SUMMERS EQUIPMENT, LLC , ET AL. VS. VFS US, LLC D/B/A VOLVO FINANCIAL SERVICES, ET AL
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001321-MR
SUMMERS EQUIPMENT, LLC AND
GEORGE P. SUMMERS III
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00236
VFS US LLC D/B/A VOLVO FINANCIAL
SERVICES, F/B/A VOLVO COMMERCIAL FINANCE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Appellants Summers Equipment, LLC, a
Kentucky limited liability company, and George P. Summers III appeal from an
order of the Floyd Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of VFS US
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
LLC, d/b/a Volvo Financial Services (“VFS”), and dismissing Appellants’
counterclaims. We affirm.
Summers Equipment, LLC, a rental equipment business owned and
operated by George P. Summers III, signed a franchise agreement with Volvo
Construction Equipment Rents, Inc., in December 2003. Thereafter, beginning in
the spring of 2004, VFS served as the lender and principal source of funding for
Summers Equipment. In connection therewith, Summers Equipment executed a
Master Loan and Security Agreement, two Promissory Notes, a separate Security
Agreement, and a Revolving Credit Loan Agreement (collectively, the “Loan
Documents”). At the same time that the Loan Documents were executed, Mr.
Summers executed a Guaranty and Subordination Agreement in which he
unconditionally guaranteed the full and timely payment, performance, and
compliance of Summers Equipment under the Loan Documents.
Under the terms of the Loan Documents, Summers Equipment granted
VFS a security interest in substantially all of the company’s rental fleet and
equipment (the “Collateral”). VFS ultimately approved credit of over $5,000,000
on behalf of Summers Equipment.
Summers Equipment subsequently defaulted on its payments to VFS
due under the Loan Documents, and VFS and Summers Equipment entered into a
written letter agreement in which VFS agreed to forbear from exercising its right to
the Collateral in exchange for Summers Equipment’s compliance with the terms of
that agreement (the “Forbearance Agreement”). The Forbearance Agreement was
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executed by both Summers Equipment, as the borrower, and Mr. Summers, as the
guarantor.
The Forbearance Agreement also included a release by Summers
Equipment and Mr. Summers of any claims against VFS. Specifically, the parties
acknowledged and agreed that:
[N]either Borrower, nor Guarantor has any claims,
defenses, set-offs or counterclaims against Lender, or,
alternatively, to the extent that any claims, defenses, setoffs or counterclaims exist, Borrower and Guarantor
hereby waive and release any and all of them in
consideration of the forbearance contained in this
Agreement.
The Forbearance Agreement further provided that it would be “governed by and
construed in accordance with the internal substantive laws of the State of North
Carolina, without regard to choice of law principles.”
Following the execution of the Forbearance Agreement, Summers
Equipment and Mr. Summers requested additional forbearance from VFS, and the
original Forbearance Agreement was amended two times, once on October 23,
2006, and again on November 30, 2006. In both cases, Summers Equipment and
Mr. Summers reaffirmed all of the conditions included in the original Forbearance
Agreement.
VFS ultimately filed suit against Appellants for breach of contract and
requested the issuance of a writ of possession to recover the Collateral in
Appellants’ possession. Appellants filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting
various claims against VFS, including fraud and misrepresentation. Appellants’
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primary assertion was that VFS had failed to provide the financing to Summers
Equipment in a timely manner, thereby crippling its business operations.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of VFS and dismissed
Appellants’ counterclaims against VFS. Appellants subsequently filed a motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment, which was denied. This appeal
followed.
Although the Forbearance Agreement states that it is to be governed by the
substantive laws of North Carolina, procedural matters such as summary judgment
standards are governed by the law of the forum state. Ley v. Simmons, 249 S.W.2d
808 (Ky. 1952). Under Kentucky law, on a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that
the nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a
judgment in its favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d
476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment “is only proper when the movant shows
that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances. Id. (citing
Paintsville Hosp., Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985)). The party
opposing summary judgment must present “at least some affirmative evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Steelvest, 807
S.W.2d at 482.
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion for
summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
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genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996). Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact, “an appellate court need not defer
to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B & R
Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001).
The trial court based its grant of summary judgment on the fact that
the Forbearance Agreement was valid and, therefore, that the release contained in
the Forbearance Agreement was valid.
Both North Carolina and Kentucky
law are clear that, because releases are contractual in nature, courts must apply
principles governing the interpretation of contracts when construing a release.
Weaver v. St. Joseph of the Pines, Inc., 652 S.E.2d 701, 709 (N.C. App. 2007); see
also Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Ky. 2007).
Moreover, the law of both states holds that, when faced with an
unambiguous contract, courts may not look beyond the four corners of the contract
when determining the parties’ intent. “When the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, construction of the agreement is a matter of law for the court[,]
and the court cannot look beyond the terms of the contract to determine the
intentions of the parties.” Weaver, 652 S.E.2d at 709 (quoting Piedmont Bank &
Trust Co. v. Stevenson, 339 S.E.2d 49, 52 (internal citations omitted), aff’d per
curiam, 344 S.E.2d 788 (N.C. 1986)); see also Abney, 215 S.W.3d at 703 (“When
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no ambiguity exists in the contract, we look only as far as the four corners of the
document to determine that intent”).
Further, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that “[t]he language in a
release may be broad enough to cover all demands and rights to demand, or
possible causes of action, a complete discharge of liability from one to another,
whether or not the various demands or claims have been discussed or mentioned,
and whether or not the possible claims are all known.” Merrimon v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 176 S.E. 246, 248 (N.C. 1934) (quoting Houston v. Trower,
297 F. 558, 561 (8th Cir. 1924)); see also Abney, 215 S.W.3d at 703 (“It is . . . of
no consequence . . . that the release was a standard, fill-in the blank form that was
broad in scope. It is a contract nonetheless”).
Here, there is no ambiguity in the Forbearance Agreement, nor do
Appellants point to any ambiguity in their arguments. Appellants not only
executed the Forbearance Agreement, they affirmed its provisions in the two
subsequent extensions of the agreement. Therefore, the trial court correctly looked
to the four corners of the document in enforcing its terms. Appellants clearly
released any claims that they had against VFS at the time that they executed the
Forbearance Agreement, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of VFS.
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court based its grant of summary
judgment on the release contained in the Forbearance Agreement, Appellants
allege that VFS perpetrated fraud in connection with the original Loan Documents
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as well as the Forbearance Agreement. Appellants contend that, as a consequence
of such alleged fraud, no valid contracts exist between the parties. Specifically,
Appellants maintain that they were fraudulently induced into executing the Loan
Documents and that VFS made misrepresentations regarding Appellants’
financing.
Under both Kentucky and North Carolina law, one of the essential elements
of a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation is a material false misrepresentation.
See Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 343 S.E.2d 174, 178 (N.C. 1986);
United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1999). Appellants
cannot pinpoint a single representation made by an employee of VFS, much less
one that was false or one upon which Appellants relied. Mr. Summers stated that
he only spoke to two VFS employees before executing the Loan Documents: Mike
Woody and Chris French. Mr. Summers acknowledged that he failed to recollect
anything specific that Mr. Woody told him in any conversations he had with Mr.
Woody. Similarly, Mr. Summers conceded that he had no memory of any
particulars regarding his conversations with Mr. French. Therefore, we disagree
with Appellants’ assertion that these unsubstantiated allegations of fraud barred the
trial court from granting VFS summary judgment.
Appellants further argue that the Forbearance Agreement was not a valid,
enforceable contract, because there was a lack of consideration for the
undertakings in the agreement. The doctrine of consideration is well-settled in
both Kentucky and North Carolina.
Consideration is defined as “any benefit,
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right, or interest bestowed upon the promisor, or any forbearance, detriment, or
loss undertaken by the promisee.” Brenner v. Little Red School House, Ltd., 274
S.E.2d 206, 212 (N.C. 1981); see also Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323, 171
S.W.2d 458, 464 (1943) (Consideration is “[a] benefit to the party promising, or a
loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is made”).
Further, under both states’ laws, forbearance constitutes valid consideration.
“[C]onsideration need not consist of a promise to pay money for goods or services.
Instead, it can take the shape of mutual promises to perform some act or to forbear
from taking some action.” IWTMM, Inc. v. Forest Hills Rest Home, 577 S.E.2d
175, 179 (N.C. App. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Alvey v. Union Inv., Inc.,
697 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. App. 1985) (“Clearly, the forbearance of a right to sue
is valid consideration to support a promise”).
Here, at the time of Appellants’ execution of the Forbearance Agreement
and the two subsequent extensions, Summers Equipment was in default under the
Loan Documents, and VFS was clearly entitled to proceed with action against
Appellants and the Collateral. Therefore, VFS’s promise to forbear from
proceeding against the Collateral was adequate consideration for the Forbearance
Agreement. Accordingly, Appellants’ argument that the Forbearance Agreement
contained inadequate consideration is without merit.
The order of the Floyd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Earl M. McGuire
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Michael J. Schmitt
Paintsville, Kentucky
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