PETRO (JOSEPH) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 6, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001570-MR
JOSEPH PETRO
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLINTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00080
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
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BEFORE: COMBS, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Joseph Petro appeals as a matter of right from a judgment of
the Clinton Circuit Court sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment for felony
theft by unlawful taking. After careful review, we reverse.
On February 4, 2008, Freddie Wilson was working on a job site at
David Neal’s home. As Wilson was walking out of the residence, he noticed an
individual hooking up a trailer to a red Ford Ranger pickup truck. Wilson testified
that he said “hey” to the individual and that the individual looked at him. Wilson
otherwise observed the individual for a few moments from approximately thirty
(30) to thirty-five (35) feet away as the individual dropped the trailer on the hitch
and drove away.
Approximately an hour later, Steve Bridgeman, Wilson’s employer,
returned to the job site, and Wilson told Bridgeman what had happened. Wilson
told Bridgeman that the man who took the trailer was short and slim with a goatee
and burr haircut. Wilson stated that the man got into a red Ford Ranger pickup
truck and drove away with the trailer attached. Bridgeman then called Neal to
determine whether anyone had permission to take his trailer. Neal indicated that
he did not give anyone permission to take his trailer.
After learning that his trailer was stolen, Neal filed a police report.
Clinton County Sheriff Rick Riddle took Bridgeman’s statement, but never spoke
to Wilson, who observed the crime occur. Sheriff Riddle did not write anything
down or make a written report after speaking with Bridgeman. Bridgeman
apparently gave Sheriff Riddle an inaccurate description of the truck, telling him
that the person who stole the trailer was driving a white pickup truck with a blue
stripe, when in fact Wilson had told Bridgeman it was red. There is nothing to
indicate that Sheriff Riddle ever had a physical description of the suspect who stole
the trailer, because he never spoke with Wilson.
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Four days later, an accident occurred close to Neal’s residence
involving a white pickup truck with a blue stripe. Because Sheriff Riddle thought
the vehicle of the individual who stole the trailer was a white pickup with a blue
stripe, he called Wilson to the scene to determine if this was the same truck as the
one used in the theft of the trailer.
At the scene, Wilson identified the white pickup as the truck he had
seen take the trailer from the residence; however, Wilson later again reaffirmed at
trial that the truck at the scene of the theft was a red Ford Ranger pickup truck.
Sheriff Riddle then took Wilson to the hospital and conducted a show up
identification of Petro, who was involved in the accident outside Neal’s residence.
Wilson identified Petro as the person he observed stealing the trailer.
Petro was indicted for theft by unlawful taking or disposition ($300.00
or more). On June 29, 2009, Petro filed a motion in limine to suppress the show up
identification. After hearing the above testimony, the trial court denied the motion
to suppress, and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, Wilson testified to the above
events. He stated that he was working at Neal’s residence and went outside to cut
a piece of trim and that is when he observed the theft of the trailer taking place. He
described that he was somewhat distracted when he first observed the person
hooking up the trailer and that he did not observe him for an extended period of
time. On cross examination and re-direct, Wilson again stated that the truck he
observed stealing the trailer was a red Ford Ranger pickup truck. The jury found
Petro guilty of theft by unlawful taking. This appeal now follows.
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Show ups are inherently suspect and “should be accepted with
caution.” Myers v. Commonwealth, 499 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Ky. 1973). Because
they are a “one-on-one presentation of the suspect to the eyewitness” often
attendant with the added impression that law enforcement believes the suspect to
be criminal, “a show up is not a generally approved method of securing an
identification.” Prof. Leslie Abramson, 9 Ky. Prac., Crim. Pract. & Proc. § 20:23
(2009-2010). This is not to say that show ups do not have a place in law
enforcement. To the contrary, show ups are helpful when used immediately after
the crime to establish probable cause or to clear a suspect. See Savage v.
Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1996). Although show ups are
allowable for law enforcement purposes when conducted close in time to the
crime, unnecessary show ups “are condemned for the further reason that the
increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.” See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).
To determine whether an identification should be suppressed because
it was unacceptably tainted by a show up, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199; Savage, 920 S.W.2d at 513. To guide in this
determination, the United States Supreme Court has enunciated the following
factors to consider: the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect, the witness’
degree of attention, the accuracy of prior descriptions, the level of certainty at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil, 409
U.S. at 199-200. Kentucky courts also consider whether other evidence “tends to
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corroborate the witness’ identification.” St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d
510, 551 (Ky. 2004).
In the instant case, we agree with Petro that the totality of these
circumstances mandates suppression. Wilson testified that he was preoccupied
with the job he was doing when he first noticed the person stealing the trailer.
Wilson also testified that he saw the suspect for a few seconds from approximately
thirty feet away. While it does appear that Wilson was fairly certain that Petro was
the person who stole the trailer when he identified him at the hospital, there is no
evidence of any other prior descriptions given to the authorities by Wilson
matching Petro’s appearance. Thus, there is no accuracy of prior descriptions to
compare with this description, and this factor does not give any credence to the fact
that the show up identification was proper or improper.
Most importantly, four days had passed before the show up
identification took place. There was no other evidence tying Petro to the crime,
and the record offers no explanation for why a regular lineup of suspects was not
used in this case. Although Petro was treated at the hospital for injuries sustained
in the motor vehicle accident, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that
Petro was a flight risk or was found fleeing the location. Furthermore, there was
no other evidence identifying Petro as the suspect. Given these circumstances and
the nature of this crime, we simply cannot say that the show up identification in
this case was reasonable or necessary under the circumstances, and thus the
subsequent conviction was in error.
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Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered by the Clinton Circuit Court on August 17, 2009.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jason M. Nemes
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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