; or (iii) regard the appellee’s failure
as a confession of error and reverse the judgment without
considering the merits of the case.
“The decision as to how to proceed in imposing such penalties is a matter
committed to our discretion.” Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App.
2008) (citing Kupper v. Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy, 666 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Ky.
1983); Flag Drilling Co., Inc. v. Erco, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Ky. App.
2005)). After reviewing AmeriCredit’s brief and the record on appeal, we do not
believe reversal is mandated solely because of Alvarez’s failure to respond; so we
will address the merits of AmeriCredit’s arguments. However, as permitted by CR
76.12(8)(c)(i), we shall accept AmeriCredit’s statement of the facts and issues as
correct.
Alvarez purchased a vehicle on December 28, 2000, and AmeriCredit
provided financing for the purchase. Alvarez defaulted on his payments and
AmeriCredit repossessed the vehicle. The car was sold at auction and a deficiency
balance remained on Alvarez’s account in the amount of $10,241.82, plus interest
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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on that sum. Alvarez has not contested the repossession, the sale of the vehicle,
nor the amount of the deficiency balance.
AmeriCredit referred the account to a collection agency, Insurex, Inc.
Alvarez negotiated with Insurex to settle the account for one-half of the
outstanding balance of $11,045.72. Alvarez was to make two payments in the
amount of $2,761.43 each to retire the balance due. The first payment was due on
December 15, 2005, and the second on January 15, 2006. Upon payment of these
sums, AmeriCredit agreed to adjust the account to reflect it had been paid in full.
Contrary to the agreement, Alvarez did not tender the first payment
until March 22, 2006. The second installment was not tendered until July 9, 2007,
after Alvarez had been contacted by AmeriCredit’s attorneys regarding the
severely overdue payment. Alvarez included a notation of “final payment” on the
second check. AmeriCredit cashed both checks and applied the sums to Alvarez’s
account. AmeriCredit filed suit on September 22, 2007, seeking to collect the
balance due on the original indebtedness, requesting Alvarez be credited with the
payments made to date, and seeking its attorneys fees. Alvarez answered the suit
alleging a settlement of the debt and an accord and satisfaction. He sought
dismissal of the suit.
The case proceeded to a bench trial. Immediately prior to the start of
the trial, the parties stipulated to most of the facts recited above. They also agreed
the balance due on the original account was $6,612.70. Numerous documents were
offered as joint exhibits for consideration by the trial court. Alvarez was the only
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person to testify. He admitted he had not timely paid the sums due under the
settlement agreement nor had he paid the full amount of the original indebtedness.
AmeriCredit argued it was entitled to full payment of the deficiency balance
because Alvarez had breached the terms of the settlement agreement, he was not
entitled to assert a defense pursuant to an alleged accord and satisfaction because it
had not accepted the second check as a final payment as evidenced by its
subsequent letters to Alvarez, and he had not proven payment in full of his debt.
Alvarez contended that he had fully complied with the substantive terms of the
settlement agreement by making the two payments and thus, there was an accord
and satisfaction. He argued his failure to make the payments on the time schedule
set forth in the agreement was insignificant and AmeriCredit’s acceptance of the
second check—conspicuously containing the notation “final payment”—prohibited
further collection actions, whether under the terms of the new agreement or accord
and satisfaction.
The trial court found Alvarez had breached the terms of the settlement
agreement by not timely making the required payments. However, the trial court
believed the amount of Alvarez’s debt was in dispute based on variances contained
in various communications from AmeriCredit to Alvarez, the amount listed in the
settlement agreement, and the amount claimed in the complaint. Further, it
believed the “final payment” notation on the second check and AmeriCredit’s
acceptance of the tendered payment was sufficient to prove an accord and
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satisfaction pursuant to KRS2 355.3-311. The trial court discounted AmeriCredit’s
argument that Alvarez had acted in bad faith and such actions should be a bar to
his assertion of the defense of accord and satisfaction. Ultimately, the trial court
discharged the remaining balance on Alvarez’s account, but granted AmeriCredit
interest on the amounts due under the settlement agreement from their due dates to
the dates they were actually paid. AmeriCredit was also awarded its court costs.
This appeal followed.
AmeriCredit contends the trial court erred in finding Alvarez was
entitled to enforcement of the settlement agreement in spite of his admitted breach
of its terms. Further, AmeriCredit argues the trial court erred in finding Alvarez’s
delinquent payments constituted an accord and satisfaction of the debt. We agree.
It is undisputed that Alvarez failed to timely make the payments due
under the settlement agreement. His first payment was three months late and the
second was more than eighteen months late. The trial court ruled that since the
settlement agreement failed to explicitly state that “time is of the essence” Alvarez
should not be penalized because of his tardy payments. However, an intention to
make time of the essence may be implied from the words of a contract. Farmers
Bank & Trust Co. of Georgetown, Kentucky v. Willmott Hardwoods, Inc., 171
S.W.3d 4, 9 (Ky. 2005). “Whether time is of the essence of the contract ‘is viewed
from the standpoint of the parties as gathered from the contract involved, under the
rule that unless the intention to make time of the essence is evidenced by
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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expression, or implication, it may not be so regarded.’” Id. at 8 (citing Distillery
Rectifying & Wine Workers International Union of America v. Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp., 308 Ky. 380, 213 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (1948)).
Here, the settlement agreement provided express due dates for the two
payments Alvarez was to make. Although setting specified due dates does not
necessarily mean that time is of the essence, Strother v. Miller, 124 S.W. 358
(1910), clearly the facts of this case make it apparent that the parties intended that
the settlement agreement would be ineffectual if not timely performed. Prompt
payment was the sole consideration which could support the formation of a new
contract or entry into the settlement agreement. No evidence to the contrary was
presented to the trial court.
Further, even if time were not of the essence, Alvarez would be
allowed a “reasonable period” to tender the amounts due, and it cannot be said that
making the second required payment more than a year and a half after its due date
was reasonable. See Carhartt Holding Co. v. Mitchell, 261 Ky. 297, 87 S.W.2d
360 (1935). Alvarez was clearly not in compliance with the terms of the settlement
agreement. As the trial court correctly noted, “AmeriCredit did not get what it
bargained for in permitting timely partial payment as a full satisfaction of the
debt.” To hold otherwise would be to allow Alvarez to selectively enforce the
terms of the settlement agreement—getting the benefit of paying the lowered
negotiated amount while ignoring the due dates for the payments. Such selective
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enforcement is unacceptable. The trial court erred in not so finding and the
judgment must be reversed.
Although we believe the trial court incorrectly enforced the settlement
agreement based on Alvarez’s breach of its terms, we must also comment on the
trial court’s finding that Alvarez proved an accord and satisfaction. To be entitled
to the defense of accord and satisfaction, a debtor must prove: (1) he tendered an
instrument in full satisfaction of a claim in good faith; (2) the amount of the claim
was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute; and (3) the creditor obtained
payment of the tendered instrument. KRS 355.3-311(1). Thus, existence of a
disputed amount of a debt is a necessary requirement.
Alvarez has never contested the amount due to AmeriCredit.
Although differing amounts due were reflected on various pieces of
correspondence issued by AmeriCredit, the trial court was informed that these
discrepancies occurred due to interest calculations, refunds of prepaid amounts for
an extended warranty Alvarez purchased, and credits for amounts paid. Thus, it
cannot reasonably be concluded there was a bona fide dispute over the amounts
due and the trial court erred in so finding. Further,
[t]he general rule is where a debt is liquidated and
undisputed, the payment of a sum less than the amount of
the debt, even though accompanied with a statement that
it is in full, does not operate to defeat the creditor from
collecting the balance of his debt for the reason that there
is no consideration for the surrender of the unpaid
portion.
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McCreary County v. Bybee, 301 Ky. 794, 193 S.W.2d 423, 424 (1946) (citing
Shawnee Sanitary Milk Company v. Fulkerson’s G. & M. Shop, 258 Ky. 639, 79
S.W.2d 229 (1935); Lewis v. Browning, 223 Ky. 771, 4 S.W.2d 734 (1928)).
Therefore, Alvarez’s notation of “final payment” on his second check had no legal
significance. There was no accord and satisfaction and Alvarez did not prove he
had paid his debt.
AmeriCredit was entitled to a judgment for the full amount of the
outstanding balance owed and the trial court erred in not so finding. Therefore, the
judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is reversed and this matter is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS BY SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent as I am
persuaded that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction applies in this case to bar
AmeriCredit Financial Services from pursuing any additional collection action
against Mr. Alvarez.
The state of Kentucky law on accord and satisfaction is best stated in
Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. Mark West Hydrocarbon Inc., 588 UCC Rep. Serv.2d
799, 2005 WL 1378841 at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 9, 2005):
Once the claimant accepts payment that satisfies [KRS] §
355,3-311’s four-part test and fails to tender back
payment within 90 days, a valid accord and satisfaction
occurs, which thereafter constitutes a complete defense
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to any attempt by the claimant enforce its former claims
against the former obligor.
Citing Morgan v. Crawford, 106 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. App. 2003). (Emphases added.)
Incorporating the elements of KRS § 355.3-311, the Morgan court
enumerated the following four factors to test whether or not accord and satisfaction
had occurred: 1) payment was tendered in good faith in full satisfaction of the
claim; 2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or the subject of a bona fide
dispute; 3) the plaintiff obtained payment of the instrument; and 4) the instrument
or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to
the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
In the case before us, the majority found that the four factors were not
satisfied because the amount was not the subject of a bona fide dispute.
AmeriCredit had referred the account to a collection agency, Insurex, which
negotiated a settlement with Alvarez on behalf of AmeriCredit. Although both of
the installment payments were tendered late, AmeriCredit nevertheless accepted
them.
When the second and last payment was late in coming, AmeriCredit
contacted Alvarez directly through its attorneys in order to compel payment of the
balance still owed on the original contract, thus keeping alive the bona fide
dispute.3 Upon learning that he might file for bankruptcy in lieu of making
payment, AmeriCredit (presumably upon advice of counsel, who had become
involved on behalf of AmeriCredit) agreed to accept the second payment late.
3
The lower court made a finding that a disputed amount did exist.
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Alvarez clearly inscribed the notation “final payment” on the face of
the check. Nonetheless, AmeriCredit accepted and negotiated the check.
Although AmeriCredit subsequently sent letters to Alvarez seeking more money, it
never tendered repayment of the amount of the second check pursuant to KRS
355.3-11(3)(b), which requires a claimant to make repayment in order to keep his
claim viable. In overruling previous case law that allowed a claimant to make a
verbal protest upon a check and thus to keep a claim viable, Morgan instead held
that accepting a check “under protest” did not suffice and that repayment within
ninety days was required in order to defeat the application of accord and
satisfaction.
In Ross, supra, this Court discussed and summarized the evolution of
this concept in a manner pertinent to the case before us:
Finally, the Court notes . . . that Kentucky law no longer
permits a claimant to avoid an accord and satisfaction by
marking “under protest” on the tendered payment.
****
Once the claimant accepts a payment that satisfies §
355.3-311’s four part test and fails to tender back
payment within 90 days, a valid accord and satisfaction
occurs, which thereafter constitutes a complete defense to
any attempt by the claimant to enforce its former claims
against the former obligor.
As AmeriCredit clearly tried to “have it both ways” in derogation of
Morgan and the pertinent statute, its claim against Alvarez must fail.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John R. Tarter
Louisville, Kentucky
No brief filed.
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