HAMILTON (JAMES GREGORY) VS. MCKENZIE (MARSHA LYNN)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001350-MR
and
NO. 2009-CA-001509-MR
JAMES GREGORY HAMILTON
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL SPARKS, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00057
MARSHA LYNN MCKENZIE
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant/Cross-Appellee, James Gregory Hamilton, appeals
from an order of the Johnson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Marsha Lynn McKenzie.
In March 1996, Hamilton purchased a tract of land in Johnson
County, Kentucky, that was adjacent to land owned by McKenzie. Shortly
thereafter a dispute between the parties arose over the location of the boundary line
dividing the properties. The dispute culminated in an October 1996 incident
wherein Hamilton allegedly threatened McKenzie’s mother, Helen McKenzie, with
a weed eater. The McKenzies sought the advice of the Johnson County Attorney,
and Hamilton was charged with menacing (Helen McKenzie being the
complaining witness1), as well as third-degree criminal trespass and second-degree
criminal mischief (Marsha McKenzie being the complaining witness).
Subsequently, in December 1996, Hamilton filed a civil action in the
Johnson Circuit Court alleging that McKenzie had trespassed on his property,
prevented him from developing the land, and had caused him to lose revenue. On
January 16, 1997, the trespassing and criminal mischief charges were dismissed
“on condition Defendant is to have no contact with complaining witness and is to
resolve the property dispute between the parties in a peaceful manner in
accordance with the terms of any circuit court order.”
The civil litigation took some time to resolve. Initially, a judgment
was entered on behalf of McKenzie. However, a panel of this Court on appeal
reversed and remanded the matter without consideration of the merits after
determining that an appearance of impropriety existed because the trial
commissioner shared office space with McKenzie’s attorney. On remand, a special
1
The menacing charge was subsequently dismissed upon the motion of the prosecutor and those
facts are not at issue herein.
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trial commissioner entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of
Hamilton. On May 13, 2004, the trial court adopted the trial commissioner’s
recommendations and entered judgment accordingly. No appeal was taken from
that decision.
On February 8, 2005, Hamilton filed a second civil action against
McKenzie in the Johnson Circuit Court asserting claims for trespass, wrongful
civil proceeding, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, libel and slander. In
November 2006, the trial court denied McKenzie’s motion for summary judgment
based upon a statute of limitations defense. However, several days before the
scheduled trial in the matter, the trial court granted McKenzie’s substantive motion
for summary judgment on all issues. Hamilton thereafter appealed to this Court as
a matter of law. McKenzie has also cross-appealed the trial court’s November
2006 denial of her first motion for summary judgment.
On appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the
appellate court must determine “whether the trial court correctly found that there
were no genuine issues of any material fact and that the moving party was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996); CR 56.03. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S .W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Summary judgment is proper where the movant shows that the adverse party could
not prevail under any circumstances. Id. Because summary judgment involves no
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fact finding, this Court will review the trial court's decision de novo. 3D
Enterprises Contracting Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metro. Sewer
Dist., 174 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Ky. 2005).
Hamilton first argues on appeal that summary judgment was improper
on his claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Hamilton contends
that there exist genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether McKenzie
acted with malice and in bad faith by filing the 1996 criminal charges against him.
We disagree.
Malicious prosecution addresses the wrongful use of criminal
proceedings without probable cause. The elements of the tort are as follows:
(a) The institution or continuation of a prior judicial
proceeding;
(b) By, or at the instance of, the person sought to be
charged;
(c) The termination of the prior criminal proceeding in
the Plaintiff’s favor;
(d) Malice in the institution of such proceedings;
(e) Want or lack or probable cause for the proceeding;
(f) The suffering of damage as a result of the proceeding.
Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky. 1981). Hamilton contends that
McKenzie had no well-founded belief that the disputed property was hers and the
fact that she filed criminal charges against him solely to seize the property for her
own use was evidence that she acted with malice.
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In finding that Hamilton could not prevail as a matter of law on his
malicious prosecution claim, the trial court first noted that Hamilton failed to
demonstrate that the prior criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor. Rather,
the dismissal of the criminal charges was conditioned upon Hamilton’s agreement
to have no contact with McKenzie and to resolve the dispute in the civil action.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that because Hamilton had “to give up
something,” the criminal matter was not terminated in his favor. See Broaddus v.
Campbell, 911 S.W.2d 281 (Ky. App. 1995).
Further, Hamilton fails to set forth any specific evidence that
McKenzie acted with malice other than his broad assertion that she was trying to
take his property from him without any basis to do so. However, the record clearly
belies such an assertion. The first judgment herein established the boundary in
favor of McKenzie. Although that judgment was subsequently reversed, it was not
in any manner related to the merits of the action. Moreover, upon remand, the
special trial commissioner noted in his report, “After having reviewed the files,
drawings and testimony of the surveyors, I do believe that this group can create
different interpretations from the same set of data that would rival any group of
attorneys.” Clearly, there was a legitimate dispute as to the boundary between the
parties’ properties, and McKenzie reasonably believed that Hamilton had
encroached on her property. The subsequent judgment in favor of Hamilton does
not somehow render McKenzie’s actions malicious. Accordingly, the trial court
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properly found that Hamilton could not, as a matter of law, prevail on his
malicious prosecution claim.
There is likewise no evidence in the record herein to establish a cause
of action for abuse of process, which consists of “[t]he employment of a legal
process for some other purpose than that which it was intended by the law to
effect.” Raine, 621 S.W.2d at 902. To prevail on such a claim a plaintiff must
show (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Bonnie Brass Farms, Inc. v.
Robinson, 598 S.W.2d 765 (1980).
Hamilton maintains that McKenzie’s ulterior purpose in pursuing the
criminal charges was simply to gain control of the disputed property. However, as
observed by the trial court,
[T]he record contains no evidence that Ms. McKenzie
attempted to use the criminal proceeding against Mr.
Hamilton outside the criminal proceeding. In other
words, Ms. McKenzie made no offers, threats, or
inducements to Mr. Hamilton to drop the criminal
proceeding in exchange for Mr. Hamilton’s surrender of
the property at issue. To the contrary, the parties were in
agreement that the criminal case would be dismissed, and
the parties permitted to resolve their differences in the
civil action.
Apparently, Hamilton believes that because the disputed property was ultimately
found to have not belonged to McKenzie, her act of bringing the criminal charges
was abuse of process. Such is simply not the standard and the trial court properly
found that Hamilton could not prevail on this claim as a matter of law.
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Hamilton next argues that the trial court erred in finding that he failed
to produce sufficient evidence to maintain a cause of action for defamation. He
argues that a stigma attached when McKenzie wrongfully charged him with
criminal trespass in 1996, and that his reputation was damaged because of such.
Again, we must disagree.
To establish defamation, a plaintiff must show (1) defamatory
language, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) which is published, and (4) which causes
injury to reputation. Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 273
(Ky. App. 1981). The words complained of must be of such a nature that courts
can presume as a matter of law that they do tend to denigrate or disgrace the
plaintiff, or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or scorn. See Digest Pub. Co.
v. Perry Pub. Co., 284 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1955).
In granting summary judgment on this claim, the trial court
concluded:
The language complained of by Plaintiff is that contained
in the summons which was issued when the Defendant
sought the advice of the county attorney. The statements
in their entirety are “and intentionally entered upon the
premises of Marsha McKenzie and destroyed property
worth more than $500.00 by destroying a wire fence and
cutting down trees.”
Plaintiff has admitted in his discovery deposition
that in fact, he cut down a wire fence and brushed the
property in question. The alleged defamatory language
consists of the allegation that the Plaintiff “intentionally
entered upon the premises of Marsha McKenzie.”
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The complexity of the underlying civil action
which determined the boundary establishes beyond any
reasonable question that there existed a legitimate issue
as to the location of the boundary. Therefore, the Court
finds, as a matter of law, that the defendant, Marsha
McKenzie, had a good faith, but mistaken belief as to the
boundary in question, and as such, is entitled to the
protections which give rise to that good faith but
mistaken belief, as they are stated in the summons issued
by the Johnson County Attorney.
Additionally, the Plaintiff was thoroughly
questioned during the course of his discovery deposition
as to any injury to his reputation, and the Plaintiff was
unable to point out any instance by which he could
establish that his reputation had been injured. Words
which do not bear any defamatory meaning are not
actionable. [Taxpayers’ League of Bell County v. Sun
Pub. Co., 256 Ky. 37, 75 S.W.2d 564 (1934)].
Hamilton has likewise failed in this Court to produce any evidence of injury to his
reputation. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial court properly found
that Hamilton did not establish the elements of defamation and could not prevail on
that claim as a matter of law. Summary judgment was proper.
Finally, we find no merit in Hamilton’s argument that there was a
genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment on his claims for
trespass and wrongful taking, and we adopt the reasoning of the trial court herein:
[T]here is ample evidence establishing a bona fide
dispute as to the location of the boundary between the
parties, which was resolved by way of civil litigation.
The Plaintiff complained of trespass in that prior civil
action, which became final thirty (30) days after the
Court’s affirmation of the recommendations. The Court
finds, as a matter of law, when there exists a good faith
but mistaken belief as to the location of a boundary line,
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such circumstances do not give rise to a subsequent cause
of action for trespass.
There is no allegation that the Defendant, Marsha
McKenzie, attempted to occupy or go upon the property
in question once the Judgment of the Court in the prior
civil litigation became final. Any alleged trespass prior
thereto was previously adjudicated. Therefore, the Court
finds, as a matter of law, that a cause of action for
trespass may not lie under these circumstances.
We would further note that Hamilton asserts that his property was wrongfully
taken since he was denied use thereof during the pendency of the boundary
dispute. Although Hamilton contends that the conditional dismissal of the criminal
charges barred him from access or use of the disputed property, we find no
evidence of such in the record. Therefore, the trial court properly granted
summary judgment on his claims.
Because we have determined that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of McKenzie on all claims, we need not address the
merits of her cross-appeal.
The judgment of the Johnson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT:
Earl Martin McGuire
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Brian Cumbo
Inez, Kentucky
Anna S. Whites
Frankfort, Kentucky
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