GOODMAN (TERRY L.) VS. CRAIG (MELISSA L.)
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001565-ME
TERRY L. GOODMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DONNA L. DELAHANTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 91-FP-005828
MELISSA L. CRAIG
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Terry L. Goodman appeals from a denial of his motion to
terminate child support. We agree with the Jefferson Family Court that, although
the paternity judgment adjudging Terry to be the child’s natural father was entered
in Kentucky, Terry waived any right to contest the jurisdiction of the Indiana court
when he failed to object to the transfer of the case and entered his appearance in
the Indiana court.
In 1989, Melissa Craig and Terry were Kentucky residents and
conceived a child. After the child was born in Jefferson County, Kentucky,
Melissa filed a complaint to establish paternity and child support pursuant to KRS
406.021(1). Terry admitted paternity and, in August 1995, an Agreed Paternity
Judgment was entered which ordered him to pay $603 per month for child support.
In November 1995, Melissa and the child moved to Indiana where they continue to
reside while Terry continues as a Kentucky resident.
In 1996, Melissa filed a pro se “Petition Pursuant to the Uniform
Child Custody Act to Transfer Case to Indiana.” On April 8, 1996, even though
there was no case in Indiana, an order was entered by the Jefferson Family Court
transferring the case to the child’s county of residence in Indiana pursuant to the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
The Indiana chronological case summary reveals that the first activity
occurred in February 1997, when over a year after the transfer order was entered, a
petition was filed to change the child’s name. In March 1997, Susan L. Williams
entered an appearance in the Indiana court as counsel for Terry who objected to the
name change. In the fall of 1997, Terry appeared for a hearing on Melissa’s
petition for modification of support which was filed in the name change litigation.
In 1998, an agreed order was entered providing that Melissa provide health
insurance for the child. In 2003, a mediated agreement was entered increasing
Terry’s child support obligation to $220 per week. Notably, Terry did not object to
the transfer of the case to Indiana or, at any time, present a jurisdictional challenge
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to the Indiana court or present any challenge that the name change litigation did
not confer subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support.
Terry did not seek to invoke the jurisdiction of Kentucky until June
26, 2009, when he filed a motion to terminate his child support obligation on the
basis that the child had attained the age of eighteen and had graduated from high
school. KRS 403.212(3). The significance of whether Kentucky or Indiana has
jurisdiction over the child support matter is that, contrary to Kentucky law, Indiana
law provides for the payment of child support for three years beyond the age of
eighteen.
Seeking to avoid future child support payments, Terry argued that
Kentucky was without authority to transfer the case to Indiana and, citing the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), as adopted in KRS Chapter 407
et. seq., that Kentucky retained jurisdiction over the case because it had issued the
original support order in 1995. The family court disagreed and found that Terry
had waived any right to object to the exercise of jurisdiction by Indiana and denied
his motion.
Since 1998, jurisdiction to determine child support matters has been
governed by KRS Chapter 407 et seq., modeled after the UIFSA.1 Based on the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the Jefferson Family Court
found that Indiana was the child’s home state and transferred the case to Indiana.
Terry contends, and he may be correct, that Kentucky had no authority to transfer
1
Prior to the adoption of the UIFSA, Kentucky adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act.
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the case to Indiana and could only decline to exercise jurisdiction. He further
contends that the transfer was in violation of CR 79.05 and KRS 30A.080, which
require that the clerk keep and maintain the original record.
Essentially, Terry argues that the Kentucky court erred when it
declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the child support matter and transferred
that case to Indiana. Even if there is merit to Terry’s contention, no appeal was
pursued from the transfer order.
For thirteen years after entry of the transfer order, Terry appeared and
voluntarily participated in the Indiana proceedings and paid child support pursuant
to the Indiana support orders. It is a basic tenant of the law that judicial error be
seasonably corrected. If the court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter, if erroneous, it is voidable, not void. Dix v. Dix, 310 Ky. 818, 222 S.W.2d
839, 842 (1949). The distinction between a void judicial act and one that is merely
voidable has been explained as follows:
Were it held that a court had ‘jurisdiction’ to render only
correct decisions, then, each time it made an erroneous
ruling * * * the court would be without jurisdiction, and
the ruling itself void. Such is not the law, and it matters
not what may be the particular question presented for
adjudication, whether it relates to the jurisdiction of the
court itself, or affects the substantive rights of the parties
litigating; it cannot be held that the ruling or decision
itself is without jurisdiction, or is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. The decision may be erroneous, but it
cannot be held to be void for want of jurisdiction.
Id. at 842. (quoting Covington Trust Co. v. Owens, 278 Ky. 695, 129 S.W.2d 186
(1939)).
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The Jefferson Family Court had personal jurisdiction over the parties
and the authority to consider matters relating to the child. It was within its
authority to either assert its jurisdiction or defer to another state’s jurisdiction;
therefore, whether it had authority to issue a transfer order, is an issue that should
have been presented in a timely appeal.
Despite his failure to object to the transfer order, or appeal the order,
and his repeated appearances in the Indiana court where he sought and obtained
affirmative relief, Terry argues that Kentucky has continuous and exclusive
jurisdiction to modify its own judgment pursuant to the UIFSA.
It has been uniformly held that if the obligor or obligee remains a
resident of the issuing state and no written consent is filed as required by statute,
the issuing state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify its support
decree. Koerner v. Koerner, 270 S.W.3d 413 (Ky.App. 2008). As Terry points
out, he continues to be a Kentucky resident and neither party filed a written
consent to modify the support order. KRS 407.5611. Courts in jurisdictions that
have addressed whether the parties can nullify the written consent requirement by
their actions have generally held that a written consent is required. See Stone v.
Davis, 148 Cal.App.4th 596, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 833 (2007). However, this issue is not
directly before this Court because the case was transferred and jurisdiction
assumed by Indiana prior to the enactment of the UIFSA when there was no
requirement that a written consent be filed.
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A similar fact situation confronted the court in Hoehn v. Hoehn, 716
N.E.2d 479 (Ind. 1999). Indiana asserted jurisdiction over a Georgia child support
order after the wife moved to Indiana and while the husband remained a Georgia
resident. Eight years after the parties filed joint petitions to modify the child
support in Indiana, the husband filed a declaratory judgment action in Georgia
seeking to have his support obligation terminated when the child turned eighteen.
Id. at 482. Indiana held that the husband’s voluntary participation in the Indiana
proceedings precluded him from challenging Indiana’s jurisdiction and further
rejected his contentions based on the UIFSA. The court properly reasoned that
once the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of Indiana and that state issued a
modified child support order, it then became the state of exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction. Id. at 483.
We agree with the analysis and, in this case, conclude that Indiana
now has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and Kentucky’s jurisdiction to modify
an order entered in Indiana and under that state’s law is confined to the limitations
set forth in KRS 407.5205(2). The parties voluntarily appeared in Indiana and that
state has issued orders modifying the Kentucky child support order.
Unambiguously, the statute states in part:
(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order
consistent with the law of this state may not exercise its
continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order
has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant
to a law substantially similar to KRS 407.5101 to
407.5902.
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(3) If a child support order of this state is modified by a
tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially
similar to KRS 407.5101 to 407.5902, a tribunal of this
state loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with
regard to prospective enforcement of the order issued in
this state, and may only:
(a) Enforce the order that was modified as to amounts
accruing before the modification;
(b) Enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and
(c) Provide other appropriate relief for violations of that
order which occurred before the effective date of the
modification.
(4) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which
has issued a child support order pursuant to a law
substantially similar to KRS 407.5101 to 407.5902.
Our decision today is supported by the plain meaning of the UIFSA
and furthers the purpose of the UIFSA to eliminate multiple and inconsistent
support orders by having only one controlling order in effect at any one time.
Koerner, 270 S.W.3d at 415.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson Family Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Michael T. Connelly
Louisville, Kentucky
Phyllis Deeb
Louisville, Kentucky
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